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ABSTRACT 
The study aims to analyse the oil revenue, its allocational pattern 
and impact on economic development in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE 
from the commencement of commercial oil production to the end of 1970. 
Chapter I, br1efly presents the geographical features, discusses the 
economic activities and fiscal pol 1cies of the pre-oil per1od, and outlines 
the evolution of the Sheikhdom political system, p1npointing important 
factors sti II influencing the uti! isation of petroleum resources and oil 
revenue. Chapter I I, discusses the petroleum industry•s development, 
importance, potential, and non-revenue impact on the local economies. 
Chapter I I I, assesses the actual oi I revenue received, discusses factors 
, 
influencing it, and explores relevant considerations for an optimum level 
of oil revenue. Chapters IV-VI I, explore the al locational trends and 
patterns of the oil revenue in each of the Emirates, (the oil revenues 
examined represent about 88% of the total received in the period studied). 
A model, built to investigate the allocatlonal patterns provides the basis 
for deducing the contribution of the oil revenue to different items through 
assessing the public revenue, expenditure and reserve. Chapter VI I I brings 
together the findings of Chapters IV-VI I, confirming an overall allocational 
similarity. A major and increasing proportion of the revenue goes on current 
and transfer expenditure. An exploration of underlying influential and 
determining factors takes up the greatest part of the chapter. Chapter IX 
examines the desirable relationship between oil revenue and economic devel-
opment, notes the improvement produced in some aspects of the economies, 
in the social services, the standard of living and consumption. It also 
shows the limited impact of the oil revenue on structural change and 
prospects for sustained development, and discusses some problems impeding 
progress. In conclusion the need for alternative approaches is discussed 
together with considerations relevant to a development-oriented approach. 
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IrlTRODUCTIOrl 
The Arabian Gulf Emirates (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and UAE) constitute 
the region that this thesis sets out to study. These small Arabian princi-
palities, Emirates, or as they used to be called, 'Sheikhdome•, are in many 
respects different from other oi 1-producing countries, while they have many 
characteristics in common among themselves. This similarity of character 
among the Emirates can be seen clearly in a wide range of fields: First, 
there is a similarity in culture, traditions, the evolution of national 
governments and external influences; second, a similarity in economic 
activities and occupations before and during the oil era, third, a 
similarity in the socio-economic policies implemented during the last 
quarter of a century; fourth, a similarity in physical conditions and 
natural resources; fifth, a similarity in size of state, area and 
population. These similarities among the Emirates, have in turn pro-
duced common phenomena and make the task of studying these political units 
as a single region more meaningful. 
For the Emirates 1970 marks the end of an epoch. By this year the 
traditional relationships in the oil industry were starting to undergo a 
dramatic change; the Emirates• international status and relations, their 
political setting, and economic policies, were about to undergo considerable 
development. Also the energy shortage and the instability of the inter-
national monetary market appear to have added new elements and necessitated 
new approaches to petroleum resources and the oil revenue. 
At this juncture of the Emirates• contemporary history, it is worth 
carrying out comprehensive research into the most important factor in the 
Emirates• economic growth during the last third of a century, i.e. the oil 
revenue. This present piece of research aims to assess the actual oil 
revenue received, to look at the pattern of allocation followed in channel-
1 ing it back to society, to explore the factors which have been actively 
influencing and determining the pattern of allocation, and to show something 
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of the 1mpact 1t has so far had on economic development, 
The study's ma1n interest 1n analys1ng the 'oi 1 revenue of the 
Arabian Gulf Em1rates, patterns of allocation and impact on economic 
development', goes beyond the clarification of the historical facts to 
assess the eff1c1ency w1th which the 011 revenue has been util 1sed, w1th 
the aim of prov1ding better understanding for the future util isat1on of 
petroleum resources and the o1l revenue. Therefore the thesis w1 11 
attempt to point out some of the strong and weak aspects of the govern-
ments' past pol 1c1es 1n respect to the1r impact on economic development. 
Such an attempt may prove useful, particularly since it comes in 1974, 
before the new increase tn oil revenue has been committed to the traditional 
channels, or dtrected to new channels which may not be the most producttve 
possible. 
In presenting and analysing the toptc, the subject is approached 
systematically tn ten chapters. Chapter I, the prologue, is a very brief 
presentation and discusston of some of the fundamentals of the Emirates' 
landscape and society. It summarises their geographical features, econom1c 
acttvtties and fiscal pol ictes in the pre-ot 1 period, and outlines the 
evolutton of the sheikhdom pol 1t1cal system; thts is to present some of 
the Important factors which have greatly tnfluenced the utilisation of 
petroleum resources and 011 revenue. Chapter I I, descrtbes the development 
of the oil industry, particularly crude oil product1on, looks briefly at 
its future and shows some of its world wide relatlonshtps. It also deals 
w 1 th aspects of the industry 1 s impact, other than through the o 1 1 revenue, 
on the local economtes. Chapter Ill, examines the actual otl revenue 
recetved by the states, looks at factors determtning tts volume and discusses 
some considerations affecttng the achtevement of the long-term opttmum 
uti 1 i sat ion of o 1 1 resources and proceeds. Chapters IV-VI I examine the 
allocational pattern of the oil revenue tn each of the Emtrates. The 
model used in computing the data is descrtbed in Chapter IV. Each of the 
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chapters constders part1cular problems Involved 1n study1ng the Em1rates 
under discussion, assesses the state publ1c revenue, publ1c expenditure 
and public reserve, and finally calculates the net allocatton of the otl 
revenue, at the same t1me sheddtng 1 ight on the trends shown by the 
allocat tonal pattern during the per1od studied. Chapter VIII compares 
the patterns and trends noted in Chapters IV-VII. It then looks at 
factors which have encouraged allocation to part1cular channels. F1nal ly, 
it explores some of the factors whtch have determtned the broadly-based 
policies of the Emirates in re-channelltng the1r otl revenue. Chapter IX 
attempts to give reasons for relating oil revenue to economic development, 
defines my usage of 11 economtc development 11 tn this context, sheds 1 tght 
on some aspects of the Emtrates 1 economic growth, and finally dtscusses 
some problems facing the Emtrates 1 future economtc development In 
Chapter X, the conclusion, the need for an alternattve approach ts dts-
cussed and some considerattons relevant to a development-oriented strategy 
are brought forward. 
A few technical po1nts need to be ment1oned in th1s 1ntroduct1on. 
This study necessttated the cho1ce of a model to act as a basts for 
investigating the channel] ing of ot 1 revenue to dtfferent 1tems of 
allocation. Thts was not an easy task, parttcularly s1nce the author has 
been unable to f1nd any study examlntng the allocatton of such revenue 
over a pertod of ttme and trytng to 1denttfy 1ts actual channel 1 tng to a 
number of items of allocation and publ tc expendtture. Thus we but lt a 
model which could identtfy the contribution of the Emirates 1 otl revenue 
to different 1tems of expend1ture and allocation. Th1s model 1s descr1bed 
fully tn Chapter IV. The model g1ves the basts for deducing the contri-
bution of the oi I revenue to different 1tems of allocation, through 
assessing and presenttng the state publ 1c revenue by source, publ tc 
expenditure by econom1c category and funct1on as far as the available 
informatton allows, and ftnally the net allocation to the reserve fund. 
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Currencies c1rculat1ng 1n the Em1rates over the per1od stud1ed are 
varied. For most of the period the Rupee was the off1c1al currency. 
Since 1961 Kuwait has been issu1ng the Kuwaiti Dinar; by 1966 all the 
Emirates had 1ssued new currencies, Th1s problem, coupled w1th the 
problem of currency devaluations, makes it d1ff1cult to use one currency 
throughout the thesis. Therefore, when assessing each of the Emirates 1 
revenue or expenditure, one currency 1s used to cover the whole per1od 
studied; th1s currency IS the one circulating at the end of 1970 1n the 
Emirate concerned. When a compar1son of different Em1 rates IS needed, 
the currency used is the Qatar and Duba1 Riyal (QDR). This is ma1nly 
because the QDR was equal to the 1965 value of the Rupee, a currency 
familiar to almost everybody 1n the Emirates. The Rupee in 1965: 
21.000 US cents. In 1970 QDR: 21.000 US cents, KD: 13 3 QDR, BD-
10 QDR, £: 11,4 QDR, 
The problem of obtaining a ser1es of statistics suitable for 
comparative purposes almost defeated us The lack of clar1ty and the un-
reliability of some off1cial statistics, such as those concerned w1th 
o i 1 revenue, pub 1 1 c revenue, pub 11 c expenditure and pub 11 c reserves, 1 s 
considerable, Therefore, we have exam1ned all the available sources to 
construct as reliable a picture as poss1ble; th1s 1s done in particular 
for the essential data, Thus we have consulted a w1de range of first 
hand documents and sources and have tested f1nd1ngs by al 1 the Information 
available. However, in some chapters of the thesis, particularly Chapter 
I and IX, the data is laid out 1n reference form, partly because the 
difficulty of find1ng strictly comparable data for all the Em1 rates requires 
fairly deta1 led cross referencing, 
Al 1 the Emirates for a part oral 1 the per1od studied have followed 
the Hijry calendar. We have e1ther converted dates to the Western 
calendar, or explicitly mentioned the H1jry calendar. When any reference 
to H1jry calendar 1s made, th1s ind1cates that the H1jry date IS the 
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original one. 
Fairly detailed information has been obtained from the data fed to 
the computer; some of it IS presented in the attached append1ces. The 
source for each group of appendices attached to Chapters IV-VI I have 
been stated on the page preceding the group of appendices concerned. 
Finally a few terms used in the study need to be mentioned here. 
Public expenditure is used to include public expenditure in the ordinary 
sense and the allocation to the Ruling family. 011 reserve is taken to 
mean published proven 011 reserve. Economic development, economic growth, 
and economic progress are taken to have the same meaning; the different 
terms were chosen only for the sake of variety. 
CHAPTER I 
THE PROLOGUE 
This chapter, the Prologue, deals with the geographical features of 
the Emirates, the1r economic activities and fiscal polic1es 1n the pre-
oil period, and finally the evolution of the Sheikhdom political system. 
These topics, discussed in the four parts of the chapter, illuMinate some 
of the basic factors determining the way in which the oil revenue is 
allocated. 
Part One: Geographical Features 
A Area 
The Emirates consist of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and UAE*, the present 
political units of the Arabian Gulf Sheikhdoms. They occupy approximately 
124,162 sq.km., as detailed in the following table: 
TABLE 1.1 
THE EMIRATES' AREA 
State Area sg.km. 
Kuwait 17,850* 
Bahrain 698 
Qatar 22,014 
UAE 83,600 
Total 124,162 
Source: MEED, 25th December, 1970, pp. 1498, 1500 and 1510. 
including the Kuwait Share of the partitioned zone, 
The map of the Emirates (Fig. 1. 1) shows the frontiers, the main 
towns, the principal highways and the International ports and a1 rports. 
These four states together with the eastern province of Saudi Arabia 
form the eastern coastal region of the Arabian Peninsula. This coastal 
* UAE (United Arab Emirates) was formed at the end of 1971. The Union 
consists of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharqh, Ajman, Umm Al-Qawain, Ras Al-
Khaimah and Fujarah. The seven Emirates were known as Trucial States 
or the Oman Coast. In this study we will refer to these seven as UAE 
for convenience. 
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reg1on 1s described by Professor F1sher as follows: 
11The coastal region is everywhere below 200m in altitude and 
consists for the greater part of an undulating plain, diversified 
very occasionally by low hills, often ant1cl 1nal. Much of the 
surface is sand-or gravel-covered, and some drifting sand can be 
traced by its 1 ithology to the regions of origin w1th1n various 
areas of inner Arabia. From th1s interior reservoir sand IS 
carried by the frequent strong w1nds towards the east, where 1t 
may accumulate in mob1 le dunes, or as a sheet. Even hillsides 
may be thinly covered by sand blown from elsewhere. In other 
areas lie flatter zones of gravel, diversified by shallow wadi 
beds. These wadis, l1ke the pla1ns, may have local depos1tsef 
silt or alluviums; ... 
The coastline, being one of asci llation (with the current 
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phase one of gentle and Irregular subsidence), IS fa1rly shallow, 
and fringed by extensive coral reefs. Lagoons and sp1ts are also 
frequent features, with intricate creeks and salt flats; 1n some 
localities 1t is difficult to distinguish sea from land, w1th a 
high t1dal amplitude through tortuous channels and winding creeks 
further adding to the difficulty. Sebkhahs (saltmarsh), some fed 
by the sea, others by the evaporation of water that seeps to the 
surface from underground sources, are another prominent featu~e; ... 
the Sebkhahs are effective factors in 1solat1ng one stretch of 
coast from another. 11 (1) 
The Emirates together w1th the other Gulf States, share the 
continental shelfs of the Gulf which cover an area of about 155,200 
sq.km. (2) A considerable part of the shallow water segment belongs to the 
Emirates. This part provided the Em1rates with the best pearl banks in 
the past and now prov1des them with their offshore oil fields, 1n which the 
scattered islands play an important role. 
B Natural Resources 
The Emirates, apart from petroleum resources (see Chap. I I), hold 
very 1 ittle natural resources. These are mainly sea resources, non-metallic 
mineral resources and agricultural resources. 
B1 - Sea Resources 
Among the sea resources, fish IS important. The Gulf fish resources, 
though neither extensively surveyed nor efficiently conserved, nevertheless 
provide for the area 1 s entire need of fresh f1sh and produce a surplus for 
export (shrimps, dried fish). The Gulf f1sh1ng 1ndustry could extend its 
activities to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean and perhaps to the other 
open Sj;as. 
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After the fish resources, comes the potential production of salt 
and Its derived products from the sea, Such products could be utilized 
as raw material for a chem1cal industry, A recent survey 1n Qatar found 
that sea sal 1nity at Khor Al-Udied is 24,000 million T,D,S, and at the 
Gulf of Salwa 20,000 (3) The production of salt from sea water could be 
associated with the distillation of the sea water, and could benefit 
greatly from the uti] isat1on of abundant solar energy, 
Among other sea resources, the pearl banks have played an essential 
role in the economic life of the people (see Part Two of this chapter), 
The sea banks could still offer a reasonable potential for commercial 
exploitation. This exploitation could be both by fishing for natural 
pearls and their shel 1, and by uti 1 lzlng the banks for the production of 
cultured pearls, (4) 
Finally, there are two other fields of activity related to the seac 
First, the people of the Emirates, having been seafarers 1n the past, and 
lacking sufficient productive employment outlets at present, could well 
benefit from their geographical position and engage in developing the1 r 
shipping industry and in related activities, At least they are on an 
equal footing with others at these act1vit1es. Secondly, the Gulf, 
especially some parts of 1t, could develop a tourist Industry, The warm 
weather of the Em1rates 1n the winter may make 1t poss1ble to attract 
tourists to the winter seaside resorts, There are from five to seven 
months (from autumn to spring) during which the temperature is suitable 
for sea swimming and related amusements, 
82 - Non-metal l lc Resources 
Among these resources, sand, clay, limestone, Gypsum, and marble 
are the prinCipal, These materials are very essential for bu~ lding 
material industries, from brick making to the cement industry. Their 
other potential is uti 1 ization for industry as In the case of sand material, 
wh1ch can provide raw material for a Glass Industry if its sil lea content 
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is very h1gh"* However, a recent geological survey in Qatar found that 
the sll lea content in the sand ranged only from 7404% to 78%. (5) In 
view of the large Sebkhahs and sandy areas, even 1 lmestone is not 
plentiful everywhere, a factor restr1ct1ng the prospects of a Cement 
Industry. Gypsum material is also relatively scarce As for ma rb 1 e , 
only Ajman has a definite commerctal deposit; the commercial exploit-
ability of a deposit dtscovered in Qatar has yet to be Investigated, 
B3- Agriculture 
The Emirates are arid lands and except for a few oases, cultivation 
is slight. The agricultural potential is greatly restricted by lack of 
water. No major or minor r1ver exists, and precipitation is insufficient 
for any form of rainfed cultivation. At Dubal, for example, the 1950-
1965 average rainfall was recorded as 112mm per annum with Its highest 
'6) level of 29mm in January"t In the other Emirates the rainfall is not 
very different from the Dubai average. Suitable agricultural soil Is 
lacking, since Sebkhahs, sand and 1 imestone dunes cover most of the area. 
The hot weather during the long summer also has bad effects on the 
cultivated land and animal husbandry and herding, 
The present area of cultivated land in the Emirates Is very small. 
The largest area is in the south eastern part of UAE, where about 3,500 
hectares are reported under cultivation, (7) Bahrain and Abu Dhabi come 
next, followed by Qatar and Kuwait In the UAE, aflaj and springs are 
utilized for irrigation while 'in Kuwait and Qatar shallow underground 
water wells are the only means of trrtgation. However, it Is noticeable 
that a considerable waste of the scarce water sources exists:** con-
sequently, if the maximum use IS made of the ava1 lable water, and if 
research is conducted into the most suitable crops, then the agrtcultural 
potential of the Emirates will be somewhat increased. 
I have been told that it should be 99%, 
In 1970 about 25% of the total water extracted from underground 
resources in Bahrain was used for decorative purposes by 
Mun i c i pa I it i es. 
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C - Population 
C1 - Development 
Prior to the development of oil resources 1n the last decade the 
population of the Em1rates was employed in the pearl ing industry, fish1ng, 
seafaring, nomadic herding and oas•s cultivation, The population in 
this part has never been stable, its size used to depend on grazing 
opportunities and the prosper1ty of the pear11ng industry, However, there 
was some permanent settlement, mainly in the coastal towns and villages 
and the oases, Since the development of the oil industry and particularly 
since the 1950 1 s, the Em1rates 1 population has increased considerably, 
mainly owing to Immigration. There has been m!grat1on between the Emirates 
as well as immigration from other countries~ 
The Em1rates, With the exception of Kuwait and Bahrain, had no 
census before the late 1960 1 s. Table 1~2 shows the trend ln populat.on 
numbers. 
TABLE 1,2 
THE POPULATION DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMIRATES, i905-1970 
Year Kuwait Bahrain Qatar UAE Total 
1905 1 48,000 100,000 27,000 86,200 271 ,200 
1957 206,473c 115,000 2 50,ooo3 130,ooo 3 501,473 
1970 733,196c 216,815c 4 11 i , 133c5 300,ooo 6 1,361,144 
c - censuses 
-1905: Lorimer, J,G., Dalil Al-Khallj (Geographical Section) estimates; 
SAK, 1971; 
2- 1957: Bahrain, Cummins, J W., 1 Report of an lnqu1ry•, p.2, est1mate; 
3 - 1957: Personal estimates; 
4 - 19 70: SAB, 19 71 ; 
5- Qatar:T970, MEDD, 1 Economlc Survey of Qatar•, p 5; 
6 - UAE: Al-Batro~ Al-Sinah, 1971, P~ 14, estimate, 
C2 - Demographic Featu~es 
The latest censuses g•ve some Indication of the demographic features 
in the Emirates. Table 1,3 overleaf provides the follow1ng indicators: 
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TABLE 1.3 
SOME DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS, 1970 
Kuwait Bahrain Qatar UAE 
1970 1971 1970 19 71 
Populat1on 733,196 216,078 111 ' 1 84 300,000 
Density (per km2) 42 309 5 3 
Estimated annual 7.6% 3.5% 8. 1% 6. 0% increase (1965-70) 
Percentage of citizens 44,5% 82,4% 40.5% N.A. to the total population 
Male percentage 56.8% 53°8% 64.5% N,A, 
Urban population N.A 78, 1% N.A. N,A. 
Source: Tables L 1 and 1.2; SAK, 1971; Statistical Bureau, Bahrain, 
Statistics of the Poj?uTation Census 1971; MEDD, 1 Economic 
Survey of Qatar 1 , p 5; Fisher, W.B., op.ciL, p.255, 
From this table we can observe the 1mpact of the development of oil 
resources on demographic factors. People in particular were attracted by 
the employment opportunities and higher wages compared with other countries 
in the Middle East. The immlgratlon to the Emirates has taken place in 
two stages. The first consisted of normal immigration, i.e. movement 
from one Emirate to another and the movement from the Arabian Peninsula, 
Iraq and the western coast of iran (Huwalah) to or from the Emirates, 
This type of movement has been noted throughout long history of the 
Emirates. The second stage becomes noticeable during the present oil 
era, when people from the rest of the Arab world, Iran, India and 
Pak1stan, and other parts of the world have emigrated to the Emirates. 
However, this latter stage again subd~vides 1nto two phases, The first 
was during the early phase of construction, when most of the expatriates 
were unskilled male labourers (Qatar and UAE), In the second phase the 
immigrants were more settled, a considerable percentage of them white 
collar and technical workers, and most of them accompanied by their 
families (Kuwait),~ 
In Kuwait I have been told that the Government is considering the 
possibility of offering free education for non-Kuwaiti children 
so as to encourage immigrants to bring the1r famil 1es, and thus 
ease social problems and segregation. 
As for population denstty, although the Emt rates are constdered 
artd lands, they have a dens1ty comparable with other Middle East 
countries. Bahrain, for example, has the highest tn the Middle East, 
Kuwait's is almost equal to Turkey's, and Qatar has a greater density 
of populatton than Syr1a and Oman. (8) 
C3- Economically Active Population 
The dtstributton of the labour force of the Em1 rates among the 
different economtc activities ls 1 isted below: 
TABLE 1.4 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTiON OF THE POPULATiON BY ECONOMIC ACTiVITIES, 1970 
UAE 1• 
~ .. ..J_ 
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Kuwait Bahrain++ Qatar Abu Dhabi Duba1 Others 
AgrlcultL!re and 
Fishing 
Mining, Quarrying 
and Manufacturtng 
Electr1c1ty and 
Water 
Construct ton 
Wholesale and 
Retai 1 
Transport Storage 
and Communication 
Community, Socia 1 
1% 
11% 
2% 
9% 
9% 
3% 
and Persona 1 Services 29% 
Others 35% 
Total 232,336 
% of populatton 31.4% 
7% 4% 
14% 17%+ 
3% N.A. 
17% 16% 
12% 16% 
13% 7% 
30% 13% 
4% 27% 
60,301 48,369 
28% 48% 
+ inc1udtng electrictty and water production, 
,., 1968. 
++ 1971. 
~*The proportton of c1t1zens was 44% 
Source: Kuwait: 
16% 9% 42% 
N.A. N.A. 
40% 17% 17% 
6% 19% 8% 
7% 17% 10% 
15% 15% 15% 
13% 17% 6% 
29,284 24,014'23,715 
63% 36% 
Bahrain: 
SAK, 1973, pp.49-51; 
Statist teal Bureau, Statistics of Population Census 1971, 
pp.23-24; 
Qatar: 
UAE: 
Min;stry of Economy and Commerce, Al-Aard Al-fqtsady 1971, p.9; 
Hill, A.G., 'The Gulf States: Petroleum and Population Growth' 
p.269, MEDD, 'Economic Survey of Northern Trucial States' 
p.255; SBA, 1969 and 1970, p.1. 
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Table 1.4 shows the following to be the main character•sttcs of 
the economically active population of the Emirates, 
The prtmary sector 1n the ot 1 productng Emirates engaged a 
very smali proportion of the economically active population. 
2. The primary and secondary sectors In Kuwait and Qatar engaged 
between one qua(ter and one third of the populatton, whtle the 
tertiary sector claimed 77% of the total economically active 
population in Kuwa1t, 74% in Duba1, 64% tn Qatar, 59% in Bahrain, 
44% 1n Abu Dhabi, and 41% in the small Trucial States 
3 The economically acttve in some of the Emt rates formed a large 
portion of the total population, reaching as high as 63% in Abu 
Dhabi, where Immigrants are mainly male However, this high 
proportion no longer remains if citizens alone are considered 
(seeChap iX)" 
Part Two. Economic ActiVIties in the Pre-Oi 1 Period 
For some centur1es the people of the Emirates have been engaged 
tn the pearl tndustry and related crafts and services, entrepot trade 
and shlpplng, nomadic herding, and the cultivation of the few scattered 
oases. 
A - Pearl ing Industry 
The pearl industry was the leading activity upon which the whole 
economic life and even the settlement and social 1 1fe of the Emirates 
used to depend. Indeed it was the pearling indust(y which directly and 
indirectly provtded the largest part of the national 1ncome, employment 
and revenue of the shei:khdoms, Thus the fluctuation in this industry's 
earntngs affected the whole 1 tfe of the area, and durtng the decline of 
thts 1ndustry, whtch began after the First World War and reached its 
worst stage at the time of the great depresston of 1929, the people of 
the Emirates experienced very difficult economic crises. (9) 
The pearl ing industry had been one of the prlnctpal activities 
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1n the Em1rat~s for centuries Not only 1n the f1 rst century A,D but 
as far back as 2000 B.C Bahra1n or 11 D1lmun 11 was famous for her pearls" (lO) 
However, the modern history of the Gulf pearl 1ng industry dates back 
over the last few ce~turies, and reached Its peak by the late decades of 
the 19th century and the f1rst two decades of this century. Dur1ng this 
period the people of the Emirates enJoyed a prosperitY reflected 1r the 
new coastal settlements and the local architecture, which was much 
superior to that of the 1930's and 1940 1 s, Bahrain, L1ngah, Kuwait and 
later Dubal were the commercial centres for the pearling industry, 
Figure 1 2 illustrates the rise and fall of the Gulf pearl1ng 
Industry from the Eighteenth Century onward, (ll) As the f1gure indicates, 
the industry witnessed Its most prosperous days just before the First 
World War, The average per capita income of people engaged in the Gulf 
pearling industry at the beginning of this century reached an estimated 
level of £27 (see Table 1 5 and Fig, L2), 
Al 1 the Gulf st~tes were engaged in the pearling industry but the 
Emirates were the ma1n active region in this Industry, The reasons for 
this were the lack of alternative employment such as agriculture, and 
the fact that almost all the known shallow pearl banks were close to 
them, The following table shows the Emirates' position in this :ndustry, 
TABLE 1.5 
EMPLOYMENT AND NUMBER OF BOATS ENGAGED IN THE GULF PEARLING INDUSTRY, 1907 
Count r'i. Boats Ensased Persons Emelo'i.ed 
UAE {Trucial States) 1 '215 22,045 
Qatar 817 12,890 
Bahrain 917 17,633 
Kuwait 461 9,200 
Total 3,410 61 '768 
Al-Hasa Prov1nce 167 3,444 
Pers1an Coast 960 8,884 
Gulf Total 4,501 74,096 
Source: Lorimer, J,G,, oe,cit,, (Historical Section), Vol, VI, pp,3112-312Q, 
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From Table 1 5 we may see that 82 4% of the total persons employed 
and 75,5% of the total boats engaged belonged to the Emirates~ We may 
also see that the men directly employed represented more than 45.0% of 
the estimated male populat1on of the Emirates (see Table 1,2), or almost 
every able-bodied man 
The prosperous pearling indust~y of the Em1rates went lnto decline 
s1nce World War I when 1t faced the f1 rst Important cr1s1s In this 
century, This was followed by the competition of Japanese cultured pearls, 
the g~eat depression of 1929, the Second World War and lastly the better 
employment prospects d1rectly and 1nd1rectly caused by the all industry 
These factors reduced the Gulf pearl ing fleets, and consequently the 
people engaged In the industry and the economic benefits der1ved from it, 
Taking Bahrain as an example we see that the pearl 1ng fleet dec1 1ned 
from 917 boats 1n 1907 to 529 •n 1928, (12 ) 248 in 1938, (l 3) 83 In 1948, (l 4) 
and 7 1 n 1969, ( 1 5) 
A detailed account of the pearl Industry 1s out of place here, but 
two points are Important, First, the ~ole of chance in the industry was 
accepted as a result of rrad1t;onal pract1ce and rel 1gious feel 1ng, for 
no man des1 red a f;xed Income, but accepted his fate, hoping to earn what 
11 God might al low 11 , Secondly, great trust was placed 1n the pearl merchants 
and boat capt a l ns, or 1 Nukh ida 1 , who represented the crew during the course 
of accounting. (l 6) These administrators wete left to dec1de the pr1ce of 
the pearls and the cost of the voyage, and to allocate to each member of 
the crew h1s share of the receipts, 
This is ln brief the story of the pearling Industry. Although it 
has now left the scene, and the old social structure has changed, it still 
affects the soc1al attitudes of the people and the1 r understanding of the 
present (see Chap VIII). 
B Trade and Mar1tlme Transport 
The people of the Em1 rates have had a long history of seafaring and 
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trade S1nce the reg1on was a coastal one with few natural resources, 
the population was forced to look to the sea to meet their essential 
needs, 
Long before rhe time of the famous Arabian seafarer Ahmed Bin 
Majid from Julfar (Ras AI-Khalmah today), seafar1ng and sh1pp1ng 
activities were among the principal occupations of the Gulf Arabs, (l?) 
The Gulf Arabs were the prlnc1pal seafarers between the Gulf and the 
other parts of As1a and Afr1ca, and they became the most expert 1n 
s e a fa r • n g i n the s e pa r t s o f t he wo r 1 d , ( 1 8) 
In the nineteenth century, the Gulf Arabs were faced With the 
competition of cheap and regular steamer services and consequently 
their maritime act1vit,es became less Important, Nevertheless some 
shipping servrces were reta1ned between the Gulf ports and w1th other 
ports in the Red Sea, East Afr1ca and South-East As1a, and sh1pp;ng 
rema1ned the second industry in the Emirates, Bahrain, for example, 
had about one hundred ships occupied in maritime transport 1n 1905, (l 9) 
During World War I, when the regular steamer services were Interrupted, 
the shipping serv1ces provided by the Em1rates resumed thel r old scale 
Gu1de books were edited to help the seafarers In the1r voyages to Afr1can 
and Asian ports, (20) Dur1ng this period, Kuwait was the principal 
country on the Arabian s1de of the Gulf-engaged in transport by sea. By 
the end of 1920 the Kuwa1ti commercial fleet cons1sted of 150 ships with 
(21) 
a load capac1ty of 40,000 tons. This activ1ty aga1n came to a halt 
between the two world wars and resumed dur1ng the Second World War, (22 ) 
One main reason for this elastlc1ty, was that the shipping trade was 
complementary to the pearl ing industry. Again, as in the pearl ing 
industry, the seafarers practised a shar1ng system 1n the d1str1bution 
of their earnings, w1th fixed shares but not fixed 1ncomes, (2 3) 
The Gulf Arabs traded not only with neighbouring countr1es, but 
also withal 1 the ports they vis1ted in their voyages 1n East Afr1ca and 
t24) South As1a, buy.ng and sell1ng from one port to another, 
The ma1n trading centres on the Arabian s1de of the Gulf were 
Kuwait in the north, Bahra1n in the m1ddle and, from the beglnn•ng of 
th1s century, Dubai In the south, These three centres supplied the 
1nter1or parts of the Arab•an peninsula, South Iraq, the lower Gulf, 
and Oman, 
C Other ActiVIties 
C1 - Agriculture 
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Ag~lculture was one of the principal actiVIties 1n Bahrain and the 
Interior oases of the UAE, but was very m1nor in Qatar and Kuwait, The 
cultivable land in Bahra1n ln the 1930's was estimated to equal 1;zo of 
Bahrain's total area (Z 5) The main crop was dates, of which Bahrain's 
production in 1905 was 5,200 tons. (Z 6 ) In addition to date palms, 1 lmes, 
bananas, oranges, tomatoes, onions, melons and a wide range of other 
vegetables are grown 1n the Emirates. Also 1n some eastern areas of the 
southern region tobacco ls also cultivated, 
C2- Boat Bu; ld1ng 
The Em1rates were famous for bu1ld1ng all the local craft used In 
the pearling and shlpp1ng Industries Bahrain and Kuwait were the main 
centres for this industry, Bahrain's production amounting to 119 boats 
in 1926, 74 1n 1927 and 89 in 1928, (Z7) Dur1ng the 1920's th1s Industry 
succeeded in applying sea d1esel eng1nes to the local craft, and In 1930 
succeeded In bulld1ng a small "tanker" for carry1ng 01 I products from 
Abadan to Bahrain, (Z 8) 
In Kuwait the Industry was able to build yachts of European des1gn 
of 65 feet length In 1931 and 80 feet length in 1932, (29 ) 
The weaving of the sa1 Is of boats was one of about a dozen other 
local crafts, 
C3 - Herding 
Herding 1n the Emirates was mainly a complementary act1v1ty for the 
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coastal settlements, wh1 le •t was the prrncipal activrty rn the rnterror 
parL However, nomadic lrfe and the trrbes 1 movements and loyal'rres 
played a maJor part 1n local pol I tiCS Consequently the tr1bes 1n the 
Interior were subs1d1sed by local sheikhs and dtd not depend entirely 
on their nomadic herding, 
Part Three: Fiscal Policies 1n the Pre-Oi I Per1od 
A I nt reduction 
In the pre-oil era we may drst:ngutsh three phases 1n the Emr rates 1 
f 1 s c a 1 po l 1 c l e s 
The first was the phase du~1ng which the concept of Sheikhdom was 
formed on the basis of tribal all lance. During th1s phase the Emirates' 
revenue was dependant on the Shelkhs 1 private income and any other public 
revenue, either collected from taxes and lev1es or g1ven to them by tribes 
as partiCipation 1n the publ 1c burden All the public revenues were 
agreed by the leaders of each tr1bal alliance and spent on their public 
affairs, However, al 1 the tncQme was 1n the hands of Sherkh to uti! 1ze 
as he thought best within the l lmrts of hrs need for his people 1 s consent 
to his po 1 I c' es , 
The second phase started when strong Sheikhs came to power and 
tried with the help of nomadic tr1bes, to 1mpose laws enforcing taxation 
against the will of the people, (30) By this stage a she1khdom had passed 
beyond Its 1nclprent phase and become an establ rshed power system. Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi were among those that reached thts phase during the 
nineteenth century, and by 1905 the revenue of these Eml rates was derived 
from the followrng sources: 
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TABLE 1.6 
THE REVENUE OF THE SHEIKHDOMS BY SOURCE, 1905 
The Sheikh's 
Private Income Publ 1c Income Total 
Bahrain Emirate (000 Rs) 89 219 300 
Kuwait (000 dollars)'' 125 274 399 
Abu Dhabi (000 dollars) N A. 75 75 
~ Dollar Marie Theresa 1n 1905-1906: between Rs. 1.32- 1.52. 
Source: Lorimer, J.G., op.clt., (Geographical Section), Vol, I, pp.358-9; 
Vol. II, p.621, Vol. IV, pp.176J-8_ 
Public revenue included taxes, custom duties and other fees and 
dues. The stronger the ruler the greater the proportion of the revenue 
derived from public sources However, no distinction whatever was made 
between the public purse and the ruler's privy purse. Thus the revenue 
collected 1n Bahrarn 1n 1905 was spent as shown in Table 1.7. 
TABLE 1.7 
BAHRAIN SHEIKHDOM'S EXPENDITURE, 1905 
(000 Rsl 
The Ruler's private eKpenditure (including the guards' wages) 
Other private expenditure 
Rul1ng Fam1ly 
Admln!stratlon expenditure 
Grants and present to the Bedouins 
100 
30 
100 
14 
56 
300 
Source: Lor1mer, J G., op.ciL, (Geographical Section), Vol I, pp.358-9. 
From Table 1. 7 we may see that less than 5% of the Sheikhdom's 
revenue was spent on the adm1n1strat1on, wh1le almost threequarters was 
a1 located to the Ruler and h1s family, With the rest spent on what might 
be called Jaw and order 
By the 1920's and 1930's the th1 od phase of the sheikhdoms' f1scal 
polic1es had begun. More organ1zed national accounts were produced, and 
the distinction between the privy purse and the publ lc purse was drawn. 
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This phase also saw an Increasing tendency to use part of publ 1c revenue 
to f1nance the soc1al serv1ces and development schemes. The birth of 
this stage was greeted by strong opposition from the rulers, strong 
demands from the people, and was encouraged by the British Government 
representatives 1n the Gulf. 
We may now turn to study trose Em1rates that reached th1s phase 
before 1950, since when the 011 revenue had dom1nated the scene. 
B Bahrain 
The administrative and financial reform in Bahrain was important 
not only because it succeeded 1n mak1ng a clear distinction between the 
ruler's privy purse and the public purse for the f1rst time 1n the 
Emirates, but also because it indicated the British Government's intention 
to encourage such a policy 
The admin1strat1ve and financial reform In Bahrain dates from the 
early 1920's. By then the relationship between Sheikh lssa, the aged 
Ruler of Bahra1n, and the Pollt1cal Agent, was becoming very diff1cult, 
whtle at the same time the competition between Sheikh lssa's sons for the 
Rulershlp of Bahra~n was reach1ng a dangerous stage, (3l) Also, in 1922, 
a strong demand arose, particularly from the Shy1ah Sect, to end forced 
labour and establ 1sh a system of rule mo;e acceptable to a changing 
SOCiety. (3Z) 
To pave the way for administrative and financial reform and to 
establish a modern form of Government "the pol it teal agent was able to 
assist a reconc1 1 1atlon between Shetkh Hamed and Abdulla~ and an 
arrangement was arrived at whereby the latter benefited financially from 
his elder brother and received a prom1se of further financial assistance 
in the event of Sheikh Hamed succeeding to the Sheikhdom", (33) By 1924 
Sheikh Hamed, the Heir Apparent, assisted by t~e Br1t1sh Government, 
Sons of Sheikh lssa. She1kh Hamed was the recognized He1r Apparent. 
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became the a c t u a 1 r u l e r o f B a h r a i n , b u t s t 1 1 l 1 n h i s c a p a c ' t y a s t he 
deputy Ruler, while his father ''Shetkh lssa Btn All c, continued his 
attttude of passive resistance to all changes made by Sheikh Hamed for 
the better rule Of the '1sland- 11 (34) 0 f th f h b h c ne o e 1 rst c anges roug t 
by this reform was the f1xing of the payment to the ruling fam1 ly (1924-
25) This aroused the opposltton of the aged ruler, who was supported 
by the Al-Khal 1fah famtly's ~efusal to accept the allocation made to 
him, (35 ) The following table shows the payment to the Civil List ln the 
ftrst three years of the reform, 
TABLE 1 , 8 
PAYMENTS TO THE CIVIL LIST IN BAHRAIN, 1924/25-1926/27 
(000 Rs) 
. 
Year'' Public Revenue C 1 v1l List Percenta9e 
1924!25 900 375 39-7% 
1925/26 1138 396 35 0% 
1926/27 1200 461 38 0% 
~·· Htjry years 1343, 1344 and 1345, 
Source: lOR, R/1512/1/150, (Finance of Bahrain State) (letter from 
Bahra1n Government Revenue Department to P.A, Bahra,n, dated 
7/2/1932). 
The second step tn th1s <eform was the modernisation of the 
administration As the revenue of Bahrain State 1ncreased, Sheikh Hamed 
des1red to create an efficient admtntstration and lighten the burden 
carrted by the Political Agent during the first years of the reform. 
With the encouragement of the Political Resident, he sought the appoint-
ment of a 11 Britlsh Officer who would come to Bahratn as Ftnancial Adviser 
-'- ( 36) 
or 11Vaztr 11 • In 1926 M ... CD Belgrave, later Sir Charles Belgrave, 
was appointed as Financtai Adv1ser to Sheikh Hamed, and s1nce then a 
11 Vazir 11 or Wazlr, in Arabic means M1n1ster and 1n Islamic tradition 
the Ruler usually had one wazir who acted as premier This understanding 
by Shetkh Hamed of the role of the Adv1ser may explain the actual role 
played by Sir Charles Belgrave 1n the Bahrain Admin1strat1on. 
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modern type of administration has been in existence and an annual budget 
has been produced, For the first three years after the appointment of 
the adviser, the Bahrain state budget expenditure was allocated as shown 
TABLE 1 9 
BAHRAIN STATE ACTUAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, 1928/29//1930/31* 
(DOD Rs) 
Expenditure Total Percentage 
Ruling Family (including Pr1vy Purse) 
Social Services 
State Protection (Law and Order) 
Other Capital Schemes 
Administration and others 
Total 
k Corresponded to 1347-1349 Hijry 
1500 
283 
465 
411 
888 
3547 
42,3% 
8.0% 
1 3 0 1% 
11 ,6% 
Source: Calculated from Bahrain Govt , Actual Budgets: lOR, R/15/2/8/24 
(Bahrain Government Annual Repo~t, 1930/31), 
The new adviser faced two main problems, the effect of the 1929 
depression on the Bahra1n state revenue and the arranged Civil List wh1ch 
became the main Item of public eJ(pendijture, as seen ln Table L10 
Year;, 
1927/28 
1928/29 
1929/30 
l93D/31 
19 31/32 
TABLE 1,10 
PAYMENTS TO THE CiViL LIST IN BAHRAiN, 1927/28//1931/32 
(000 Rs) 
Public Revenue C I VI] Lests as % of P, Revenue 
1230 462 37 7% 
1242 504 40,5% 
1134 508 45.5% 
817 488 59,7% 
509 289 56.5% 
k HiJry years 1346-1349, 
Source: lOR, R/15/2/1/150 (Letter from Bahra1n Government Revenue Dept., 
to P.A Bahra•n, dated 7/2/1932), 
The Civil List payment consisted of payments to Sheikh lssa Bln Ali, 
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the nominal Ruler of Bahra1n In 1932, at the t1me of h1s death, the 
payment was Rs 60,000 per annum, (37) Payments were also made to Sheikh 
Hamed's brothers, other Al-Khalifa fam1 1y members, and to She.kh Hamed 
h1mself. He r-ecelved the following amounts: 
TABLE 1,11 
SHEiKH HAMED'S ALLOCATION FROM PUBLiC REVENUE AND HIS PRIVATE INCOME, 
1927/28//1930/31 (000 Rs) 
Year 'Ji\ AllocatiOn Percentage of Private ! ncome 
p, revenue approximately 
1927/28 162 13 2% 61 
1928!29 162 13.0% 60 
1929/30 160 14.0% 83 
1930/31 159 19,5% 35 
* H1jry years 1346-1348, 
Source. lOR, R/15/2/1/150 (Letter from Bahra;n Government Revenue Dept., 
to P,A, Bahraun, dated 7/2/1932), 
During thls flnanc;al cr•sls the whole question of the Civil List 
had been ra;sed in an attempt to prevent such a high proportion of the 
publIC revenue from going to a few idle people, for Bahrain, like the 
other Emirates, "has a numerous rul;ng family who have traditionally 
1 ived in idleness at the expense of the State11 (3 8) 
Consequently considerable negot1at 1ons between the parties con-
cerned had been going on, and different pressures were brought to bear 
on the Ruler when h1s father d1ed in 1932, 11 to let a large proportion 
of the allowance/ 1f poss1ble the whole, lapse to the State, 11 ( 39 ) This 
was an attempt at a long-term policy of reducing the C1vll List, At the 
same t1me the search for an Immediate solut1on was also going on, mean-
wh•le the C1V1 1 L'st in the first six months of 1351xaccounted for 62% 
(40) 
of the total revenue_ The solut•on to the problem appeared to have 
been found in the idea that the 11 Civl I List should depend on the revenue" 
Shaikh lssa allowance, 
x Hijry, 
as suggested by the Pollt1cal Res1dent 1n h1s letter to the Pol1t1cal 
Agent 1n Bahrain, to be communicated to the Ruler, where he sa1d: 
it would be an excel lent thing 1f some standard for 
the Cu11 List could be f1xed .n relation to the 
prosperity, or otherwise, of the stateo In discuss1ng 
th1s point you suggest that a sl !ding scale for the 
Civil L1st, w1th a maximum and perhaps minimum 1 imit, 
might be flxed, ln preparat1on to the gross revenue of 
the stateo(41) 
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This suggestion seems to have been accepted and the adv1ser wrote to the 
Political Agent, Bahratn. 
From the beg1nning of next year the Civl 1 List should 
depend on the revenue of the prev1ous year, and should 
not be a fixed amount Independent of revenueo A maximum 
should be settled. Or as has been suggested, there should 
be a fixed amount with something in the nature of a bonus 
depending on the inc~ease of revenue (42) 
Th1s long d.scuss1on about what might be cal led the central question 
in the internal pol 1tlcs of the Emirates, ended here with the Poi 1t1cal 
Resident's policy as he wr~te to the Pol lttcal Agent, 11we should con-
centrate on the al 1 1mporcant question of trying to get the Ruler and 
the Al-Khalifa to accept a reasonable sliding scale •n the Ctvi 1 List,' 1 ( 43 ) 
However, the C1vil L1st allocatton was never w, 11 tngly accepted by 
the Ruler and the Rul lng fam11y. This made the adviser fear an attack on 
the state fund when he went on leave, As he wrote at the end of 1933, 
while proceedong to go on leave 
The poss1b1 lit•es Which I am afra1d of are, an attack on 
the reserve and attempts to increase the C1v1l Ltst by 
reduc;ng other expenses such as education, muntcipalittes, 
pol oce, etc (44) 
The Impact of the above mentioned attempts to solve the heavy 
burden on the state revenue caused by the C1vl 1 L1st, resulted 1n the 
pol icy which has been adopted since 1935, 11 ln 1935 when the Bahrain 
Government received the f,rst oil royalties, a system of f,nancial 
administration was settled upon as follows The o1l royalty would be 
d1v1ded 1nto thirds, one th1rd going to the pr1~y purse of the Ruler, 
one th1 rd to non-recurrent capital expenditure and the remaining third 
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to be invested ,,( 45 ) The Civ1l L1st exclud1ng the Ruler's allocat1on 
should be met from other revenue on a f1xed bas1s, which resulted 1n a 
conSiderable proportiOnal red~ctiOn. Thus In 1947148 the c.vil List 
payment was Rs 632,000 or abour 6% of the year's total revenue. (46 ) The 
correspond•ng frgure ,n 1929130 was Rs 342,000 or 26 5% (see Table 1 10 
and 1.11). As for the total payment to the Rul •ng fam•ly, the proportion 
decreased from 43% in 1928/29 to on1y 20 7% ln 1947/48. (4]) On the other 
hand the reform made a great impact by cal I •ng into ex1stance organised 
f;scal accounts and a modern administration interested •n soc1al services 
and development schemes (see Table L9 and 1367 H•J•y budget) 
This 1n brief was the result of the Admlntstrat1ve and Financ1al 
Reform in Bah~aln before the 1950's 01 I agreements ~esulted In 1ncreas1ng 
o1l revenue so that 1t became the main source of the publ 1c revenue; the 
Ruler's Income also rose aga1n cons~derably 1n relation to public revenue. 
This 1S perhaps one of the weakest points In lhe 1930's flnanc1al reform, 
for the R•.J!er 's lncome was geared dl""ectly to the o1l Income and not 
fixed to the public ~evenue, With a max1mum 1 1mit, as had been suggested" 
However, the effect of th1s may be examined later in the study (see Chap. 
i V) • 
C Kuwait 
The ma1n fofces 1nduc1ng adm•nlstratlve and f1nanc~al reform in 
Kuwait we-e somewhat d·ffeTent from those 1n Bahrain The popular demand 
1n Kuwait was more clear than in Bahra1n, whl le the British played an 
' ( 48) as~1strng role, The roots of the Kuwait adm1nlstrat1ve and financial 
reform of 1938 date back to 1921 when Sheikh Ahmed Al-Jaber succeeded 
She1kh Salim as Rule~ At that t•me the establishment of an elected 
c.ouncl! or ( 1 MaJlls ashu;a'), was one of the ma1n 1deas (49 ) However, it 
was not pressed enough to appea• clearly ln the agreement between the 
people of Kuwa1t and Sheikh Ahmed. (50) 
The problems of allocation to the Civil L1st were a permanent 
featu(e of Kuwa1t1 fiscal pol 1cy Thus 1t was not strange for She1kh 
Ahmed Al-Jaber to be faced with the problem of seal 1ng the Civil List 
payment a month or so afce< h:s success,on in 1921, (5l) However, the 
Ruler seemed to be sk' I led ar the game, and was able to Increase his 
allocat~on from almost the same as the other sen1or members of the 
faml ly in 1921, (52 ) to more than three quarters of the total pub! lc 
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revenue in addition to the income from the Al-Sabah family property 1n 
1938 (Table 1 12) 
Th1s development, together w1th the Impact of Bahrain's f1nanclal 
and adm~n,strat:ve reform and the growing awa<eness of the people, gave 
the main impetus to the demand of the Kuwaltl popular movement (1938} 
for better ut1l isatlon of the publ ,c revenue, (53 ) 
In 1937 the publ1c revenue of the Kuwait Em1 rate was allocated as 
fo 11 ows: 
TABLE 1 12 
THE ALLOCATION OF KUWAiT STATE PUBLIC REVENUE, 1937 
Allocation 
The Ruler's Privy Purse 
Household (the Ruler) 
SABAH Family 
Administration (Sec~etar1es, 
Bodyguards, etc 
To Munlc1pallty for Education 
Total Publ 1c Re~enue 
Rs 
589,560 
11 '000 
67,500 
74,940 
2,000 
746,000 
Percentage 
1 0' 1% 
Source. Calculated from an estimation made by the Pol 1tlcal Agent, Kuwait, 
lOR, R/15/1/45/1, pp,81-82, 
The Ruler's addlt1onal p;1 vate income from properties, etc , was 
estimated at Rs 82,400 (lOR, R/15/1/45/1), In effect the ruler regarded 
the income f~om the Al-Sabah propert•es as personal to himself and made 
an allocation to the Al-Sabah family of Rs 67,500 from the public revenue, 
It should be noted, however, that this accounting dlstrnction was a 
theoretical analysis made by the Political Agent, The Ruler was only 
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engaged with disbursements In trad•tional terms from to~al ava1 lable 
The aforementioned way of allocation roused the people's 
opposition to the ruler and put the Al-Sabah family 1n opposit1on to 
him also. The Al-Sabah agreed to 1 •mit their 1ncome to the 'family 
private income 1 and were consequently lncl 1ned to support the notables 
1n 1mpos1ng their elected 'administrative counc1l r upon the Ruler. 
The administrative council, after 1t was elected by the notables,~ 
establ lshed its right to enact the budget law by 1ts declaration of 9th 
July, 1938.~~ The dec!aratijon sa1d: 
Article 2. The administrative counc1 1 has to establ 1sh the 
following laws: 
The Law of Budget, VIZo the proper control of all state's 
income and expenditure and its divers1on 1n a just manner, 
wlth the exception of the personal properties of the Al-Sabah, 
w1th wh1ch the counci 1 has no rlght to Interfere (54) 
Th;s declaration assumed control of all the State public revenue 
leaving the 1ncome from the Al-Sabah private propert:es to meet the 
family allowances (55) This decijs1on reflects the most sound practice 
of puttjng a dtstlnct l lne between the private purse and the publIC 
purse, The decla1atlon ~hocked the Sheikh as the Pol 1t1cal Agent wrote: 
The pres1dent had taken the declaration to His Highness early 
on the morning of the 9th, but as Sheikh Abdulla as-Sal im, 
the President, expla1ned to the councl 1 on his return to them, 
His Highness, had broken down so completely in the face of this 
document, wh~ch had taken away from h1m the control of the 
State's ;ncome, that he deferred signature for a few hours. (56) 
However, the Rule~ of Kuwait accepted the new situation for a while, 
after a threat of abd1catlon( 57 l - wh1ch he seems to have forgotten about 
later- and as the Pol 1t1ca'i Agent wrote to the Pol,tlcal Resident: 
The Cou~c1 1 idea started as Advisory Counc•l and ended as Adminis-
trative Counc1 I assuming leg1slat1ve power Sheikh Abdulla al-Sallm 
was the President of this counc1 l 
Article of the declarat•on read· 11The people are the source of 
power, as represented by the Council of their elected representat1ves 1'. 
11
, the She1kh told me that In accordance w1th the counci1 1s 
inaugural law he had promised that he would at the end of 
the year, when it 1s due, transfer the Kuwait Oil Company 1S 
cheque, about £7,700 to the counci 1 and all the ma1n resources 
of the country will now go 1nto the counc1 1 1s handr so that 
he can 1t be considered to be screwing any longer 11 58) 
W1th this popular pol 1cy, the Counci 1 seems to have gone far 
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beyond the lim1t that any Sheikhdom would be prepared to accept 
wil l1ngly if the She1kh had any cho1ce. However, the reg1me 1s apparent 
acceptance was only temporary The<"efore, the Kuwa1t f1nancial reform 
rested at what we have called 1the third evolutionary phase of the 
Sheikhdom fiscal system 1, 1 ,e organ1sed national accounts With f1xed 
allowances to the rul 1ng fam1 1 les from the public revenue This was the 
pOSition in Kuwait shown in rhe revenue department 1s accounts for 1946 
(in which only 12.3% of the income from 011 companies) as follows 
TABLE 1,13 
ALLOCATION OF PUBLiC REVENUE DEPARTMENT IN KUWA1T, 
(6/1211945 - 29/11/1946),'' 
(000 Rs) 
Allocation Amount Percentage 
Ru! 1 ng Fam1l y -·;.'(. 616 30,3% 
Soc1al Se'"vlces 280 13,8% 
Law and Order 529 26 '0% 
Public Work 69 3.4% 
Adm1n1strat10n and others 537 26 4% 
Total 2 '031 
~ Corresponded to 1365 Hijry. 
~k including extraordinary grant of Rs 289,031 to Sheikh Abdulla al-
Mubarak. 
Source. Calculated from Finance Depa'"tment Budget: lOR, R/15/5/222, 
(Account of the Kuwa1t Mun1c:pallty, Health, Food Supply and 
Revenue Department), pp,3-4 
However, this account dealt only With the Revenue Department (Mal 1yh). 
The other departments whose accounts were not 1ncluded were:( 59 ) 
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1) Educat 1 on ll ncome 1% of the va 1 ue of a 1 I goods imported 
Into Kuwatt, 30% of the profit of the Landing and Trans-
portat•on Company and an extraordinary grant of Rs 261,600 
from the Revenue Department) 
i •) Publ 1c Health. (income I ikewise 1 % on the value of all goods 
umported and 30% of the prof1ts of the Land1ng and Transport 
Compan )"), 
1i;J Municipality: (~ncome t% of the value of imports and a house 
tax) 0 
From these facts we may re-establ 1sh the allocation of the Kuwait 
Public Revenue as shown ;n fable 1,14 
TABLE 1 14 
THE ALLOCATiON OF KUWAIT PUBLiC REVENUE, 1945/46" 
(000 Rs) 
Allocation Amount Percentage 
Rul lng Family (Including the p~1vy purse) 
Social Services~-
Law and Order 
Mun lc I pa 1 ; tl '~ 
Adm,nlstratlon and others 
616 
945 
525 
166 
606 
Total 2 '858·~)nh 
" ~ 366 H 1 J ry 
-•-•, 1ncl1.Jde 2% of all goods 1mported to Kuwait, 
•'- ·- Include 0 5% of all goods imported to Kuwa1 t 
21 7% 
33,0% 
18,3% 
5 8% 
210 2% 
~T-~ tncludes ln add,tlon to Customs Revenue 2,5% on al 1 goods Imported 
In Table 1,14 we see the allocat1onal pattern in Kuwait in the last 
yea1 before the State rece:ved o1l royalt1es, which began 1n 1947 Having 
1n m1nd rhe background of the Kuwautl popular movement, the Kuwait 
Sheikhdom's success1on system and the f.nancia 1 reform 1n Bahra1n, we can 
recogn~se the forces that 1ed to such anal ~ocat•on of the public revenue 
D -Other Emlrates 
The other Emirates !n the Gulf had not arr1ved at this third phase 
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of frscal pol1cy before 011 production started, some attempts at frnanc1al 
(60) 
re-organrsatron had been made but were Without success, The reasons 
for th1s frozen state of affa1 ~s were the lack of education and world-wide 
contact among the people, the entrenched strength of the ex1strng 
Governments and the small revenue of the southern Em1 rates 1n the pre-oi 1 
period. 
To recaprtulate, the three phases 1n the development of the 'fiscal 
system of Sheikhdom' may be characterrsed as follows: 
The First, was the phase when the ma1n revenue of a Sheikhdom came 
from the Emir's pr1vate resources and any other revenue agreed by the 
allred trrbes, and all the revenue was spent to serve the welfare and the 
secur1ty of the allres, 
The Second, phase normally began when a strong Sheikh or family 
dominated the situatlun, helped by nomad1c tribes or strong bodyguards 
or both, and came to consrder the territory of the tribes who they 
dominated as formrng a country and the country almost as a pr1vate 
estate, In this phase the Sherkhdom revenue Included the Sheikh's 
private revenue and other public revenue whlch was obtained ma1nly from 
customs dues and other taxation AIl the revenue was allocated according 
to the Ruler's own WI 11 and mainly allocated to himself, his family, and 
to ma1nta1nlng the securrty of h1s rule, as rn the case of grants to 
nomad1c t(ibes Dur1ng th1s phase no allocation to the social serv1ces 
was made and very 1 ittle, if any, for administration, wh1ch was almost 
conf1ned to the customs house Th1s phase was the dom1nant one until 
the 1920's and 1930's, when some Em1rates (Bahrain and Kuwait) moved to 
the third phase, wh:le others continued as they were until oil royalties 
were recerved a~ even for some years afterwards, 
The Th1rd Phase. Thrs phase 1s characterrsed by the production of 
organised national accounts w1th fixed payments to the Rul 1ng famil 1es, 
wh1ch were proportionally much lower than in the prev1ous phase (although 
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absolutely lar'ger as o1l revenues Increased), and by an organ1sed ad-
ministration With an interest in soc1al services and stable law and 
order, This phase was a by-product of the popula~ demand for modern 
government, the 1ncreas1ng publ 1c revenue and the pressure of the 
Br1t1sh Government for modern adm1n1stration 
These are the three phases of the development of the 1 F1scal 
System of Sheikhdom' In the pre-oil period_ .. , However, as may be noted, 
the difference between the second and thl rd phases is only 1n the 
financial polic1es and not 1n the political system, for in both phases 
the She1kh IS the source of power, but 1n the latter he seems to have 
followed Br:t:sh adv1ce and has granted concessions which may lessen any 
effectiVe opposition to his ruleo 
Part Four: The She•khdom System and its Evolution 
This part of the study WI 11 be concerned with the political 
evolut1on of the 'Sheikhdom System' and Its impact on the use of the 
pub], c revenue 
The 'She1khdom System' •n the East Arab1an peninsula evolved •n 
three pol lt:cal stages These three stages are the tribal confederation, 
the autocratHC and the const1tutuonal stage 
A The Stage of Tribal Confederatlon(6l) 
The rulersh;p of almost all the Em•rates (except Bahra1n) began 
from this stage By the 17th and 18th century the se~far1ng occupations 
were prosperous on the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula. This pros-
per1ty had attracted most of the local 1nhab1tants to sea occupations and 
encouraged new movement of nomad1c tribes from the 1nterior Sea far 1 ng 
actiVIties necessitated a way of 1 lfe more stable and secure than the 
nomad1c, Thus, the demand for peaceful and organised 1 lfe grew among the 
The fourth phase started 1n Kuwait w1th the production of the con-
stitution, where the state publ 1c revenue and expenditure IS under 
the control of the National Assembly and the Ruler's allocation is 
f1xed at a certain sum dec1ded by the Nat1onal Assembly. This practice 
was followed in Bahrain from 1974 
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coastal inhabitants. They also des1red power to res•st external pressures 
and some authority to represent their Interests and deal with communitY 
affa1 rs The oas1s settlers also needed a more stable and organised 1 1fe" 
The result was the creat,on of many tr1bal alI lances and consequently a 
plural 1ty of local powers Th1s •n •tself constitUted nothtng new. Its 
Importance lay 1n the way 1t developed under the Influence of the economic 
need for stab, 1 1ty and the 1ncreasing Interests of the organised powers -
European, Turks, Wahab1s - 1n the area~ 
The confederation of tribes or families became the corner stone of 
the She1khdom System in the Em1 rates The Qawasim's were the oldest 
confederation, followed by the Ban1 Vas 1n the 18th century, (62 ) and the 
selection of the Sabah Bin Jaber as head by the settled tribes 1n Kuwait 
1n 1756, (63 ) and later the Bni Autbah and other tribes in Zubarh and 
Bahrain, and lastly the Al-Thanl fam1 ly in Qatar, who were supported by 
other tr1bes according to tr1bal relations or allegianceo 
Once the head of a family was selected or recognised as the Chief, 
hls fam1 ly would clalm the rtght to sovereignty over the Shetkhdom, which 
sometimes resulted 1n the em1gratlon of tr1bes and the establ 1sh1ng of 
new Sheikhdom~, as in the case of the migrations of the Bnt Autbah from 
Kuwait to Zubarah and the Al-Bu F!asih from Abu Dhab1 to Dubat, In this 
stage, the tribes had a say In the appointment of the rulers. Those who 
objected to the appoonted ruler or his way of rule had the choice of 
movtng and changing the1r loyalty, or, 1f they were strong enough, of 
changing the1r loyalty without moving, This explains the importance of 
tribal loyalty 1n the Sheikhdoms, and the distinction 1n mode of govern-
ment and other matters between the settled inhabitants and the nomadic 
tribes or settlers of nomadtc or1g1n Early 1n th1s phase the Sheikh's 
rule depended ent1 rely on his personal mer• ts and qualifications 1n war 
and peace, and the loyalty of the people who selected h1m or the tribal 
confederation to which his famijly belongedo A ruler was a tribal Sheikh 
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who would consult his people in publ1c affaP"!>, 11A tnbal Shaikh 1s 
regarded as f~rst among equals and tribal affairs are ordinarily dis-
cussed and sett 1 ed ar gathering of tribesmen in his tent ,,( 64 ) Thus one 
may say that the f1rst stage ended when tne tribesmen lost the:r influence 
with the Rulero 
However, although th1s stage has bee11 left beh'nd by all che Emi'"ates, 
some aspects st1l! su~'vlve'' as 1n the case of the Ad\tJsory Council 1n Abu 
Dhabi' and In the behaviOUr of ~ertaln tribes, eog the emigration of some 
of the Ban1 Vas to Qatar 1n the 1950~s, (&S) or even more recently the 
m1grat1on of the Al-Mahalld,h tribe from Qatar to Kuwa1t ln 1964, (66 ) 
B The Autocratlc Stage 
The autocrarlc stage commenced when the contederated tribes or the 
inhabitants lost their influence and the She1kh ruled, sometimes with the 
support of h1s tr ,be o~ fam•ly and somet1mes even aga1nst the1r w1l 1, but 
w1th the support of outside parties such as Bedou~n tr1bes or private 
bodyguards, 
The following are the main factors encouraging development to the 
autocratic stage (6?) 
1, The priVIleged and self-perpetuating position gained by the 
fam1ly of the Sheikh 1n an Em1 rate, especially when the faml iy 
had helped to found this position either by supporting his 
e1ectlon as first Sheikh or by heading an 1nvas•on by allied 
tr1bes (the case in Bahrain) 
2 0 The poss i b i 1 1 ty of a She 1 kh 1 s securl ng success 1 on through 
threats rather than W1ll1ng acceptance, and the tendency 1n 
islam~c trad•tlon to eschew the delegation of power, 
Some of its features still extst even today, for Instance, the gathering 
of every Jnterested person In the Shelkh 1 s 'Majlas•, where he can speak 
w1th the Shelkh and b~,ng h1s complal~t or suggestion directly to him, 
However, these gatherings are now no more than a traditional custom, and 
the people 1n fact could not say anything which m1ght anger the powerful 
Sheikhs. 
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3, The 1ncrease 1n public revenue, the result of grow1ng p,·os-
perity and settled power, whtch enabled the Sheikh to control 
the settled inhabttants by purchastng the support of Bedou1n 
~r:bes, mostly f~om outside the Em1 ·ate, or by building up a 
L 
bodyguard from fam1 ly members, slaves and foreigners," 
4. The converston of the tr1bes from a nomad1c and mi I 1tary to a 
commercial and seafar1ng mode of 1 ife made the establ lshment 
of autocratic power eas1er. 
5. The Br1t1sh treaties w1th the Sheikhdoms strengthened the 
rulers by remov1ng the threat of external Invasion and later 
by hold1ng the prom1se of help 1n quell lng internal dlstur-
bances. Although they encouraged administratiVe and f1nanc1al 
reform, the Brit•sh d1d not interfere with the autocratic 
pol ttlcal structure of the Sheikhdoms, Indeed they strengthened 
1t when popular demand went beyond a certain point, as 1n the 
case of Kuwait and Duba1 1n 1938, and Bahrain in 1954 and 1965. 
The Emirates have sought a more popular type of rule since the 
1960's, when the Br1t1sh obligation to the Sheikhdoms ended, or 
was scheduled to end. 
6 The formation of organtsed pol 1ce forces in the Sheikhdoms was 
the last step in breaking most of the links connecting the Sheik-
dam system to Its first stage of evolution. W1th organ1sed 
pol;ce forces- which were staffed 1n most cases from un-
Indigenous persons - the Sheikhs and the ruling famil 1es no 
longer depended on the1 r own tribes to defend their rule. 
Espec1al ly since the receipt of the oil royalties and increased 
The key factor here IS the growth of maritime merchant trade. The 
channeling of wealth through coastal trading towns made effective 
taxation a poss1bi l 1ty. The customs house became the source of public 
revenue of a new kind which gave power and wealth to the Ruler. 
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contact With the outside world, a concept of 'the people' has begun to 
develop and new social and political forces have been pushing the 
Sheikhdoms towards rhe;r th:rd or 'constltut1onal 1 stage of development 
However, no pol•tlca! system could last for a long time 1f it was 
totally unaccepted by the ;nhabitants, and the She1khdom System was no 
except I on That the She1khdom System l~sted for so long in 1ts auto-
cratlc stage may be attributed to the following factors: 
a) The She•khdom System accorded With old-established tribal 
relations and the traditional desire of the populace for JUSt 
rather than democratiC government. 
b) The She1khdom System always d1stlngu1shed between persons of 
rr•bal or1gin and other Inhabitants. While the Ruler and the 
Rul lng fam1lies were autocratic and tyrannical towards the 
latter, they were careful not to offend the tribes and 
strengthened relations with them by favouring them 1n employ-
ment and the conferring of other benefits (grants) and by 
Inter-marriage 
c) The pol It leal unawareness of the populace and the1r ignorance 
concern•ng state revenue, Our study of the publ1c f1nances 
wll 1 g1ve us a clear idea of the 1 1mited amount of Information 
published concerning state revenue and expenditure, T~is, 
together with the relative prosperity enjoyed by the Emirates 
during the last two decades has made the populace less inter-
ested in pol 1t1cs 
d) The 011 revenue helped to concent~ate power in the hands of the 
Rulers. This concentration preserved the 'status guo' in two 
ways. F1rst, the Government became the main channel through 
wh1ch the 01 l revenue was pumped to the country. Consequently, 
everyone, whether employee, contractor, merchant, or tr1bal 
Sheikh had to keep on good terms w1th the reg1me if he wanted 
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d)/ to enJOY an easy .ncome or perhaps accumulate wealth. 
Secondly~ the Rulers w1th the help of the oll revenue spent 
lav1shly on propaganda machinery and a large pol 1ce force and 
Secret Serv1ce. By these means the Rulers decreased effective 
opposition to a m1n1mum. 
These four factors, •1'1 rny opir>•on~ account for the people 0 s fa:rly 
wl 11 1ng acceptance of the Sheikhdom System 1n ~ts autocratic stage. 
From the above we may see the ma1n factors supporting the evolutton 
of the Sheikhdom System to the autocratic rule (where a rulers word is a 
law) that prevailed in almost al 1 the Emirates(6B) by the beg1nn1ng of 
this century and 1n all the Emlrates(69) by the 1950gs. The people 
offered some sort of resistance; although 1t was not organised completely 
on a pol I tical basis. it was to some extent reflected in a general 
tendency to demand some restriction on the powers of the ruler and more 
publ lc partiCipation in government. Movements mak1ng this kind of demand 
occurred in Kuwa1t 1n 1921, (?O) in Kuwait and Dubai(?l) 1n 1938 and in 
Kuwait~ Bahrain and Qatar~ and to a lesser extent the other Emlratesp 
during the 1950~s and 1960"s. 
However, with the 1ncreas1ng state revenue, particularly after 
1950, the Sheikhdom System departed speed1ly from Its fundamental basis, 
tribal all1ance, and became a more autocratic rule than 1s generally 
acceptable at the present time. W1th the rapid spread of education and 
world w1de contact and transfer of ideas, the people began to favour 
modern forms of government w1th more publ 1c participation, which might 
reduce inequal 1ty, utilise the oi 1 revenue more productively and modify 
the old pol I tical structure This 1ncreas1ng demand for more popular 
rule, although it is for democratic types of government, has nevertheless 
allowed the pract1ces and forces of the past to play an essential role. 
Th1s development has gulded the Sheikhdom System to the th1 rd stage of 
its political evolution. 
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C Constitutional She•khdom 
Constitutional Sheikhdom constitutes the th1 rd stage in the pol 1tical 
evolution of the Sheikhdom System As we have seen, before 1960 no written 
modern constitution existed ;n any of the Em1 rates (apart from the Kuwaiti 
Elected Adm1nistratlve Council 1 s Declaration of 1938, which the Sheikh of 
Kuwa•t had s!gned) The Kuwait const•tut.on of 1962 was the first modern 
constitution In the Emirates, Th1s constitution was approved by the Am1 r, 
Without alteration on 11th November, 1962 after 1t has been approved by 
an elected assembly of 50 members. The 4th article of the constitution 
sa1d: 
Kuwait is a hereditary Amirate, the succession of which is 
confined to the descendants of the late Mubarak Al-Sabah. 
The Heir Apparent shall be named within one year of the 
accession of the Am.r. H1s appointment shall be effected 
by an Amiri decree upon the nomination of the Amir and the 
approval of the National Assembly which shal 1 be passed by 
a major1ty of Its members in a spectal sltt1ng. If the 
appointment IS not made in the way shown above, the Amir 
shall nominate for the position of Heir Apparent at least 
three descendants of the late Mubarak Al-Sabah and the 
National Assembly shall pledge al leglance to one of them 
as Helr Apparent. 
and Article 6 said: 
The system of government 1n Kuwait shal I be democratic, under 
wh1ch sovereignty is vested 1n the nation, the source of all 
powers The sovereignty shall be exercised •n accordance 
with rules prescribed 1n this constitution (72) 
From this statement 1 the nation is the source of all power- we 
may see the relation between the 1962 const•tutlon and the 1938 Adminis-
trative Councl 1 Declaration. 
Up to 1970, although some Emirates had tried to work a sort of 
constitution, none of them had arrived at the stage of cons1der1ng the 
people and not the Amlr or his family to be the source of power, 
However, since 1972 Bahrain has started the process of demo-
crat1sing 1ts system of Government and at the end of 1973 the Em1 r issued 
a const•tUtlon whtch was approved by a Constituent Assembly, half of whose 
members were elected. The constitution was s1milar to that of Kuwait. 
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The production of the Kuwalt and Bahrain Constltutrons has considerably 
changed the structure of the She:khdom System. Both constitutions 
declared that the people (the nation) is the source of power, This 
declaration followed by an elected National Assembly allowed for w;der 
publlc participation, However, th~s change allowed a considerable role 
to be played by the ruler and the ruling families, 
looking for the effects of the constitutions of Kuwait and Bahrain 
on fiscal policy, we see the following: 
1. The constitutions gave to the Nat.onal Assemb1 1es the rtght 
to fix an annual allocation, to be decided at the beginning 
of his term of office, to the Emir, In Bahrain as far as the 
present Emir is concerned, the allocation was left to be 
decided by an Emir! decree- thus the members of the rul 1ng 
families WIll no longer rece•ve any d1 rect allocation from 
the state public revenue nor will the Ruler 1 s allocation be 
a proportion of public revenue or oll revenue 
2, The Government Budgets show all the state public revenue, not 
merely part of these revenues, !he budgets moreover are now 
approved by the Assembly and are publ 1shed. 
3" lhe constitutions Instituted the right of a Central Accounting 
Agen~y (Dlywan Al-Muhasabah) to look after all the state revenue 
and expenditure and report directly to the assembly, 
In this chapter we have descrrbed briefly the Emirates' geographical 
features, we have summarily surveyed the econom1c and fiscal systems of 
the pre-oll period, and finally we have out! ined the evolution of the 
pol 1tical system of Sheikhdom to 1ts present stage, Th1s background 
Information w~ll later be ut1 1 1sed to expla~n the factors determining the 
allocat•on of o;] revenue In the Em:rates 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ()I L I t!DUSTRY 
This chapter w1l l discuss the follow1ng aspects of the ol l 
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1ndustry 1n the Em1 rates. F1 rst, a h1stor 1cal survey w1ll be given, 
Second, an atte~pt WI 11 be made to assess the crude 01l production of 
eve~y company operating in each Em1 rate This assessment w1 11 be 
ut1 1 1sed to check the 011 revenue rece1ved by each Emirate, The 
deta1led findings will not be presented 1n the text, but are contained 
in the appendices attached to the chapter, Th1rd, the Emirates' 
position ln the international o1l 1ndustry will be shown together With 
the relative differences between them, Fourth, the 1mpact on the local 
econom1es of the development of the o1l resources w1ll be d1scussed, 
Th1s discussion will exclude cons1derat1on of the 1ndustry;s paymenrs to 
the government, which will be reserved for later chapters. 
The chapter falls into three parts: a Hlstor~ca1 Survey; Crude Oil; 
and the Impact of Develop1ng the 011 Resources on the Local Econom1cs, 
Part One: A H1stor1cal Survey 
A Historical Background 
The modern petroleum Industry 1n the Em1rates dates back to the 
beginn1ng of th1s century when the APOC discovered o1l in Pers1a From 
that time the Political Agents of Great Br1ta1n in the area began to 
concern themselves w1th 1nvestigat1ng and enqu1 r1ng about 01 l seepages 
and other signs lnd1cating oi 1-bearlng structures These investigations 
led them to the Naptha spring near Halul Island; (l) the asphalt deposit 
at Bahrain, (2) the seepage at Burqan;( 3) and other m1nor seepages. The 
result of the pioneer geological surveys was not very encourag1ng for 
further geological 1nvest1gation. APOC, the on1y 01l company which was 
then operating 1n the Gulf, was not optimiStiC about find1ng commerc1al 
011 f1elds south of Basrah. This belief was based on the assumption 
that th1s area was 1n the reg1on "where sed1mentary rocks were thinly 
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developed and that fold1ng, even if present, would be very gentle.'' (4) 
Major Frank Holmes who had Interests 1n mining and contact with 
the Middle East dur1ng World War I, heard at that time of o:l seepages 
1n Arabia and other M1ddle East countries. (5) After the war Holmes and 
others -eg,stered the Eastern and General Synd,cate L,mited 1n London on 
6th August, 1920 (G) 
W1th the arr1val of MaJor Holmes at Oq1 r late 1n 1922 to seek an 
o1l opt1on for a concession to explore for oi 1 in the AI-Hasa prov1nce, (l) 
the second stage of the history of the petroleum industry on the Arab1an 
s1de of the Gulf began, Dur1ng this stage APOC faced an unexpected 
competitor and this made it rethink 1ts attitude towards securing 011 
concessions on the Arabian side of the Gulf. APOC st1 ll thought the 
possibility of flnd,ng 011 1n commercial quant1tles :n that area was low, 
but tried to secure 011 concess1ons on the Arab1an s1de to avoid any 
trouble that mtght arise from a newcomer in the area. (B) Major Holmes, 
benef,ttng from hts compet1tor's low op1nion of the commercial potential 
and h1s own beltef 1n his ability to understand the local circumstances, 
made h1s f1 rst moves and secuFed three opt•ons for 011 concessions 1n 
Al-Hasa prov1nce, the Neutral Zone and Bahrain, With an eye to a Kuwa,tl 
option for an O• l concession. 
The syndicate, lack1ng oil exploratfon and explo1tatlon exper1ence, 
tr1ed to sell the three options co Br,tlsh oil companies but falled,(9) 
hampered by Dr Arnold He1m's negative report about the oi 1 potentialities 
( 1 0) 
of the Al-Hasa province In the U.S A. some interest was shown, but 
the r1sk was cons;derable, ma1nly because the geology of the area was of 
( 11) doubtful promise However, later the GULF corporat1on accepted options 
on the syndicate r1ghts and s•gned separate agreements for Bahratn and 
for the ma1nland, after see,ng an encouraging geo1ogfcal report written by 
( 12) 1n September, 1926. 
Professor T. George Madgwtck was the supervisor of the snyd1cate team 
dril 1 ing for water at Bahra1n 1n 1925. 
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The Ame--ican o1 1 tnterests, f, •st GULF and later Standard Oil of 
Callforn•a, went ahead wtth survey1ng, e><:plor1ng and drtll,ng for oil In 
Bahrain, while Major Holmes, representing the syndicate and work1ng for 
GULF, concent"ated h1s efforts on secudng the ma•nland 011 concessions, 
most espec1 a 1 i y the Kuwal t te· r• tory concession He was faclng a very 
strong compet:t8·,, e APOC, and had to use all his abl1•ry tn building 
good relations With all part1es concerned in Kuwatt and other parts of 
Arab.a 
The 1929 depression came and made everyone reflect about the 
development of the o1l 1ndustr"y Pr1or to 1929, the Arab merchants had 
feared that the potential permanent employment g1ven by the otl 1ndustry 
would affect their owr1 employment needs tn the pearl ing Industry, (l3) 
After 1929, the Sheikhs and othe· people concerned thought of the 01 I 
1ndustry as a remedy for the disastrous s:tuat1on caused by the depress1on 
. h l ' d (l 4) 1n t e pear 1ng 1n ustry, 
However, although the Sheikhs would have liked to encourage the 
o1l ;ndustry by granting oil concess1ons, they would nor: hurry the matter 
by accepting iess than the best te·ms poss•ble; and so negot•at!on and 
competltton went ahead, wh1 le both the competitors were try1ng to get 
more Information about the geology of the area, (15) and tryong at the 
same time to get E1d of each other in one way or another Th•s com-
petition went on benefit1ng the She:khs and they encouraged •t to some 
extent, until the doscovery of otl 1n Bahra;n 1n 1932 Inaugurated the 
th1rd stage of the htstory of the o1l industry on the Arab1an coast, 
W1th the Bahra1n discovery everything was changed and tdeas about 
the area, once thought of as not promlstng tor oil, became very differenL 
J 
The existing competition reached Its peak 1n Kuwa1 t 1n 1933(lGJ when the 
competitors real 1sed that It would be better for both of them to com-
pr om1 se Th1s 1s what happened ln Kuwait, and later on Major Holmes 
and the APOC or AIOC representatiVe worked together to secure an 011 
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concession for the Kuwait Oil Company (iJ) 
In Saud1 Arabia STANCAL and jPC went on competing With each other 
and the Saud• Government granted the concession to STANCAL ma1nly because 
of the better ftnanclal terms they offered and partly for political 
cons.derations. (l 8) In Qatar and the orher Em1 rates 1n the Gulf AIOC 
was ahead of any other compet.tors AiOC secwred the Qatar 011 con-
cession 1n 1935, (l 9) and 1n the same year a two years' option for Oil 
concessions for Abu Dhabi and other Emirates (ZO) AIOC later trans-
ferred 1ts right in Qatar and the other Em1rates to IPC, However, 
although almost all the Em1 rates were covered by 01 I concess lon during 
the early 1930's, none of them, except Bahrain, produced 011 before the 
end of the Second World War when Kuwait came on stream 1n 1946, 
B The Facts of Locat1on 
The development of the Gulf oil •ndustry, 1n the last f,ve 
decades, are here outlined. The five maps overleaf show the remarkable 
and steady tncrease of the Industry's activities, 
To start With F1g 2,1, which shows the Gulf oil tndustry's activity 
in 1930, we see the west stde of the Gulf bare of any s•gn of oil install-
at ions Though by the end of the 1920's an option fo~ oi I concessions 
had been granted to the syndicate and an Amer1can company was carrying out 
a geological survey at Bahrain, and prepar1ng for dr1ll1ng, no oi I well 
had been drilled by the end of 1930, iran and l;aq were the only countries 
in the Gulf w1th discovered commercial o.l t•eld:, and only Iran was 
expo r t I n g o 1 1 a t t he t l me 
Ftg, 2 2 shows a remarkable change •n the Gulf 011 industry The 
1930's were very VItal yea·s for the industry Th1s decade started w1th 
the Bahra1n oil discovery 1n 1932, which triggered ol 1 explorat;on in the 
region, The decade ended with the dtscovery of 011 in Saudi Arab1a, 
1936-38, (Zl) Kuwa1 t 1938, (ZZ) and Qatar, January 1940 (Z 3) The Bahra1n 
Refinery, the f1rst to be buflt on the Arabian s;de of the Gulf, was 
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(24) 
completed by the end of the 1930's Four countries, 1nstead of one 
In 1930, were exporting 011; six countries had discovered oil f1elds, 
and almost all the area, except the neutral zone, was covered by oil 
concession agreements 
Fig 2 3 shows cons1derable change In the Gulf oil Industry during 
the 1940's, this '" spite of the lnte'rupt1on caused by the Second World 
War By the end of 1950, s1x countr1es 1n the Gulf were exporting oll; 
four had refin1ng fac1]lt1es; rhe complete area was covered by oil con-
cession agreements; and explo.ac•on for oll was go1ng on in almost every 
country 
The map for 1960 (Fig, 2,4) shows the remarkable development In 
off-shore exploration and the development of oil f1elds, Th1s achieve-
ment together with the concentrated effort to develop the d1scovered oi 1 
fields of the 1930's and 1940 1 s, resulted in increasing the oil pro-
duction of the Emirates from 20 mill •on metric tons 1n 1950 to 96 mt11lon 
in 1960 This put the Emirates' share of the wor!d 01 l production at 
about one tenth of 1960 compared with only 4% 1n 1950, Dur1ng this period 
Abu Dhab1 and the Neutral Zone JOined other countries wtth known com-
mercia] reserves of o\1, 
Finally Fig, 2,5 indicates the total development of the Gulf 
industry during th1s century The Gu~f, both on land and off-shore, is 
now covered Wtth the industry's establishments The Arabian s1de of 
the Gulf, once thought of as an unprom1slng reg1on, has become one of the 
most important regions for reserves, production and export of oil, 
Part Two: Cr-ude 01 I 
~f one searches for a country or a reg1on In the world depending 
on crude oil product•on and e~ports to ma:nta:n Its very existence and 
meet the bas1c requ1 rements of the popuiat1on, one can find no better 
example, nowadays than the Em1rates Since the decl 1ne of the pearl 1ng 
Industry the Emirates have depended to a very large extent on the pro-
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duct;on and export of crude 011 to provide them d1 rectly or •ndirectly 
With employment, to activate local markets, and above all to provide the 
publ lc expenditure with almost ;ts total revenue. Indeed it IS 01l 
production and export and the 011 ~eserve that gave the Emirates the1 r 
present importance in che econom1cs and pol 1t1cs of the world 
A Producing 011 Fields 
The 1970 crude 011 production of the Emirates came from twenty 
prtncipal oil f:elds, twelve of them onshore and e:ght off-shore fields, 
All of them, except the partot,oned zone onshore 011 f,elds, are flowing 
ones, With water, gas, or water/gas drive. The total of produc1ng wells 
was 1,588, with a da1ly production average from 295 B/D at Wafrah 011 
field to 17,160 B/D at Fateh ol1 fle1d The table shown overleaf shows 
the pr1nclpal producing 011 foe1ds of the Emirates, 
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TABLE 2 1 
THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCING OIL FIELDS - END 1970 
Prod, No of 
Operat1ng Date of 000 Prod Gas/Oil Gravity 
Fields and Country Co, Discovery B/D We 11 s Rat1o" (API) 
BAHRAIN 
Bahra1n F1eld BAPCO 1 932 77 203 714 33.0 
Abusafah(a) ¢ ARAMCO 1963 74 6 N A, 3LO 
KUWAIT(b) 
Burgan KOC 1938 1887 368 460 30-32 
Magwa-Ahmedl II 1952 372 178 518 30-32 
Managish II 1959 66 14 530 30-32 
Raudhatain II 1955 344 51 890 30-32 
Sabriya II 1957 1 3 48 855 30-32 
Umm Guda I r II 1962 55 31 210 30-32 
Partitioned Zone(a) 
Khafj i ¢ AOC 1960 283 62 292 28.1 
Hou t. ¢ II 1969 
SJawaris AMI NOlL 1962 60 24 N,A, 24,5 
S"Umm Gudair II 1966 56 16 N,A, 23,0 
Wafra II 1953 99 355 N A, 18° 34 
QATAR 
Dukhan QPC 1940 191 sox 1050 4L4 
lddel Sha rq i ¢ Shell Qatar 1960 48 1 4 1820 35.4 
Maydan Mahzam ¢ II 1963 127 11 570 38,0 
ABU DHABI 
Murban ADPC 1960 425 47 1007 40,5 
Umm Shaif 0 ADMA 1958 100 28 112 3 37,5 Zakum ¢ II 1964 259 39 40.9 
DUBAI 
'. 
Fateh ¢ DPC 1966 85.8 5 N,A, 31 0 0 
Notes· ¢ offshore 
Number of cubic feet of gas produced with one barrel of oil 1970, 
Kuwait 1969 
(a) 
( x) 
(b) 
Include Saudi Arab1a share 
Total wells drll led, 
Da1ly production and gas/oil ratio of Kuwait and partitioned zone 
f1elds estimated according to 1969 rat1o, 
NAFT AL-ARAB, Feb, 1971, p.37, mentioned Dubai 's production of 
natural gas 750 b1l lion This gives a ratio of 24,190 which is 
equal to ten times the highest ratio 1n the other Emirates. 
Source: Ministry of F1nance and Petroleum, Kuwa1t, NAFT AL-KUWAIT: Haqag wa 
Argam, 1969; Direct communication with Department of Petroleum 
Affairs, Qatar; Al-Batro1 wa al~Sinah, 1971 and 1972; Dubai Petroleum 
Company, Dubai, Background Material; BP, Our Industry Petroleum, 1970; 
Producing 01 l Companies' Annual Reports. 
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Table 2.1 indicates the ma•n feature of the producing oi I fields in 
the Em1rates. 
1, Burgan field alone produced an average of 1,887,000 B/D or about 
44 5% of the total crude oil productaon 1n 1970 
2. The average da1 Jy production of off-shore o1lfields is h1gher 
than that of the onshore fuelds and this may compensate for the 
h1gh cost of developing offshore 01 !fields 
3, The gas/oil ratiO is higher in the offshore fields than onshore 
ones, 
4. Most of the onshore ollfaelds were discovered before 1958, but 
none of the offshore 01lf1elds were d1scovered before then~ 
5. Three fields were discovered between 1932-1940, nine faelds 
between 1952-1960, and seven fields between 1962-1969 Beside 
these last seven, there are some f1elds wh1ch were discovered 
1n the same period but were not completely developed before the 
end of 1970 (see F1g 2,5), 
B Crude Oil Production 
The commercial oil production of the Emirates commenced 1n Bahrain 
in 1934. However, the importance of their share in world production was 
realised from the late 1940's onward, That was when the Kuwait onshore 
o1l production started In 1946 and Qatar onshore 1n 1949, .later followed by 
the partationed zone onshore 1n 1954 and offshore In 1961; Abu Dhabi offshore 
in 1962 and onshore in 1963; Qatar offshore in 1964, Abu Safah in 1966; 
and Dubai in 1969. By 1970 Kuwait was producing 2,989 thousand barrels per 
* day, Abu Dhabi 751 thousand B/D, Qatar 358 thousand B/D, Bahrain 114 thousand 
~~ 
B/D, and Dubai 86 thousand B/D. 
Each of the Eml rates experaenced a steady growth in 1ts crude 011 
production (see Apps, 2, 1" 1-2, 1,5) and as Fig, 2,6 shows, production of 
* Including Kuwait's share in the production of the partitioned zone, 
*~ Including Bahrain's share 1n the Abu Safah oilfield. 
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the Em1rates ha5 bee~ stead1ly 'nc;eas1ng since the early 1940's (App, 2, 1,6) 
The most remarkable 1ncreases were recorded between 1945-1955, Divldtng the 
period Into two main stages, we see that from 1945 to 1950 product1on ln-
creased more than twenty one times, th1s was ma1nly through the impact of 
Kuwa1t's production from the Burgan f'eld, Although the rate of growth then 
slowed considerably, product!on had nevertheiess trebled In 1955 compared 
w1th 1950, After that growth continued at a much lower rate, and production 
took f1fteen years to treble again In 19700 
The role played by rhe crude oil productYon of the Em•rates 1n M1ddle 
East and total world product1on, 1s shown below, 
TABLE 2,2 
THE EMIRATES POSITiON 'N WORLD CRUDE Oil PRODUCTION, SELECTED YEARS 
(PERCENTAGE) 
Year Of M, East % Of the War I d % 
1935 L5 0,08 
1940 6,8 0,33 
~945 3°7 0 28 
1950 23, l 3,90 
1955 38,4 8,00 
1960 36,2 9' 10 
1965 34,5 9 66 
1970 29 0 8,87 
Source: Calculated from Appendix 201 7 
Table 2,2 shows that rhe Emirates have produced about one tenth of the 
world's supply of crude oil and about one third of the Middle East's supply 
s1nce 1955, Dur1ng the early 1950's the Emirates' share of oil production 
was Increased rapidly to compensate for the stoppage of Iranian otl pro-
d1.Jct 'on. 
Stnce 1955 the Emirates' share In the Mtddle East's crude o;] pro-
duction has decreased in consequence of the rapid growth of crude oil 
production, espec1ally in Iran which was try~ng to regain the share 1t had 
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1n the 1940's However, the Em1rates 1 5hare of the world's total production 
of crude oi 1 increased unti 1 1965, and only dropped 1n the period 1966-70, 
Th1s drop may be attributed to two factors, the first is the Em1rates 1 
decreased share 1n Middle East P'Oducr,on; the se:ond IS the 1ncreas1ng 
share of the new producers outside the Middle East, e,g, North Africa. 
Looking to the relat1ve dlfferences among the Emirates themselves, 
Fig, 2,7 shows that some of the Em1rates have changed ranks in the last 
two decades. However, since 1950 Kuwait alone has had the overwhelm;ng 
shaie Th1s share accounted for 88 6% of the Emlrates 1 total production 
of crude oil ln 1960, but late( fell to 70,4% in 1970, reflecting the 
growth of Abu Dhab1 as the second largest 01 I producer In the Emirates, 
Qatar kept its share at about 9% of the total crude oil production of the 
Emirates, Qatar 1 s off-shore production was the main 1reason for this 
Bahrain's share fell considerably ffom 703% in 1950 to just 2 1 % ln 1960, 
reflecting the humble potentiality of the Bahra~n field; but later, ln 
1970, Bahrain's share showed a sl lght lmprovement due to !ts stake in the 
Abu Safah 01 I field, Lastly Dubal 's output in Its first complete year of 
operation was 2 0% of tocal crude 01l production 
C Crude 01 l Exports 
The Emirates are one of :he most ;mportant exporters of crude oil, 
Abu Dhab1 and Dubal exported all rhe1r production as crude oil, Qatar almost 
all 1ts production, and •n 1970 Kuwait exported 130 million metric tons out 
of lts total production of 150 mill ion metr1c tons Bahra1n Is the ex-
ceptional case in the Gulf reg~on, as ;t Imports crude oil Instead of 
e.xport i ng 1 t 
In fact the Emirates are playing a more important role in the 
international crude 011 trade than they do 1n world crude 011 production. 
Table 2.3 overleaf shows us this 1mportant ~ole~ 
Relative 01Stnbut1on of the Em1rates Crude Ott Product1on 1950,1960 & 1970 
1950 
1960 
1970 
FIG 2 7 
TABLE 2-3 
THE EMIRATES' SHARE IN WORLD CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORT, 
1966 & 1970 (PERCENTAGES) 
1966 
Prod. ~· 
The Em 1 rates 10 23 I 
Other M lddl e East 19 36 Crude Producers 
Other Crude 71 41 Producers 
Source: Calculated from Apps ..., 1 ' ~ ' I and 2.2 . 
1970 
Prod ~ 
9 18 
20 39 
71 43 
This table indicates that the Em1 rates' share 1n the lnte;national 
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crude oi 1 trade is very much greater than their share in production. They 
provided the international market With 18% of ItS needs in 1970, a fall 
compared w1th 1966 when It was 23%, this drop reflects the slow growth 1n 
the Emirates' product1on of crude 011 and the 1ncrease in local refin1ng 
capacity ln the late 1960's. 
The reason why the Em1 rates have an even larger share 1n trade than 
in production and reserves are on the one hand their relat1vely small 
domestic consumption -a result of smal 1 population, lack of Industry, and 
abundant suppl 1es of natural gas, and on the other the preference of con-
suming countries for obtaln1ng crude ol I rather than ref1ned products. 
The relat1onsh1p between the crude 011 production of the Emirates 
and their small local markets for petroleum products, together with the 
var1at1ons in th1s respect between the Em1 rates, wll 1 prov1de a subject for 
later consideration. 
The geographical distribution of the crude 011 exports of the Emirates 
IS shown 1n Ftg. 2 8 (25 ) As the f1gure Indicates, Western Europe 1s the 
ma1n 1mporter With a 59.7% share of the Em1rates total export. This equalled 
794 million US. Barrels 1n 1970 out of Europe's total 1mport of 3,976 million 
barrels, (2G) or about one f1fth of 1ts needs. The second 1mportant des-
tinat1on is Japan and the Far East, which absorbed 25.8% of the Emirates' 
The Em~rates' Export of Crude 011, by Dest1nation 1970 (m11l1on barrels) 
Abu Dhabi 
FIG 2 8 
The Em1rates 
(excluding Duba1) 
Qatar 
~ ~ 
I EUROPE JAPAN & FAR EAST AUSTRALASIA NORTH AMERICA OTHER 
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total export 1n 1970. Ausrraias1a •mported 3,5%, North Ameroca 2.2%, 
and the rest of the world 1mported the rema1ning 8 7%. 
D Producing 011 Companies 
To complete au~ presentat1on of the crude ot 1 actiVit;es 1n the 
Em1 rates we gove the following table the share 1n production of the pro-
ducing o1 1 compan1es ~~ 1970 
TABLE 2.4 
PARENT COMPANIES 1 GROSS SHARE OF THE EMIRATES' CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 1970 
THOUSAND BARRELS DAILY 
Company 
Majors 
Gulf 01 l Corportat•on 
BP 
Shell Dutch/Shell 
Standard 01 1 Company 
(New Jersey) 
Mobil Oil Corporation 
Texaco, Inc , 
Standard 0' 1 Company 
(California) 
Total Major 
Others 
CFP 
Other International 
01 1 Companies 
Local Government and 
National o, I Cos, 
Share 
1566 
1493 
318 
84 
77 
60 
256 
305 
35 
Total 4248 
% of the 
Eml rates 1 
Production 
1.8 
1 4 
6.0 
7 2 
0 8 
Total 
Company 
Production 
( G 1 oba 1} 
3242 
3994 
5135 
6093 
2083 
3252 
2558 
26357 
Emirate Share 
of Total Global 
Product ion (%) 
48.3 
37.3 
6.2 
L4 
3.4 
1 8 
L9 
Source: App. 2 3; Royal Dutch/Shell g'oups, Group and other Major 
F1nanclal Results Compared, p 5 
Table 2 4 Indicates that 85 8% of the Em1rates' crude O• 1 product1on 
1n 1970 was produced by the seven MaJors; two of them, Gulf and BP - the 
owners of KOC -accounted for more than two thl rds. Th1s at the same time 
represented about half of the Gulf 01 l Corporations production from all 
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sources and 37 3% of BP product,on in 19700 
Shell and CFP came next with 7 5% and 6,0% respectively. The 
independent compan1es accounted for 7.2%, wh1 le the government and national 
oil companies' share 1n 1970 was 0 8% However, thls has changed s1nce the 
beg1nning of participation era In 1973 and now (1974) most of the Emtrates 
own a stake of about 60% 1n the operat,ng companies' cap1tal 
E Crude 011 Reserves 
It 1s stat1ng the obvious to say that the 011 reserves are the 
fundamental base for the 01 1 industry. The f1rst srep in the act;v1t1es 
of the 011 Industry 1s the search for o1l deposits, upon wh1ch future 
development IS entl rely dependent The f1 rst pre-requisite 1f an area 1s 
to be considered promising as regards 011 deposits ls ;ts locat,on 1nside 
the sedimentary bas1ns where all the known petro:eum reserves have been 
found (Fig. 2.9) These sedimentary bas1ns are now known to extend over 
most of the earth's land surface and the continental shelveso (27 ) 
As Fig. 2.9 shows, al 1 the Emirates' onland and off-shore areas 1 ie 
1n the sedimentary bas,n within an area containing the largest 011 f1elds 
h . d ( 28) 1 n t e wor I 
The regular exp 1 or at l on for o 11 1 n the Em 1 rates started about 1930 
and since then an Increasing rese,ve has been discovered In 1944 the 
Emirates' Oil Reserve was estimated as follows: (29 ) Kuwait 9,000 m1 Ilion 
barrels; Qatar 1,000 m1ll1on barrels; and Bahratn 300 m1llion barrels 
Th1s equals 16 2% of the world's total reserve. After the accelerated 
exploration for oil which followed the Second Wo-ld War the Emirates' 
reserve was estimated at 51,884 m1 11 1on barrels in 1957, Th1s was equal 
to 21.4% of the world's total reserve of o1l (App 2,4) In 1970, the 
proven oil reserve was estimated at 98,784 m1ll1on barrels or about 16% 
of the world's total Th1s 1nd1cates that though the Emirates reserves 
have been increas1ng, the1 r proportional share 1n the world's reserve has 
fa 11 en. 
FIG 2 9 IN SEDIMENTARY BASINS 
.,}:J 0 
. . , 
0 .. 
Petroleum discovery 
Sedtmentory bos1ns 
• ·~ 
\a I 
j> 
Scource SHELL, Exploration 
and Product1on 
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As for the reserve/product•on ratiO •n the Em1rates, a steady decrease 
has been exper,enced s1nce the late 1950's Fig 2,10 shows us that, 
although the rema1n1ng quantity of the Em1rates' proven reserves Increased 
almost every year, the reserve/product•on ;atio fe1 1 from 109 1n 1958 to 
JUSt 64 1n 1970, with the sharpest part of the fall 1n the per1od 1966-1970, 
This reflects the fact that the Em,rates had already been extensively ex-
plored for 01 l, and any new discovery of 01 l fields was bound to be m1nor 
compared with prev1ous dlscover1es. Moreover, production had steadily 
increased, However, in sp.te of ali th1s, the Emirates still enjoyed a 
better position than the world as a whole, for the world reserve/production 
ratio 1n 1970 was only about 38, (30) 
The relattve posit1on o~ the separate Emirates Wtth regard to 01 I 
reserves and the reserve/product1on ratiO is g1ven below •n Table 2 5 
Em 1 rate 
Kuwait 
Abu Dhabi 
Qatar 
Bahra1n 
Dubal 
Total 
THE EMIRATES' PROVED OIL RESERVES, 1970 
(MILLION BARRELS) 
Share of 
1970 Share of 1970 
Reserve Reser \Fe Product l on 
79950 80 9 70,4 
11800 11 ,9 16.5 
4 300 4 4 8 5 
1751 : '8 2 7 
983 LO 2 0 
98784 
Source: See Apps, 2,4 and 2,1 6. 
Reserve/ 
Product1on 
RatiO 
73 
47 
33 
42 
31 
Kuwait has an 80,9% share of the reserves compared With only 70.4% of 
production, Its reserve/production ratio IS also the strongest, w1th 73 
years to go at the 1970 level ot product1on Abu Dhab 1 ranks second with a 
share in the reserve (11 .9%), smaller than that in production, wh1le the 
reserve/production ratio was 47. Bahrain's reserve/production rat1o was 42. 
This is explained by Bahrain's share in the Abu Safah 01 I field. However, 
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•t should be noted that as far as the Abu Safah field, IS concerned, 
Saud' Arabia IS the dominant partner The reserve/production ratio for 
Qatar and Dubal was 33 and 31 respect.vely, the lowest among the Em1rates. 
Dubal's low reserve/pr'oductlon rat1o spr1ngs partly from the fact that the 
Al-Fateh 011 f.eld Is a new one and •t IS early yet to assess 1ts potential, 
However, the figures for Qatar's reserves may be more accurate, for most of 
Qatar's 011 fields have been producing long enough to assess the1 r proven 
capacity. 
Part Three: impact of Petroleum Exploitation on Local Economics 
In this part we W1 11 look at some aspects of the impact made on the 
local economics by the exploitation of oil resources We exclude the 
1mpact of the oil companies' payments to the governments, which will be 
d 1 scussed 1 n deta • l : n the fo 11 ow 1 ng chapters Our concern •s to see the 
development in the ref1n1ng tndustry, in the domest;c con~umpt.on of 
petroleum products, ;n activities cente•~•ng on 011 tankers and p•pelines, 
1n natural gas production and usage, 1n natural-gas-based Industry, and 
finally the impact of the local expenditure of the operating 011 companies, 
Dur1ng our presentation we may discuss some of the problems, dnd the prospect 
these act1vltles hold of accelerating the technological and economtc 
development of the region, 
A The Refining Industry 
The Emirates' refln•ng •ndust"y started •n Bahrain, where the first 
oi 1 refinery on the Arabian coast of the Gulf was burlt Plans for 1t were 
drawn up 1n 1934. The f1rst plan was for a refinery w1th a capacity of 
10,000 B/D, Th•s was completed by 1937 
--
Later the capaclty was Increased 
to 25,000 B/D, (31) 
The Bahra1n ref1nery was first thought of as a solut1on for the 
difficulties fac1ng BAPCO 1n market•ng Bahra1n crude oil ,(32 ) however, 
afterwards the Bahrain refrnery played an 1mportant role 1n the Second 
World War by supplying petroleum products to All led Forces in the Middle 
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and Far East, particularly after Japan's attack upon the Un1ted States, by 
which time a dec1s1on had been taken to increase the Bahrain refinery 
capacr ty to 65,000 B/D, (33) 
A1 - Change 1n Ref1ne~y Loc3t.on: 
Prior to the Second World War, the location of refineries 1n general 
was resource orientated, In 1939 almost 60 m• ll 10n to~s out of a total 
capacity of 85 mill ion tons (e~cluding North Amer1ca and the Communist 
world) was 1n the produc1ng countr;eso (34 ) The M1ddle East up to the 
Immediate post-second Wor 1d War years was eKport,ng the bulk of its output 
as ref1ned products, (35 ) At that time M1ddle East reftnerles were the 
largest in the WOI']d. (36 ) This h.storical trend has changed s1nce the end 
of the World War I I, and the Middle East became ma1nly an exporter of 
crude oil. The rat1o of crude oil delivered fo~ ref•ntng to the total crude 
01 I production of the Middle Easr dec 1 :ned from 66 per cent 1n 1937, 55 per 
cent in 1949, 21 per cent •n 1960, (3ll w only 14 per cent 1n 1970. (38 ) As 
for the Em1rates, they have changed from be1ng crude oll importers unt1l 
1946, when Bahra;n was the only produc1ng Em1rate, to export1ng 89 per cent 
of thel r output as crude o,l In 1970 (Apps. 2.1 7 and 2 2L 
The shift of the ref;n,ng ,ndustry from producing countries, to the 
consum1ng countrles, particularly after the Second World War, may be 
attributed to a number of considerations, Some of the pr1ncipal ones have 
been summarised 1n these terms. 
For Western Europe and Japan pol 1t1cal and strategic considerations, 
as wei l as the Impact of nati~na' economic polICies, have strongly 
re1nforced the probable, though unquantlf1able, econom•c advantages 
of locating refineries at the market rather than at the point of 
production. 
The second main trend 1n the post-war locat1on of the ref1n1ng 
Industry can be explained, however, pr1nclpally In terms of 
polit1cal and econom1c nat,ollallsm.(39) 
The development in s1ze of the crude oil tankers and the decline 1n 
the wastage rates of the ref1n1ng 1ndustry has produced considerable 
economies and has consequently reduced the theorettcal econom1c advantages 
of locating the refineries near the producing rather than near the 
consum,ng centres. 
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The transition period, and particularly the late 1950's and 1960's 
WItnessed a grow1ng demand 1n the producing countries for a local Integrated 
petroleum Industry, Th1s demand a1med at securing more added value from 
the o: 1 1ndustry for the p'"'oduc:ng count,-;es To meet this demand several 
attempts were made to Increase the output of the local refiner1es. The 
national oil companies In the produc<ng countries cons1der th1s to be one 
of their ma1n alms, Pol lut1on problems in the lndustr1a1 countr~es are 
an addlt1onal recent factor favour1ng the ref!nlng of oil ln the produc1ng 
countries. 
Another new factor has emerged s1nce the early 1970's and particularly 
since the October War of 1973, This factor 1s the era of the seller's 
market. The oil-producing countries have very 1 1ttle competition 1n the 
products market, and th1s WI 11 encourage them to increase their ref1n1ng 
and marketing activities, However, the powe,- of this trend will be res-
tricted by the technological capacitY of the produc1ng countries and by 
the problems It poses for the consum1ng coun~r1es wh1ch are already facing 
balance of payment d1fflcult1es. 
A2- The Ref1n1ng Industry of the Emirates 
The ma1n ref1ner1es 1n the Emirates are in Kuwa1t and Bahrain~ Table 
2,6 shown overleaf shows the ma1n features of these ref1nerles: 
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TABLE 2 6 
THE EMIRATES' REFINERiES, 1970 
Percentage 
Em 1 rate 
Kuwatt 
Bahrain 
Qatar 
Total 
Ownership 
KOC 
AMI NOlL 
KNPC 
BAPCO 
Govt" 
Locat1on 
Mtna A 1-Ahmad 1 
Mina A.bdulla 
Shuaiba 
Sitrah 
Ummsatd 
of Crude 
Capac1ty Throughput throughput 
000 B/D 000 B/D to Capactty 
250 237 95 
144 77 54 
95 92 96 
205 254 124 
!.1. 0,7 100 
695 667 
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1970, KOC, Annual Report, 1970; 
ANIMOIL, Annual Report, 1970; KNPC, Annual Report, 1970; BAPCO, 
Annual Report, 1970, 
From the table we see that Kuwait's share of the total ref1nlng 
capacity was about 72 per cent, but ;ts share of the throughput was only 
60 percent; Bahrain almost accounts for all the rest, s1nce Qatar's share 
was negligible, The other Emirates had no ref1nerles at the end of 1970; 
but since then and under pressure to meet the local demand of the Inland 
market, a 15,000 B/D refinery has been planned for Abu Dhab1 together with 
a new 6,000 B/D refine~y for Qatar (40) 
The ref1n1ng Industry of the Emirates has been affected by the 
general trends in the oil industry, Bahratn began Its production at the 
tlme when the establ 1shment of refineries near the produc•ng centres was 
the general pol •cy of the produc1ng companies, wh1 le other parts commenced 
their product ton during the sh1ft from this pol 1cy, Certain other factors 
have also affected this development, such as the need to meet the demand 
for bunker fuel, the tnland local consumption needs; the lack of Inter-
nat1onal downstream facl 1 1ties fo1 some producing companies; the marketing 
d1ff1cultles facing heavy crude; cheap reftnery fuel and hydrogen; and the 
national demand for a more Integrated national o, I 1ndusrry, All these 
factors have affected the development of the Eml rates 1 ref1n1ng industry 
as illustrated overleaf: 
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TABLE 2 7 
CRUDE OIL THROUGHPUT CAPACITY OF THE EMIRATES' REFINING INDUSTRY, 
SELECTED YEARS ( 00 0 B/D) 
Year Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Total 
1937 25 25 
1940 33 33 
1945 65 65 
1950 155 25 180 
1955 185 30 215 
1960 186 220 0.7 406.7 
1965 205 342 0. 7 547-7 
1970 205 489 0,7 694 7 
Source: Longr1gg, S.H , op,clt , p, 103; WORLD PETROLEUM (Annual Refinery 
Issue), 1945, p-76, 1953, pp,88-93, 1955, p, 136, OPEC, Annual 
Statistical Bullet1n, 1970, pp.43 and 52; Al-Petrol Wa Al-Gas 
AJ-Arabl, March 1966, p,35; App,2.5, 
The markets for the Emirates' refined products d1ffer greatly from 
those for crude onl In add!t~on to local markets and bunkering, the 
Emirates' refined products are exported to South As1a and the Far East, 
the Arab countrles, and Europe. But the main markets are South Asia and 
the Far East wh1ch in 1970 absorbed 60% of the total export of ref1ned 
products from Kuwait, wh1 le bunkering accounted for 21%, and the Arab 
countries, Europe and America accounted for only 19% (4 !) 
The prices of ref!ned products from the Emirates kept 1n line with 
those of the Western Hemisphere unu 1 1957. (42 ) More recently they have 
dropped behind slightly, although remaining closer than the1r crude oil 
equivalents. (43) This may reflect the advantage which the Emirates have 
over other competitors in the markets of South As1a, the Far East, the 
Arab countr1es and other Eastern countr1es, However, th1s market is a 
relatively small one, and there 1s a growing tendency to establ 1sh local 
refin1ng 1ndustr1es, 
A3- Some Problems of the National Ref1n1ng Industry 
What 1s meant here by 'National Ref1n1ng lndustry 1 are refiner1es 
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owned by Governments or clt1zens of the Em1 rates, In th1s sense the only 
Important ref1nery ls the KNPC refinery at Shua1ba, the other plant IS the 
Qatar Government Topp1ng Plant at Umm-Sa,d, which the Government bought from 
QPC 1n 1968 at $59,520. (44 ) However, this plant with itS 680 B/D 1S pro-
ducing for the monopo1 1sed local market and buy~ng the crude at ccst price 
from QPC,( 4S) hence no maJor problems have ex·sted up to now. The KNPC 
refinery at Shuaiba With its 95,000 B;D capacity was the f1rst to use 
h d 1 I d ( 46) d ' h ' f h h y rogen 1n a ownstream process un1ts, an 1t IS t 1S re 1nery w 1c 
concerns us here. 
The KNPC reflne~y's problems may be summar;sed as the problems of an 
inexperienced wealthy newcomer to a completely new f1eld, a newcomer 
motivated by national consijderations as wei 1 as commerc1al ones Thus the 
KNPC refinery was establ 1 Shed to fulfl J one of tne main alms which 1t has 
1n fact been trying to achieve, i e, an 1ntegrated 011 company (4?) The 
KNPC consider the going onstream of Shuaiba ref1nery 1n 1968 as "a land-
mark in the further expansion of the Kuwait National Petroleum Company 1n 
the International oil bus1ness ,,( 48 ) So the corner stone :n establishing 
this export ortentated ref1nery may be found •n the national pol1cy of the 
Kuwait Emirate, A second factor at the time was the problems which were 
facing Kuwait 1n marketing some of :ts heavy crude 1n 1965.(49 ) The 
second factor worked together w;th the th·~d, the national des,re to 
utilise wasted natural gas; as Fas1l Mazld1 put •t in h1s paper, "the fact 
that we can make extremely large quantities of cheap hydrogen \s of 
Interest to the ref1nery development wh1ch we are considering,", (SO) These 
last two factors affected the ref1n1ng technology chosen by KNPC, and this 
1n turn comb1ned With other Cli'CUm!>tances to cause the ma1n problems of 
the KNPC refinery at Shuaiba~ The main problems may be 1 ~sted as: (Sl) 
a) Up-to date advanced te~hnology 1n an under-developed country. 
b) Lack of experienced 1abour to run th1s sort of refinery and 
deal with Its technical problems Th1s lack affected the 
b/ refining cost as well as restricted the range of products, 
c) The fact of its be1ng the f1rst national heavy indust~y In a 
small country 1mportlng everything (except crude) affected the 
cost of runn.ng the Industry as well as the fixed cost and 
caused a considerable delay 1n the construction period, 
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d) On the commerr.al s•de, berng an export-or:entated industry with 
a single refinery, compet1ng With well establ 1shed competitors, 
1t was faced with marketing dlff1cult1es, 
e) Short run p'oblems tn adjust~ng the reftnery to be able to refine 
heavy crude and extract more expens 1 ve 1 1 ght products ( 1 t has an 
advantage in producing these over other types of reflnery) These 
difficulties were caused by techn1cal problems and to a lesser 
extent by t~e change 1n the co~t of sh1pping caused by the closing 
of the Suez Canal, 
These are the matn difficulties wh1ch have faced the KNPC refinery 
at Shuaiba and caused heavy losses to the companyc (5 2) These losses may be 
attributed to three main ~easons. 
Fl rst: 
Second 
Third: 
The high fiJ<ed cost- the capital investment per datly barrels of 
intake was £676(5 3) wh, le the corresponding cost of tefinery 
facil itles of a not too complex nature bu1 It by SHELL 1n the same 
period was between £250-£350; (S4) and the h1gh running cost (55 ) 
The refinery failure In processing the heavy crude for Whtch It 
had been designed led to It be1ng used as an ordtnary ref1nery for 
l 1ghter crudes; an under use of capital and more expensive stock. 
The lack of manager1al, technical and marketing exper.ence, 
These diffiCLtlt,es fall ;nto two broad categories. The first IS short 
term diff,culties wh,ch usually face a new export or;entated Industry in Its 
first years; the severity of these d1ff1cultles depends on the country con-
cerned, its stage of 1ndustr,a1 development, and 1ts ma~ketlng experience, 
The second is that of dlfficult~es inherent in the new and advanced 
59 
technology chosen. New techn1ques need a longer per1od of adaptation to 
reach the stage where thelr main problems are known and solved, 
However, the KNPC refinery at Shuaiba has already successfully solved 
a great many of 1ts short term d:fficult1es and ga1ned considerable ex-
perience 1n adapt•ng the new ~ef1ning technology (56) Two ma1n results on 
the technical s1de have been achieved; the first was the refinery's success 
tn refin1ng 25% of 1ts throughput from Umm-Gudalr heavy crude in 1971, (5l) 
compared with less than 1,5% 1n 1970. (5B) The second was the r1se of the 
throughput to an average of 120,000 B/D Without 1nvo1ving the addition of 
any processing unitS at the refinery, (59 ) compared with 92,290 B/D in 1970. (GO) 
On the marketing side cons1derable experience has also been gained, and 
regional marketing companies have been establ lshed However, the dlff1-
cultles of the Shualba refinery have affected the development of the nat1onal 
refining industry in the Em1rares, as may be seen from the dec,sions of Abu 
Dhabi and Qatar to build smal 1 refiner1es 1nstead of follow1ng the1r prev•ous 
intention to establ 1sh export-orientated refineries. These refineries, 
although they will obtain their crude needs at cost pr1ce from the pro-
ducing companies, wll 1 be faced w1th the economic dtsadvantages(Gl) of small-
scale industry and these may offset the advantage of cheap crude. 
B Domestic Consumption of Petroleum Products 
Domestic consumption consists of 1nland local consumption, refineries' 
losses and bunkering, The Em1rates with its small population and abundant 
cheap natural gas has 1 ittle need for refined products. The main consumers 
of the refined products are the ol 1 tankers and other visiting steamers. 
Table 2.8 shows the Emirates' domestic consumption: 
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TABLE 2.8 
THE EMIRATES' DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF REFINED PRODUCTS AND 
REFINERIES' LOSSES, BY EMIRATES AND MAINS PATTERN OF 
CONSUMING, 1970 ( 000 B/D) 
Loca 11 y Total 
Ref. Ref1neries Inland 
Country Product I m~orted Losses Consumet1on Bunkers Total 
Kuwa1t 14.7 0.2 9.5 24.4 80.8 105.2 
Bahra1n 2.3 N,A, 11.2 13.5 19.2 33.7 
Qatar 2.1¢ N .A. 2. 1 17. Oe 19. 1 
Abu Dhabi 2.6 2.6 35.0x 37.6 
Other 
Em 1 rates 2.6e 2.6 17.0e 19.6 
Total 19, 1 5 4 20.7 45.2 169.0 214.2 
Notes: ¢ Include 1 mported refined products. 
X Bundering at Das Island alone was 17,200 B/D. 
e Estimation accord1ng to the number of VIsiting sh1ps or population. 
Source: OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin (1970); Al-Batrol wa Al-Sinah 
1971; Department of Petroleum Affairs, Qatar, Private communication, 
Apps. 2.6. 1 and 2 h.2. 
From Table 2.8 we may see that bunker1ng alone accounts for 79% while 
~ef1nery losses account for 9.6% and local consumption for about 11.4%. In 
1970 the Em1rates' domestic consumption accounted for more than 32% of the 
year's ref1nery throughput. 
C 011 Tankers and Pl~el ines 
The only international oil pipeline is the Saudi Arabia/Bahrain 
pi pel 1ne. In the other Emirates there are no pipelines to transport the oil 
outside any of them. All the ex1st1ng pipel 1ne systems are field/export 
terminals or refinery connectors (F1g. 2.5). 
As for 011 tankers, Kuwa1t 011 Tankers is the only national 011 
tanker industry 1n the Emirates. Kuwa1t 011 Tankers Company was established 
in 1957 by the Kuwait pr1vate sector. As in Table 2.9 overleaf, the 
company's Annual Report of 1970 shows the following indicators. 
TABLE 2"9 
KUWAIT OIL TANKERS COMPANY· SOME INDICATORS, 1970 
(KD MILLiON) 
Capital and Reserve Net Profit Fleet Tonnage 
17.8 800,000 Tons 
Source~ Kuwait Oil Tanke~, Annual Repo~t (1970), 
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However, a grow1ng demand for- an integrated nat,onal oil industry has 
been noticeable recently, a des1re to enter the oil tankers' market has also 
been expressed through partiCipating in OAPEC 
D Natural Gas Production and Usage 
The term "natura 1 gas 's app ]1 ed to gas produced at the surface from 
underground accumulat,on of wide composition which may or may not be 
directly associated wtth accumulation of oiL"(62 ) Natural gas consists 
mainly of hydrocarbons, of which Methane Is the essential component 
Associated gas may be found in solut•on w1th the crude oil o• as gas-cap 
in the Emirates natural gas production is maijnly of assoctated-
solution gas, the production of wh1ch depends entlrely on crude 01 l pro-
ductiono For this reason, plus the absence of sufficient local needs for 
natural gas, and the diff1cult1es ~n transporting natural gas economically 
to the 1ndustr1al centres of the world, the flaring of natural gas was 
inevitable-
However, although the greater part of natural gas production 1n the 
Emirates is still be1ng flared, It is play1ng an essential role in reductng 
production costs by offering natural dr1ve ior crude, and solving some of 
its sulphur content problems, as well as provfd,ng the Em• rates w1th cheap 
fuel for electrlf,catlon, water d,stlllation and the ref1nlng industry. 
Natural gas also provides the petro-chemtcals industry with its raw 
materials and, through gas Injection schemes, is used to maintain reservo1 r 
pressure ;n the oi 1 fields. Table 2 10, shown overleaf, glves the Em1rates' 
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natural gas production, reserve and usage_ 
TABLE 2,10 
NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION, RESERVE AND USAGE BY EMIRATES, 1970 
(0 00 MILLION CUBIC FEET) 
0 I J 
Compan_tes Govt" Total 
Country: Use Use Flared Production Reserve 
Kuwait 1 35 53 382 570 41000 
i 1rj1t 
24 Qatar 5 12 1 150 10000 
--'\~ }\ 
44 Bahrain 39 5 1000 
Abu Dhab 1 26 1 3 227 266 1 0000 
Dubai N,A, N,A, N,A, N,A, 700 
Total rn 76 730 1030 62700 
Usage percentage 21,8 704 70.8 100 
Notes: ~ include field injection. 
,., .. , Almost all the companies' need for gas was for running pumping 
stations and all of it was flared after use. 
;,,o,•, BAPCO only, 
Source: SAK, 1971, p, 130; Ministry of Education, Qatar, Annual Report, 
1970/71, p,17; Direct contact w1th the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Industry, Abu Dhabi; ADPC, Annual Report, 1970; BAPCO, 1 Bapco 
and Bahrain'; BAPCO, Annual Report, 1970; Reserve in 1/1/1970; 
NAFT AL-ARAB, Apri 1, 1971, p.41 
Though the proport1on of used natural gas production has been in-
creasing during the last dec:ade,( 63 ) It is still less than one third 
Among the Emirates Bahrain IS the only one which has no wasted gas, and to 
supply the Alumin•um Bahrain Company (ALBA), BAPCO had to drtll for un-
associated natural gas from the Khuff Zone, (64 ) Other Emirates d1ffer in 
the1r proportion of utilI sed natural gas; Kuwait is the leading one, 
followed by Qatar and Abu Dhab1 The oil compan1es util1sed 21.8% of the 
natural gas produced 1n 1970, using a considerable part for field injection, 
All the gas ut1l ised was onshore, while offshore gas is almost totally flared, 
The 1970 production was about 1 63% of the year reserves, and if we 
take 1nto consideration the fact that almost all the gas discovered in the 
Em1rates has been associated gas, we may real1se the potential Importance 
of the Emirates for future natural gas suppl•es_ 
63 
There are many schemes for ut11 ~s1ng natural gas in industrial 
development as well as for export, The 1ncreas1ng demand for natural gas, 
the development in the technology of gas 1 iquidlfication and trans-
portation, and the development 1n the petro-chemical Industry w1ll all 
open up w1der poss1bil 1t•es for uti! 1s1ng the Em1rates' gas output. 
Together W1th field '11jectlon needs, rhe potential ways of ut1l .s,ng the 
Em1rates' natural gas may be seen 1n F:g 2.11~ 
The analysis of some of the natural gas IS shown in Table 2 11 below, 
TABLE 2 11 
SELECTED OIL FiELDS ASSOCiATED NATURAL GAS AVERAGE 
ANALYSIS (WEiGHT %) 
Burgan Dukham 
(Kuwa•t) (Qatar) 
Methane C H2 47 5 57.0 
Ethane C2 H4 22 5 15,0 
Propane C3 H6 19.0 10.0 
Butane C4 H8 1LO 2.3 
Pentane C5 Hl12 plus 3.0 
H2 s 3,5 
co 2 8,0 
Source: Burgan: Mazldi, Fas;a1, Natural Gas Utilisation 1n Kuwait, p.3; 
Dukhan: MEDD, 'Economic Survey of Qatar', p.64 
E Natural Gas Based Industry 
E1 - Potential Utll1sat10n of Natural Gas in Industry 
Bes1de the possibll 1ty ot successfully liqu1fylng the natural gas to 
LPG and LNG for export and local needs, there Is a great potentiality for 
the use of natural gas for the needs of Industry~ We may distinguish 1n the 
first Instance, three broad categor;es of industry which might util 1se nature 
gas. The first is the chem1ca1 •ndustrles where "90%.of' the world production 
is petroleum der1ved and th1s share ,s st1ll ,n::reaslng. 11 ( 65 ) In this 
industry natural gas may be used as the raw mater,al with a very wide range 
of potential products (Ftg. 2.12). 
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The most Important of these In terms of world production are~ 
Ammon1a, Urea~ Ethylene, Propylene, Methanol, Butadiene~ Alcohols, 
Acetylene~ Black Carbon, Carbon Dlsulph1de and Sulphur, (66 ) This Industry 
With 1ts rapid growth~ technolog1cal development and Increasing range of 
products, 1S an important field for uti I ising natural gas. The second is 
the base-energy 1ndustr1es, where gas is used mainly for under-boiler steam 
ra1sing~ e.g. cement works and thermal power plants. The third use IS as 
fuel for 1ndustry, particularly those lndustr1es which need clean and high 
therMal fue 1 , e.g. Metal!u;g.cal, Glass, C11ina, Glazed riles and BiscuitS 
and Bread Industries. 
E2 = Geographical D1str1butlon of Natural~Gas~Based industry 
Kuwait. In Kuwait natura1 gas 1S used in many industries, especially 
the fertiliser plants, power stations and reflner1es Kuwait Petro-
chemical Industries Ltd., was establ1shed 1n 1963 With a major share of 80% 
held b~ the Kuwait Government and a cap1tal of KD 16 m1l 1 1on, After an 
unsuccessful joint venture, the company together with British Petroleum and 
Gulf Exploration and Development, establ 1shed the Kuwait Chemical Fertl lisers 
Company llm1ted (KCFC) KCFC product,on In 1970 was, Ammonia 120,000, 
Alluminlum Sulphate 71,000 and Urea 162,000 metr1c tons.( 6 ?) In 1970 the 
Kuwait petro-chemical Industry began to construct a new fertll1ser plant 
designed to produce Ammonla 96,000 metric tons and Urea 123,000 metric tons 
per annum, (68 ) The company later 1n 1972 doubled its capital to reach 
KD 32 million. (69 ) 
Another 1ndustry util1sing natural gas 1n Kuwait Is the refining 
industry; the gas •S used as fuel and also to produce hydrogen and extract 
sulphur and sulphur'c ac1d ( 70) The third important f1eld for utilising 
natural gas locally was the us~ng of the natural gas as fuel for the power 
stations upon wh1ch the water distillation plants are entirely dependent. 
Bahra1n: The 1ndustr1al utilisation of the natural gas in Bahrain 
up to 1970 was confined to the BAPCO Refinery and the government power 
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station at Juffer 
Alum1nium Bahrain (ALBA) was Incorporated as a company in August 1968. 
The Bahra1n Government owned 19% of the capital and the rest was owned by 
SIX foreign partners. The company began prod~ct1on ln May 1971 and planned 
to use 100 mt Ilion cub1c feet ~f natural gas a day to produce 120 thousand 
tons of aluminium per annum (?i) ALBA IS the first metallurgical proJeCt 
1n the Emirates and the largest s1ngle consumer of natural gas. Natural gas 
is also used in power stations and the refining industry 
Qata.-. The 1ndustrial ut1i1sa-:10n of nar;u~a] gas in Qatar up to 1970 
was conf1ned to the power stat\on p1ants, upon which water dlstlllatlon Is 
dependent, and the Umm-Bab Cement factory, 
The Qatar Fen ill ze'; Company (QAFCO) was founded 1 n Doha on June 29, 
1969. Its purpose is to bu11d and operate a 900 metric tons/day amonla and 
a 1,000 metric tons/day Urea plant. The Qatar Government holds a 63% share 
in the company cap1tal. (72 ) The plant at Umm-Said WI 11 use 50 MCF a day of 
Dukhan natural gas as raw material and 1ts only source of energy. (? 3) The 
plant was scheduled to commence production 1n 1972. 
Abu Dhabi: Up to 1970 the only Industrial ut1 I 1sat1on of natural gas 
was the capital 1 s power stat1on and water dlst1llat1on plants. 
E3- The Problems of Utilising the Associated Solution Natural Gas 
Together with the technical problems, caused by the contents of the 
solution gas, which contains a h1gh percentage of 1mpure gases, there is a 
major problem on the supply side, 
The associated-solution gas Is produced with crude 011, and so its 
daily production depends enturely on the need tor crude ol 1 and the 1 imited 
storage facilities, S1nce the crude and ref1ned produ~ts depend on inter-
national demand and weather cond•t,ons, the da1 1y product1on differs from one 
day to another, Thus ln Kuwa1t In 1970 the da1 ly production differed from 
a maximum of 1 ,860 MCF a day t~ only 746 MCF a day (l4) This sort of problem 
1s unlikely to occur with the da; ly supply of unassoclated gas. To solve 
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th1s problem the parties concerned are asKed to carry out w1de research 
on the short-term underground storage of natural gas. Th1s ls not an utter 
1mpossib1l ity, and It is worth engaging In research in th1s field since 
almost all the Emirates d~"1nk,ng water, electriC•ty, Industry and LPG and 
LNG export plants are dependent on associated-solution natural gas, 
Even more than in the case of crude 011, the production and utilisation 
of natural gas raises several problems relating to the 'best' pol 1cies for 
the Emtrates, 
The full and d 1 rect ut 11 1 sat 1 on of natura i gas resources 1 s dependent 
on other types of production, Here each of the Em1rates .s to some extent 
uniquely situated, although 1t rema1ns true that the capital der1ved from 
petroleum and gas sales is the only relatively plentiful production factor 
in the reg;on as a whole_ This in addition to the nature of the local 
market- s1ze and cultured characteriStiCS - is of great Importance to 
later discussion of income and expend~ture 
F The Impact of the Oil Companies' Local Expenditure 
The contribUtion of the oll .ndustry to the gross national products of 
a country consists of that part of the 'value added' by the 1ndustry that 
remains in the g1ven country, These contr1butlons are reflected 1n the 
payments to the governments, operat•ng expend!ture and capital formation by 
the 011 companies, For example, the oll production's dl rect contribution 
to Kuwa l t 1969170 GDP was 56 7%, (7S) In this part of the study, however, 
we are going to refer to certain aspects of the industry's contribution to 
the local economies, mainly through employment, ~ocal purchase, and local 
contractors, leav•ng the compan.es' payments to the government to be discussed 
in detail 1n Chapter I I I 
F1 - Employment 
The oil Industry is a cap1ta1 inten51ve, not a labour •ntens1ve 
industry Nevertheless, the oil industry, particularly at the beginning 
prov1ded the Emirates with considerable and badly needed employmento Thus 
the 011 Industry in 1953 prov1ded employment fo;"" 50% of Qatar's actlve 
population, and 19% of Kuwait's active population 1n 19580 (76 ) This 
contribution was mainly due to the small population of the Em1rates. 
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Although th1s contribution has decreased, the Oi 1 industry still provides 
significant employment opportun•t:es ~n the Emirates as compared with other 
ol 1 producing compan1es. Table 2 12 below shows the employment In the 
Emirates 011 Industry, 
TABLE 2.12 
EMPLOYMENT IN THE EMIRATES O!L INDUSTRY, 1970 
Clt•zens Non-Citizens Total 
Kuwait 1794 5353 7147 
Bahrain 3630 448 4078 
Qatar 1569 454 2023 
Abu Dhabi 572 808 1380 
Duba i (e) 200 700 900 
Total 7765 7763 1552S 
(e) Estimation. 
Source: Apps. 2.7.1-2 7.3; BAPCO, Annual Report, 1970; BAPCO, Bapco and 
Bahrain 
From Table 2_12 we see that the 011 Industry provided JObs for 15 
thousand persons almost equally d1v1ded between citizens and expatriates. 
This percentage 1n fact depends upon two factors: one is the availability 
of experienced labour and the other is the opportunities in other employment. 
In th1s employment, estimated wages and salaries may reach $58 mill ion a 
year. (7?) However, the Impact of th•s expend·ture depends on the part that 
1s spent in the local economy. 
Employment ln the Em• rates' oi: :ndustry has declined (Fig. 2.13) (7S) 
in consequence of the stage of deve 1 opment reached 1n exploration and pro-
duction. The other influential factor has been the advanced technology 
used by the companies and their dependence on the local economy to prov1de 
some goods and services which the companies had previously provided for 
themselves We can detect the effect of the exploration and drilling In 
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Abu Dhabi during the late 1950's 1n the Increased labour force 1n 1960, 
and we can also note the part played by the development of the refining 
industry and the Dubal oil industry •n slow1ng down the decrease 1n 
employment 1n the late 1960's 
F2- Local Purchase and Local Contractors' Services 
The operating oil companies contributed to the local economies through 
local purchasing and local contractors' services In Kuwait, for example, 
in 1970 KOC's expenditure on local purchase amounted to $8,4 mill1on and 
its expenditure on local contractors' services was $12.9 m1ll1on; (79) 
AMINOIL's expenditure amounted to $4 5 ml1 1 1on and $8.0 respectively; (80) 
and AOC's expenditure 1n both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was $8,4 mi 11 ion for 
local purchase and $23.0 mill1on for the local contractors' services. (8l) 
In Bahrain, the Bahrain Petroleu~ Company's expend•ture for both local 
purchase and serv1ces was $5 mllllon (82 ) The Qara~, Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
ol 1 companies have not announced any figures to show the1r contribution to 
the host economies in terms of their expenditure on local purchase and 
local contractors' services, However, one can estlmate the1r contribution 
as comparable to those in Kuwait and Bahrain The ol 1 companies' con-
tribution to the local economies In terms of local purchase and serv1ces 
usually decreased after the company reached the stage of completing its 
exploration, dri 11 ing and production facil ;ties For example, KOC expen-
diture in this field fell from $24,0 m,ll1on in 1958(83 ) to $22.3 million 
in 1970, and this was \n spite of the 1ncreas;ng general contribution to 
the local economy from the companies' total expendlture. 
The oil Industry's contribution in fact exceeds the contributions 
mentioned earlier, e.g, to the field of training, whlch has increased man-
power productivity. Moreover, the !ndustry w1th lts advanced technology 
has affected technological development in the area 
These are in br1ef some of the Important effects made on the local 
economies by the development of the oi 1 resources of the Emirates. However, 
the most important impact comes from the companies' payments to the 
governments. These payments, and the pol 1c1es channel 1 1ng them, are the 
subject of the remaining chapters, 
In th1s chapter the bas!c background to oi 1 and gas production and 
sales has been given. The connect;on between these facts and 1ncome and 
expenditure in the Emirates is a two-way relationship T~e rate of ex-
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ploitat1on, the proportion of crude export to refining, etc", is increasingly 
affected by the Emirates' policies regard1ng 1ncome and expend1ture, 
although unt1l recently the1 r power to influence decision un this global 
industry was fairly l !mired, Succeed1ng chapters wn 11 examine some of the 
changing relationships which are now developing 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EMIRATES OIL REVENUE 
This chapter fa!ls •nto three parts; an assessment of the total 
o• 1 revenue rece•ved~ an eKploration of the facto~s determining the 
revenue, and a d1scuss\on of some of the considerations relevant to 
ach!evtng an optimum level of a: I revenue. 
Our assessment will cover the period from the f1 rst year of the 
commercial production of otl .n each of the Em1 ~ates unti 1 1970. Our 
aim tS to clar1fy the statements of the actual revenue received during 
these pertods;· the data be1ng der1ved from the governments'' official 
sources {publ lshed and unpublished), as wel 1 as those of the Inter~ 
national o1l ~ndustr-y and the specialised periodicals. The data has 
also been checked by the o~l production f1gures, {Apps. 2.1.1-2.1.6). 
In this chapter as In the other parts of this thesis, oil revenue 
1s taken as meaning all revenue received by the states from all aspects 
of 01 l explorat!on, exploitation, and ref1n1ng. As further noted 1n 
sub-section C, on Part Two of this chapter, these receipts appear under 
different headings, i.e. royalty, income tax, and other payments, e.g. 
Bonus: The ~nlttal payment at the time of s1gning ol 1 concession 
agreement, or payments pa!d accord1ng to some other con-
d1tlons such as level of production, discovery of 011 etc. 
Rent: Payment paid annually in accordance wtth the concession 
agreement. 
Import dues· Duty on Imported crude 01 I as in Bahrain (see App. 3" 1). 
Others: Payments for education, pol ice, jetties rent and government 
representat•ves allowances, etc. 
It must be noted that this chapter 1s concerned with the per1od 
before serious dlscuss:on of parttc~patlon and other ~ew approaches 
Retroactive and other payments, where possible, are allocated to the 
year received, rather than to allocated dates 
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to the oil industry had been made, 
Part One: Assessment of the 01l Revenue 
A Individual Emirates 
In this part we present br1efly the actual revenue received by 
each Emirate giving the detailed figures 1n the appendices attached to 
the chapter (Apps 3~ 1 - 3 4) These deta1 led figures wi 11 be uti 1 1sed 
later in the next four chapters, where they form the backbone for our 
investigation concerning the allocat1onal pattern of the oi 1 revenue. 
A1 - Bahrain 
Bahrain State was the first of the Em1 rates to receive 01l revenue. 
The first payment from the oil companies was received 1n 1926 and during 
the period 1926-1934 Bahrain State recelved a total of £6,800, The oi 1 
revenues of Bahrain State from 1934/1935, the year dur1ng which the 
commercial production of crude Oil commenced, up to 1970 were BD 171.7 
m 1 1 1 i on ( QD R 1 , 71 7 m i I 1 ion) This sum was received from the following 
sources. 
TABLE 3.1 
BAHRAIN STATE: TOTAL OIL REVENUE BY SOURCE, 1934/35//1970 
(OOO BD) 
Amount Percent of 
BAPCO 160463 
-;, 
146019 85 0 1 Production 
Crude oi 1 Import's Dut1es 14444 8.3 
= 
Others 11259 
Total 171722 
~ Production and associated actiVities. 
Source: Appendix 3.1. 
total 
93.4 
6.6 
100 
--
As the table shows 93.4% of the total revenue came from the activities 
of the Bahrain Petroleum Company and 6 6% came from other sources, of which 
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Bahrain's share on the Abu Safah 01 lf1eld accounted for 90%. The table 
also indicated that 85,1% of the total ol 1 revenue rece1ved came from 
Bapco's crude Oil production, wh1 lethe government's receipt from duties 
on imported crude was 8 3%c 
A2 - Kuwa1t 
The 011 revenue of Kuwa1t State fro~ the commencement of commercial 
production 1n 1946 to the end of the f1nanc1al year 1970/71, amounted to 
KD 3,458 mi 11 ion (QDR 45,986 mi 11 ion). This total includes KD 242 mi 11 ion 
Which was rece1ved from the oil companles but kept in an independent 
~~ "it 
account to be used 1n financing the 1971/72 publ 1c budget, 
Table 3.2 shows the total 01 l revenue rece1ved 
KUWAIT STATE: TOTAL O~L REVENUES BY SOURCE, 1946;;1970/71 
Source: 
Source 
KOC 
AOC 
AM~ NOlL 
Others 
Total 
(000 KD) 
Amount 
3,298,859 
91.373 
56,357 
11 '00 3 
3,457.592 
Pe11cent of total 
95,4% 
2.7% 
L6% 
0,3% 
100% 
The table 1nd~cates that KOC alone contributed 95.4% of the total 
Al 1 the available Hnformatlon Indicates that Bahra1n 1 s share 1n this 
field equals one half, However, the Bahrain State average receipt per 
barrel for the period studied was about 45 cents; this in spite of the 
fact that the Saud1 Arabian Gove(nment 1 s average receipt for the same 
period wc;~s about 88 cents per barrel (see Appendix 3.1), 
** The Kuwait State Budget 1 s annual oil revenue comes from the years oil 
royalties and the prev1ous year's Income tax from the operating oil 
companies, Th1s together With the fact that all the retroactive payments 
appear In the yea· 1n wh1ch they are collected, causes differences be-
tween Kuwait Government sources and other sources concerning the sum 
received annually from the ou 1 companies. After a thorough examination, 
the reason appeared to be 1 t,me lag'. However, the difference almost 
equals the KD 241 m;]]ion which represent the income tax due for 
1970/71. 
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011 revenue received by the State of Kuwait durtng the per1od stud.ed. 
AOC accounted for 2_7%, AMINO!L 1.6%, and the non-producing companies 
0 3%, this last fact represent;ng Kuwait Shell bonuses and rental payments. 
A3 - Qatar 
Qatar's commerc1al oil production started at the end of 1949. In 
a per1od of twenty-one years Qatar State received a total of QDR 5,748 
mil 1 ion as shown in Table 3-3-
TABLE 3.3 
QATAR STATE: TOTAL OIL REVENUE BY SOURCE, 1950/1970 
(MiLLION QDR) 
Source Amount Percent of Total 
QPC 4,707 81 0 9% 
SHELL QATAR 1 '0 16 17-7% 
Others 25 0.4% 
Total 5,748 100% 
Source: Appendix 3 3. 
Table 3 3 shows that QPC 1 s share 1n Qatar•s total oil revenue 
accounted for 81.9%, Shell Qatar for :7 7%, and the other operating 
companies for 0,4%. However, though Shell Qatar contributed less than 
one fifth of the total oil revenue .n the period stud.ed, the company 
has shown signs of rapidly lncreastng its pa•t1cipation (see App. 3-3), 
and 1t has overtaken the QPC 1 s share •n the annual oil revenue by 1973. 
A4 - Abu Dhab1 
In Abu Dhabi crude 011 production commenced in 1962, and since then 
an increas.ng oi 1 -evenue has been recetved by the state. However, the 
delay in amending the old o~1 agreements to brtng them in 1 ine with those 
of other producers .n the Gulf, was the reason for the very low average 
receipt per ba>~rel, which was 50.9 cents, 36.4 cents, 18,2 cents, and 
32.5 cents tn 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965 respect.vely By the end of 
1965 and 1966 Abu Dhabt had obtained the same financial terms as those 
operating in the OPEC member countries. This resulted In ratsing the 
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per-barrel recetpt to 75,3 cents 1n 1966.(l) 
The total oil revenue received by the state up to 1970 amounted to 
BD 396 mil lion (QDR 3,959 ml 11 ton) as shown in Table 3.4. 
TABLE 3 4 
ABU DHABI STATE: TOTAL OIL REVENUE BY SOURCE, 1962/1970 i'\ 
(OOO BD) 
Source Amount Percent of Total 
ADPC 258,206 65,2% 
ADMA 137,703 34.8% 
Total 395.909 100% 
Excluding the payments from non-producing compantes, estimated at 
BD 6 mi 11 1 on by the end of 1970 (see App. 3. 4)' 
Table 3.4 shows that of the total 01 l revenue recetved by the 
state, two thords came from ADPC, whJ le ADMA 1 s share was 34.8% Th>S IS 
in sptte of the fact that ADMA had started two years earlier. 
AS - Dubai 
The commercial product ton of c~ude 011 from Dwbai commenced •n 
1969. However, Duba1 had rece1~ed annual payments from 01 I compan;es 
since the late 1930's, These payments 1nc•eased dur'ng the 1960's and 
reached QDR 1 9 mill 1on per annum In 1965 and ?966 and QDR 3 1 mill iOn 
per annum tn 1967 and 1968. (2) The total o1l revenue received by Dubal 
state in 1969/70 was QDR 154 m1 j l 1on, as shown below :n Table 3.5 
TABLE 3 5 
DUBA! STATE: OIL REVENUE, 1969-1970 
Year 
~969 
1970 
Total 
( 000 QDR) 
Revenue 
1 7' 196 
137' 146 
154,342 
Source: Rent and Bonus see: MEDD, 'Econom1c Survey of the Northern Trucial 
States', pp. 89-90; PPS, Feb. 1970, p.67; Royalty and tax estimated 
according to production (App. 2 1 5) and averaged payment per 
barrel PPS, SepL 1972, p.332 
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A6- Growth of the Emirates 1 Otl Revenue 
The growth trends tn the Emtrates' oil revenue are clearly revealed 
in Ftg, 3,1 (see Apps. 3.1 - 3,4), They are rising trends. The main 
causes are the follow1ng: First: the output of crude otl increased very 
rapidly durtng the first few years of production (approximately the 
ftrst five), Thts may be seen from App. 2,1.6 also; the trend 1s common 
to all the Emtrates, as shown •n F1g, 3 1, Second: the tncrease in the 
early 1950's may be explained mainly by the introduction of an income 
tax system, which increased the Emirates off-take per barrel considerably, 
as wtl 1 be shown later in this chapter However, this reason is com-
btned with the rapid increase in production in Qatar and Kuwait. Third: 
the increasing revenue 1n the late 1960's stems from the agreement between 
the o1l companies and OPEC members to consider the royalty payment as 
part of the cost of production pa1d to the states as the owners of the 
resources, while income tax was to be calculated on the estimated net 
proftt, Thts agreement, known as 'expensed royalttes', wtll be dtscussed 
later in the chapter. In this period other factors also played an 
essential role in the growth of the revenue In Bahrain the share of 
the revenue coming from the Abu Safah otlfield was an Important factor. 
In Qatar the commencement of production by Shell Qatar, and in Abu Dhabi 
the applying of the financ1al terms prevailing in the OPEC member 
countries to the original oil concessions of ADMA and ADPC, stmilarly 
had an important tmpact 
B Some Differences 
The various Emirates differ 1n such matters as the per barrel 
receipt, the share of total oil revenue, and the per capita income from 
oil revenues, 
Bl - Recetpt per Barrel 
The receipt per barrel dtffers to some extent in each of the Emtrates, 
these receipts have also been increasing rapidly over the last two 
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decades, as shown 1n Table 3 6-
TABLE 3 6 
THE EMIRATES' RECEIPT PER BARREL OF CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, 
Year Bahratn¢ 
1950 17.9 
1955 8L8 
1960 79,3 
1965 80.3 
1970 83,5 
¢ BAPCO production only 
SELECTED YEARS 
·/- \ 
US CENTS/BARREL 
Kuwait 
8,6 
76 7 
76 5 
78-9 
82 8 
Qatar 
8.2 
83 6 
86,4 
83,2 
91 < 5 
Average receipt for Bahrain, OMAN and Duba1 
Abu Dhabi 
32.5 
92.0 
~~ For the purpose of compar1son, the average 1s based on the payment 
obligation for the year shown, 
Source: 1950:Apps, 2,1 1 - 2.1 5 and 3,1 3- 3,4; 1955-?0:Petroleum 
Information Foundation, op.c1L, PP- 1-5, 
The differences may be attributed to three main factors: First: 
the crude gravity, in which Qatar and Abu Dhabi are relatively well 
placed_ Second: the f,nanc,al terms obtained by each Emtrate, Th1s 
difference may be noted 1n the case of Bahratn's 1950 receipt, whtch 
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was Rs 10 per ton, while the other Em1 rates were receiVIng Rs 3 1n the 
same year; this may also be seen 1n Abu Dhabi's average receipt in 1965. 
Third: cost of production (see Part Two of this chapter), as in the 
case of Kuwait's average receipt for 1960, whtch dropped because of the 
high cost of crude produced by AMINOIL from the partitioned zone, and 
Qatar's average receipt for 1965 which dropped because of the high pro-
duction costs of Shell Qatar Company at that time. 
The receipt per ,barrel since 1973 has shown an enormous increase. 
Thus by the end of 1973 the Emtrates' receipt per barrel reached 
about US $8, and 1n 1974 w1th the pafttc1patlon agreements runn1ng 
at 60% of the operating companies' capt tal, these recetpts may 
reach US $10 per barrel, 
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B2- Each Emirate•s Share of the Total 011 Revenue 
Prior to 1946 Bahra1n was the only Emirate which had reached the 
commercial production stage, but since then other Emirates have come on 
stream, Kuwa1t in 1946, Qatar In 1949, Abu Dhabi 1n 1962 and Dubai in 
1969. Each Em1rate 1 s pos1t1on has changed during the last two decades 
(Fig 3 2). Table 3,7 shows each Emirates' share of the total revenue. 
Year 
1950 
1960 
1970 
-;', 
Grand 
Total 
TABLE 3,7 
THE EMIRATES• OIL REVENUE, 1950, 1960 and 1970 
(MILLION QDR) 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Abu Dhab1 Duba1 
9 55 5 
77 2' 109 260 
174 3,959 582 1 '1 06 137 
1 '717 45,986 5,748 3,959 154 
Total 
69 
2,446 
5,958 
57,742 
* The totals represent each state's oi 1 revenue since the beginning of 
commercial production, 
Source: Apps. 3,1 - 3 4 and Table 3,5, 
With the increase ln the number of Emirates producing, the rank 
of each one Has altered, Thts change can be seen from Fig_ 3.2, where 
we see Bahrain ceding its 1950 place (as second 1n rank) to Qatar 1n 1960, 
and the latter ceding this rank to Abu Dhabi in 1970. Kuwait has, since 
1950, been in the first place, far ahead of any other Em1rates, However, 
Kuwait 1 s share in the Emirates• 011 revenue dropped considerably from 
86% 1n 1960 to 66% in 1970, Th1s was almost equal to Abu Dhabi and Dubai •s 
share in the 1970 total oi I revenue. Therefore, in 1970, while Qatar and 
Bahra1n almost kept the1r 1960 1 s share, the drop 1n Kuwa1t 1 s share was 
absorbed by the newcomers, 
Another Inference that can be drawn from these f1gures are the 
difference between an Em1 rate 1 s share in production (F1g. 2.7) and its 
share in revenue. These differences have been explained 1n the discussion 
FIG 3 2 
Relat1ve D1stnbut1on of the Em1rates 011 Revenue 
Selected Years and Total. 
79 41% 
1950 
1970 
QATAR 
BAHRAIN 
KUWAIT 
ABU DHABI 
DUBAI 
86 23% 
1960 
TOTAL 
82 
of the per barrel rece•pt 1n each of the Em1rates 
B3- Per Captta Share from 011 Reven~e 
The third aspect 1n the comparison between the 1nd1vidual Em1rates, 
IS the pee cap1ta sha,"e of the state's 011 'evenue Th1s IS shown tn 
Table 3 8 
TABLE 3,8 
EMIRATES' PER CAPITA SHARE FROM OIL REVENUE, 1970 
(QDR and US $) 
Emirates Population (000) Rev, ( M 1 1 1 1 on) Per Capita 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
UAE 
733 
113 
300 
216 
Abu Dhab1 and Duba• only 
Source: Table 1 2 and Table 3.7. 
QDR 
3,959 
582 
1 ,24 3 
174 
QDR i 
5,401 I, 134 
5' 150 1 ,082 
4 '143 872 
816 172 
From Table 3.8 we saw that although Kuwa1t 01 l revenue 1n absolute 
terms was far ahead of any other Em' rates', in relattve terms 'thad 
grown closer to that of the other Em1rates, and 1f we consider the 
; mportance of the o 11 revenue ; n the Em 1 rates' Nat 1 on a 1 1 ncome we 
realise how meaningful vhos compariSOn •S 
Part Two: Factors Determ1n1ng the Em1rates' 011 Revenue 
The factors determ, n 'ng the Em1 rates 1 ol 1 revenue fa 11 under three 
broad head1ngs, ~ the level of crude 011 production, the cost of pro-
duct1on, and the ftnancial rerms appl icab1e These factors are closely 
·nte•related tn determ1n1ng the volume of oil revenue received by any 
producer it rs d·ff1cult to say wh·ch one of them •s the pr1me factor 
However, we may constder a relatively low cost of production to be an 
Important factor, s•nce 1t provide~ the operating companies with an 
1ncent1ve to increase crude orl production, and affords the Em1rates a 
better chance of getting favourable f1nanclal terms from the con-
cessronaires These three factors have, 1n fact, been generally discussed 
in almost every book or art1cle concerned wrth 011 economics. Our treat-
ment here Will be confined to the exam,nat,on of the way In wh1ch these 
factors have affected the Emr rate5' oil revenue, 
A Cost of Production 
The cost of producrng any commodity •S an Important factor in 
determining the future level of production of this commodity, It is 
certain that, •n a commercial sense, no commodity wl I 1 be produced If 1ts 
cost of production w1ll ex:ceed 1ts current prvce in the market: 1t is 
certain also that a producer of a relatively low cost commodity w1ll try 
to Increase h1s production capacrty and output as long as h1s profitS 
are maximizing. A producer or producers who enJOY a relat1vely low cost 
of production may obtain an econom•c rent 111 addition to normal profits, 
This economic rent may last as long as the marg\nai ly competltrve 
producers needed 1n the market are producing at higher cost 
This S1tuat1on may be noted clearly in M1ddle East Crude 01 I 
product ron The Mtddle East produces ol1 at a ~elatlvely low cost 1f 
compared w1th other producers outs•de the regron and consequently 1ts 
price contains a certain elemenc of 11 econom•c rent 11 The relation 
between d;fferent costs of producing 011 and the creation of economic 
"ent has been recognised by economists, and In a lecture del rvered in 
February 1971, Mr F S McFadzen, a manag1ng drrector of the Royal Dutch/ 
She11 Group of Compan1es, sa1d: 
Were wells are prol if·c and shallow, costs can be less than 
10 cents a barrel: at the other extreme, In the North Sea 
and the USA for example costs can be ten or twenty t;mes 
greater and the.e are all sorts of variat1on between the 
two, These wide differences 1n costs, therefore, produced 
fa1 rly substant1al econom1c 1ents •n certain areas, (3) 
We may now look at the cost of pooductron !n the Emirates and see 
to what extent this cost has affected the Emr rates' 011 revenue. 
TABLE 3,9 
THE PRODUCTION COST OF OIL IN THE EMIRATES, SELECTED YEARS 
Kuwait 
KOC 
AMIN01L 
AOC 
Bahrain 
BAPCO 
Qatar 
Onshore 
Offshore 
Abu Dhabl 
12 g ( J) 
(US CENTS PER BARREL) 
1960 
10(1951) e(4) 15(1959) e(4) 
35 e(4) 28(1959) e(4) 
6(1969) 
29(1971) 
N A 
N A 
N,A" 
N,A, 
84 
g ( 1 ) 
g(2) 
Onshore 
Offshore 
13,6(1971) g(3) 
24 0(1971) g(3) 
No rbyalty .s 1ncluded. 
e Est 1 m<He 
g Government sources. 
Not Announced 
Source: L The Planning Board, The Kuwait Economy, 1969/70, p.96. 
2 AI-Seyassah, 9/2/1973, p.3 (A pari imentary reply by the 
MiniSter of F1nance, Kuwa1t), 
3 An 1nterv1ew w1th the Head of the Economic DIVISion, Ministry 
of Petroleum and Industry, Abu Dhab1, Apri:, 1 972. 
4. C. lssawai and M Yeganeh, opociL, p.117. 
From Table 3 9 we saw the level of the Em1 rates 1 011 production 
costs. These costs d1ffer from 6 cents a barrel for KOC 1s production, 
by far the largest producer 1n the Em1rates, to 29 cents a barrel for the 
smallest producer, AMINOIL, wh1ch produced the heaviest o1l in the area 
and used the most expensive technique of production, i.e. pump1ng tech-
n1que, because of lack of suff1c1ent natura! dr1ve. All the other 
producers' costs 1 n the Emirates I ay between these two extremes, We 
real.se the relatively low costs for the Em1rates and other Middle East 
producers 1f we compare them W1th other producers outside the Middle 
East, Recently, the Middle East Econom1c D1gest (16/6/1972, p.664) wrote: 
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"The average well 1n the US produces 14 barrels a day 
at a cost of about $2 50 a barr'el, 1n the Middle East 
the average well produces over 5,000 barrels a day at 
a cost of about 20 cents a barrel o 11 
With the absence of accurate studies and publ 1shed data on this 
subject, one cannot be sure of the exact var1at1on of th1s cost in the 
d1fferent producing areas But what nobody d1sputes is the relatively 
low cost of M1ddle East 011 production compared with costs 1n other 
produc1ng areas; and since this part of the study is confined to the 
effect of the cost of production on the Emlrates 1 01 l revenue, we need 
not proceed to explore the extent of these variations, 
The relatively low cost of producing the Em1rates 1 oi 1 has affected 
their oil revenue in three ways, These are by provid1ng the producers 
w1th strong incentives to Increase the'r production of the Em1 rates 1 
crude 01 l,by al 1ow1ng for h1gh prof1ts and consequently h1gh •evenue from 
income tax, and at the same t1me by prov1d1ng the base for better 
financial terms to the States, not only from the new concessionaires but 
also from the existing concess1on holders, The chang1ng conditions in 
the Middle East oi I industry dunng the last two decades could not have 
been achieved if there had been no 11 economic rent 11 caused mainly by the 
relatively low cost of production 1n the reg1on. Thus the relatively 
low cost of production has affected and is still affecting the oil revenue 
of the Em1 rates, and of other producers 1n the Middle East, 
B Crude Oil Production 
The Emlrates 1 oil revenues have been greatly affected by the quantity 
of crude 011 produced, The Em1 rates' 011 revenues were almost completely 
related to the volume of production 1n the pre-1951 per1od; and s1nce then, 
although other factors have been brought 1n, 1 e, cost of production and 
financ1al terms, there is a close l 1nk between the 01 l revenue and the 
volume of oil produced. Clearly the changing oi I resources, the pattern 
of oil exploration and the granting of concessions as outl 1ned 1n Chapter 
II are also of major importance, 
In addition to the cost of production, crude o1l output also 
depends on other important factors. These are the crude oil reserve, 
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the world demand for oi 1, the pol IC!es of the operating oi 1 compan1es and 
the oi 1 pol 1cies of governments. We will attempt to clarify the effects 
of these factors on the crude oil production of the Emirates and con-
sequent 1 y on the 1 r o 1 I revenue, 
Bl - Crude 01 I Reserve 
It IS the crude o1l reserve which provided the industry with its 
base and determined its future development. The quantity of the reserve 
as well as 1ts qual 1ty has affected crude oil production. In 1970, 
although each Emirates• share in production d1ffers from Its share in tha 
reserve, each Em1rate nevertheless held the same rank ln reserve, pro-
duction (Fig. 2,7) and revenue (F1g, 3.2), As for the effects of the 
quality of the oil reserve, we may refer to the marketing difficulties 
which were facing some of the KOC 1 s heavy crude 1n the late 1960 1 s, and 
the higher pr1ce paid for 1 ighter crude. With increasing pollution 
problems the quality of the reserve may play a more Important role 1n 
the future production of crude oil However, as far as the foreseeable 
future is concerned the world hunger for oi 1 wi 11 certainly reduce any 
marketing difficulty fac1ng the heavy crude w:th high sulphur contents. 
82 - World Demand for Oi 1 
The world demand for 011 was a determining factor in the development 
of the Emi rates• oi 1 resources and their Increasing oi 1 production. 
Moreover, the Emirates have also been affected by the increasing world 
demand for imported oil, wh1ch has not only replaced other domestic fuels 
1n most consumer countries but also partly replaced the ind.genous oi 1 
suppl 1es of some of them, e.g. the USA. 
The increasing world demand for 011 during the last twenty-five 
years IS shown overleaf in Table 3. 10, 
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TABLE 3.10 
GROWTH OF WORLD OIL DEMAND, SELECTED YEARS 
(000 BD) 
Year Demand Increase over previous 
~e r i od 
1946 7 '773 4 years 
1950 10,968 41 '0% 
1955 16 ,213 47.5% 
1960 21 ,993 35 6% 
1965 31 ,040 45.6% 
1970 46,260 48.9% 
Source: 1946-1960. WORLD OIL, August 15, 1958, p.39, (including natural 
gas 1 iquids); 1965 and 1970: BP, Statistical Review of the 
World Oi 1 Industry, 1971, p.21. 
The world demand for 011 during the last twenty-five years has 
increased rapidly. This demand more than doubled every decade Another 
factor which affected the Em1 rates' oil production was the ever more 
rap1dly Increasing demand for Imported o1l, wh1ch ach1eved an 1ncrease 
of 10.7% per annum for the per1od 1961-1971, while the total demand for 
oil increased by 7,8% per annum for the same period. (4) This trend of 
depending on imported oil to meet domestic demand seems to be increasing 
and the USA, wh1ch consumes one-thl rd of the whole world's energy, will, 
it is estimated, import more than half of Its petroleum needs by 1980, 
compared with only twenty-five per cent 1n 1971. The Middle East's 
exports to the USA are expected to rise tenfold- to 6 m1 l lion barrels 
per day dur1ng this decade, (5) 
However, the world demand for oil depends on the ab1 1 ity of 011 to 
compete with other sources of pr1mary energy and on the degree of economic 
deve 1 opment. 
As for the ability of oi 1 to compete wtth other sources of primary 
energy, we may refer to the historical competition and the future outlook 
as shown in Table 3.11 overleaf. 
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TABLE 3.11 
WORLD COMMERCIAL ENERGY DEMAND BY SOURCE, SELECTED YEARS 
Soltd Petroleum Natural 
Year Fuels Fuels Gas 
Hydro Nuclear 
Electrtcity Electricity 
Total 
(106b/d o.e.)x 
1920 
1930 
1940 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1985 
86% 
81% 
69% 
52% 
36% 
22% 
15% 
14% 
9% 
14% 
21% 
32% 
41% 
53% 
55%;';;', 
2% 
3% 
6% 
10% 
16% 
18% 
17% 
16% 
3% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
7% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
* Excluding USSR, Eastern Europe and Chtna. 
0' 03% 
1% 
7% 
10% 
16,6 
18.0 
22.2 
28.6 
40.9 
69.5 
115' 0 
145-0 
** Thts estimation was made before the sharp Increase in the price of oil, 
which may considerably change the pattern of energy demand. 
x o.e.: oil equtvalent. 
Source: Royal Dutch/Shell Group, The Energy Outlook, p.2 
As Table 3.11 shows, the oil share 1n world commercial energy has 
increased substantially during the last half century. The Increasing share 
of natural gas 1n the world's commerctal energy may provtde another source 
of income for the Emirates, parttcularly with the tmproving technology for 
l iquifytng natural gas and with the tncreasing environmental pollution 
problems caused by other fuels, 
The other factor which has affected the demand for energy is the 
degree of economic development The higher the per capita income the 
h . h h . (6) 1g er t e per cap1ta energy consumption. 
B3 The Oil Companies' Pol ictes 
Besides the general economic JUStification for the companies' pro-
ductton schemes, there are other pol 1cy considerations that may also push 
forward or hold back production We may recal 1 here that about 86% of the 
total oi I production 1n the Em1 rates in 1970 was produced by the seven 
'Majors', and together with CFP the share was about 92% (Table 2.4). These 
companies are international Integrated oi I companies, and their pol ictes 
are affected by the1r overall Interest in all the1r act1vit1es, an 
interest which may somettmes be at variance with that of the producing 
·'· 
country. Professor Edith T. Penrose noted that: 
11 The rate at which the international companies made new 
investments, and the allocation of their Investment among 
the several producing countries, were Influenced by 
several types of consideration 
In the f1 rst place, the compantes are so large that each 
had to consider the pol ittcal consequences of 1ts actions, 
not only in the distribution of offtake among the several 
produc~ng countr1es but also In the rate of importation 
into some of the consumtng countries. ,. 
Secondly, the size and world-wide scope of the operations 
of the companies led them to put great weight on the ( 
avatlabiltty of crude oil from a w1de variety of sources ... 11 7) 
The effects as far as the Emirates are concerned, of th1s type of 
influence on pol 1cy, may be noted tn the following examples. 
First: 11When Iran closed down in 1951, Kuwaiti production was 
( 8) 
stepped up constderably. 11 Kuwattl annual production increased 63% 
1n 1951 and 33.4% in 1952. In this example, although the Kuwait oil-
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field potentiality was the base for this increase, the shut down of the 
Iranian oilfield was the important factor behind this sharp increase 
compared with that of 1950. (App, 2, 1.2). 
Secondly: In Abu Dhabi, ADPC 1s exploration activities went 
slowly until 1958, and then 1n October 1958 drilling was stepped up and 
concentrated in the Murban area, where the first well had been completed 
1n 1954 and the company had 11 found hopeful but not convincingly com-
mercial traces of otl. 11 ( 9) During the early 1960 1s a heightened pace 
of exploration and drll 1 tng was sustained and in consequence Abu Dhabi 
crude otl production commenced 1n 1962 and tncreased rapidly. In this 
example, although pr1or to 1958 we may see the effect of the Saudi clatm 
* The existance of such confl 1cts may explain the producing countries 
demand to have a more powerful say in the plans made by the 
operating oi 1 companies. Th1s demand led to the participation talks 
of the early 1970 1s. 
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to certain areas of Abu Dhabi, we may also notice certain elements of the 
oil companies' pol icy. Although the potential 1ty of the Abu Dhabi oil-
field was once again the base for the rapid increase in production after 
1958, the dispute between the lraq1 Government and IPC was also taken 
into consideration by the IPC parent companies in the1r decis1on to step 
up their activity in Abu Dhabi, 
84 - Government Pol ic1es 
The governments of the Em1rates had very 1 ittle effect on oil pro-
duction before the 1960's, but since then these governments, 1 ike those 
in other producing countries, have tried to increase thel r role in 
planning the production schemes for their oil resources. Up to 1970 
almost all the governments of producing countries had urged the companies 
to increase their 01 l production. Th1s pol 1cy was adopted by al 1 the 
producing countries. This was 1n sp1te of the OPEC pol 1cy of getting 
its members to agree on pro-rationing the output scheme to prevent another 
drop in the posting price 1 ike that of the late 1950's. However, the 
organisation has failed entirely on this issue. (10) Such a policy is 
impractical and even unnecessary when demand IS increas1ng faster than 
the supply, which was the case during the late 1960's and early 1970's. 
Another factor making this kind of programme unnecessary was the policy 
pursued by the companies during the 1960's, of avoJd1ng any dramatic 
confrontation with the producing countries, for an excess of supply over 
demand would almost inevitably lead to decreasing posted price and con-
sequently a confrontation. 
Nevertheless, the governments adopted a pol 1cy of Increasing their 
own role in their 011 industry by forming the national oil companies, 
and by increasing their control of the producing companies. Moreover, 
the new agreements carry stringent requirements concerning the size and 
speed of exploration and development undertaken by the compan1es. These 
governmental policies have affected the size of oi 1 production and 
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consequently the states' 011 revenue. 
In the early 1970's a new trend began. This trend was born in the 
Kuwait National Assembly and became the official pol 1cy of the Kuwaiti 
Government, when "the joint owners of KOC, Br1tish Petroleum and Gulf 
Oil, have been told by the Kuwa1t1 Ministry of Finance and Oil, to limit 
production in 1972 so that tt WI 11 be substant.ally the same as the 1971 
average,"(ll) That was about three mlll,on barrels daily, This govern-
mental restriction was a conservation measure as well as an indication of 
the country's lack of productive capac1ty to absorb the additional oil 
revenue. This restriction was based on the idea that Kuwa1t 1 s oil revenue 
should be correspondent to the state's need for revenue for both current 
and capital expenditure, Th1s idea also reflected the uncertainty of the 
Kuwaiti National Assembly about the state o1l reserve(lZ) on one hand, 
and on the other the risks wh1ch have faced the state reserve fund invested 
abroad. In later parts of th1s thes1s the feed-back affects of govern-
ments' financial and development pol 1cies on their 011 production pol icy 
will be further considered, 
So far we have presented some of the pol 1cies of the producing 
countries that have affected 01 l production, The governmental pol 1cies 
of the consuming countries also requ• re attention, 
This group has affected oil production by their protecting tariffs, 
by restricting imports from some sources, and by other polic1es which 
have ultimately affected the total demand for 011 or the demand for certain 
k1nds of crude, Thus both oil producing countries and consuming countries 
have affected the total supply and demand for oil, 
From the above we can see the effect of a country's crude oil reserve, 
of world demand, of the pol 1cies of operating 011 companies, and of 
governmental pol 1c1es on crude 011 production, and consequently on the 
state's o' 1 revenue. 
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C Financial Terms 
The f1nanc1al terms applied to the production and sale of the 
Emirates' oil have been changing considerably since the early 1950's 
when the tonnage royaltieS bas1s changed, and all the 01 l concessions 
1n the Em.rates- as elsewhere :n the Middle East- were amended to 
allow for the profit shar1ng erao The second important amendment was 
royalty expens1ng dur1ng the mid-1960's_ In this part of the study we 
w• 11 exam1ne the main financial factors wh1ch have affected the receipt 
per barrel and consequently the total ol 1 revenue of the Eml rates. We 
wi 11 not concern ourselves w1th the facto~s beh1nd the f1nanclal terms, 
for these 1 1e beyond the scope of this br1ef account, 
C1 - Royalties 
The oil royalty payments to the Em1rates have been arr1ved at by 
three main methods of calculation" Tonnage royalty, unexpensed royalty 
and expenses royalty. 
a) The Tonnage Royalty 
In all the pre-1950 o.l concessions ~n the Emirates, the royalties 
were dependent on quantity produced regardless of the pr1ce of oil or 
any other factor. The royalty was f1xed per ton produced This royalty 
was Rs 3! in Bahrain (BAPCO); Rs 3 (KOC), and $2.5 (AMINOIL), in Kuwait; 
Rs 3 (QPC) in Qatar;( 13 ) and Rs 3 1n Abu Dhabi (l 4) All the Emirates' 
royalty prior to 1950 was tonnage royalty and pa1d 1n 11 Gulf11 rupees, while 
although other producers in the M1ddle East, particularly Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq, were receiving tonnage royalty, the1r royalt1es were calculated 
in gold value and consequently their receipt per ton was higher, (15 ) 
b) Unexpensed Royalties 
After the amendment of the concessions agreements 1n the early 1950's 
the Emirates' o1l royalties were f1xed as a percentage- 12!% of the tax-
reference pr1ce - posted price - t0 form part of the 50% income tax due 
to the governments from the operating companies profits as calculated 
93 
according to the tax reference price. 
c) Expensed Royalties 
The producing countries 1n their 1962-64 negotiations asked for a 
separate payment of royalty from the oil companies before assessing their 
income tax obl 1gat1onso Royalty would then be shown as an operating cost 
in the same way as other expenses, e.g. wages and salaries, and deducted 
before arr1v1ng at taxable national profits as def1ned by OPEC - 11 namely, 
imputed sales proceeds on the basis of posted or tax-reference prices, 
less operating cost inclus1ve of royalty. 11 (l 6) All the OPEC members 
have s1nce 1964 begun to receive an expensed royalty, Qatar and Kuwait 
since 1/1/64 and Abu Dhab1 since November 1966. However, a certain 
discount from the tax-reference price had to be allowed for, but later 
In 1968 most of these discounts were reduced, The OPEC members 1 additional 
revenues from the 1968 agreement ranged between 4.8 and 9.0 cents per 
barrel, over and above the Increases in revenue of 3.5 to 5,5 cents per 
barrel obtained at the end of 1966 (l7) 
This in brief summarises the three stages which the royalty payment 
has passed through. However, in some of the 1960 1 s 011 concession 
agreements, the royalty payment was higher than 12.5 per cent of the tax 
reference price. In Abu Dhabi, for example, the Middle East Oi 1 Company 
will pay up to 14% of the posted price as royalty, and this percentage 
'11 h 16° • h p 0 C ' I • (18) WI reac ~ 1n t e an cean orporat1on s concession 
C2 - Crude Oi 1 Pr1ce 
The Middle East Crude Oil price is a subject that has engaged a 
considerable part of the works of the oil economists. (l 9) However, our 
concern here will be confined to the posted prices which have prevailed 
since 1950. How these prices came into effect or what the right price 
should be, are not go1ng to be discussed here Since exploration of this 
would necessitate detailed dlscuss1on beyond the scope of this work 
However, we cannot proceed without cast1ng at least a glance at the 
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prospects for oil pr1ces as these were seen in 1970 and 1971, 
Since the early 1950 1 s the Emirates 1 oil revenue has been closely 
affected by the posted price, on the basis of which the net profits, 
calculated from the tax reference price (the posted price minus any 
discount agreed on), and the royalt1es have been determined. The 
Emirates 1 posted price of crude 011 has been changed as follows: 
1953 
1953 
1956 
1957 
1959 
1960 
1970 
TABLE 3.12 
POSTED PRICE OF OIL, KUWAIT AND QATAR, 1953-1970 
Kuwait 
API 31 
(April) 
(July) 
(Dec ) 
(May) 
(Feb.) 
(August) 
(Nov.) 
( $ PER BARREL) 
(Al-Ahmidi) 
0° - 31 9° 
L50 
L 72 
L85 
1,67 
1 59 
L69 
Qatar (Umm-Said) 
API 41,0°- 41 9° 
2 08 (40.0 - 40.9) 
2 10 
2.23 
2 05 
1. 95 
End 1970 L69 1. 95 
Source: OPEC, OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1970; see also PPS 
Sept. 1971, pp, 326-327_ 
From Table 3.12 we may see the change in the posted price since the 
early 1950 1 s. The Kuwait and Qatar onshore crude 011 price gives us an 
idea of other crude prices, since each API grav1ty degree counts for 2 
cents. 
We also see the rise 1n price for the crude oi 1 up to May 1957, 
while in February 1959 and August 1960 the price dropped below that of 
1953. This drop in price affected the Em1 rates 1 receipt per barrel -as 
1t did that of other producers 1n the Middle East. These two reductions 
resulted in the formation of OPEC, which tried to undo these reductions, 
an aim only achieved in the last quarter of 1970 and successfully held 
since 1971, when the prices drove ahead, However, because of the 1959 
and 1960 reduction and the stable oil price dunng the 1960 1 s 11 the 
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1971 increase in posted prices and the realignment of prices to take 
account of dollar devaluat•on; Petroleum Intel I tgence Weekly has 
calculated that 'real import costs' to Europe and the USA are lower than 
the 1 r 1 9 57 1 eve 1 ' 1 ( 2 0) 
Since the posted pr1ce •s considered •n most cases as the tax 
reference price, 1ts effect on revenue was clearly not•ceable, and any 
change would affect the states' rece•pt per barrel. In 1959 and 1960 
the o1l companies lowered the posted pr1ce, and 1n doing so shocked the 
producing countries into a real 1satlon of the var1ab1 lity of their 
revenues; this in turn led to a determination to change the relation 
between the companies and the produc1ng states radical I yo 
However, the price of crude 011, 1 ike any other commodity price 
was affected by the equil lbrlum of supply and demand, although in the 
case of crude oil there were also other factors affecting th1s pr1ce; 
no commodity, in the long run, can depart far from this economic law 
1n such a wide market. Thus when the reductions took place they were 
an expression of the fast Increasing supply durtng the late 1950's which 
had not met wlth enough demand to absorb it; and when t~e prices were 
driven upward 1n 1971 they too were an expression of the increasing 
demand for petroleum dur1ng the 1960's (see Table 3.10) and. the estimated 
demand for the 1970's (see Table 3. 11) The world reserve/production 
ratio was also steadily fall tng Thts ratio fell from about 64 in 1960 
to 52 and 37 in 1965 and 1970 respectively. (Zl) This led Mr. H.R. Warman, 
Chief Geologist of British Petroleum, to come to the following conclusion 
in a recent paper about 'The Future of 011 1 : 
·'· 
"Perhaps the most obvious conclusion 1S that the pressures 
of shortage and changes of ~ources wdl inevitable lead to 
continued pnce increases.••l22)' 
However, we may think of the 1ncreas1ng pr1ce of oil as not only 
This article was written before the 1973 increase. 
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arising from the pressure from the producing countries, although there 
IS a considerable pressure, but as also indicative of the increasing 
scarcity of commercial energy and the h1gh cost of developing these 
sources to meet world needs Thus a price Increase would normally balance 
the supply of a scarce commod1ty With demand by Increasing supply as well 
* as by reducing demand However, any price chosen will have its long-
term consequences on both the producers and the consumers, and it w1l 1 
be in the long-term interests of both to allow the economiC price of oil 
I~·/~ 
to express itself, 
C3 - Rate of Income Tax 
The rate of income tax has affected the Emirates' oil revenue by 
allotting to them a part of the operating oil companies' profits, Income 
tax payable on negotiated and agreed tax-reference oil pr1ces was intra-
duced in the Emirates- as elsewhere ln the M1ddle East- during the 
early 1950's. A profit-sharing agreement was concluded in Kuwait in 
December 1951 with effect from January, 1951, in Bahrain 1n 1952 with 
effect from January, 1952, Qatar w1th effect from 2nd September, 1952, (23 ) 
and Abu Dhabi onshore 19th September 1964 and offshore November 1966. (24 ) 
The 50% income tax concept was prevalent in the Middle East during the 
1950's and 1960's, A new method of expensing royalty was adopted in 1964. 
This in fact raised the actual 1ncome tax paid In princ1ple, from less 
than 50% (after royalty payments) to 50% in add1tlon to royalties. The 
second change in the income tax rate was achieved during the last quarter 
of 1970, raising the 1ncome tax to 55% in addition to royalties with effect 
from 14th November, 1970, This increase in the rate of Income tax should 
lead directly to an Increase in the Emirates' oil revenue In 1971 this 
Demand may be reduced by an Improvement 1n the technology of using the 
scarce commodity, which will be encouraged by h1gher pr1ces, 
If any commodity were sold below its economic price this could hinder 
the development of other alternative commodities, while 1t IS also true 
that an over-priced commodity would encourage the development of 
alternatives and risk losing 1ts previous position. 
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Increase was estimated per barrel of output as follows: Kuwa1t 6.68 cents, 
Abu Dhabi 7.90 cents and Qatar 8 19 cents (Table 3.13) 
C4 - Other Factors 
Almost all the oil concessions in the Em1rates provided the states 
w1th bonuses, rental and other small payments, These payments although 
not large sums, were important when they were received before the oil was 
produced 1n commerctal quantities. However, although bonuses and other 
payments have recently been considerably larger than those of the 1930's, 
they represent a very small proportion in the Emirates' current 01 I 
revenue, In addition to the payments associated with production there is 
another sort of payment associated with ref1n1ng actiVIties (Bahrain and 
Kuwait), The discounts allowed for the operating companies from the 
posted price have also affected the states' 011 revenues, 
C5 - Other Factors Affecting the Real Income 
The real income is dependent upon the purchasing powe~ of the 
monetary income, In this respect the rea 1 1 ncome of the Emirates is 
affected by the world-wide inflation and in the pre-1950's, when the 
royalties were pa1d In rupees, 1t was affected by the devaluation of the 
rupee in the 1930's and 1949, However, the current revenue, wh1ch 
depends largely on the posted pr1ce, was adjusted on account of currency 
devaluation, and an annual increase of 2.5% to compensate for •nflationary 
effects has been made s1nce the 1971 Tehran Agreement 
From our survey of the effects of the financial terms on the 
Emirates' o1l revenues, we can see how Important these factors have been 
in determining the Em1rates' o•l revenue The •mprovement 1n these 
financial terms increased the rece1pt per barrel For example the Qatar 
receipt per barrel increased from 8,2 cents in 1950 to 86,4 cents 1n 1960 
and 91 5 cents 1n 1970 (Table 3.6). The estimated increase from the 1971 
Tehran Agreement was estimated as can be seen 1n Table 3,13, 
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TABLE 3.13 
OIL REVENUE: ESTIMATED INCREASE RESULTING FROM TEHRAN AGREEMENT, 1971 
(CENTS PER BARREL) 
Emirates II I I I IV v Total 
Kuwait 
15;2-31/5/1971 
1/6-31/12/1971 
Abu Dhabi 
15/2-31/5/1971 
1/6-31/12/1971 
Qatar 
15;2-31/5/1971 
1/6-31/12/1971 
Increase 
I I Increase 
Ill Increase 
of 
of 
in 
IV El imlnat1on 
v Elimination 
27.22 6.68 2 < 79 1 67 
32 82 6.68 3.36 1. 67 
19.53 7 90 L97 2 07 
25"35 7 90 2 59 2 07 
19°25 8, 19 1 .97 2 0 14 
25. 19 8 19 2.58 2 14 
posted p"l ce 
Income tax." 
royalty payments. 
of expensing royalty dtscount. 
of market1ng and gravity discount. 
Source: NAFT AL-ARAB, March 1971, ppo22-23 
0. 86 39' 2 
0 0 86 45.4 
L84 33.3 
1 84 39 8 
2 0 10 33.7 
2' 10 40.2 
The actual Increase ln the average pe" barrel receipt 1n 1971 over 
1970 was 32 2 cents in Abu Dhab1, 34,9 cents 1n Qatar, 36.7 cents in 
Kuwa1t, with 28.0 cents as the average for Bahrain and Duba1. (2S) 
These are the effects of the financial terms on the Emirates' oil 
revenue, which together with crude oil production and low cost of pro-
duction resulted 1n increas1ng oi 1 revenue to such an extent that these 
countries, although considered underdeveloped, enjoyed one of the highest 
standards of per capita Income 1n the world" 
Part Three: Some Consideration for Achieving the Optimum Level of Oil 
Revenue 
The most obv1ous fact about petroleum resources, ls that they are 
1 rreplaceable, Any country's production w1l l lead to the depletion of its 
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deposit once the equ~valent quantity has been produced, Therefore, a 
far-sighted pol 1cy to ach1eve the optimum uti l1sation of the petroleum 
resources must be adopted 1f considerable waste is go1ng to be avoided, 
This policy should a1m at max1mnslng the benef1ts a society der1ves 
from the explo~tation of its petroleum resources, tak1ng into consider-
ation the well being of future generations as well as of the present one 
Thus, such pol 1cy would not always a1m at maximising 011 production and 
oil revenue when it is possible; nor would it necessar1 ly a1m to dis-
tribute production over a longer period of t1me 
There Is no ready answer to the question The problem should be 
left for the country concerned to solve in the 1 1ght of it's econom•c 
capacity to uti I 1se its petroleum resources and the revenue derived 
from them in the most eff1c1ent way, taking :nto account anticipated 
future benefits However, light can be shed on some relevant con-
siderations. 
A Alternative Ways of Ut1 I 1S1ng Petroleum Resources 
Petroleum resources, at the present time, may be exported as crude 
to the International market where a considerable demand exists or 
utll ised as a base for domest1c •nd~stry and other f,elds of economic 
activity, In the Em1 rates the o• I !ndustry is crude-export-oriented, as 
shown earlier .n Chapter I I, The Em, rates should compare the long-term 
benefits which might be der1ved from these resources by e1ther way of 
utilisation, i.e. the benefits der1ved from act1v1t1es based on uti l 1sing 
the petroleum resources as fuel and raw mater1al, and the benefits 
derived from the ut1l isatlon of the export proceeds. In pract1ce it is 
not a simple e•ther-or choice. Rather it is a question of f1ndlng the 
best combination with wh•ch to achieve the maximum possible benefit, 
The r1ght combination 1s, however, not easy to f1nd If they dec1ded to 
* We mean the recoverable reserve In the 1 ight of present and future 
technology, not merely the proved reserve, 
100 
use the1r petroleum resources as a base for Industry and other econom1c 
activitres, the Emirates wouid require a long per1od of preparat•on 
before therr pol rcy be~ame viable They would need to gain technolog•cal 
know-how and adapt therr economies to grapple with the export diffrcultres 
fac•ng manufactured products. Moreover they would need to follow com-
pletely new approaches to a number of quest,ons, such as employment 
pol ic1es, econom:c lncentijves, and even the quest1on of the economiC 
and pol ltrcal unification of the Emirates and their economic integration 
into some form of large~ ~egional co-operatiOn (see Chaps VI! I and IX) 
Thus, such a cho•ce may se• ve as a long-term gu1del 1ne rather than an 
immediate alternatrve to the present pol 1cy" 
B The Product1ve Absorptive Capacity 
Since petroleum •s an eKhaustible resou;ce, the est1mation of the 
local need for its export proceeds should take into cons1derat.on the 
capacity of the domesr;c economy to abso~b the proceeds econom1cal ly 
Otherw1se these proceeds w1 Jl be d1 rected to ltems of expendrture whrch 
do very 1 ittle to increase the product1ve capaciry of the economy More-
over, a level of revenue Which eKceeds the econom1c needs may even prove 
destructive by encourag·ng waste of the nat1onal resources and produc~ng 
the wrong Incentives through such rh:ngs as a disconnectron of the link 
between effort and reward (see Chap IX) 
The present productiVe capac1ty of the Emirates w•ll be 1nsuffic1ent 
to absorb the present levels of the oil revenues with even moderate 
efficiency and even in the medtum term (26 ) For example, Qatar oil 
revenue rn 1974 may be estimated at more than $1,500 m1ll1on (per capita 
income about $11 ,000) compared w;th a government local expenditure •n 
1970 of less than $l50 mrl 1 ion However, In other exportrng countries 
the case is not so" Though none of them Will be able in the short term 
(1-5 years) to develop their product1ve capacities to absorb the •n-
creasing oil revenue; some of them, such as Iran, Alger1a, Nigeria and 
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Iraq have the potential natural and human resources to increase the1r 
absorptive capac1ty to match the increasing oil revenue In the medium 
term, 
Nevertheless there are some poss~br lit1es wh1ch may help the 
Emirates to increase the absorptive capacity of their economies, First: 
establ rshlng new rndustr\es 1n the flelds of energy-based ref1n1ng and 
petrochemical 1ndustrles; establishing and expanding Investment companies 
and financial instrtut1ons to enter the external markets, expanding the 
local fishing industries, animal husbandry and other agricultural activities 
when they are economically v1able; developing shipprng and related 
industries, Second: through economic and political unification of the 
Emirates. Such unification could provtde larger markets for Industry, 
release a considerable proportion of the educated civil servants to work 
in the other fields of the economy, and provide a larger economy for 
planning and specialisationc The problem of the smallness of the Em1rates 
wi 11 be discussed later in Chap, iX, Third: integration Into some form 
of wider regional econom1c co-operation such as the Arab Common Market, 
wil 1 allow the Emirates as a part of the region to enjoy the1 r comparative 
advantages, e.g. their petroleum productron and petroleum-based Industry, 
financial potentlal, shipping and other maritime actiVIties~ These 
opportunities may provide the Emirates With a wider range of productive 
outlets which may absorb some of their 011 revenuec 
However, we must emphasise aga1n that the Emrrates need to develop 
~ 
their social, economic, and political institutions, The ful 1 realisation 
of the danger of over-dependence on one exhaustible resource, and the 
recognition of the variable nature of their present day prosperrty may 
wel 1 be considered pre-requisites for any effective Increase 1n the 
productive capacity and consequently the absorptive capacrty of the 
* The Emirates have in fact already started the process of reshaping 
their institutions, 
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Emirates 1 economies 
C International Investment Opportunities 
The th~ord consideration which should be explored fully when 
plann1ng for oil product1on and ~evenue ;s the expected benefits to be 
der1ved from 1nternat1onal investment opportunities, compared to the 
ant 1 c1pated benef1ts of keep1ng the petrole~m :esou. ces in the ground. 
The Emirates and other producers can decide to produce more oil and 
receive revenue in excess of the1 r local econom1c needs This Is a 
reasonable course 1f the international ma1ket IS secure enough for their 
investment Th1s could Indeed be a far-s1ghted pol 1cy, from the pro-
ducers 1 po1nt of view, lf we consider the econom;c rent e 1 ement In the 
present structure of the price of o1lc Thos economic -ent may be 
decreased or even eliminated by a cons:derable development •n energy 
technology and the production of other sources of energy at a cheaper 
price (see Chap. IX). 
In VIew of the recent s1ze of the 01 I reven~e surpluses, the 
available 1nternat1onal investment oppoltun,tles aoe not adequate, So 
far the produc1ng countr~es' surpluses have been invested 1n short-
term flnanc1al assets, 11 But they have enough already both from their 
own po1nt of view, and probably from the po1nt of v1ew of the stability 
of the world monetary system, wh1ch would become dange~ously 1 1qu1d If 
all future surpluses where held 1n the fo;m of money or near money, 11 (Z?) 
As Professor Little and Mr, Mab•o polnred out: 11 Apan from searching 
for oil and for substitutes, rhere IS one th1ng that the Western World 
and Japan can do to help themselves: 1mpF0V1ng the longer-term Arab 
(281 Investment In theor countr1es. 11 ' These investment prospects are 
mainly long-term government and onternatlonal agency bonds, equ1t•es, 
and real estate. 
Long-term bond5· g1ven present-day uncertainty about the future 
rate of acceleration of 1nflat1on, the Em1rates could ask for a real 
i03 
rate of Interest for long-term loans, ,f they are go1ng to produce oi I 
in excess of their absorptive capacity needs Th1s rate should take 
future Inflation into account, They then should ask fo,. 1 Indexed 
bonds' 11 S1nce the oll p;oducers would be invest1ng essent~al ly to 
secure future Import~, when rhe1 r 011 exports have peaked out, the 
bonds should be indexed on some :nternatlonai bundle of goods and services 
wh1ch these countries anticipate want1ng to import 11 (29 ) !t may be 
recognised also, that the producers could fear default on the part of 
some borrowing governments Ut1l 1s1ng the lnternat1onal Monetary Fund 
(IMF) as Intermediary may help to ease this fear, 
Egu1ty and Real Estate: The other two forms of long-term investment 
that m1ght suit the 011 produc1ng countries are Investment 1n real estate 
and equ1ty in the internatoonal market- fhe prospects for swch invest-
ment should be wider 1f the world needs more o;l than the produc1ng 
countries can produce while absorb;ng the proceeds However, such 
investment opportunities are restricted in most countries and are always 
subject to leg1slat\on" Thus though lt •s understandable that no 
country will allow fore1gn countries to dom1nate 1ts economy, It is also 
necessary for the investors to have reasonably secure opportunities if 
they are going to 1nvest" Therefore the lnvestors may ask for guarantees 
aga1nst the exprop(iatlon of hojdings and property, and the 1mposit1on of 
d1scr1minatory or excessrve taxes ( 30) 
These sorts of investment, in addit1on to other present day forms 
may prov1de the necessary incent1ve for the producers to continue to 
export oil and rece1ve revenues in excess of the1r local economic needso 
Thus, the consuming countries should explore the possib1 I ity of offering 
the producers a comb1nat1on of acceptable assets in exchange for 011, 
wh•ch will cost the consumers less than do1ng Without the o1L (3l) 
However, unless the Emirates are ~easonably sure that the future 
value of their assets Invested ln the international market w1ll at least 
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equal the predictable future value of their produced petroleum resources, 
it would be unwise for the Emirates to produce oil and receive revenue in 
excess of their local absorptive capac1ty. This is, of course, a judgement 
based on economic considerations. Nevertheless, the econom1c considerations 
are not the only active forces in the real world. 
The need to relate oil production and export to the ava1 lable pro-
ductive opportunities of 1ts proceeds seems to be gaining understanding 
not only from producing countries but also from consuming countries as 
well. Th1s is indicated by the various b1 lateral agreements aim1ng to 
assist in expanding the absorptive capacity of produc1ng courtries 1n 
return for their supply1ng consuming countries with o1l, In a recent 
comment on a high rank Saudi Minister1al delegation to the USA, the US 
Ambassador to Saudi Arab1a, Mr, James Akins, said· 
"that from the American point of view 1 the purpose of the 
operation is to show the Saud1s that it is worth producing 
the oil rather than keep1ng 1t In the ground.••(32J 
In this chapter we have presented the individual Emirates• oil 
revenues, looked at the factors determining the sums received, and 
discussed some considerations which may help 1n planning oil production 
and oi 1 revenue. The oil revenue of the individual Emirates wil 1 form 
the back-bone of our discussion in the following chapters, Our consid-
eration of ways of achieving the optimum oi 1 revenue will also help our 
discussion in the rema1ning chapters of the thesis" 
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CHAPTER IV 
BAHRAitJ: THE ALLOC8JION OF JHE OIL REVE~~UE 
Th1s chapter falls into three parts, First: An Introduction, Thus 
WI 11 deal with two different subjects: A) An account of the method by wh1ch 
the available data concerning the allocation of the o1l r-evenue in all the 
Em1 rates will be analysed; B) A br1ef introduction concernrng Bahrain, 
Second: Bahrain state public revenue, expenditure and reserve, Th1rd: 
Bahrain state oil revenue allocational pattern. 
Part One: Introduction 
A Method 
This chapter as wel 1 as the following three wtl I exam1ne the 
allocational pattern of the oil tevenue 1n the lndiv1dual Em1rates, ~ e 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Un1ted Arab Emirates, One model will be 
uti 1 1sed for computing the ava1 lable data for each of the Emirates. 
The oil revenue IS taken to mean all the payments received by the 
states from the working o1l companies, e g. income tax, royaltles, bonuses, 
rent and rmport duties (see Chap. Ill, p. 74), In exam1nlng the allocation 
of these revenues we have to know the pract,ces and procedures adopted by 
each Emirate 1n allocating Its o1l ~evenue Theref~re we cannot depend 
entirely on any one source, such as a government's closed accounts of 
budgets, unless it shows all the oil revenue received; rn other cases we 
w1 11 have to consult al 1 sources available and search for any information 
which may throw I ight on the actual pract1ce in any part1cular Emirate, 
Such a s1tuat1on arises in many of the Emirates, when the allocation to the 
privy purse of the Rulers is made before the rema1n1ng oil revenue is 
entered to the government budgets, 
The expend1tu~e of the 011 revenue wil 1 be considered under f1ve 
ma1n head1ngs: Current Expenditure, Cap1tal Expenditure; The Allocation 
to the Ruling Family (sometimes called the Pr1vy Purse); Expenditure on 
Land Purchase Schemes; and f1nally Allocation to the Reserve Fund, At 
the same time we wil 1 try to breakdown each of the ma1n Items 1nto their 
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functional allocations, e.g. the current expenditure on soc1al services, 
the current expenditure on public uti 1 1ties, etc. We wi 11 also show the 
structural change and development of the public revenue, public expenditure 
and the public reserve and WI 11 indicate the role played here by the 011 
revenues. 
In the following paragraphs and with the help of F1g. 4.1 we wi 11 
explain the model used in computing the data, but first the following 
terms require definition: 
Annual Oil Revenue: All the revenue received by the states 1n one 
fiscal year. 
Oi 1 Revenue Spent: The annual 011 revenue minus any allocation to 
the reserve fund; or plus any sum withdrawn from the reserve fund 
to finance public expenditure. 
Annual Available 011 Revenue: Annual 011 revenue plus any sum 
withdrawn from the reserve fund to finance public expenditure. 
Net Allocation of Total Oil Revenue: The final actual allocation 
of the total 011 revenue received in the period studied. 
Gross Deficit: Total deficit caused by the failure of the self-
revenue of any particular group of services to cover their expen-
diture. 
Total Gross Deficit: The total def1c1t on all public services and 
other allocations reckoned aga1nst the1r total Internal revenue. 
Proportional contribution of Oil Revenue Spent: The proportional 
contribution of the 011 revenue spent, to meeting the gross deficit 
of the public services and allocations, expressed as a percentage 
of total gross def1cit. 
The model is built as follows (see Fig. 4.1): 
Set One: Revenue 
1. All the revenue is divided 1nto groups, e.g. oi 1 revenue, 
revenue from social services, revenue from publ 1c utilI ties, etc. 
Simplified Form of the Data Computmg Model 
S t ONE ,e S.t TWO Strt THREE 
Revenue Expend rtu re Surplus on Def1c1t 
Total Total 
1950 1300 
! 
1950 1200 
! 
1950 
1t0 ~ 
1970 1900 1970 1950 1970 -50 
Total TR Total TE 
IGll OIL REVENUE IG1 l OIL 
950 0 950 
~ 
• 
l 
1800 0 1800 
IG2l SOCIAL SERVICES IG2l SOCIAL SERVICES SOCIAL SERVICES 
6 11 2 20 6 19 -14 5 -2 
~ ~ ! ~ ~ l 
20 4 0 100 25 40 = 
I l j 
IGN-ll CAPITAL ITEM IGN-ll IGN-1) 
0 0 
l l 
25 12 
~ ! 
-25 -12 
0 0 200 150 200 150 
(GN) OTHERS IGN) OTHERS IGNl OTHERS 
Computed as Computed as .. 
Total Annual ReYenue Total Annual Exp. - Revenue- Expend 1ture 
-Total AMual ReYenue 
of IGl• G2 . •GN-1) 
Total Annual Ex p of 
IG1 + G2.. . • GN-ll ! 
.. 
SUMMARY TABLE SUMMARY TABLE SUMMARY TABLE 
Year G1 G2 GN lOtal Y~r G1 G2 GN Total Year G1 G2 .GN Total 
1950 950 19 
l l ~ ! i 
1950 0 45 
l l l l i 
1950 95 -26 
~ l ~ i ! 
1970 1800 2J. 
.. 1970 0 165 
-· 
1970 1800 141 
TOTAL .. 
-- ... . .. TOTAL ....... 
---- ·-· 
TOTAL ... . .. 
-- --
FIG 4 1 
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2. Every group IS divided into sub-g~oups, e g. soc1al services 
are d1v1ded 1nto Educat1on, Health, Soc1al Affairs, etc. 
3. We feed the computer with all the revenue information avai ]able 
about every sub-group, starting w1th the total publ 1c revenue 
rece1ved 1n any f1scal year. 
4 From the information nored 1n 3 above we calculare the following: 
a) The total revenue received by any group of services. 
b) The revenue of the adm1n1strat1on and others, computed as 
follows: the revenue of the admin1strat1on and others: 
total publ 1c revenue - (The total revenue of Group 1 + 
Group 2 .. T. ,.+Group n-1). 
c) A summary table including the totals of all groups and the 
grand rota 1. 
Set Two: Expenditure 
1. We organ1se expenditure by the same method as that used for 
organis1ng revenue, 1 e, we d1v1de 1t 1nto groups and sub-
groups (Set One, 1-3), 
2. We compute the group totals, the total for the administration 
and others, and the summary table as we did !n Set One 4 (a, b 
and c) . 
3. We then compute the following: 
Set Three: 
a) Oi I revenue spent: annual 011 revenue minus allocation to 
or plus withdrawal from the reserve fund. 
b) Allocation to the reserve fund = annual oi 1 revenue minus 
oil revenue spent. 
1. Set Three= Set One minus Set Two (1 and 2 as mentioned 1n Set 
Two). 
2. From the summary table in Set Three we compute the following: 
a) Gross Deficit: Gross deficit on each group of services• self 
11 0 
2. a)/ revenue. 
b) Total Gross Deficit: The total of the gross deficitS of 
all the groups. 
3. Proportional contr1but1on of 011 revenue spent to meet all 
serv1ces 1 def1c1t expressed 1n percentage 
01l Revenue Spent 
Total Gross Def1c1t 
4. The allocation of oil revenue spent : 
Proportional contribution of oil revenue spent x Gross Deficit 
5. The allocation of annual ava1lable oil revenue IS the allocation 
of annual available oil revenue to items of expenditure and 
reserve" 
6. Net allocation of total 011 revenue: Actual allocation of all 
the oil revenues received during the per1od studied. At this 
stage we may regard the reserve fund as an intermediary 
account where 011 revenue is kept unt1 l need arises (see Chap. 
VIII). Thus when presenting the structural change in the oil 
revenue al locational pattern structure we should note that 
though in most years the annual ava1 lable oil revenue equals 
the annual oi 1 revenue, it could be larger when public ex-
penditure 1s additionally financed from the reserve. 
B Bahrain 
11 1n 1935, when the Bahrain Government received the f1rst oil 
royalties, a system of financial administration was settled upon as 
follows: The oil royalty would be divided into thirds. One third going 
to the privy purse of the Ruler, one third to non-recurrent capital ex-
penditure and the remaining th1rd to be invested. It was also decided 
that the current expenses of the government should be met out of the 
government 1 s other revenues. 11 (l) 
This was the policy of the Government of Bahrain when the oil 
11 1 
revenues in respect to oi 1 production were received, However, although 
this differentiation between the 011 revenue and other sources of 
revenue may be considered as a theoretical one, a study by the govern-
ment claimed that th1s policy was also followed successfully 1n practice 
during the period 1935-1955 (2) 
The all revenue 1n 1935 represented only 42% of the state 1 s total 
revenue. This, together with the problems facing the Government of 
Bahrain during the financial crisis of the 1930 1 s and its attempts to 
overcome some of 1ts f1nancial and administratiVe d1ff1cult1es, such as 
the allocation to the Ruler 1 s privy purse and the c1vi 1 1 1st (see Chap, I, 
pp. 15-20), provided the main reasons for the pol 1cy adopted 
Since the late 1950 1 s oil revenues have Increased and there have 
been changes in Bahra1n 1 s admln1strat1on and pol 1cies Consequently the 
Bahrain publ 1c budget has also changed in two respects, first in the 
system of f1nanc1al adm1nistrat1on, and secondly in the degree to which 
budgets show the whole pos1t1on of the state revenues and expenditure. 
Thus, the government budgets after 1959 no longer show all the revenue 
received by the state or its allocations, The budget, in fact, shows only 
two th1rds of the state 1 s oi 1 revenue, while the remaining th1 rd is re-
served for the Ruler and allocated to him directly before budgeting. ( 3) 
This practice was followed until 1965. When the Abu Safah oilfield 
revenues started to be received in 1966, these where also allocated to 
the privy purse of the Ruler 1n addition to the one third reserved for him· 
from the BAPCO payments, while the government budgets• 011 revenues con-
tinued to be two th1rds of the BAPCO payments only. This assumption, 1 .e. 
that all Abu Safah 01 lf1eld revenue was allocated to the privy purse of 
the Ruler is made for the following reasons: 
* However, in the 1974 budget, Abu Safah 01 I revenue has appeared for 
the f1 rst time together with the BAPCO total estimated oi 1 revenue. 
Also for the first time •since 1960 the allocation to the Ruler has 
appeared in the budget. 
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1. S1nce the Government of Bahra1n 1s budgets, espec1ally those 
of the last five years, have met their deficits by draw1ng from 
the reserve fund, 1t IS difficult to believe that all the 
revenue com1ng from the Abu Safah field was allocated to the 
reserve. 
2 During the period 1960-1970, although the Government of Bahra1n 1s 
annual reports (statement of revenue and expenditure) gave al 1 
the information affecting the reserve fund account (for example, 
the setting up of a special account 1n 1960, the loss resulting 
from the sterling devaluation in 1967, and al 1 withdrawals from 
this account to meet the budget deficits), nothing at all is 
mentioned about the Bahra1n state 1s half share of the Abu Safah 
011 revenue. 
3, All attempts to get an explanation about this matter from 
off1cials 1n Bahra1n have fa1 led, 1n spite of their valuable 
help 1n providing any other information. Since 1966 the 
Government of Bahra1n Annual Reports and all the offic1al 
publications, as far as I know, seem to ignore the Abu Safah 
fl el d. 
4. All oil revenues rece1ved by the state and not appearing in 
the budget were allocated to the privy purse of the Ruler 
(compare the BAPCO payments- 1961-1970- w1th the budget oil 
revenue- App, 3. 1), Therefore, on the basis of this 
assumption, the state 01 l revenue (App 3, 1) and the actual 
budgets, we may reassess Bahra1n 1s public revenue and ex-
penditure 1n a form which WI 1 I help us to exam1ne the allocation 
of the Bahrain state oi 1 revenue, 
The Government of Bahrain had produced an annual budget for some 
years before rece1v1ng the o1l royalties 1n 1935 (see Chap. I, pp.15-20) 
and this practice has continued since then, We have been able to obtain 
11 3 
detailed budgets for the years since 1947 (1367 H1Jry). All of these 
budgets, except the one for 1962, were actual budgets or closed accounts 
of the budgets. As for the per.od 1935-1946/47, we have not been able 
to obtain deta1led budgets, but as we mentioned earl1er, t:he oil revenue 
was d1v1ded into three th1rds, one to the prlvy purse of the Ruler, one 
to cap1tal expend•tu~e, and one to the reserve fund Thus, on th1s bas1s, 
and knowing the net allocatiOn to the reserve fund, we may estimate the 
allocation of the state oi 1 revenue as shown in Table 4. 1. 
TABLE 4,1 
THE ALLOCATION OF THE STATE OIL REVENUE IN BAHRAIN, 1935//1946/47 
(000 BID) 
Total 011 Revenue (1935-1946/47) 
* Reserve Fund 
;';; )::. 
Privy Purse 
Capital Expenditure 
Amount 
1564 
106 7 
670 
Percentage 
48.9 
33.3 
18.8 
* The balance of the reserve fund and cash on hand at the beginning of 
the fiscal year 1948/49 was BD 1,781,000 The 1947;48 surplus was 
BD 217,000-
:'n'' Excluding allocation to the c1v1l list. 
Source. Government of Bahrain, Annual Report (1378 H1jry) p 74, and 
1955 pp.4-6. 
Having presented the h•stor1cal background and examined the 
allocation of the state oil revenue for the per1od 1935-1946/47, for wh1ch 
no detailed information about the breakdown of public expenditure has been 
obtained, we will now turn to a discussion of Bahrain 1 s public revenue and 
expenditure in Part Two. This wi 11 provide a bas1s for our examination of 
the allocation of the state o1l revenue 1n Part Three of th1s chapter. 
Part Two: Bahrain State: Publ 1c Revenue, Expenditure and Reserve, 1947-1970 
This part of the study covers the period 1947/48-1970 dur1ng which 
approximately 98% of the total 011 revenue (1935-1970) was received. 
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A Public Revenue 
Bahrain 1 s publ 1c revenue dur1ng the period studied IS 1nd1cated in 
Table 4.2 below: 
BAHRAIN STATE: TOTAL PUBLIC REVENUES, 1947/48//1970 
(000 BD) 
Source Amount % of Total 
Oi 1 Revenue 167,030 75.8% 
Social Serv1ces 664 0.3% 
Law and Order 2,879 L 3% 
Public Uti litiesx 
Transport and Comm. 2,453 1. 1% 
Grant from the Ruler 250 0' 1% 
Administration and others 46,969 21 3% 
Customs revenues 36,640 
Interest on investment 2,712 
Others 7,616 
Total 220,245 99.9% 
x Operated as Independent publ 1c bod1es. 
Source: Apps. 4.1 and 4.4. 
As Table 4.2 shows, Bahra1n 1 s total public revenue dur1ng the period 
1947/48-1970 amounted to BD 220 m1 11 ion. The oil revenue accounted for 
75.8% of these revenues, followed by customs at 16.5%, while al 1 other 
revenues accounted only for 7.7%. The publ 1c revenue has shown a con-
siderable rate of growth as may be seen from Fig. 4.2 (App. 4. 1). The 
public revenue increased from about one million Bahrani D1nars 1n 1947/48 
to twenty-two mi 11 ion Bahrani D1nars in 1970. As for the structural change 
of these revenues, we may refer to App 4.1 from which we see that the 
oi 1 revenue 1 s share of the state 1 s annual publ 1c revenue rose from 44.4% 
in 1947!48 to 60.9% in 1950, 71.4% in 1955, 75.0% 1n 1960, 77.5% 1n 1965 
;'~ 
Excluding revenues of public bodies and interest on the reserve fund 
1961-1970. 
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and to 78.1% in 1970. Thus, whlle non-oi I revenue accounted for 55.6% 
1n 1947/48, its share dropped to only 21.9% 1n 1970. Most of this 
revenue was der1ved from customs dut1es wh1ch, as the annual closed 
accounts of the budgets showed, decreased from 44.4% of the total publ 1c 
revenue 1n 1947/48 to 15.4% In 1960 and 14.3% in 1970 (App. 4.4), The 
proportional share of all other publ •c revenues, excluding these two 
main sources, also decreased from 11.2% 1n 1947/48 to 9 6% in 1960 and 
only 7.6% in 1970. 
B Public Expenditure 
Bahrain state's total public expenditure during the period studied 
is broken down in Table 4.3. From it we can see that the overall total 
publ 1c expenditure amounted to BD 216.6 mi 1 l1on, less by only BD 3,6 
million than the total revenues rece1ved. 51.7% of th\s expenditure was 
current expenditure and 28.9% went to the pr1vy purse of the Ruler. The 
remaining 19.4% was cap1tal expenditure. 
From Fig, 4.3 (App. 4.2.7) we can see the growth of publ 1c ex-
penditure over the per1od stud•ed The annual publ 1c expenditure of the 
state rose from less than one m1l l1on 1n 1947/48 to BD 26.5 in 1970. 
Thus, the growth of public expenditure, particularly in the 1960's, was 
ahead of the growth !n the publ 1c revenues, and consequently increasing 
sums were drawn from the reserve fund to f1nance public expenditure. 
Allocation to current expenditure and the privy purse showed the highest 
rate of growth, followed by cap1tal expenditure. In the early 1960's 
the allocations to cap1tal expenditure were around the 1960 level, but 
later dropped considerably below that level~ Thus, while total expen-
diture 1n ~970 increased more than twenty-six fold over the 1947/48 
level, the allocation to capital expenditure increased only eight fold 
1n the same period, 
TABLE 4.3 
BAHRAIN STATE: TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, 1947/48//1970 
(000 BD) 
A I I oca t i on s 
Current Expenditure 
Social Services 
Law and Order 
Public Utilities 
Transport and Comm. 
Agriculture 
Administration and others 
Capital Expenditure 
.c 
Public Works" 
Public Utilites 
-;'-;·/\ 
Social Serv1ces 
Transport and Comm. 
Others 
Ruling Family 
Privy Purse 
*""1~* Other Members 
56,675 
25,618 
1 ,287 
4,884 
1 '176 
21,950 
13,615 
10' 754 
6,995 
79610 
3,205 
62,602 
187 
Amount % of 
111 '590 
26. 1% 
11.8% 
0.5% 
2.2% 
0.5% 
1 0. 1% 
42' 179 
6.0% 
4.6% 
3 0% 
3.2% 
1. 4% 
62 '789 
28.8% 
0. 1% 
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Total 
5L 7% 
19.4% 
28.9% 
Grand Total 216,558 100,0% 
* Including the cap1tal expenditure on Education, Law and Order services, 
Roads and Drains, and Administration. 
~·:;': Housing only 1 1ssa Town 1 , 
*** Since 1950/51 paid by the Ruler from his allocation. 
Source: Apps. 4.2.6 and 4.2.7. 
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The structural change in public expenditure can be seen 1n the 
fo 11 owing tab 1 e: 
TABLE 4.4 
THE STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BAHRAIN STATE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, 
SELECTED YEARS (PERCENTAGES) 
Year Current Ex~enditure Ca~i tal Rul1n9 Fam1l:t 
1947/48 48.0 25.6 26.4 
1950/51 38.7 32.5 28.8 
1955 33.2 37.3 29.5 
1960 43.0 30.7 26.3 
1965 55.4 22.3 22.3 
1970 64.4 6.3 29.3 
Source: App. 4.2.7. 
As shown 1n Table 4 4 a considerable change 1n the structure of 
public expenditure was noted. This change at f1 rst benefited capital 
expenditure when 1ts proportional share rose from about one quarter in 
the 1940's to about one third in the 1950's. Later in the 1960's 
current expenditure returned to its position of the 1940's and even 
enjoyed an increasing proportion of the total public expenditure, r1sing 
to about two thirds in 1970. The allocation to the privy purse of the 
Ruler, as mentioned earl 1er, was fixed at one third of the state's oil 
revenue up until 1965, which made 1ts proportion of the total expenditure 
Increase with the increasing importance of the oil revenue. However, 
since 1966 th1s allocation has no longer been conf1ned to only one third 
of the state's oil revenue, but has also Included all revenues received 
from the Abu Safah 01 ]field, which means that its proportional share has 
-'-
again 1ncreased considerably from 1966 up to 1973." 
The functional allocation of annual public expenditure, excluding 
According to the 1973 constitution of the State of Bahrain, the 
allocation to the privy purse wi 11 be a f1xed sum and no longer a 
porportion of the state's total public revenue, This sum is fixed 
at BD 6 mil 1 ion per annum as mentioned in the 1974 budget, 
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the pr1vy purse for which no functional breakdown 1S available, may be 
seen 1n detail in App, 4.2.7 or in br1ef 1n Table 4 3. 
C Publ 1c Reserve Fund 
Th1s fund was created 1n 1935 Its ma1n aim was to prov1de the 
state w1th a reserve to secure the state's future public revenue in 
times of cris1s, such as the 1929 depression which affected the Bahrain 
pearllng Industry and, consequently, the state public revenues (see 
Chap. I, pp.15-20), or the anticipated problems when Bahrain's oi 1 pro-
duction comes to an end. 
The Bahrain government and the Pol 1tical Agent at Bahrain at an 
early stage thought of some local industrial projects 1n which to 
invest some of the state reserve fund, However, none of these projects 
came into existence, and except for the Bahrain government's share in 
the Gulf Aviation Company, which in 1956 was BD 20,445, (4) almost al 1 
the Bahrain State public reserve up to 1960 was invested in foreign 
securities and deposited with the banks. In 1959, the last year 1n which 
the breakdown of the reserve fund contents were ava1 lable, the reserve 
fund was Invested as follows: 
TABLE 4.5 
BAHRAIN STATE PUBLIC RESERVE INVESTMENT, 1959 
(000 BD) 
Indian Stock 
3% Government of India Loan 1963/65 
2~% II II II II 
British Stock 
3% British Saving Bonds 1955/65 
3% II II II 1960/70 
3% II II II 1965/75 ( regd.) 
3% Transport Stock Guaranteed 1978/88 
4% Fund1ng 1960/70 
Medium Term Depos1t, Eastern Bank Ltd,, London, 
Total 
Cash Value 
1 '086 
100 
803 
5,725 
1 
689 
796 
2 '1 00 
11 '300 
Source: Government of Bahrain, Annual Report, 1959 (Statement of Revenue 
and Expenditure, 1959), 
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At the beg 1 nn i ng of 1961 1 t was announced that the 11 Bah rain 
Government Reserve Fund amounting toRs 136 mill 1on (£10.2 mil 1 ion) 
invested 1n securities and med1um term deposit has been transferred to a 
separate account. 11 ( 5) From 1961 up to the end of 1970 noth1ng was added 
to th1s account except 1ts estimated interest, and after allow1ng for 
the withdrawal and losses debited from it, the reserve fund at the end 
of 1970 (excluding the fund 1 s investment prof1ts 1961-1970) may be 
estimated at BD 5.3 mill ion. (6) However, knowing that this account 
balance at the beginn1ng of 1961 was BD 13 6 m1 Ilion, and a total of 
BD 8.1 mil 1 ion was deb1ted to it between 1961 and the end of 1970, (7) 
f~ 
we may calculate a balance amount1ng to BD 5"5 m1 11 ion, which IS very 
close to the estimated one. (8) 
The breakdown of the Bahrain state pub I ic reserve investment at 
the end of 1970 was not obtainable, but we may anticipate from the 
available information that the government invested in some commercial 
and Industrial projects, such as ALBA, together with the previous types 
of investments. As for the investment profits, although the government 
regarded these prof1ts as publ 1c budget revenue up to 1960, between then 
and 1970 nothing was mentioned about them except that they were going to 
be added to the reserve fund directly, The interest earned in 1960 was 
equal to 3.15% of the total investment. 
From the afore mentioned survey, together With Table 4ol and 
Table 4.6, we can see that although Bahrain State had allocated a con-
siderable proportion of its oil revenue to building a public reserve fund 
1n the early periods, government policy changed in the 1960 1 s- part1-
cularly the late 1960 1 s - and 1ncreas1ng sums were withdrawn from this 
account to meet the 1ncreas1ng deficit on the budget. 
The balance of the 1970 1 s Statement of Revenue and Expenditure was in 
debit of BD 172 thousand, 
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Part Three: The Al locatron of the State's 011 Revenue, 1947/48-1970 
After discussIng the state pub It c revenue, pub I 1 c expend 1 ture and 
the public reserve, we shall now exam1ne the allocation of the state's 
oil revenue. The method to be used here has been described in the 
1ntroduct1on to th1s chapter Th1s part WI 11 cover three points, The 
f1rst of these rs the proport,onal concribution of oo1 revenue spent to 
cover the gross deflc1t 1n the ma1n Items of expendrture. The second 
concerns the allocation of the total 011 revenue received, wh1le the 
th1rd wi 11 examine the changing pattern of 011 revenue al locat1on. 
Before starting our d1scuss1on 1n this part of the chapter we 
should explain that the allocation to the pr1vy purse, though taken 
directly from oil revenue, has been treated 1 Ike any other 1tems of 
expenditure. Therefore, we cons1der the part allocated to it from the 
oil revenue as equal to the proportional contribution of 011 revenue 
spent to cover the gross deflc1t of the non-o;l revenue used to meet 
state public expenditure. Thus, wh1le the total allocation to the prrvy 
purse, dur1ng the period studied, amounted to BD 62.8 m1 11 1on (Table 4.3), 
the part cons1dered as allocated from oi I was equal to BD 53.8 mil 1 ron 
only (Table 4.7), Therefore, a sum equal to BD 9 m1 11 1on was considered 
as having been allocated from the non-ol 1 revenue. Th1s treatment wil 1 
be followed in al 1 our d1scuss1ons of the allocation of the Emirates' 
oil revenue as far as public expenditure (1nclud1ng the allocation to 
the Ruling family) is concerned, 
A Proportional Contr1but1on of 0!1 Revenue Spent (PCORS) 
The PCORS to cover the gross def1cvt of the budget's non-oil 
revenue IS shown 1n Table 4.6 overleaf 
TABLE 4"6 
THE PROPORTIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF OIL REVENUE SPENT, 1947/48-1970 
(DOD BD) AND PERCENTAGES 
Year 
1947/48 
1948/49 
1949/50 
1950/51 
1951/52 
1952/53 
1953/54 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Annua 1 01 1 
Revenue 
' 1 ) 
459 
492 
938 
1 '534 
2,010 
2,404 
6,993 
4,255 
5,252 
5,256 
5,933 
7,545 
7,668 
7,817 
7,949 
8,068 
8,784 
8,855 
12,091 
13,514 
14,332 
17,473 
17,410 
Budget Surplus 
or Def1clt 
(2) 
217 
148 
185 
747 
938 
857 
2,363 
1 '1 51 
1 ,823 
707 
1 '0 1 3 
2 '186 
514 
-486 
-112 
21 
1 '357 
-1 '800 
-210 
-805 
-1 ,802 
-1 '0 76 
-4,249 
Spent 0 i 1 
Revenue 
(1 ± 2)=3 
242 
344 
753 
787 
1 ,072 
1 '547 
4,630 
3' 104 
3,429 
4,549 
4,920 
5,359 
7' 154 
8,303 
8,059 
8,047 
7,427 
10,655 
12,249 
14,317 
16,030 
18,518 
21 ,659 
Total 
Gross 
Def1c1t 
(4) 
684 
908 
1 '341 
1 '544 
1 ,993 
2,381 
6' 183 
4,272 
4,704 
5,823 
5,990 
6,623 
8,756 
9,222 
8,868 
9,228 
9,465 
11 '838 
13,763 
16 '0 86 
17,615 
20,575 
21 ,659 
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PCORS 
3 
7j 
% 
35 
37 
56 
50 
53 
64 
74 
72 
72 
78 
82 
80 
81 
90 
90 
87 
78 
90 
89 
89 
91 
90 
1 DO 
Total 16 7 '0 30 3,687 162,686 189 '530 85.8 
Source: Computed from Apps. 4.1, 4.2, 7 and 4.3.2. 
As Table 4,6 shows, the total gross deficit in the non-oi 1 revenue 
amounted to BD 189,5 million. A sum of BD 167 m1 il 10n was allocated from 
oil revenues. This sum was equal to 85.7% of the total gross deficit. 
The 011 revenue spent was about 97% of the total oil revenue received in 
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the period studied. A steadily increas1ng trend has been noted rn the 
proportional contrrbutlon of oil revenue spent to meet the gross deficit 
in the non-oil revenue. This percentage rncreased from only 35% in 
1947/48 to 50% rn 1950/51, to 72% in 1955, 81% in 1960, 90% rn 1965 and 
to 100% in 1970. This change, in fact, lndrcated the decreasing pro-
port10n of revenues from the non-oi I sources, particularly the customs 
revenues, as mentioned earl rer In Part Two of thrs chapter. Therefore, 
Bahrain State, which was recognised for a long perrod as not being totally 
dependant on the oil revenue, no longer retains thrs posrt1on, but JOins 
the other Emirates by depending 100% on the or 1 revenue to cover the 
deficit in the self-revenue of its different departments. 
B The Allocation of the Total Or 1 Revenue 
The net allocation of the total ol l revenue received rn the period 
studied is indicated in the following table: 
TABLE 4.7 
THE NET ALLOCATION OF TOTAL OIL REVENUE, 1947/48//1970 
(000 BD) 
Allocation Amount % 
Current Exeenditure 74,067 
Social Services 48,766 
Law and Order 19,828 
Pub! ic Uti 1 I ties 1 '161 
Transport and Comm. 2 '129 
Agriculture 1 '0 17 
Administration and others 1 '168 
Caei tal Exeendrture 34,795 
Public Works 11 '231 
Public Utrlties 8,872 
Social Services 5. 771 
Transport and Comm. 6,278 
Administration and others 2,643 
Rul1n9 Famil'i 53,820 
Reserve Fund 3,687 
Grant Total 166 '369 
Source: Apps. 4.2.6, 4.3.5 and 4.3,6, 
of Tota 1 
44.4% 
20.9% 
32.4% 
2.3% 
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Table 4.7 shows the structure of the net allocation of total oil 
revenue, wh1le Fig, 4.4 shows the development in the allocations of the 
annual ava1lable oil revenue•s. From the afore mentioned table and 
figure, and with the help of the detailed Apps 4,3,3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5 and 
4.3 6, we may briefly d1scuss the allocation of the total 011 revenue, 
and the development in the annual allocat.on as follows: 
1. Total Allocation: In the period studied a total of BD 166 million 
received from the oil industry was allocated to the different items of 
expenditure. Of this amount 44.4% was allocated to current expend1ture, 
32.4% to the ruling family, 20.9% to capital expenditure and 2.3% to the 
reserve fund. The sum ava1 lable for these allocations increased from 
less than half ami Ilion Bahrani Dinars in 1947/48 to four mi 11 •on in 
1955, n1ne million in 1965, and more than twenty one m1ll 1on Bahran1 
Dinars in 1970 (App. 4.3.4). 
2. Current Expenditure: As mentioned earl 1er this item of 
expenditure accounted for more than two-fifths of the total allocation. 
This ranked it first among the allocations, The functional allocation 
of current expenditure was as follows: social serv1ces accounted for about 
two thirds (65. 7%); law and order services more than one quarter (26.7%); 
transport and communications 2.9%; administration and other services, 
public utilities and agriculture about 1.5% each. The development of the 
allocation to current expenditure shows the highest rates of growth and 
its 1970 allocation was about one hundred and thirty five times that of 
1947/48. Its allocation increased from BD 91 thousand in 1947/48 to 
BD 800 thousand in 1955, BD 5.3 mil 1 ion in 1965 and to BD 12.2 mill ion in 
1970. 
3. Capital Expenditure: Capital expenditure accounted for more than 
one-fifth of the total oil revenue, It ranked third among the four main 
allocations. Its functional allocation was as follows: public works 32.2% 
or about one-third (this department executes construction works for most 
FIG 4 4 
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of the other departments, particularly Education, Health, Law and Order 
Serv1ces, Roads and Drains and Public Buildings); public utilities, more 
than one quarter (25.4%); housing 16.5%; ports 17.9%, others 7.5%. The 
development of this allocation showed two trends The first was a 
relatively high rate of growth, particularly up to 1961. Dur1ng this 
period the ailocat1on to capital expenditure most frequently ranked 
second behind the allocation to the reserve fund, but for several years 
of the period it surpassed the reserve fund allocation. The second trend 
has been apparent since 1961, when this allocation dropped from BD 2.75 
million in 1961 to BD 2.66 mil 1 ion in 1965 and f1nally to BD 1.68 mill ion 
in 1970. 
4. The Allocation to the Ruling Family: This allocation accounted 
for about one third of the total oil revenue received, and ranked second 
to current expenditure. The main recipient of this allocation was the 
privy purse of the Ruler, which accounted for 99.7% of the total amount 
allocated to the Ruling Family, wh1 lethe other members of the Ruling 
Fam1 ly accounted directly for only 0.2%, This, in fact, represented the 
payment to the civil 1 ist in the late 1940 1 s, while since then the Ruler 
has paid for the civil 1 ist from his own allocation. This item showed a 
very high rate of growth in the period 1966-70. Its share of 1970 annual 
available oil revenue was more than a hundred times that of 1947/48. As 
may be seen from Fig. 4.3, this allocation ranked third among the main 
allocations for most years of the period, up until 1958 when its rank 
became second. From then up to 1970 it has maintained this position 
among the main groups of allocations. 
5. Reserve Fund: The allocation to the reserve fund accounted for 
the principal share of the state 011 revenue up to 1956, but since then 
its share has dropped considerably, and in 1961, 1962 and 1966-70 the 
saving on this account was used to finance the government 1 s budget. The 
net savings of this account for the period 1947/48//1970 were only BD 3.7 
125 
m1 ll ion, which equalled 2.3% of the 01 I revenue rece1ved dur1ng the 
per1od. 
C The Change in the Allocational Patterns 
The change in the allocational patterns of annual available oil 
revenues as plotted in Fig. 4 5 shows that the long-term trend in these 
revenue ai locations favoured the allocations to the rul 1ng family and 
to current expenditure aga1nst the allocations to capital expenditure 
and the reserve. 
Thus, the allocation of the annual available o1l revenue (annual 
oil revenue plus any sum drawn from the reserve fund) in 1947/48 was as 
follows: current expenditure 20%, ruling fam1 ly 16.5%, capital expenditure 
16.0% and the reserve fund 47.5%, The corresponding allocations in 1960 
were 34.3% current, 27.2% rul 1ng fam1ly, 31 8% capital and 6.7% the 
reserve fund, and 1n 1970, 57.3% to current expenditure, 36% to the privy 
*~ purse and 7.7% to capital expenditure, 
Hav1ng examined the public revenue and expenditure of Bahrain, and 
the allocation of its oil revenue, we wil 1 reserve the factors affect1ng 
these patterns of allocation and the1 r impact on the economic development 
of Bahrain for d1scuss1on later in the study. 
* As from 1974 the annual sum allocated to the privy purse WI 11 be 
fixed at BD 6 mill ion and as far as the state oil revenue is increasing 
the proportional allocation to this Item w1l l decrease. 
** However, it should be noted that we have dealt here with the allocation 
of annual available oil revenue, which in 1970 was 24.4% above the 
annual oi I revenue. This 1s because the state drew BD 4.2 mill ion to 
cover the budget deficit (see App. 4 3.5). In fact the annual oil 
revenue was not even sufficient to cover al locat1ons to current 
expenditure and payments to the privy purse, which were both about 
BD 20 mill ion compared with an annual oi 1 revenue of BD 17.4 mill ion 
(App. 4.3.6). 
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NOTES - CHAPTER IV 
(1) Government of Bahrain, Annual Report, 1955, p,4. 
(2) ~·' pp.4-6. 
(3) Two further points of 1nformat1on 1nd1cated that although the 
Ruler obtained a part of the o1l revenue during this period, 
these allocations no longer appeared in the budget. 
First: Government of Bahrain, Annual Re ort, 1959, p,9 
('Statement of Revenue and Expenditure• mentioned that the 
government oil revenue excluded one third ass1gned to the privy 
purse. Second: MEDD, An Economic Survey of Bahrain, 1965, said 
when discussing Bahrain's oil revenue, "under the present arrange-
ments the government receives a fixed proportion of the oil revenue 
paid to the state", p.26. 
(4) Government of Bahrain, Annual Report, 1956, p.110. 
(5) 
(6) 
All the previous statements mentioned the advanced loan from the 
government to the company, but noth1ng about the share. 
Government of Bahrain, Annual Report, 1960, p, 1, 
1935//1946/47 BD 1 '564 thousand (Table 4, 1) 
1947/48//1970 = BD 3,687 thousand (Table 4.6) 
Total = BD 5,251 thousand. 
(7) Total of withdrawal and 1967 sterling devaluation loss: Annual 
Statement of Revenue and Expenditure, 1966-70. 
(8) However, one important lImitation on th1s estimation lay in the 
unpublished closed account of the 1962 budget, 
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CHAPTER V 
KU'.NAIT: IHE ALLOCATIOr! OF OIL REVENUE 
This chapter falls Into four parts· lntroduct,on; Public Revenue 
and Expenditure; The Pub] 1c Reserve; and the A1 locat1on of the Ot l 
Revenue 
Pan One. introduction 
The f 1 rs t pub l 1 shed budget In Kuvva1 t, a:, far as we know, was 
produced ,n 1946. ( l ) The second pub 1 1 shed budget was produced 1n 1947 
when the frrstotl royalty hom KOC was rece•ved (2) In both budgets 
there was no f1xed appropriated allocation of the state oil revenue or 
( 3) 
any other source of publ1c revenue All the o: l revenues were recetved 
by the Sha1kh htmself, and as the Pol 1 tical Res1dent 1n the Gulf wrote, 
all the KOC ooyalty paymef"\t 11 15 pa'd to •he lmper.al Bank of Iran In 
London and rransm1tted to thel r Kuwa't branch tn the name of the Ruler 
of Kuwait In Kuwa1t 1 t IS kept 1n the Sha1kh's name, separately from 
the ftnaf"\ce department's account Only the Shaikh can operate on tt 11 ( 4) 
However, as far as the 1947 all royalty and other payments are concerned, 
the 1947 budget and all other avatlable lnto.,matton tnd1cated that 'the 
Ruler' tral"lsfe,-red almost all the o1l revenues he •ece•ved from o1l 
( 5) 
compantes to the Kuwa•t f;nance department The Ruler transferred 
these payments 1n spite of the fact that the non-oil revenue avatlable to 
rhe f1nance department was more than enough to cover 1ts expenditure 
(Including al locatton to other departments) as shown overleaf 1n Table 5, 1. 
TABLE 5,1 
KUWAIT STATE: FINANCE DEPARTMENT BUDGET, 1947 
Sect1on 
Social Services 
Law and Order 
Rul1 ng Fami 1 y 
Pub 1 i c Works 
·k 
" 
Administration & others 
Total 
~'r }: 
Oi 1 Revenue 
Grand Total 
~ Net allocat1on. 
(000 KD) 
Revenue 
Amount % 
1 0 
559 
569 
2,688 
3,257 
0,3 
1 7 0 1 
82.5 
Expenditure 
Amount % 
213 42 8 
55 1 L 1 
55 11,1 
132 26.4 
42 8,4 
497 
497 
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Surplus or 
Def1cit 
-213 
- 45 
- 55 
-132 
+517 
----=r2 
2,688 
2 '760 
** In App. 3.2 the bonuses payment pa1d by AMINOIL taken to the 1948 
income not to the 1947. 
Source: lOR, R/15/5/222. 
However, this budget, as far as one can tell, was the last budget 
publ lshed in Kuwait during the period 1947-1951, and it was not until 
1952 that a summary of Kuwa1t 1s finances appeared publicly. The d1s-
continuity in publ ish1ng the budget and making 1t available to parties 
concerned may be seen as a sign of a change 1n the way the oil revenues 
were directed 1n 1947. Th1s change may be seen 1n a clearer 1 1ght if 
we note. (a) the public criticism aga1nst the Sheikh and government of 
Kuwait, and (b) the Br1tish Government 1s concern about the way in which 
the social and administrative reform was handled in the late 1940 1s. (7) 
Owing to th1s change, no government budget or any other central account 
of public revenue and expenditure 1n Kuwait 1s available for the period 
1948-1951, This lack of information makes any attempt to estimate the 
state public revenue and expenditure extremely difficult. However, 
fortunately, this period 1s total oil revenue represented only about 0.4% 
of the state's total oil revenue rece1ved during the per1od 1947-1970/71 
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(see App, 3, 3), Consequently we w1ll exclude the per1od pr1or to 1952 
from our examination of the allocation of oil revenue in Kuwait, 
The f1nanclal admin1strat1on ;n Kuwait ln the pre-constitutional 
period, was directed solely by the Ruler and for most of the period he 
was his own Mln1ster of Finance, 11 ln Kuwa1t the Ruler 1s the state and 
It is for him to allocate this revenue·, as he thinks best •• (B) Con-
sequently there was no fixed pol 1cy of f1nancial administration in Kuwait 
unlike the situation in Bahrain at the time, The Ruler allocated a 
considerable part of the revenue to the various departments and kept the 
rest In a reserve fund, in h1s own name for investment, However, the 
Ruler transferred the balance of this account to the finance department 
In September 1964 (9) (See Part Three of this chapter). and since then 
all the state revenues has been rece1ved directly by the M1n1stry of 
Finance, whtch became responsible for fiscal pol icy, Since the estab-
I lshment of the National Assembly the public budget has been sent to it 
annually for approval and so has the closed account of the budget. 
Part Two: The Government Public Revenue and Expenditure, 1952-1970/71 
In th1s part we wll 1 be concerned w1th the structure and development 
of the Kuwait state budget 1s upon wh1ch our examination of the allocation 
of 011 revenue in Kuwait IS based 
The first public financial statement published since the 1947 
budget was a summary of the receipt and expenditure of the Kuwait state 
for 1952. (10) This account, with the actual capital expenditure of the 
state of Kuwait 1953-1956, the education department budgets, the social 
affairs department budgets, and the 1956 estimated budget, were the ma1n 
sources for our estimation of the 1952-1956 publ 1c revenue and expenditure. 
Al 1 data used s1nce 1957 were der;ved from the closed account of the 
budgets The first systematic general budget 1n Kuwait was prepared in 
oi 1 revenue 
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19560 ( 11 ) The 1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959/60 budgets were produced 
before the Kuwait budget law came into force on February 9, 1960o (12 ) 
These budgets did not differentiate between current and cap1tal expen-
diture, but since then all budgets have been presented in two separated 
accounts, the ordinary budget and the construction budget. 
A Pub! ic Revenue 
·}\ 
91.8% of the Kuwait state budget 1 s total revenues during the 
period 1952-1970/71 (excluding extraordinary revenue drawn from the 
reserve fund) were derived from oil. 
The development and the structure of the state budget 1 s total 
revenues during the per1od studied, are shown in Table 5.2, Table 5.3 
and F i g. 5. 1 • 
TABLE 5.2 
THE PUBLIC BUDGET 1 S TOTAL REVENUE, 1952//1970/71 
(000 KD) 
Source Amount 
Oi 1 Revenue 3,197,568 
Social Services 1 ,842 
Law and Order 12,500 
Pub 1 i c Uti 1 it i es 53,294 
Post, Telephone and Telegraph 26,562 
Re-sale of Land 35,658 
Administration and others 152,597 
Total 3,480,021 
Source: App. 5. 1. 
Percemtage 
91 '8% 
0' 1% 
0.3% 
1. 5% 
0. 7% 
1. 0% 
4.3% 
99.7% 
From Table 5.2 we can see that the oi 1 revenue represented more 
than nine-tenths of total revenue received by the state. The remaining 
one-tenth came mainly from customs and ports duties and fees, the re-sale 
Excluding the investment revenue which was added to the reserve fund 
directly and excluding also the other public revenues from public 
bodies and the municipality. 
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of land and the revenues of other government departments, As for the 
development of the budget revenue, Fig. 5,1 shows us that the non-oil 
revenues were increasing faster than the other revenue up to 1959/60, 
but since then they have increased more slowly. The oil revenue's rate 
of growth was h1gher in the early 1950's and late 1960's than in the 
period which 1 ies between The Kuwait budget's total revenues increased 
annually during the whole per1od studted, except for one year or so. 
The budget's total revenue in 1970/71 increased to about 17 times that of 
1952. However, there was I 1ttle change in the budget's revenue structure 
as may be seen in Table 5.3, 
TABLE 5.3 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC REVENUES, SELECTED YEARS 
(PERCENTAGES) 
Source of Revenue 1947 1952 1957 1960/61 1965/66 
Oil Revenue 82,5 96.4 95.2 91.7 92,0 
Law and Order o. 3 N,A. N.A. 0' 1 0.4 
Re-sale of Land 0.7 1.0 1,1 
Pub l i c U t 1 1 1 t i e s L1 2,0 1.6 
Post, T. & Telegraph 0' 1 0 c 3 0 6 
Administrat•on & others 1 7' 1 3,5 3' 1 4,7 4.0 
Source: App. 5.1 and Table 5. 1, 
1970/71 
86.5 
0.4 
0.4 
2.0 
1.6 
8.7 
Table 5.3 indicates the overwhelming dependence of the budget on 
oil revenues since the first oil royalty was received in 1947. The oil 
revenue was about 95% of the budget's total revenue during the 1950's, 
and except for 1970/71 the o• 1 revenues' share has always been more than 
nine-tenths of the total. The decline 1n the 1970/71 share may be explained 
by an un-named item which appeared in the f1nance department revenue 
(Administration and others 1n Table 5,3). This Item was called 'other 
revenue' and amounted to KD 17 mil 1 ion, The estimated revenue under the 
same item for 1971/72 and 1972/73 was only about KD 200 thousand. This 
indicates its temporary nature, Nevertheless, it inflated the non-oil 
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revenue and consequently affected the structure of the budget, br1ng1ng 
the oil revenues 1 share down to 86 5%, However, s1nce the o1l share 1n 
the revenue of the 1971/72 budget was KD 332 m1 11 1on out of a total of 
KD 360 million, i,e, more than nine-tenths of the total(l 3) we may 
cons1der the proportional decrease In the oil revenue 1n the 1970/71 
budget as an Isolated event whlch does not lnd1cate any change 1n long-
term fiscal policies, 
It should be noted that the government has not considered the return 
on the reserve fund investment budget revenue, as it was cons1dered in 
Bahrain and IS st1ll considered in Qatar, This pol 1cy has affected the 
relative Importance of the state 1 s non-oil publ 1c revenues, which, had 
they included the return on the reserve fund, would have amounted to 
about 10% during the 1960's (see PaFt Three of th1s chapter), 
B Public Expenditure 
As already mentioned, Kuwait 1s publ 1c budget expenditure followed 
more than one accounting practice dur1ng the per1od studied, There were 
two main practices, The f1rst prevailed dur>ng most of the 1950 1s, 
during wh1ch time the expenditure was made ava1lable to the different 
departments without differentiation between cap1tal and current expenditure. 
The second has prevailed since the 1960 1s, dur1ng which t1me there have 
been two budgets; the ordinary budget and the construction budget. This 
difference is reflected in the structural change 1n the publ 1c budget 
expenditure (see F1g. 5.2). However, although th1s difference in 
accounting methods does affect the allocation to the social services and 
public utilities, during the late 1950 1s, Its general effect IS largely 
counterbalanced by the classificat1on of both the cap1tal and the current 
expenditure of the Public Works Department as cap1tal expenditure, The 
Publ 1c Works Department 1s current expenditure in 1959/60 was Rs 64 m1l lion 
while the capital expenditure for other departments was Rs 106 mil lion. 
500 
0·1 
N 
Ll'l 
C7l 
Development of PubliC E1Cpend1ture 1952-1970/71 
e e Ruling Fam1ly - - - land Purchase 
-- -- Cap1tal E1Cpend1ture --- Current Expenditure 
------ Total 
I 
I 
/ 
I 
C7l C7l 
A __ .../ 
/ ' ------
--
~ N ID C7l ~ -.. Ll'l ro 
C7l C7l 512 
,.- _....,. ........... ...... -- ---
,........ -
/ 
Ll'l CIO 
ID ID 
2! C7l 
FIG 52 
r:::: 
..._ 
0 
~ 
133 
Another difficulty that has faced us has been the functional 
allocat 1on of the expenditure. For example, the expend1 ture of the 
Ministry of Public Works was d1ff1cult to allocate on a functional bas1s. 
Th1s Ministry executes work for almost all the other ministries (education, 
ports, health, communlcat,on, public bu1 ld1ngs, etc ) and at the same t1me 
adm1n1sters other departments such as the Department of Agriculture, 
Hav1ng dealt w1th these matters we may now turn to the al locat1onal 
pattern and growth of publ 1c expenditure 1n Kuwait~ Table 5.4 shows the 
allocation of the public expend1ture of the Kuwa1t government dur1ng the 
period stud 1 ed, 
'{fABLE 5 4/ 
THE TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, 1952//1970/71 
(MILL I ON KD) 
Expenditure 
Current 
Social Services 
Law and Order 
Publ1c Ut1l1ties 
Post, Telephone, Telegraph 
Administration and others 
Total Current Exp, 
Capital 
Pub 1 1 c Works 
Others 
Total Capital Exp. 
Land Purchase 
Ruling Family 
Grant Total 
Source: Apps. 5,2.6 and 5.2.7. 
Total Amount 
480 
356 
102 
41 
769 
1 '748 
329 
259 
588 
697 
87 
--
3' 120 
% of Total 
15.3% 
11.4% 
3.2% 
L 3% 
24.6% 
55.8% 
10.5% 
8.3% 
18.8% 
22,3% 
2. 7% 
--
99.6% 
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Current expenditure accounted for 55.8% of the total followed by 
expenditure on the land purchase scheme, which accounted for 22.3%, then 
came cap1tal expenditure with 18.8% and the allocation to the rul 1ng 
fam1 ly of 2.7%. The development trends of these expenditures over the 
period studied is shown in Fig. 5.2, (App 5-2-7) The structural change 
1n publ 1c expenditure IS also shown 1n Table 5.5. 
TABLE 5 5 
THE STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, SELECTED YEARS 
(PERCENTAGES) 
Expenditure 
"'/;";'; 
Current Expenditure 
Soc1al Services 
Law and Order 
Public Utilities 
Post, T. & Telegraph 
Adm1nistrat1on & others 
Total Current Exp 
Capital Expenditure 
Ruling Fam1ly 
Land Purchase 
Grand Total 
·'· 42.8" 
1 L 1 
8. 41' 
62.3 
·'· 26.4" 
1 1 1 
99.8 
13 '5 18.8° 
2.2 2.6° 
4.4° 
009° 
12 0 10 8° 
27.7 37.5 
59. 1 34.7°0 
L2 0.9 
11.6 26.4 
-- --99 6 99 5 
* Sum allocated from the f1nance department 
•'n'< Including transfer expenditure. 
¢ Including cap1tal expenditure. 
1960/61 1965/66 1970/71 
13 5 13' 4 18.0 
1L8 10 0 2 15 2 
3.4 2.8 3. 1 
LO 1.3 1.7 
18.0 26.6 35.4 
--47.7 54.3 73.4 
19' 1 8.6 15.7 
1 9 4 1 2.6 
30.9 32.7 7.9 
-- --99.6 99.7 99.6 
¢¢ Including current expenditure of publ 1c works department 
Source: App. 5.2.7 and Table 5.1. 
From the Table, F1g. 5.2, and App 5-2 7 we may note the follow1ng: 
Total Expenditure 
The public expenditure of the Kuwa1t government showed a very high 
rate of growth. The total increased from less than half a m1llion Kuwait 
Dinars 1n 1947, to more than three hundred m1 11 10n in 1970/71. However, 
s1nce 1952 the growth of public expenditure has been less than 1n the 
previous period. The budget expenditure 1n 1970/71 was about 17 t1mes 
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that of 1952, 
Current Expenditure 
Th1s item shows a very high rate of growth, and at the beginning of 
the 1960's it became the f\ rst 1tem of public expenditure after being 
second 1n the rank 1n the early 1950's, Its allocation 1ncreased from 
KD 5 m:ll 10n 1n 1952 to KD 224 m1l l 1on 1n 1970/71 The growth 1n this 
expenditure was affected by two ma1n factors· the 1ncreas1ng of the 
Government Ministries, agenc1es and departments, and the allocation of 
a considerable part of public expenditure under th1s head to help some 
of the Arab States, particularly U,A"R, and Jordan Th1s factor may be 
seen clearly from the growth in the transfer payments as shown in Table 
5.6 
.,,, Budget 
TABLE 5 6 
GROWTH OF THE TRANSFER PAYMENTS, 1964/65-1970/71 
(MILLION KD) 
Year Amount As % of Total Exp, 
1963/64 2' 3 L 3% 
1964/65 8 9 4,9% 
1965/66 26 0 3 10,5% 
1966/67 18 0 3 6 3% 
1967/68 68,3 21 0% 
1968!69 56. 1 21.2% 
1969/70 62,6 21,8% 
6 7' 1 
·l· 
20 8% 1970/71 
estimation, 
Source: BAYAN, 1967/68, p.38, 1970171, p.46 and 1971/72, p,42. 
Capital Expenditure 
Th1s 1tem accounts for most of the budget's expenditure during the 
early 1950's. Its share reached 70% 1n 1953, However, since the late 
1950's expenditure on capital Items has tended to fall compared with other 
expenditure. In 1965/66 it real 1sed the lowest level of only 8.6% of 
total public expenditure, but s1nce then expend1ture on cap1tal 1tems 
has returned to 1ts standard of the early 1960 1 s 
Land Purchase 
Expenditure on the land purchase scheme was one of the main features 
of publ 1c expenditure In Kuwait, Th1s 1tem of expenditure began 1n 1952 
and was g1ven an increasing proportional a11ocation up to 1959/60, when 
it accounted for 42% of total expenditure, The land purchase scheme 
accounted for an average of between 20%- 36% 1n the period 1960/61 -
1967/68, and dropped to less than 10% In the last three years, reach1ng 
1ts lowest point since 1952 1n 1969/70, when its share was only 3-3%. 
Ruling Family 
The allocation to the Rul 1ng fam1ly through the state budget ranged 
between about 1 and 6% However, the al locat10n to the pr1vy purse of 
the Ruler (if any) dur1ng the period prior to 1963/64 was not allocated 
through the budget, or discounted from 011 revenue before budgeting. The 
Ruler in fact had access to the unspent oil ~evenue which was kept in h1s 
personal name, However, th1s po1nt WI 11 be d1scussed later in Part Three 
of th1s chapter, The allocation to the pr1vy purse since 1963/64 has been 
f1xed by the National Assembly and consequently Its proport1onal share 
has dropped from 5.6% 1n 1963/64 to 2,6% 1n 1970/71. 
Part Three: The Kuwait State Reserve Fund 
The allocation of part of the oil revenue to investment has been 
one of the ma1n features of the Emlrates 1 f1nancial pol 1c1es. In Kuwait 
this policy has been followed since 1950 and the I ,B,R.D. 1 s report states: 
11 The 1961 M1ssion estimated that about 25 percent of the oi 1 revenue 
( 14) '· '· 
earned s1nce 1950 had been so invested. 11 "' The allocation of part of 
* The allocation to Sheikh Abdulla Al-Salen was KD 10 m1l lion and to the 
present Ruler KD 8 million, Part of this allocation is paid to the 
Ruling family by the Ruler, This amount was sa1d to be KD 2 m1 11 ion. 
~* Meaning allocated to the reserve fund account. 
the oi 1 revenue to be kept as a state reserve fund was not started 
regularly until 1950.( 15 ) Moreover, this account was kept under the 
Ruler's name until September, 1964, when he arranged for 1t to be 
regtstered in the name of the ftnance department 
Our discuss ton in th1s part wt 11 concern two ma1n po1nts. The 
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first Is an est1mation of the reserve fund balance on 31/3/1965, to find 
out the difference between the esttmated balance and the actual one. 
The second is the structural change ln reserve fund Investment 
A Estimated Balance of the Reserve Fund 
The corner stone upon which our estimation 1s based was the known 
investment profits for 1951, which appeared as part of the government 
( 1 6) 
revenue durtng 1952. We have estimated the reserve at the end of 
1951, from this known interest, on the basts that the Interest was 
equal to 3,5% of the total tnvestment We chose thts rate s1nce tt was 
• ( 1 7) the prevatl1ng average rate for Bahra1n Investment abroad. Our 
complete estimation of reserve fund movement is shown in Table 5. 7. 
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TABLE 5,7 
ESTIMATED MOVEMENT OF THE KUWAIT STATE RESERVE FUND, 1952-1964/65 
(000 KD) 
Year 1 s Net Budget Year 1 s 
Beg1nning Prof 1 t Surplus end 
Year Balance or Loss or Def1 c1 t Balance 
1952 2,370(a) 8 3 (b) 1 ,985 (c) 4,438 
1953 4,438 155(a) 22,707(c) 27' 300 
1954 27,300 955(a) 29,023(c) 57,278 
1955 57,278 2,005(a) 62,032(c) 121,315 
1956 121,315 4,800(b) 48,880 (c) 174,995 
1957 174,995 6,940(b) 33,011(c) 214,946 
1958 214,946 8,880(b) 29,746(c) 253,571 
1959/60 253,571 9,660(b) -14,339 (c) 248,892 
1960/61 248 '892 9,520(b) 35,110(c) 293,522 
1961/62 293,522 12,110(b) 19,143(c) 324' 775 
1962/63 324 '775 12,300(b) 24,674(c) 361 '749 
1963/64 361 '749 19,662(b) 31,083(c) 412,494 
1964/65 412,494 22,763(e) 39,998(c) 475,255 
Actual Balance 460,302(d) 
(a) Estimate: the interest earned on reserve fund investment : 3.5%. 
(b) Actual, 
(c) Budget revenue minus expenditure (see Apps. 5.1 and 5.2,7,) 
(d) Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, 1 Ciosed Account of the Budget 1 , 
1964/65. 
(e) Est1mated as follows: 412,494 X 19,662 
361 '749 
: 22,763 
Source: Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs: op.ciL, (2nd ed, 1954), p.125, 
SAK, 1964, p.62; IBRD, op.cit., p.1]2; M1n1stry of Finance and 
Petroleum, 1 Al-Hisab Al-Khltamy Li1 m1zameh 1 , 1963/64. 
From Table 5,7 we est1mated the reserve fund account balance at 
KD 475 m1ll ion. The actual balance was KD 460 mill ion. This difference 
between the estimated and actual balance may be partly explained by the 
part which might have been spent by the Ruler himself, s1nce he has no 
offic1al allocation from the Oi 1 revenue, except h1s al locat1on as a 
member of the ruling fam1 ly. The Ruler, as mentioned earl 1er, has access 
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to this account and he may have allocated part of this account to h1mself. 
However, the aim of this estimat1on was the examination of the possibility 
that the Ruler of Kuwait, during the period 1952-1962/63, had received a 
proportional allocation of the state oll revenue, as was the case 1n the 
other Em1rates, From our 1above mentioned est1mat1on we may suggest that 
the Ruler of Kuwait during the per,od studied did not rece1ve a f1xed 
proportional allocation (third or quarter) from the state oil revenue. 
B Composition of Kuwait Reserve Fund Investment 
Prior to March, 1961 the Kuwait reserve fund was Invested almost 
totally abroad. In the period 1962-1963 an Increasing part of these 
investments were used to finance government establishments and made 
available by loan to some ~f the A~ab States. However, the ma1n 
structural change in the placing of the reserve fund did not beg1n unti 1 
the late 1960 1s as shown 1n Table 5_8, 
TABLE 5,8 
CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE KUWAIT RESERVE FUND 
SELECTED YEARS (PERCENTAGES) 
1961 1965 1968 
Government Establishments (incl ,KFAED) 15,2 20,8 
Investment in Fore 1 gn Shares 
Secur1ty and deposit 100,0 5L1 33,4 
Local companies 1 shares 3,5 6.6 
Deposit and 1 oans (local) 6.0 11.4 
Loan to Arab governments 21 '9 24.4 
Others 2 0 3 3.4 
Total 100 0 100,0 100,0 
Source: Appendix 4.4, IBDR, op.cit , p,8L 
1971 
20.8 
32.9 
7,8 
15,6 
19.7 
3.2 
100.0 
From Table 5,8 we can see the structural change in the Kuwait reserve 
fund, The ma1n change can be seen mostly in the policy to invest in the 
industry and public establishments of Kuwait its~lf, and 1n prov1ding loans 
to local companies. The second trend has been to lend money to Arab States, 
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as d1 rect governmental loans or through KFAED Investment abroad 1n 
deposit accounts, shares and other forms of short and medium-term 
securities, has been reduced constderably dur1ng the last decade, However, 
there are considerable government assets 1nvested abroad 1n such outlets 
These assets cons1st of the sum accumulated from 1ncome tax paid by some 
of the 01 i compan1es 1n advance tsee Appo 4 4), a sum invested under the 
name of the 1 Independent Account 1 s 1 nee 1964 
The breakdown of investment profit 1s not usually given. However, 
these profits 1nclude the 1nterest on the 1lndependent Account 1 , Th1s 
interest amounted to KD 14 ml 11 10n in 1969/70 
The profits earned from the Kuwait state reserve fund and the 
investment of the 'Independent Account' is not clear at a11, particularly 
dur1ng the 1960 1s, The IBRD report mentioned that the 1962/63 pub I 1c 
investment income was KD 12.3 m1 Ilion, wh1 le Dr. El-Mallakh quoted a 
figure as high as KD 43-3 million for the same year. (l 8) Another problem 
that has faced us here IS the great difference 1n the administrative 
expenses of th1s account. These expenses amounted to less than one 
hundred thousand Kuwalt1 Dina(s 1n 1967/68 and 1968/69, while they were 
as high as KD 8.7 m1 11 1on In 1969/70 and KD 2.3 m1 11 1on 1n 1970/71 (App. 
54) o However, the explanation of this difference goes beyond the scope 
of this study. 
From our prev1ous discuss1on of the Kuwait state reserve we may 
see that the Kuwait state assets on 31/3/1971 were der1ved from the sources 
as shown 1n Table 59 overleaf: 
TABLE 5.9 
KUWAIT STATE ASSETS BY SOURCE, 31/3/1971 
(KD MILLION) 
Budgets Surplus (Net) 
Reserve Fund Investment Prof1t (Net) 
The Independent Account 
Total 
360 
224 
246 
830 
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·/\ ... 1~ 
* Exclud1ng the difference between the estimated balance of the 
reserve fund and the actual balance (KD 15 m1 11 10n) and other 
allocations from the investment revenue which appear as part 
of its adm!nlstrat,ve expenses, but were ,n fact used for other 
purposes (such was the case w1th the expenses for 1969/70, wh1ch 
1ncluded more than KD 8 mlll1on allocated to meet the cost of 
the "Summ1t Conference of the Kings and Pres1dents of Arab States 
held 1n Rabat In September, 1969). 
·'--', Excluding cash in hand (KD 7 m1ll1on), stores, stock and f1xed 
assets (public bu1ld1ngs, etc.) 
Source: Apps. 53 6 and 5.4 
Part Four: The Allocation of the 011 Revenue In Kuwait 
In the prev1ous parts of this chapter we have been trac,ng the 
channels through which the publ 1c revenues were used. We have now 
amassed a cons1derable part of the 1nformat1on needed to assess the 
al locat1on of the 011 revenues. However, two further points need to be 
dealt With, First, the total allocation to the reserve fund was taken 
as equal to the actual part transferred from the budget, and d1d not 
Include the revenue generated from the investment of this fund. Second, 
the allocation to the pr1vy purse raises a problem. a) when 1t was f1xed 
in the 1963/64 budget, 1t was more than tw1ce that of the al locat1on to 
the ruling fam1ly 1n 1962/63, and hence 1t 1s diff1cult to believe that 
the Ruler's allocation dur,ng the constitutional era was about three 
times the amount he was receiving ;n the prev1ous period And b) when 
we est1mated the reserve fund balance at the end of the 1964/65 f1scal 
year, the difference was KD 15 m1ll1on (which IS a relatively small sum). 
However, it was difficult to get a straight-forward answer to the quest1on 
of what was the actual allocation to the Ruler of Kuwait 1952-1962/63 
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But 1f we take lnco cons1derat;on the personal history of Shaikh Abdulla 
A1-Salern, from h1s Presidency of the Admin1strat1Ve Counc1l 1n 1938 (see Chap, 
I, p,22) to hts role in producing the 1946 and 1947 f1nance department's 
budget, we m1ght expect him to draw ve"y little of the state's -evenue for 
h1mselL Therefore, if he did draw any part of the state revenue, this part 
was certainly relatively small, and to avoid the poss1bl I 1ty of error 1n 
this situation we may 1gnore this part and cons1der it as com1ng from the 
re::.erve fund investment profits and not from the o1l revenue, 
A ; The Proportional Contr1but1on of 011 Revenue Spent (PCORS) 
The proportional contr;butlon of the o,] revenue spent 1S shown 1n 
Table 5' 10. 
TABLE 5 10 
PROPORT!ONAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE OIL REVENUE SPENT, 1952-1970/71 
(000 KD) AND PERCENTAGES 
Annua 1 Budget Surplus 0 I i Revenue Total Gloss PCORS 
Oi 1 Revenue or Deficit Spent ( 1±2:3) DefiCit 3 
Year 1 2 3 4 4 
1952 19,573 1 ,985 17,588 17,588 100% 
1953 60' 161 22,707 37,454 37,454 100% 
1954 69,302 29,023 40,279 40,279 tOO% 
1955 100,498 62,030 38,468 38,468 100% 
1956 104 '32 -, 48,800 55,521 55,521 100% 
1957 110,437 33 '0 1 i 77,426 77.426 100% 
1958 127,706 29,746 97,960 97,960 100% 
1959/60 167,709 -14,339 182,048 182,048 100% 
1960/61 159,896 35' 11 0 124,786 124,785 100% 
1961/62 166,952 19' 14 3 147,809 147,809 100% 
1962/63 173,004 24,674 148,330 148,330 100% 
1963/64 190,574 31 ,083 159,491 159,491 100% 
1964/65 206,209 39,998 166,21 I 166,211 100% 
1965/66 225,325 3,327 221,998 221,998 100% 
1966/67 231,675 -35,256 266,931 266,931 100% 
1967;68 263,097 -36 '172 299,269 299,269 100% 
1968/69 242,988 4,642 238,346 238,346 100% 
1969/70 280,440 20,929 259,511 259,511 100% 
1970/71 297,701 39' 14 3 258,558 259,074 99% 
Total 3,197,568 359,584 2,838,024 2,838,540 
Source: Apps, 5,1; 5,3,1; 5-3,2 and 5,3,3, 
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From Table 5 10 we can see that the gross total def1c1t of the 
self-revenue of the different items of expenditure :n the Kuwait publ tc 
budgets for the period studied was KD 2,838.5 ml 11 ton, of wh1ch 
KD 2,838,0 mi11 ion were met from 01 I revenue, Th1s was almost 100%. 
B The Allocation of Total Ot1 Revenue, 1952-1970/71 
During the period 1952-1970/71 a sum of KD 3,195 mil loon from the 
state oi 1 revenue was allocated to f1nance the state budgets and build 
a public reserve fund 
This sum represents 92.6% of the total otl revenue rece1ved by 
Kuwait state for the period 1947-1970/71 (see App. 3 2) The other 7 4% 
is divided between (a) oil revenue received 1n 1970!71 but not yet 
allocated, since according to the usual pract1ce ;twas going to be 
utilised to f1nance the 1971/72 budget. (Th•s amo~nt was KD 242 mil l~on 
(App. 3.2) and represents 7.0% of the total oil revenue recetved). 
(b) the rest, consisting of about 0,4%, represents the 011 revenue earned 
dur1ng the period 1947-1951, for which an allocatlonal breakdown cannot 
be made because of insufficient Information 
The allocation of the total 011 revenue received and allocated in 
the period 1952-1970/71 was as shown 1n Table 5 1 I overleaf. 
TABLE 5.11 
ALLOCATION OF TOTAL OIL REVENUE, 1952//1970/71 
( M I L L I ON KD) 
Allocation 
1) Current Expenditure 
a) Social Serv1ces 
b) Law and Order 
c) Post, Telephone and Telegraph 
d) Public Utilities 
e) Administration and others 
Total 
2) Capita 1 Expenditure 
a) Pub 1 i c Works 
b) Public Utilities 
c) Post, Telephone and Telegraph 
d) Administration and others 
Total 
Total Current and Capital Exp. 
3) Land Purchase 
4) Ruling Family 
5) Reserve Fund 
Grand Total 
Source: Apps. 5.2.6, 5.3.5 and 5.3.6. 
Total Oil Revenue 
Amount 
477 
343 
15 
48 
616 
1 ,499 
329 
121 
36 
102 
588 
2,087 
661 
87 
360 
3' 195 
144 
Percentage 
14.9 
10. 7 
0.5 
1.5 
19.2 
'4"6.]' 
10. 3 
3.8 
1.1 
3.2 
18.4 
65.2 
20.7 
2.7 
11.2 
99.8 
Of the KD 3,195 million oil revenue allocated during the period studied 
KD 1,499 million, or 46.8% of the total was absorbed by current expenditure; 
KD 588 million, or 18.4% went on capital expenditure; KD 661 m1 Ilion, or 
20.7% was allotted to the land purchase schemes; KD 87 million, or 2.7% was 
paid to the Ruling family, and KD 360 mill ion, or 11.2% went into the 
reserve fund. 
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Current Expenditure 
The functional allocation of total current expenditure was as 
follows: the administration and others accounted for 41.1% of the total 
sum allocated to current expenditure, followed by the soc1al serv1ces 
with 31.8%, law and order serv1ces, 22,9%, public util 1t1es, 3.2%, and 
post, telephone and telegraph, 1,0% 
Capital Expenditure 
The funct;onal allocation of cap1tal expenditure was as follows. 
public works absorbed 56.2% of the total. (This department, as mentioned 
earlier executes work for almost all the departments, espec1al ly by 
constructing road, ports and similar faci 1 I ties). The public utilities 
came next with a share of 20.4%, the administration and others cla1med 
17.3%, and 6.1% of the total cap; tal expenditure was allocated to the 
post, telephone and telegraph serv1ces 
C Development of the Annual Allocation 
Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 show the annual growth of the sums allocated from 
oil to finance the different Items of expenditure in the state budgets 
and provide the allocation to the reserve fund From F;g. 5,3 we see that 
allocation to current expenditure has shown steady growth. Expenditure 
on law and order showed the highest rate of growth, fol !owed by adminis-
tration and others (including the transfer payments, e.g. payments to 
Arab states), and the soc1al services. The allocation to cover the 
current expenditure of the public util 1t1es and the post, telephone and 
telegraph services showed less tendency to grow and even showed some 
decrease in the absolute sums allocated s1nce 1966/67, The telephone and 
telegraph ministry in fact produced a surplus in 1970/71. 
From Fig. 5.4 we can see that current expenditure has shown the 
highest rate of growth among the main items of allocation. The growth 
has been steady, and the total current expenditure ln 1970/71 was 44 t1mes 
higher than that of 1952. The allocation to the land purchase scheme also 
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showed a high rate of growth, and durtng the late 1950's and early 1960's 
it ranked second to current expenditure, However, s1nce the late 1950's, 
the allocation to capital expenditure has shown changtng trends and the 
rate of growth has been low, the allocation for 1970/71, betng only 
twice that of 1952, The allocation to the reserve fund has not been 
stable at all and it seems to have been determtned by the needs of the 
budget. The allocation to the Rul tng fam1 ly grew fast unt1 1 it was 
ftxed in 1963/64; later, in 1966/67, it was decreased from KD 10 mtll ion 
to KD 8 mi 11 ion, 
D The Change in the Pattern of Allocatton 
The change in the pattern of allocating the annual available o: I 
revenue (the annual oil revenue T any amount drawn from the reserve fund 
to meet the budget deftcit 1n that year) IS shown tn Fig 5.5 (App, 
5.3.4), The main characteristic of thts change is the domination of 
both expenditure on land purchase and current expenditure. Thts trend 
started in 1953, expenditure on land purchase schemes dominattng during 
the 1950's, and current expenditure domtnattng from the beginning of the 
1960's. The allocation to the reserve fund and to cap1tal expenditure 
has been greatly affected by the above-mentioned trend. and consequently 
their share fell from 83% in 1953 to 64%, 49%, 11% and 29% in 1956, 1960/61, 
1965/66 and 1970/71 respectively, 
These are the main points of the allocatton of state oil revenue in 
Kuwait. There are other important points whtch can be deduced from the 
detailed appendices attached, and these wi 11 be used later 1n our dis-
cussion of the factors determining the pattern of oi 1 revenue allocation 
in the Emirates, and the tmpact on their econom1c development of the uses 
to which the oil revenue has been put, 
IL./Ol.6l 
OL./6961 
l.9!996l 
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NOTES - CHAPTER V 
(1) lOR, R/15/5/222 (letter from PA Kuwait to the Pol1t1cal Resident, 
dated 15/1/1947); see also in the same file 1946 and 1947 budgets 
printed in Arabic and translated into English. 
(2) ~., 
(3) ~·, (letter from the Pol !tical Resident to His Majesty's 
Secretary of State for India, dated 13th March, 1947). 
(4) ~·, Political Residency, D.O. No, C/60, dated 19/3/1947. 
(5) Ibid., (letter from PA, Kuwait, to the PR dated 13/4/1947). The 
Political Agent said: 11 ••• the Shaikh has just paid the revenue 
department Rs 1,014,000/- from the oil royalties of Rs 1,024,000/-
paid in December last.'' 
(6) lOR, R/15/5/226 (criticism against Shaikh and government, Kuwait). 
(7) lOR, R/15/5/230 (Internal Administration, Social Reform) (Notes 
on Mr. Burrow's interview with his Highness, 14/5/1949). 
(8) Hay, Sir Rupert, The Persian Gulf States, p 102; see also: 
Richmond, Sir John, op cit , p.6; Royal Institute of International 
Affal rs, The Middle East, p.125 (2nd ed 1954). 
(9) Private communication. 
(10) Royal Institute of International Affairs, op.cit., p.125 (2nd ed. 
1954). 
(11) Tk~Planning Board, Kuwait, The First Five Years Development Plan, 
1967/68- 1971/72, p.28. 
(12) IBRD, The Economic Development of Kuwait, p.45. 
(13) Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, Kuwait, 'Mashrua Al-Mizaniyh Al-
Aameh L i 1 Dawl i h 1 1972/73, 
(14) IBRD, op.cit., p.80. 
(15) lOR, R/15/5/230. 
(16) Royal Institute of International Affairs, op.cit., p.125 (2nd ed. 
1954). 
(17) Government of Bahrain, Annual Report 1372 Hijry, (Statement of 
Revenue and Expenditure 1372); see also IBRD, op.cit., p.80. 
(18) IBRD, op.cit., p.81; Mal lakh, Regaei El-, Economic Development and 
Regional Co-operation, Kuwait, p.77 (The source used by Dr. El-Mallakh 
was the finance department, Kuwait, while the IBRD again depended on 
the same source). 
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CHAPTER VI 
QATAR: ALLOCATION OF THE OIL REVENU( 
Qatar has produced oil 1n commerc1al quantities s1nce 1949 and 
received oil revenues in respect of th1s production since 1950. In the 
early 1950's Qatar state tried to adopt Bahratn 1 s system of financial 
administration in allocating ItS oil revenueo However, no budget or any 
other central account of public revenue and expenditure was published. 
This policy is st1 1 I followed and even the Adv1sory Counc1l of 1972 only 
has the right to debate the draft budget of the major pub I ic projects 
(the construction budget). (l) We have therefore been faced with diffi-
culties in obtaining the complete series of government budgets and have 
~~~.1 
only been able to obta1n budgets for the eight years from 1953-1955"" 
and 1966-1970.*~* The state's oil revenues during these e1ght years 
represented the financial policy of two rulers in different decades, and 
included the budgets of the last five years, a period during which more 
than 45% of the total oil revenue was recetvedo Hence, they present a 
reasonable sample for analystng the use of the o11 revenue in Qatar, To 
avoid the difficulties and the poss1bil ity of great error in estimating 
the public revenues and expenditure for the m;sstng years, we have 
chosen to ignore the public revenues and expenditure for the periods 
1950-1952 and 1956-1965, instead giving some indication of state policies. 
This chapter falls into three parts" The f1rst IS concerned with 
the years for which no central budgets were obtained. The second examines 
the state public revenues, public expend1ture and the public reserve for 
the pertods 1953-1955 and 1966-1970; this examination wtll provide the 
basis for analysing the allocation of the oil revenue ln Part Three of this 
chapter. 
* All the Hijry years were changed to the corresponding A,D" years: 
1370 = 1950 and 1390 = 1970o 
~b'' 1373-75 Hi j ry. 
*** 1386-90 Hijry. 
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Part One: Allocation of the 011 Revenue, 1950-52 and 1956-65 
A The Period 1950-52 
Qatar state received the first oil royalty in 1950 and the avail-
able information indicates that the state followed a system of financial 
administration similar to the system prevail 1ng in Bahrain at the time. 
Thus, a British advisor was appointed and a fixed proportion of the oi 1 
revenue was allocated to the Ruler, However, although a sort of central 
account for public revenue and expenditure was produced in 1950, in which 
a considerable part of the revenues were allocated to a public reserve 
fund and 11 approximately one-quarter of the oil receipts are reserved for 
the Sheikh. 11 ( 2) 11 lt was not until 137/' (1953) that the first detailed 
budget was produced in Qatar. 11 ( 3) As Mr, Cummins' report noted, the 
government consol 1dated bank accounts 1n Doha rece1ved three-quarters of 
the oil royalty payments. 11The remaining quarter is for the Ruler's 
account. 11 ( 4) 11All instructions to the banks involving expenditure or 
other financial transactions and all cheques drawn on the government's 
consolidated bank accounts are s1gned JOintly by H,H, the Ruler and the 
Advisor. 11 ( 5) However, though a distinction between the public purse and 
the pr1vy purse of the Rwler had been drawn as early as 1950, the 
government departments had to be established before any comprehensive 
development programme could be commenced. Thus, the framework of a 
departmental system was taking shape at that time as may be seen from the 
enrolment of government employees as shown overleaf 1n Table 6. 1. 
;':. 
Hi j ry. 
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TABLE 6,1 
ENROLMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE, 1943/48-1954" 
(NO, OF PERSONS) 
Department 43/48 ~ iQ. .2..!. _g .21 .2i_ Total 
Adviserate 3 3 2 11 
Education 3 5 5 6 19 
Court 4x 1xx 7 
Customs 4 7 
State Engineer's Office¢ 3 
State El , ' 0 ect r 1 c 1 ty 21 
C i vi 1 Engineering 2 3 8 5 18 
Mechanical Equ1pment 2 4 7 8 21 
Water Department¢ 1 0 
State Medical Services 2 5 24 7 38 
Qatar Police 2 2 5 14 23 
6 7 14 22 52 42 178 
* The Hijry Year 1374 taken as corresponding to 1954. 
x Including Sheikh Ahmed Bin All Al-Thani who was appointed as a judge 
1n the Civil Court. 
xx Sh~ikh Khalifa Bin Hamed Al-Thanl who was appointed as a judge in 
the Civil Court 
¢ No date of enrolment was given. 
Source: Calculated from J.W, Cummins, 'Government of Qatar: Review of 
Salaries', pp.112-118-
As shown in Table 6.1 the government employees enrolment increased 
from 14 employees in 1950 to 28 in 1951 and to 50 in 1952. Also, as may 
be noted from the table, most of the departments were not established 
before 1951. Thus, because of the lack of channels through which the oi 1 
revenue might be used, the government bu1 lt up considerable 1 iquid assets 
as shown in Table 6.2 overleaf: 
TABLE 6,2 
THE GOVERNMENT 1 S LIQUID ASSETS, 1950-1952 
(0 00 QDR) 
Ll qu 1 d Assets 1950 19 51 
Cash 2,560 14,307 
Investments 7,509 
Total 2,560 21 ,807 
Sundry Debtors 301 114 
Total 2,861 21 ,922 
Less: Current Liabilities 
S, CredItors 1 '1 34 660 
Excess of Liquid Assets 
1 '727 21 , 261 over Liabil it1es 
151 
1952 
24,683 
7,500 
32 '18 3 
760 
32,943 
550 
32 '393 
Source: Cummins, J.W , 1 Report on the Accounting Establishment and 
Organisation of the Government of Qatar 1 , pp.3-4. 
Assuming that one quarter of the 011 revenue was allocated to the 
privy purse of the Ruler, we may estimate the allocation of 01 I revenue 
dur1ng the period 1950-1952 as follows: 
TABLE 6.3 
THE ALLOCATION OF THE OIL REVENUE, 1950-1952 
(000 QDR) 
Amount Percentase 
P r 1 vy Purse 18,727 25 0% 
Reserve 32 '393 43 3% 
_,_ 
Government p. Expenditures 23,774" 31 < 7% 
Total Oi 1 Revenue 74 '894 100.0% 
'~ Including allocation to the Ruling fam1ly, 
B The Per1od 1956-1965 
During this per1od of ten years there was a change •n the admin1s-
tratlon and the general economic condition of Qatar Thus we may dis-
tingu1sh two different stages; the first represented the late years of 
Sheikh Ali 1 s rule assisted by a British Adviser (1956-1960), and the 
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second represented the early years of Sheikh Ahmed 1 s rule, assisted by 
the Heir Apparent and Deputy Ruler, Sheikh Khalifa (1961-1965). (Sheikh 
Khal ifa IS the present ruler). 
B1 - The Late Years of Sheikh Ali •s Rule, 1956-1960 
This per1od consisted of five years, mostly w1th 1ncreas1ng oil 
revenue and, consequently, increasing public expenditure. The f1nanc•al 
administration and the f1nanc1al system of allocating oi 1 revenue was 
Similar to the one followed in the per1od 1953-1955 (see Part Two of this 
chapter). The Ruler received one quarter of the oil revenue and the 
remaining members of the Rul 1ng family received the• r allocation through 
* the Government budget. The Adviser was the head of all the government 
departments and responsible directly to the Ruler AI 1 financial trans-
act1ons concerning government f1nanc1al accounts were s1gned jointly by 
the Ruler and the Adv1ser. 
Although we have no complete information concerning- the allocation 
of oil revenue dur1ng th1s period, we would expect a continuation of the 
1953-1955 pattern of allocation, with an 1ncreas1ng allocation to the 
Ruling fam1 ly and the government 1 s capital and current expenditure. In 
1954, 31.7% of the oil revenue had been allocated to the Ruling family, 
37.5% to the reserve, and 30.8% to the government•s cap1tal and current 
expenditure, and it was reported that the al locat1on of the 1955-56 oil 
revenues was 11one th1rd to the Ruler and h1s family, one third to state 
public expenditure and one third to the reserve. 11 ( 6) This pattern of 
allocation may have been preserved, particularly up to 1958- However, 
when the state oil revenue dropped from QDR 287 ml 11 ion in 1958 to 
QDR 253 million in 1959 and QDR 260 million in 1960 (App. 3.3) this 
pattern was no longer able to meet the 1ncreas1ng demand of the govern-
ment 1 s current and capital expenditure, and the allocation to the Ruling 
* In Bahrain the Ruler had been allocated one third of the oil revenue 
from which he paid the Ruling fam1 ly 1 s allocations. 
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family. Th1s change 1n the economic cond1tion caused some problems for 
the Ruler and his government, and even paved the way for his abdicat1on 
of the Rulership on 24th October, 1960. (?) As far as the government's 
current and capital expenditure is concerned, the main 1mpact was on 
education, health, electr1c1ty and water, The allocation to both 
education and electr1c1ty had risen considerably dur;ng this per1od as 
shown in F1g. 6.1 (App. 6.4). 
B2 - The Early Years of Sheikh Ahmed's Rule, 1961-1965 
Again th1s period consists of five years for which no government 
central budgets or any other central account of public revenue and 
expenditure was obtainable. However, the economic condition preva1 ling 
in Qatar at the time was completely different from that of the 1950's. 
In the late 1950's Qatar Petroleum Company's ol 1 production froze almost 
at its 1958 level and 1t was not until 1964 that Shell Qatar's oil pro-
duction commenced (App. 2. 1.3), Consequently, the annual oil revenue did 
not increase (App. 3.3) and this affected the whole econom1c situation, 
even resulting in a change of administration and in the pattern of 
allocating the state's oil revenue, Thus, at the end of 1960 a new Ruler 
came to office and the oil revenue was div1ded equally between the Ruling 
family and the government. (8) This change was in demand for so~e time 
and a kind of contract was formed to solve the problem of succession 
caused by the abdication of Sheikh Ali, an event wh1ch gave political 
power to the Ruling family and consequently gave them a more important 
say in public affairs, By the end of 1960 the allocation of oil revenue 
was reported as shown 1n Table 6.4 overleaf: 
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THE ALLOCATION OF OIL REVENUE IN QATAR, 1960 
The Government 
The Ruler 
The Heir Apparent 
Sha1kh Ali 
(PERCENTAGE) 
Other Members of the Ruling Family 
50% 
25% 
2,5% 
2.5% 
20% 
100% 
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Source: Dabbag, M.M. Al-, Qatar, Madhiha wa Hadhiruha, p 54, 
This pattern of allocation was followed until 1963. Such a pattern 
not only prevented the state from keeping apart a portion of the ol 1 
revenue for investment, but moreover resulted in freezing the government's 
capital, and, to a lesser extent, its current expenditure during th1s 
per1od (see Fig. 6.1 and App. 6.4). This new financial pol 1cy and the 
change in the economic situation interrupted the Infrastructure develop-
ment schemes and stopped any attempt to increase social services, a matter 
which caused the concern expressed by Qatar's notables dur1ng the 1963 
* popular movement. 
Although the 1963 movement ach1eved none of its aims directly, it 
affected future development and prov1ded a reason for the Deputy Ruler's 
hold1ng of the allocation to the Ruling fam1 ly at VIrtually its 1963 level. 
During this time we may assume that the Deputy Ruler and Heir Apparent 
was able to persuade the Ruler to 1 im1t his allocation to only one quarter 
of the QPC payments and not to extent it to include one quarter of She! 1 
Qatar Company's payments, which had commenced in considerable sums in 1964. 
This assumption is based on two points: a) the issuing of a long statement 
* This movement started by the end of April 1963, when the government 
1mpr1soned about 50 leading citizens, an action that resulted in a 
general str1ke for more than a week. However, the movement ach1eved 
none of Its aims directly, and most of the leaders were exiled, some 
of them not being allowed to return until 1972, 
155 
from the Ruler cal led 1 Explanatory Statement on the Comprehensive 
Programme for the Advancement of the Country• dated 27th May, 1963. In 
th1s statement the Ruler prom1sed to undertake a series of steps in the 
political, soc1al and economic fields to achieve ••a SQCiety of justice, 
quality, stability and production•• (translated from Arab1c).( 9) b) the 
point emerging from our examination of the allocation of the oi 1 revenue 
in Qatar during the period 1966-1970, that the Ruler•s allocation was 
fixed to one quarter of the QPC payments. Thus, wh1le in the early years 
of this period the allocation of the o1l revenue followed the pattern 
mentioned in Table 6.4, 1 ,e, one quarter to the Ruler, one quarter to the 
Ruling family and one half to the government, the pattern changed, presumably 
in 1964, as follows· the Ruler•s allocation was fixed at one quarter of 
the QPC payments, wh1 lethe Ruling family received anal location of no 
fixed proportion through the budget, and the rema1n1ng revenue was allocated 
to the different government departments. As the 1966 budget indicated, 
the allocation to the Rul 1ng family, exciud1ng the allocation to the privy 
purse of the Ruler, was QDR 97 mill ion, equal to 22.2% of the total oil 
revenue received 1n 1966. 
We have thus arrived at a general conception of the allocation of 
the oil revenue in Qatar dur1ng the years 1950-52 and 1956-65, the two 
main recipients were the government, including the reserve fund, and the 
Ruling family. The proportional allocation changed considerably, first 
favouring the Ruling fam1 ly, and later the government. However, in so 
far as we have been able to estimate it, the government•s share of the 
1966 oil revenue was only 60.5%, compared With 69.3% in 1955. 
Part Two: The Public Revenue, Expenditure and Reserve, 1953-55 and 1966-70 
The ma1n sources for our invest1gation of the state revenue, expen-
diture and reserve during these periods are: a) Qatar•s actual budgets for 
1953 and 1954, its estimated budget for 1955, and the closed account of 
the budgets 1966-70. b) the state oil revenue (App. 3.3). The allocation 
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to the prtvy purse of the Ruler, whtch d•d not appear 1n the budget, has 
been esttmated as equaling the stare oil revenue less r:he government 
budget oil revenue, The resulttng sums almost equal one quarter of the 
QPC payments, except 1n 1970 when the allocac~on fell considerably below 
thts proportton, The only plausible explanac•on of th1s drop is that 
the Ruler re-paid some of his allocation to cove~ the unexpected ex-
pendtture of the Mtntstry of Health under the adm.n1strat1on of h1s 
eldest son, The Ministry of Health 1 s 1970 expenditure reached QDR 52 
mt Ilion, compared wtth QDR 26 mill .on in 1969 and QDR 25 m1 11 ion 1n 
1968, The allocation ro the Ruler tn 1970 should have been ln the reg!on 
of QDR 90 m;llion, but seems to have been QDR 66 mil 1 ~on, 
A Public Revenue 
Qatar stare publ 1c revenue dur1ng the periods 1953-55 and 1966-70 
is shown in Table 6,5, 
THE STATE PUBLIC REVENUES, 1953-55 and 1966-70 
(MILL I ON QDR) 
1953-55 1966-70 Totai 
Source Amount % Amount % Amount % 
0 i 1 Revenue 
Administration and others 
Law and 0 rde r 
Public Utilities 
Transport and Communication 
Total 
,., lncludtng investment profiL 
Source: App, 6,1, 
387 
6 
2 
397 
97"5 
1 5 
0,5 
0, 3 
N ,A" 
2,597 91 2 
211 7 4 
2 
28 0,9 
7 0,2 
2,846 99,7 
2,985 92 0 
218 6,7 
4 0' 1 
29 0,9 
7 0.2 
3,243 99,9 
Table 6 5 shows the total publ 1c revenue received and the change in 
its structure in the two periods studted" As ~s shown tn the table, otl 
revenue accounted for 97.5% in 1953-55 and 91,2% 1n 1966-70" The main 
change noted was the increase of the revenue from customs and the investment 
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profit in the per1od 1966-70 (administration and others), 
B Public Expenditure 
The allocation of Qatar state public expenditure for the periods 
studied is g;ven below 1n Table 6~6 
ALLOCATION OF THE STATE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, 1953-55 and 1966-70 
(MjLLiON QDR) 
Current Expenditure 
Social Services 
Law and Order 
Public Utilities 
Transport and Communication 
Administration and others 
Capital Expenditure 
Social Services 
Publ it Utilities 
Transport and Communication 
Public Works (Eng,) 
Law and Order 
Administration and others 
Ruling Family 
The Ruler 
Other members 
Land Purchase 
Grand Total 
360 
144 
134 
21 
205 
58 
114 
74 
162 
33 
_n_ 
512 
556 
Amount 
864 
520 
1 ,068 
201 
2,629 
% of Total 
32,0% 
12,7% 
5,4% 
s, 0% 
0"7% 
7,8% 
19 0 7% 
2~0% 
4,3% 
2,8% 
6 0 1% 
L2% 
2,9% 
40,6% 
17 0 5% 
22,4% 
],6% 
Fig 6,2 shows the development of the dlfferent Items of expenditure, 
Us1ng the figure, Table 6,6 and App, 6,2,7 we wil 1 briefly discuss the 
structure and development of pub! 1c expenditure Jn Qatar 
Total Expenditure 
Total expenditure rose considerably dut1ng the periods studied, 
Expenditure for 1970 amounted to QDR 556 million compared with only QDR 57 
c: 
0 
~ 
0:::: 
0 
0 
Development of Publ1c ExRend1ture (by Ma1n Group.§l 
1953-1955 & 1966- 1970 
560 
540 Cap1tal Expenditure 
Land Purchase ... 
Rull ng Family 
Current Expenditure 
440 
420 
400 
480 
360 
340 
320 
300 
280 
260 
240 
220 
200 
180 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
FIG 6 2 
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m1l 1 ion 1n 19530 However, the development of pub I IC expenditure was 
affected by the slow growth of the 011 revenue during the per1od 1959-
1963 (see Fig 601 and App, 6.4). Thus Qatar's publ 1C expenditure in 
1970 was only ten time5 that of 1953, while Kuwait's expendltu~e in 
1970/71 was more than forty-four times that of ~952 
Current Expenditure 
fhe total current expenditure amounted to QDR 864 m1 ll 10n or 32% 
of total expenditure, The propo~t1on of current expenditure 1ncreased 
rapidly and 1n 1970 1t was about 39% compared With only about 17% in 
1953. The 1970 expenditure was QDR 216 m1 11 ion or about twenty-rwo times 
greater than that of 1952. 
Capital Expend1ture 
Total cap1tal expenditure was QDR 520 m1l l!on or 19,7% of total 
expenditure. Its share of the overall total decreased from 38.1% in 
1953 to only 20.6% 1n 1970. However, during the early 1960's this 
a1 locatton suffered most, and its share 1n 1966 was as law as 7.5% only 
Since then its proportional allocation has Improved. The 1970 allocation 
was QDR 114 m1ll ion or about s1x t;mes that of 1953 
Allocation to the Rul 1ng Faml 1y 
This allocation ~ons1sted of QDR 1,068 m1ll ion or about 40.6% of 
the total. Its shate of the overal 1 total decreased to 32.8% in 1970 
compared With 44.8% &n 1953 and 49 8% in 19550 However, the sum allocated 
to this item increased from QDR 26 ml Ilion In 1953 to QDR 182 m1 Ilion 1n 
1970. 
Land Purchase 
This item of expenditure accounted for QDR 20 1 mill 1on or about 7.2%, 
This 1tem has been one of the main Items of publIC expenditure s1nce the 
late 1960's. 
C Public Reserve Fund 
Our examination of the reserve fund wi 11 concern two points, the 
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balance of the fund at the beginning of 1971, and Its rnvestment outlets 
at that period. 
C1 - The Accumulated Balance 
From our prev.ous discussion and the ava1lable Information we may 
assess the balance of the reserve fund account as follows: 
TABLE 6 7 
THE BALANCE OF THE RESERVE FUND ACCOUNT, 1971 
(000 QDR) 
Net Amount 
Government Net Liqurd Assets, end 1952 32 '393 
2 Budget Surplus, 1953-55 141 '894 
3 Budget Surplus, 1966-70 472,483 
4 Total Surplus ( 1 + 2 + 3) 646 '770 
5 Loss from Sterling Devatuat~on -36,494 
6 Total 610,296 
7 Net Surplus, 1956-65 (8 - 6) 119,425 
8 Actual Balance of the Reserve, 1971 729,701 
Source: Private contact with the Ministry of Frnance, Qatar; Table 6,2 
and 6. 10, 
As shown in Table 6.7 the reserve fund balan~e at the begrnning of 
1971 was QDR 730 million Thrs balance had been accumulated over the 
previous 21 years. The allocatron to the reserve fu~d, expressed as a 
percentage of the state oil revenue, is shown below: 
TABLE 6.8 
ALLOCATION TO THE RESERVE FUND AS PERCENTAGE OF OIL REVENUE 
1950/52, 1953/55, 1956/65 and 1966/70 (MiLL I ON QDR) 
A 11 ocat ion Allocation as 
Oil to the percentage from 
Period Revenue Reserve oi I revenue 
1950/52 75 32 42o7% 
1953/55 387 142 36.7% 
1956/65 1 ,686 119 7,0% 
1966/70 2,600 472 18.3% 
Source: App. 3.4, Table 6. 7. 
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The table shows that the allocation to the reserve fund was 
relat1ve1y high in the early 1950's, but dropped 1n the period 1956/65, 
reflecting the state of oil production at that period and the pressure 
of the allocations to the Ruling family and to government expenditure. 
Later 1n the late 1960's, with the .ncreasing all revenue from Shell Qatar 
Company and the expensing of the royalty, the state was able to set aside 
higher proportions of 1ts revenues for the reserve fund accounts. 
C2 - The Reserve Fund Investments 
The breakdown of the reserve fund investments Is given in the 
following table: 
TABLE 6.9 
THE STATE PUBLIC RESERVE INVESTMENTS, 1971 
(000 QDR) 
Government Local Current and Deposit Acts. 
Investment 1n Qatari and Arabian Companies 
Investment Abroad (Different currencies) 
Foreign Bonds 
Amount 
1 11 ' 11 3 
108,655 
483,114 
26,819 
729,701 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Qatar, direct contact. 
Percentage 
15.2 
14.9 
66.2 
3-7 
Table 6.9 Indicates that about 70% of Qatar's reserve funds are 
Invested abroad, mainly in bank deposits and fore1gn secur1t1es, while 
15.2% is invested with local banks and 14.9% invested in local and 
Arabian companies shares 
The breakdown of the investment profit is not offiCially given, and 
it 1s difficult to analyse the Investment revenues. However, the Invest-
ment profit, as the government budget stated, Is as shown overleaf in 
Table 6.10. 
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TABLE 6 10 
THE INVESTMENT PROFIT, 1953-55 and 1966-70 
(0 00 QDR) 
Year Amount Year Amount 
1953 244 1967 (net loss) -22,694 
1954 1 ,600 1968 26,969 
~955 1 ,600e 1969 31 ,244 
1966 17,000 1970 33,843 
e: budget estimation, 
Source: Government Budgets. 
Part Three: The Allocation of the State Oil Revenue 
After assessing the state public revenue, expenditure and reserve, 
we are in a pos1tion to examine the allocatron of the state 011 revenue: 
Our d1scussion will cover mainly the e1ght years ment,oned earl re~ (1953-55 
and 1966-70), 
A - Proportional Contribution of the 011 Revenue Spent (PCORS) 
The proportional contribution of the 011 revenue spent Is given ln 
the following table: 
TABLE 6 11 
PROPORTIONAL CONTRiBUTION OF OIL REVENUE SPENT, 1953-55 and 1966-70 
MILLION QDR AND PERCENTAGE 
Annua I Pub 1 ic Total PCORS 
Oil Revenue Oil Revenue Gross 3 
Revenue Surplus Spent Deficit ~ 
Year 1 2 (1 + 2) = 3 4 % 
1953 85 29 56 56 100 
1954 139 52 87 87 100 
1955 163 60 102 102 1 00 
1966 434 118 319 331 96 
1967 490 78 411 411 100 
1968 526 104 422 422 1 00 
1969 563 83 480 498 96 
1970 582 89 493 505 97 
Total 2,985 614 2,371 2,412 98 
Source: Apps, 6,1, 6.3,1, 6,3,2 and 6, 3. 3, 
162 
As the table indicates the ot l revenue covered 98% of the deft cit 
1n the separate departmental accounts. The investment profit and customs 
-;\ 
revenue prov1ded the remaining 2%. 
B The Allocatton of the State Total Ot 1 Revenue 
B1 - Allocatton of Total Otl Revenue, 1953/55//1966/70 
The al locatton of the total 011 revenues recetved during the periods 
studied 1s shown in Table 6.12 
TABLE 6.12 
ALLOCATION OF THE STATE'S OIL REVENUE, 1953/55 and 1966/70 
(MILLION QDR) 
As % of Total 
A 11 ocat ion Amount Oll Revenue 
Current Exeenditure 610 20.5% 
-Social Services 328 11 '0% 
Law and Order 136 4 6% 
Pub 1 i c Uti 1 l ties 102 3 4% 
Transport and Comm. 13 Oo4% 
Administration and others 30 LO% 
Caettal Exeenditure 510 17. 1% 
= Social Serv1ces 57 1 9% 
Publ, c Ut•lit1es 112 3 9% 
Transport and Commo 73 2 4% 
Publ tc Works 159 5 4% 
Law and Order 32 LO% 
Administration and others 75 2.5% 
Rul 1 ng Fam1 l Y. 1 ,048 35, 1% 
The Pr1vy Purse 502 16,8% 
Other members 546 18.3% 
Land Purchase 197 6.6% 
Public Reserve Fund 614 20.6% 
= 
Grand Total 2,979 99.9% 
Source: Apps, 6.2.6, 6.3.4 and 6.3,5 
* However, these surpluses appeared matnly because of the lack of detailed 
information concerning public revenues for these years, a lack whtch 
forced us to classify all non-ol 1 revenue under the head of 'Administration 
and Others' Therefore, 1f the detat led budgets were obtained, almost all 
the main items of publ 1c expendtture includtng the administration, would be 
in a state of def1cit, as may be seen from their behaviour tn 1967 and 1968, 
where detailed information was obtained. 
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The table shows the structure of the net allocat1on of the oi I 
revenue; Fug 6 3 presents the development of the annual allocation, On 
the basis of the table and the figure, and w1th the help of App 6 3 4, 
we w1ll d1scuss the allocat1on of the oil revenue •n Qatar 
Total Allocation 
In the per1ods stud1ed a total of QDR 2,979 mill ijQn was allocated, 
35.1% was allocated to the Rul1ng fam1ly, 20"6% to the reserve fund, 
20.5% to current expenditure, 17,1% to capital expenditure, and 6.6% to 
land purchase, 
The total allocation Increased from QDR 85 m1 l] 1on in 1953 ro QDR 
579 m1 l lion •n 1970, or about seven fold 
Ruling Family 
The allocation to the Rul lng fam1 ly was the largest of all the 
allocations. Its share was 35 1%. Th1s allocation was d1str1buted in 
the proportion of 47 8% to the Ruler and 52.8% to other members of the 
fam1 1y. 
Th1s alloca-c10n accounted for 30.6% of the total o1i revenue ln 
1970, compared w:th 30 0% 1n 1953. The actual sum al1ocated was QDR 177 
mlll1on 1n 1970 or about seven t1mes that of 1953, However, proportionally 
the allocation shows two trends, the f1 rst dudng the 1950's and early 
1960's, when it Increased proportionally, the second dur1ng the late 1960's 
when 1ts proportional share of the annual oil revenue decreased, From 
App. 6.2.5 we can see that 1n 1953, 78% of the sum allocated went to the 
Ruler and 22% to the other members of the Al-Thanl fam1 ly; 1n 1970, about 
36% was allocated to the Ruler, wh:]e the other members rece1ved 64% 
Reserve Fund 
Th1s allocation accounted for 20.6% of the total 011 revenue rece•ved 
dur1ng the periods stud1ed However, Its proportional share of the total 
all revenue received in 1950-1970 was QDR 730 m~ I l1on (Table 6. 7) O~"" only 
12 6%. 
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Its annual al lo~at1on Increased from QDR 29 mil I 10n 1n 1953 to 
QDR 89 m1 11 10n ln 1970. Nevertheless •ts proportiOnal share of total 
O!l -evenue dropped from 34.1% 1n 1953 to 15.3% 1n 1970 
Current Expenditure 
164 
Th1s 1tem of expend1ture accounted for 20.5% of the total 011 
revenue. Its total allocations amounted :o QDR 610 m1 11 tOn The 
funct1onal allocation of th1s sum was as foilows: Soc1al Serv1ces 53.7%, 
Law and Order Serv•ces 22.3%, Public Ut1 lities 15 7%, Transport and 
Commun1cat1on 2.0% and Admin1strat;on and others 6.4% 
The sums allocated to this Item increased from about QDR 9 m1 11 ion 
1n 1953 to QDR 160 m• ll;on 1n 1970, record1ng the highest ~are of growth 
among the a1 locations. Soc1al Serv1ces In turn recorded the h1ghest rate 
of growth among the Items of current expenditure. Thetr propo(t;onal 
share in 1970 was more than sixteen times that of 1953, followed by law 
and order and publiC util 1tles 
Capital Expenditure 
This item accounted for 17 1% of the totai _ This amounted to 
QDR 510 mill ion, the functional allocation of wh1ch was as fo~lows: Public 
Works 31 2%, Pub! 1c Utll it1es 22.0%, Transport and Commun1cat1on 14.3%, 
Soc1al Services 11 1%, Law and Order 6 3% and Adm1n1strat1on and others 
14 7% 
Though the annual sum allocated to cap1tal expenditure was Increased 
in 1970 to about f1ve t1mes the sum for 1953, 1ts proportional share 
decreased from 25.5% 1n 1953 to only 5.9% 1n 1966 Since then, however, 
th1s share has improved and in 1970 was 15.3% of the annual 011 revenue. 
Land Purchase 
F1nally land purchase accounted for 6 6% of the total, 1ts pro-
portional share being In the region of 7% during the late 1960's. 
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B2- Estimated Allocat1on of the State 011 Revenue, 1950/52 and 1956/65 
At this stage we may estimate the allocatlon of the total oil 
revenue rece1ved during the periods for wh1ch no budgets or any other 
central accounts of publ 1c revenue and expenditure were obtained This 
estimate will be used as an Indication and wi 11 not be used for comparative 
purposes Th1s estimate is based on assuming the same al locatlonal 
pattern for o1l revenue spent dur1ng these periods as the one discovered 
for 1953/55 and 1966/70. During the latter years the 011 revenue spent 
was allocated as follows. Rul 1ng Fam1 ly 44.3%, Current Expenditure 25.6%, 
Cap1tal Expenditure 21.6%, Land Purchase Scheme 8 5% (see App. 6.3 3) 
The oil revenue received dur1ng the period 1950/52 and 1956/65 was QDR 
2,763 m1l 1 1on (App. 3.3 and Table 6.11). The 011 revenue spent was QDR 
~ L~ 
2,763'- (32 + 119) = QDR 2,612 m,ll1on in Qatar and Duba1 R1yals. 
Therefore, on the above bas1s, we may estimate the allocation of the 
state 011 revenue for these periods as follows: 
TABLE 6.13 
ALLOCATION OF THE STATE'S 0 I L REVENUE, 1950/52 and 1956!65 
( M I L L i 0 N QD R) 
A llocar 1 on 
Ruling Fam1ly 
Current Expenditure 
Cap1tal Expenditure 
Land Purchase 
01 1 Revenue Spent 
Reserve Fund 
Total Oil Revenue 
Amount 
1 '157 
669 
564 
222 
2,612 
1 51 
2,763 
C Change in the Pattern of Allocation 
As percentage of 
Total Oil Revenue 
41 .9% 
24.2% 
20.4% 
7.9% 
94 4% 
5.4% 
The change in the state policy for allocating the o1l revenue can be 
;'~ 
Tota 1 oi 1 revenue ( 1950-52 and 1956-65). 
h': Allocation to reserve (1950-52 and 1956-65)(Table 6.7). 
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seen clearly 1n Table 6,14 and Fig 6 4, 
TABLE 6, 14 
THE STATE OIL REVENUE ALLOCATION: STRUCTURAL CHANGE, 1953/55 and 1966/70 
(PERCENTAGES) 
A 11 ocat 1 on 1953/55 1966/70 
Current Ex~endtture 10,6% 21 "8% 
Social Servlces 2.0% 12. 3% 
Law and Order 1.7% 4.9% 
Public Util1t1es L6% 3.6% 
Transport and Comm, 0~0% 0.5% 
Administration and others 5 1% 0.3% 
Ca~ital Ex~enditure 
}· 
21 '8% 16.4% 
Ru l1 n9 Fami 1 Y. 30 ~ 9% 35.8% 
Privy Purse 24 7% 15.7% 
Other members 6.2% 20' 1% 
Land Purchase 0.0% 7 5% 
Reserve Fund 36,6% 18.2% 
99 9% 99.7% 
~ Details may be extracted from Tables 6.6 and 6,11. 
Source: App. 6.3.4. 
Table 6~ 14 and Fig. 6,4 show that the allocatlonal patterns of the 
state oil revenue changed considerably, The trends of th)s change again 
reflected the general tendency to increase the allocations to current 
expend1ture and the Ruling fam1 ly These allocat;ons increased from about 
40% 1n 1953 to 43% In 1955 and 67% 1n 1966 The •mprove~ent 1n the state 
oil revenue since then has succeeded 1n keep1ng these allocations 1n line 
with others. However, although the allocation to the Rul 1ng fam1 ly has 
shown some decrease 1n 1ts proportional share, the allocation to current 
expenditure almost absorbed the results of this change, br1nging its 
proportional share to about 35% of the total all revenue 1n 1970 compared 
with 28% and 29% in 1968 and 1969 respectively. 
FIG 6 4 
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Th1s is, 1n brtef, Ihe ma:n f1nd1ng from our exam1nat1on of the 
state 01! revenue in Qatar, The factors determin1ng the allocat1onal 
pattern of th1s revenue and the1r 1mpact on economic development will be 
discussed later In the study, 
NOTES - CHAPTER VI 
(1) Government of Qatar, 'Al-Nizam Al-Asassy Ai-Muaqat Al-Muadal', 
(Article 51 (3)), p,7, 
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(2) U,N,, Summary of Recent Economic Development 1n the Middle East, 
1952/53, p,63, 
(3) Cumm1ns, J W, 'Report on the Accounting Establishment and 
Organ1:;ation of the Government of Qatar', p 2, 
(4) ~ ' p 2, 
(5) ~-' p,2, 
(6) Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East, (Third 
edition) , p, 1 39, 
(7) Dabbagh, M M, A1-, Qatar: Madhiha wa Hadhiruha, p, 194-
(8) J.EJj_,' 
(9) Legal Affairs Department, Qatar, Majmuwaat Qawanln Qatar Hata 1966, 
pp,614-619 
(10) MEDD,' Economic. Survey of Qatar' ,pp-137-140, 
(11) However, although th1s estimate has been based on reasonable 
assumptions, some reservations must be made, 
The first concerns the allocation to the land purchase scheme and 
capital expenditure. a) Although the land purchase scheme started 
1n the late 1950's, it was not on a large scale and dur1ng the 
period 1961-1964 very 1 ittle was allocated to th1s Item Thus the 
estimated allocation may be In excess of the actual allocation, 
b) As for the allocation to cap1tal expend•ture, although, dur1ng 
the period 1956-1958 it may have rece1ved a proportionally larger 
allocat~on, lt certainly enJoyed a smaller proport1onal allocation 
dur.ng the perijod 1960-1965, as may be seen from the 1966 budget 
where the allocation to cap1tal expenditure was only 5,9% of total 
expenditure, Therefore, the allocation to th1s item may have been 
less than the estimated one, The second point concerns the 
allocations to the Ruling family and to current expenditure, a) 
Although, the allocation to the Ruling fam1 ly was 30,7% in 1955 
and 39,3% In 1966, the allocation during the period 1961-1963 was 
above the estimated proportional allocation (Table 6,4), b) The 
allocation to current expenditure, particularly after 1959, when 
the oil revenue froze at 1ts 1958 level for some years, might also 
have accounted for a sum 1n excess of the estimated one, These 
are the main 1 1mitatlons on our estimate of the allocat1on of the 
state o1l revenue during the period 1950/52 and 1956/65 
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CHAPTER VII 
UAE: THE ALLOCATION OF THE OIL REVENUE 
Of the 5even Em1 rates which comprise the UAE, only two, Abu Dhabl 
and Dubai p~oduced oil ~n commerctal quantities before the end of 1970-
Abu Dhab1 has p~oduced o; 1 since 1962 and Duba1 s1nce 1969 Othe~ 
Em1rates, however, receiVed payments from the operat•ng o~ 1 companies. 
These payments were small, estimated at £!,6 m1 11 ion in 1969< (I) The UAE 
was formed in 1971; before that time, although these Emirates had much 
in common, they did not constitute a state Therefore our presentation 
1n th1s chapter w,] 1 Introduce each of the two o· 1-ptoduc ng Em1rates 
separately, 
As Duba~ has neither a central budge~ nor any other sorr of ce~tral 
account for publ ~c revenue and expenditure, it 1S d;tf1:ulr to examine 1n 
detai 1 the allocat:on of oil revenues 1n th1s Em: rate Hence, this 
chapter wl 11 be mainly concerned with Abu Dhabi and falls 1nto three parts: 
an introduction, the publ 1c , evenue, expend1ture and eserve of Abu Dhabi 
State, a~d the allocation of the o,l reven~e :n Abu Dhab~. 
Part One; introduction 
Th1s ;ntroduction wi 11 be concerned With the peFiod dur1ng which 
no central account of publ 1c ~evenue and expenditure was produced. This 
per1od consisted of f1ve years In Abu Dhabi (1962-1966), and of two years, 
1969-1970 "n Dubal-
A Abu Dhab1 
Slnce the commencement of oi 1 productJon :n 1962, the Ruler of Abu 
Dhabi has received an lncreas1ng revenue from th;s source The total oil 
revenue received up to the end of 1970 amounted to BD 396 m1 1 l 1on, of which 
81.9% wa~ received after 1967, the pe·1od for which an ~nnual public budget 
was produced, The period pr;or to 1967 accounted for BD 73 mill ion or 
18,1% of the total oil revenue rece1ved (see App, 3,4). This per1od mostly 
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represented the Rule of Sheikh Shakhbut, who was succeeded by Sheikh Zaid 
on 6th August, 1966, (2) During 1962-1966 the development of public ex-
pend1ture did not reflect the revenue available for the Emirate, and 
except for a few improvements 1n the public admlnlstrat1on and public 
utilities there was very little change.( 3) There Is very little infor-
mation which might help us estimate public expenditure dur1ng this period. 
However, information can be given concerning changes \n some social and 
economic indicators whose movement is usually much influenced by public 
expenditure. 
TABLE 7, 1 
SOME SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC iNDICATORS IN ABU DHABI, 1965-1968 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
Number of Schools 5 5 9 21 
Number of Students 528 808 2223 4900 
Number of Teachers 33 46 77 223 
Customs Revenue (000 BD) N A, 73 239 511 
Tonnage Imported (000 Ton) 20 36 144 244 
Taxable I mpo r t s ( 0 0 0 B D) N ,A, 2934 9556 20471 
~-
Allocation to (TSDF)"(ooo BD) 266 666 1820 338 
Oil Revenue (Mill 1on BD) 15,7 47"4 48 6 72,8 
f, TSDF: Trucial State Development Fund, 
Source: SBA, 1969 (pp,34, 40 and 45), 1969 and 1970; Truc1al State Counci 1, 
Report on the Truc1al States Development Fund, 1970 p,19, 
From the table we can see the change in these Indicators 1n 1967 
compared with their level of 1966, Thus, while the oil revenue increased 
by only about 4%, the number of schools Increased by 80%, students by 165%, 
tonnage imported by 400% and the allocation to the Truclal State Develop-
ment Fund was about three times greater than that of 1966 The new 
services suppl 1ed by the government after 1967 and the heavy expenditure 
on capital schemes are also noteworthy. These changes could ind1cate how 
low the level of public expenditure pr1or to 1967 was in comparison with 
the revenue avai !able to the state, In that case we would expect the 
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building of a considerable reserve fund; but as government sources 
revealed, the state reserve at the end of 1967 was only BD 10.5 mil 1 1on, (4) 
or a sum equal to less than one quarter of the 1966 oil revenue. The only 
other recepient of the oi 1 revenue, apart from the government's public 
expenditure and the reserve fund, is the privy purse of the Ruler 
However, accurate knowledge of the allocation of the oil revenue 
during this earlier period is denied us. In consequence, despite the 
fact that this period consisted of five out of the nine years dur1ng which 
the oil royalty and taxes were received, and accounted for 18 1% of the 
total oi 1 revenue received, we have no choice but to ignore 1t, hoping 
that our examination of the remaining 81.9% of the total oil revenue 
received during the period studied WI 11 suffice to ind1cate the 
al locational pattern. 
B Dubai 
Dubai Emirate has produced oi 1 in commercial quantities since 
September, 1969. The estimated oil revenue was QDR 17 million and QDR 
137 mill ion for 1969 and 1970 respectively (Table 3o5). The period is 
very short and very difficult to examine. However, almost a1 1 the Emirates 
passed through such a period before organis1ng their administrations and 
establishing new departments through wh1ch the 011 revenue Is channelled. 
The Rulers, in this transitional period, treated the oi I revenue as they 
were in the habit of treating other r~venue such as customs duties. If 
they had central government budgets, then expenditure would be allocated 
through these budgets -as was the case in Bahrain and Kuwa1t (1947 
budget) -while if they had no budgets, revenue was considered as private 
income and very 1 ittle of it was used for publ 1c services, as was the case 
in Abu Dhabi. No central account of publ 1c revenue and expenditure was 
produced and no grant or other allocation from the Ruler was made available 
to the Mun1cipal ity of Dubai in 1969-70, although the Municipality provided 
the Emirate with almost all the services usually prov1ded by other 
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departments, as ~ay be seen from the Mun:cipallty budget below. 
TABLE ],2 
DUBAI MUNICIPALITY BUDGET, 1969 and 1970 
(000 QDR) 
Expenditure 1969 1970 Revell ue 1969 1970 
Admlnlstrat1on 276 324 Fees and dut•es 3 133 3,900 
Engineering Dept. 1 '561 2,648 
Pub 1 l c He a 1 th 989 1, 377 Pub I i c Health 45 59 
Pub 1 i c Transport 81 83 Public Transport 106 61 
Information and 68 181 info,rmauon and 19 89 Publish1ng Services Pub] IShing se~VICes 
Fire Services 140 194 Other Taxes l '14 3 I, 558 
Total 3, 115 4,787 4,446 5,667 
Source: Dubai Municipality, 'Al-Mlzanlh Al-Aamlh' 1969; Dubal Munlc1pallty, 
'Kashf Al-Mazanih Al-Aameh Al-Taqd,ryh', 1970. 
As may be seen from Table 7,2 the Municipality in Dubai provided 
many services and collected fees and taxes In excess of its expenditure 
needs. As some 85% of the population of Dubal l 1ved 1n the Mun1cipality, 
as considerable capital and current e~pend;ture for var.ous services had 
been provided by the Trucial State Counc" 1 Development Office, (S) and 
since moreover the Emirate revenue frrom customs 1n ~969 and 1970 can be 
estimated at QDR 32 5 mill 1on and QDR 34 mi11lon respectively, we may 
assume that very l ~ttle, if any, of the Emirate's 01 l revenues were used 
to finance publ1c expenditure. The:efore unt•l the Ruler set up a modern 
and central administration and drew the line between the publ 1c purse and 
his privy purse, the oil revenue would have been consldered as his private 
income without any restriction, and it would have been up to hlm to use it 
as he thought best, the result depend1ng greatly on hiS personal attitude. 
In th1s introduction we have tr•ed to give some 1nd;cation of how 
the oil revenue In Abu Dhab1 and Dubai was used during the periods when 
no central government account of public revenue and expenditure was pro-
duced. However, although up to 1970, Dubai did not publish a budget or 
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any other Information wh1ch m•ght Indicate the aliocational pattern of 
Its 01 l revenue, Abu Dhabi has produced and published an annual budget 
s1nce 1967, The examination of these budgets w1ll form Part Two of this 
chapter, 
Part Two: Abu Dhabl State' Public Revenue, Expenditure and Reserve, 1967-
The main source for our examlnat'on w,J] be the budgets, the o1l 
revenue (App. 3.4), and the reserve fund account. However, two main 
dlfflcultles face us, The first 1s that the off1cla1 information does 
not mention payments received from oil companieS other than the produc1ng 
ones. And consequently the published state oil revenue ~s always less 
than the actual o&l revenue by the amount paid by non-producing companies" 
These payments seem to have been received by the Ruler directly and only 
later were they transferred to the f1nance d6pa;tment where they are 
mentioned under the heading 'Grants from H,H. the Ruler', The secbnd 
difficulty was that although the publ 1shed budgets of 1967 and 1968 
mentioned an allocation to the Head of the State and also mentioned the 
total oil revenue received from the producing companies, rhe 1969 and 
1970 budgets mentioned the net 011 revenue received by the f1nance depart-
ment and noth1ng was said about the allocation to the Head of State. To 
overcome these difficulties we assume that all o1l revenue received by the 
··/~ 
state and not transferred to the budget was allocated to the privy purse 
of the Ruler. This w1ll be assumed as a gross allocation to the Ruling 
family, wh1le the net allocation needs to be reduced by the amount granted 
to the budget by the Ruler. By using th1s method we arr1ve at a net 
allocation to the Ruling fam1 ly equal to 25 0% of the total oi 1 revenue 
received du~ing the period 1967-1970, If this is compared w1th the 
BD 31 mi ll1on or 25.6%, allocated to the Ruler out of the BD 121 m1ll ion 
t';: 
We have considered only the oil revenue received from the main producing 
companies and have excluded the estimated payment of other oil 
companies (see Notes on App, 3,4), 
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ot I revenues rece1ved dunng 1967 and 1968, accord1ng to ::he budgets, (7) 
the~ we realise how close our estimate must be in th1S case, 
Calculated on these p~emises the public revenue, publ 1c expenditure 
and pubi ic reserve of Abu Dhabi state was as follows: 
A Public Revenue 
The total revenue received duF•ng rhe per1od studied, 1967-1970, 
1s shown be~ow In Table 7,3" 
TABLE. 7,3 
ABU DHABI STATE.: TOTAL REVENUE RECEIVED, 1967/70 
(000 BD) 
Source Amount Per~entage 
Oi 1 Revenues 322,869 95,8% 
Social Serv1ces 47 
Law and Order 355 0 0 1% 
Public Utilities 782 0.2% 
Communications 930 0,3% 
Grants from the Ruler 4,460 1 0 3% 
Administration and others 7,252 2' 1% 
Total 336,695 99 9% 
Source: App, 7 1, 
The main feat~~e of Abu Dhab1 state publ1c revenue as shown in 
Table 7.3 Is the overwhelm1ng dependence on ,lhe oal revenue, a dependence 
even greater than is the case in other Em;rates. Total revenue derived 
from other sources Including grants from the Ruler accounted for only about 
4% of the total revenue received dur1ng the period studied. As for 
structural change, there was very 1 lttle. Reienue derived from the govern-
ment departments as fees, dut1es, and Interest on investment, including 
oil revenues and grants from the Ruler, amounted only to 2.7% in 1967, 
2.9% in 1968, 2.5% in 1969 and 3.0% 1n 1970 (see App. 7.1). 
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B Public Expenditure 
During the period studied total public expenditure was allocated 
as follows: 
TABLE 7.4 
ABU DHABI STATE: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, 1967/1970 
(000 BD) 
Current Expenditure 
Social Services 
Law and Order 
Pub 1 i c Uti 1 it i es 
Communications and Transport 
Administration and others 
Total Current Expenditure 
Capital Expendrture 
Educat 1on 
Health 
Housing 
Social Affairs 
Industry (Public Utilities) 
Communications and Transport 
Agriculture 
Municipality 
Administration and others 
Total Capital Expenditure 
Privy Purse (Ruling Family) 
Grand Total 
Source: Apps. 7.2"5 and 7.2,6. 
Amount Percentage 
11,915 3.5% 
45,348 13.6% 
5,047 1. 5% 
1 ,642 0.4% 
53,620 16 0 1% 
117,572 35.4% 
3,289 0 9% 
2,691 0 7% 
14,086 4. 1% 
420 0. 1% 
27,319 8.0% 
38' 171 11 '2% 
6 '128 1. 8% 
29,792 8.5% 
7,970 2.3% 
128 '866 38.3% 
85,320 25.7% 
331,758 99.9% 
Table 7.4 shows the breakdown of the total expenditure allocated 
to the different services. The structural change of these expenditures 
over the period studied is shown overleaf in Table 7.5, 
TABLE 7,5 
ABU DHABI: STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, 1967-1970 
(PERCENTAGES) 
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Year caeital Exe Current Exp, Priv~ Purse 
1967 35.9% 35,7% 28,4% 
1968 42.5% 34.3% 23.2% 
1969 42.4% 33.3% 24.3% 
1970 33.3% 38.8% 27.9% 
Source: App. 7.2.6. 
From Tables 7.4 and 7.5, and App. ],2,6 we may illustrate the 
ma1n features and structural changes of the public expenditure of Abu 
Dhabi state in 1967-70, However, before doing so we must stress the 
shortness of the perlod studied and the fact that it was on the whole a 
boom period which may not lnd1cate clearly the future trends and patterns 
of public expenditure.* 
Total Public Exeenditure 
A total of BD 332 million was spent during the four years studied, 
The annual expenditure more than doubled 1n 1970 compared w1th 1967. 
Expenditure rose from BD 44 m,ll 1on in 1967 to BD 100 mil lion 1n 1970. 
Caeltal Expenditure 
Capital Expenditure accounted for the greater part of public expen-
diture in Abu Dhabi. Its share was 38.3% of the total, In 1967 its share 
was 35.9%, increasing to 42,5% in 1968 and to 42.4% in 1969, but dropping 
to only 33.3% in 1970. This last change ln the posit1on of this item of 
expenditure may reflect the long term trend which has been experienced 
in other Emirates (see Chapter VI I 1). However, the annual allocation 
increased from BD 16 mi 11 ;on 1n 1967 to BD 33 million ln 1970. 
* This early period ln Abu Dhab1 almost typifies the early per1od of heavy 
capital expenditure on infrastructure which we find at the quivalent 
time in each of the Emirates. 
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Current Expenditure 
Current expend•ture accounted for 35-4% of total expenditure during 
the period studied. The annual allocat1on increased from BD 16 million 
in 1967 to BD 39 million 1n 1970. Its sha~e of the total also increased 
stead1 ly from 1968 onwards, accounting for 38"8% 1n 1970, compared with 
35.7% in 1967. This change may aga•n indicate the gene1al trend in the 
pattern of the Emirates' public expenditure. 
Allocation to the Privy Purse of the Ruler 
The allocation to the privy purse of the Ruler IS here taken as 
the gross allocation without allow1ng for the deduction of the grant 
allocated by the Ruler to the state. The net allocation to the pr1vy 
purse will be shown later in this chapter. Thus the gross allocation 
to the privy purse of the Ruler accounted for 26"2% of total expenditure. 
The annual allocation to this 1tem increased from about BD 13 m1l 1 1on in 
1967 to about BD 28 m1 Ilion in 1970. 
C Public Reserve Fund 
Little information has been published about thts account, indeed 
except for the information publ 1shed in 1969 about its balance at the end 
of December, 1967 and 1968, noth1ng has been mentioned about lt. We are 
forced, therefore, to rely on estimates- The shortness of the per;od and 
our examination of the publ lc revenue and expenditure, together w1th the 
published balance of this account for 1967 and 1968, provide a reasonably 
sound basis for the estimate given overleaf in Table 7.6. 
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TABLE 7,6 
ABU DHABI STATE. ESTIMATED MOVEMENT OF THE PUBLIC RESERVE FUND, 1967-70 
(000 BD) 
Year O~en1n9 Balance Sur~lus or DefIcit Closing Balance 
1967 10,502(a) 7,484(b) 17 '9 86 
1968 17,986 - 3,917(b) 14,069 
1969 14,069 -12,767(b) 1 '302 
1970 1 '302 14,137 15,439 
Source: (a) SBA, 1969, p.59; (b) Table 7.7 
The breakdown of the reserve fund account is not available except 
for 1967 and 1968, where the information indicates that the account 
balance of BD 13.2 mi lllon on 31/12/1968 was invested as follows: 
Abu Dhabi Fund Investment Board BD 6 million, loans to foreign govern-
ments BD 6 mill 1on and local investment BD 1.2 m1ll 10n. 
Part Three: Allocation of the 01l Revenue in Abu Dhabi, 1967-70 
This part of the chapter wll 1 be presented 1n three sub-sections. 
(A) Proportional contribution of the oil revenue spenL (B) The 
allocation of the total oil revenue. (C) The structural change of the 
allocational pattern of the annual available 011 revenue, 
A Pro~ortional Contribution of the Oil Revenue Spent (PCORS) 
The PCORS to cover the total gross deficit result1ng from the gap 
between departmental self-revenue and expenditure Is shown overleaf in 
Table 7.7. 
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TABLE 7.7 
ABU DHABI: PROPORTIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE OIL REVENUE SPENT, 1967-1970 
(000 BD) AND PERCENTAGES 
( 1 ) (2) PCORS 
An. 0 I 1 1-2 = (3) (4) 3 
Oi 1 Revenue Surplus or Total "If 
Year Revenue Seent Deflc1t Deficit % 
196 7 48,617 40,737 7,484 41,148 99 
1968 72,800 76,717 - 3,911 76,717 100 
1969 90,875 103,642 -12,767 103,642 100 
1970 110,577 96,440 14, 137 96,440 100 
322,869 317,536 4,937 317,947 
Source: Apps, 7.1, 7.3. 1, 7.3.2 and 7.3.3. 
From Table 7.7 we can see that almost all deftclts 1n the various 
items of expenditure were met by the 011 revenue, wh1ch was indeed almost 
the only source from which the deficit could be made up. The only ex-
ception was in 1967, when the communication and transport services 
produced a surplus over their current expenditure. However, after 1968 
none of the main expenditure groupings was able to produce revenue 
sufficient to cover even its current expenditure (see App. 7.3). Thus 
out of a gross deficit of BD 317.9 million, BD 317.5 mill ion was met 
by oil revenue (annual oil revenue plus any sum drawn from the reserve 
fund). This illustrates the extent of the dependence of all the public 
services on the oil revenue, not only for their capital expenditure but 
also for the greater part of their current expenditure_ 
B The Allocation of the Total Oil Revenue 
The allocation of the total oil revenue received by the state in 
the period 1967/70 is shown overleaf In Table 7.8, 
TABLE 7.8 
ABU DHABI STATE: ALLOCATION OF TOTAL OIL REVENUE, 1967/70 
(000 BD) 
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Allocation Amount % of Grand Total 
Current Expend.ture 
Social Services 
Law and Order 
Pub 1 i c Ut 11 i ties 
Communication and Transport 
Administration and others 
Total Current Expenditure 
Capital Expenditure 
Social Services 
Public Utilities 
Communication and Transport 
Agriculture 
Municipality 
Administration and others 
Total Capital Expenditure 
Ruling Fam1ly 
Reserve Fund 
Grand Total 
11 '86 3 3c7% 
44,974 13,9% 
4,263 1. 3% 
727 0.2% 
46,249 14,3% 
108' 076 33.6% 
20,450 6 3% 
27,276 8,5% 
38' 161 11 '8% 
6 '1 08 1. 9% 
28,752 8.9% 
7,959 2.5% 
128,706 39.9% 
80,753 25 0% 
4,937 L5% 
322,472 
Fig. 7.1 shows the development of the allocation from the annual 
available oil revenue to the different items of expenditure and the 
reserve, From the figure, Table 7.8 and App. 7.3.4, the following features 
emerge: 
Total Allocation 
The total oil revenue received during the per1od studied was BD 322 
million. Of the total, capital expenditure claimed the principal share of 
39.9%, followed by current expenditure's 33.6% and the allocation to the 
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privy purse of the Ruler, which accounted for 25%. The net allocation 
to the reserve fund was only 1.5% of the total oil revenue received. 
The annual oi 1 revenue increased from BD 48,6 mll lion in 1967 to 
BD 110.1 million in 1970. 
Capital Expenditure 
The total allocation to this item was BD 129 mil lion, This 
allocation increased from about BD 16 million in 1967 to BD 45 mill ion 
in 1969 and later dropped to BD 33 mill ion. Its proportional share was 
32.8% in 1967, 43.7% in 1968, 43.3% in 1969, but dropped to 30.1% in 
1970 The functional allocation of capital expenditure in Abu Dhabt ls 
given in clear and detailed form compared with the other Emirates. The 
functional allocation of total capital expenditure for the perlod studied 
was as follows: 15.8% to the social services; 21" 3% to the public 
utilities; transport and communication 29.6%; agriculture 4.8%; 
municipality 22.3% and administration and others 6.2%. 
Current Expenditure 
The total allocation to current expenditure amounted to BD 108 
mill ion. The annual allocation showed a steadily increasing trend, 
reaching BD 35 mi Ilion in 1970 compared with BD 15 million in 1967. The 
proportional share also increased from 29.7% in 1967 to 31.9% in 1970. 
The functional allocation of current expenditure was as follows: 11 0% 
social services; law and order 41.6%; public utilities 3.9%; transport 
and communication 0.7% and administration and others 42.8%. 
Ruling Family 
The total sum allocated amounted to BD 81 mil lion. The net allocation 
Increased from BD 10.6 million 1n 1967 to BD 27.9 m1ll 1on in 1970, The 
net proportional share also increased from 21.9% In 1967 to 25.2% in 1970. 
The functional allocation of this item 1s not known, However, this 
allocation is received by the Ruler, while no other allocation is made 
through the budget to other members of the Rul 1ng family. 
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Reserve Fund 
The net total allocation to the reserve fund amounted to BD 5 
mil lion. This allocation tended to fluctuate. In fact no special 
attention was g1ven to bu1ld1ng a state reserve, and thus the allocation 
to the reserve fund was determined by the needs of other allocations. 
C Structure Change in Pattern of Allocatlon 
The changing trends of the allocational pattern of the annual 
available oi 1 revenue are shown below: 
TABLE 7.9 
ABU DHABI STATE: CHANGES IN THE ALLOCATIONAL PATTERN OF THE ANNUAL 
AVAILABLE OIL REVENUE, 1967-70 (PERCENTAGES) 
1967 1968 1969 1970 
Current Expenditure 29.7 32,5 32.6 3L9 
Ruling Family 21.9 23.8 23o 1 25.2 
Capital Expenditure 32.8 43.7 44.3 30. 1 
Reserve Fund 15.5 12.7 
Source: App. 7.3.4. 
As may be seen from Table 7.9 the change 1n the allocat1onal pattern 
of the oil revenue was not steady. The allocation to the reserve fund 
showed considerable fluctuation, The main clearly discernible trend is 
the tendency of the allocations to the privy purse and current expenditure 
to gain an increasing share of the total oil revenue. These allocations 
accounted for 51.6%, in 1967, whl le their share in 1970 was 57.1%. While 
the period studied is very short and it is consequently too early to 
discover the long term trends, it might be said that the increasing pre-
ponderance of the allocation to current expenditure was experienced in 
almost all the Emirates. 
These are the main points concerning the allocation of the oil 
revenue of Abu Dhabi state. Other important indications may be found in 
the detailed appendices attached to the chapter, 
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In th1s chapter, we have dealt with public revenue, public 
expenditure and the publ 1c reserve, and it is upon these that we have 
based our examination of the allocation of the oil revenue. The factors 
determining the patterns of allocation and the1r impact on economic 
development will be discussed later ,n the study. 
NOTES - CHAPTER VI I 
(1) MEDD, 1 Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States, p.89. 
(2) Al-Batrol wa Al-Sinah, 1972, p 133. 
( 3) F o r d e t a I 1 s see : Ma n n , C , o p " ci t, , p p . 1 1 4 - 1 1 8 . 
(4) SBA, 1969, p,59 This balance is considered to represent the 
account balance in January 1967 for two reasons. F1 rst, the 
balance of this account at the end of 1968 was about BD 3 
mi Ilion more than at the end of 1967, and since we know that 
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the 1968 budget was in deficit and must have drawn from this 
account to cover its defic1t, we may assume that the sum 
mentioned as representing 31/12/1967 also represents the opening 
balance of the account for 1967. Second, since the payment of 
the oil revenue for the last quarter would not have been received 
before March 1968, in accordance with usual practice, the budget 
surplus would not be realised at the end of 1967. Therefore, 
the balance of the account at the end of 1967 should be approxi-
mately the same as the opening balance of the year with exception 
of the interest gained during the year. 
(5) True i a 1 State Counc 1 1 , Report on the True 11 a 1 States Deve 1 opment 
Fund, 1970, pp.19-30. See also: Trucial State Council 1 The 
Official Bulletin of the Development Off1ce 1 , Dec. 1971, p.3. 
(6) Est1mated according to the 1966 custom revenue/import value ratio. 
See MEDD, 1 Economic Survey of the Northern Trucial States• p.6; 
Ports and Customs Department, Dubai, Statistical Report, 1970, p.21. 
(7) SBA, 1969, pp.57-58. 
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CHAPTER VI I I 
FACTORS DETERMINI~G IHE ALLOCAIIO~ OF IHE OIL REVENUE 
This chapter falls 1nto three parts 1) a summary and comparison of 
the f1ndings of Chapter IV to VII r 1 .e. of the allocat1onal patterns of the 
oi 1 revenue; 2) a discussion of the factors wh1ch tend to channel the 
011 revenues towards particular items of expenditure, and 3) an attempt 
to explore briefly the factors determining the fundamental pol 1cies 
underlying the al locat1on of the revenue in the Em1 rates, 
Part One~ The Allocation of the 011 Revenue, A Compar1son 
A The Position of the 01 I Revenue in the Public Revenue 
The oi 1 revenue provides the Emirates with the greater part of 
their public revenues. Ever slnce the o1l revenue started, it has con-
stituted a very high p<opo~tlon of the total publ 1c revenue, in Ban~a1n, 
when the f1 rst o1l royalties we'"e rece1ved in 1935, the oi 1 revenue then 
amounted to 44.2% (App. 4.4) of the total publ 1c revenue. In Kuwait, ln 
1947, this proportion was 82.5% (Table 5, 1). in the other Em: rates the 
proportion was more than 90%~ S1nce then, this sourcP of revenue has 
assumed an increasingly 1mportant position. In 1970 the share of the 
oil revenue 1n the pubi 1c revenues of each of the Emirates was as 
follows; Bahrain 78%; Kuwait 91.4% (1969170); Qatar 90 1%; and Abu Dhab1 
96,9%. The overall percentages for the entire per1ods stud1ed in each 
of the Em1 rates were as follows: Bahrain 75 8% (1947;48//1970); Kuwait 
91.8% (i952//1970J71); Qatar 92.0% (1953/55 and 1966/70); and Abu Dhabl 
95.8% (1967/70)' 
Some of the Emirates have been trying to d1verslfy the sources of 
the1r public revenue and 1nc;ease the proportional contribution of the 
non-oil revenueo This has been the case partiCUlarly when the growth 
rate of the oil revenue has decreased or when a government has tried 
to lessen its over dependence on the oil revenue. However, desp1te 
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these attempts, none of the Emirates has been able to alter its over-
whelming dependence on the oil revenue. In fact this dependence has 
increased. Taking Bahrain, which has tried hardest, as an example, we 
find that the proportional contr1but1on of the oil revenue 1ncreased 
from 60% in 1950 to 75% 1n 1960, and by 1970 it had increased aga1n to 
78% (App. 4.1). There are two main reasons for th1s: a) the rapid 
growth of the oil revenue during the per1od studied; b) the necessity 
of dramatic change if the economic price of the goods and services 
produced by the public sector were to be recovered, and taxation of the 
national economy were to be introduced. These changes might wel 1 affect 
the policy governing allocations to the Ruling families, the land 
purchase schemes, and even some of the transfer payments and the policies 
control] ing employment in the public sectors, 
B The Allocation of the Total Oil Revenues 
The pattern according to which each of the Em1rates has allocated 
its total oil revenue during the per1ods studied is shown in Fig 8.1, 
From this figure the following major differences can be noted: 
B1 - Current Expenditure accounted for about 47% and 45% of the total 
oil revenue received in Kuwait and Bahrain respectively; about 34% of 
the revenue rece1ved in Abu Dhabi, and about 20% of the revenue received 
in Qatar. The allocation to current expenditure was the largest of all 
the allocations made in Kuwait and Bahrain; in Abu Dhabi it ranked 
second to capital expenditure; while in Qatar it ranked third, preceded 
by allocations to the Ruling family and the reserve fund, The breakdown 
of current expenditure in each of the Emirates IS shown overleaf 1n 
Table 8.1. 
The Allocat1onal Patterns of the Em1rat.s' Total 011 Revenues 
Bai'Jrarn (QDR 1664 Ml 
194.7/H\ -1970 
Abu Dhab1 (QDR 3225M ) 
1967-70 
Rt::•rve Fund 
Caprtal Expenditure 
Land Purchase 
Rulrng Fam1ly 
Expenditure 
Kuwa1t (QOR 
ua tar (QDR 2979 N) 
1953/55-19 66170 
Source T~l)iec; '• 7, '; 11,6 12 
and 7 e 
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TABLE 8.1 
THE BREAKDOWN OF THE EMIRATES 1 TOTAL OIL REVENUE ALLOCATION TO 
CURRENT AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY FUNCTIONSx 
(MILLION QDR) AND PERCENTAGES 
Allocation Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Abu Dhabi 
Current Exeenditure 741 19,937 610 1 ,081 
--
Social Services 65.7% 31.8% 53.7% 11.0% 
Law and Order 26.7% 22.9% 22.3% 41 .6% 
Transport & Comm. 2.9% 1. 0%¢ 2.0% 0.7% 
Pub 1 i c Uti 1 i ties 1. 6% 3.2% 15.7% 3.9% 
Administration & 
others 3. 1% 41 . 1% 6.3% 42.8% 
Ca~1tal Exeenditure 349 7,820 510 1 '287 
Public Works XX 32.2% 56.2% 31 '2% 
Public Utilities 25.4% 20.4% 22.0% 21 3% 
·'· Social Services 16.5%" -J~ ..;, 11 . 1% 15.8% 
Transport & Comm. 17.9% 6' 1% 14.3% 29.6% 
Others 7.5% 17.3% 21. O% 33.3%¢¢ 
x For the periods studied. 
xx Including all or part of social services, law and order, transport 
and communication and administrat1on 1s capital expend1ture. 
,., Housing only. 
** Included in public works expenditure. 
¢ Excluding current expenditure on ports. 
¢¢ Including expenditure on the municipality, agriculture and the admin-
istration. 
Source: Tables 4.7, 5.11, 6.12 and 7.8. 
The Emirates also differ clearly 1n the detailed allocation of the 
oil revenue allotted to current expenditure. 
Bahrain, for example, uses th1s port1on of 1ts oi 1 revenue mainly to 
f1nance the current expenditure of the social services (65.7%) and the 
services maintaining law and order (26.7%). The pattern in Qatar is similar, 
except that Qatar has allocated a considerable proportion to make-up the 
deficit caused by the current expenditure of the eublic ut1 l ities. The 
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proportion of the revenue allotted to this was at 1ts highest 1n th1s 
Em1 rate, where it reached 16.6%, compared with only 1.6% in Bahrain, 3.2% 
1n Kuwait, and 3.6% in Abu Dhabi. 
In Kuwa1t, though the al locat1on to the social services represented 
about one third, it was exceeded by expenditure on 1 Administrat1on and 
others 1 , wh1ch accounted for 41,1% of the allocation to current expen-
diture. The allocation to the services for maintaining law and order 
(22.9%) was very much lower than the proportion allocated in Abu Dhabi, 
and approximated to that of Bahrain and Qatar. 
Abu Dhabi devoted the greater part of 1ts current expenditure to 
f1nanc1ng the 1Administration and others 1 (42.8%). This proportion was 
higher than in any of the other Emirates. Another important flnd1ng in 
this breakdown is that Abu Dhabi devoted a very high proportion of 1ts 
current expenditure to the services for maintaining law and order (in-
eluding defense, as in the other Emirates). This proportion was 41.6% 
compared with 26.7% in Bahra1n, 22.9% in Kuwait and 22.3% in Qatar. 
B2- The Allocation to Capital Expenditure represented about one fifth 
of the oil revenue in the three Emirates which produced oil before 1950. 
These Emirates were Bahrain 20,9%, Kuwait 18,4% and Qatar 17.1%. Abu 
Dhab1 allocated 39,9% of Its oil revenue to capital expenditure, which 
made her capital expenditure/oil revenue ratio the highest among the 
Emirates, reaching nearly twice that of the other Emirates, The breakdown 
of this expenditure is made difficult by the absence of information con-
~ 
cerning the functional allocation of public works department expenditure" 
* One can trace the breakdown of expenditure through exam1n1ng the publ 1c 
works department 1 s budgets, but though this is possible for some years, 
1t is very difficult to find all the information needed concerning the 
functional allocation of public works department expenditure for most 
of the years (particularly the 1950 1 s). However, in all the Emirates, 
except Abu Dhabi, capital expenditure on education, health, ~ervices 
maintaining law and order and public bui !dings were included in this 
item. In Kuwait roads, ports and housing were also included, while 
in Qatar and Bahrain roads were included. 
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in most of the Emrrates, as the budgets and closed accounts of the 
budgets show. However, as Table 8.1 has indicated, all the Emirates 
allotted between two frfths and one quarter of therr capital expenditure 
to the public util rties. As for the functional allocation of other 
capital expenditure we may give the following br1ef account (Table 8. 1): 
Bahrain allocated 17.9% of Its capttal expenditure to transport 
and communications, with the sea port as the marn reciprent. Housing 
accounted for 16.5%, and publ rc works, includrng capital expenditure on 
education, health, public bur ldings and roads, accounted for 32.2%. 
Qatar allocated 11.1% of its capital expendrture to the sacral 
services, including housing. Transport and communications which rncluded 
the sea port and the airport but drd not include roads, accounted for 
14.3% of total capital expenditure. Public works, includ1ng roads, 
sewage and other engineering proJects and equipment, accounted for 31.2%. 
Administration and others accounted for 21.0%. 
Kuwait, more than half the capital expendrture tn Kuwait was con-
centrated in the publ rc works department, which was responsible for the 
construction not only of roads, but also schools, hosprtals, houses, ports, 
airports and many other construction works. The allocation to transport 
and communications represented mainly the capital expenditure of the 
post, telephone and telegraph ministry. 
Abu Dhabi, capital expenditure IS allocated on a functronal basis. 
Thus no independent allocation was made to the public works department. 
However, as shown in Table 8.1 the administration and others item (mainly 
pub] ic buildings and the municipality works) received 33.3%, transport 
and communications (mainly roads, ports and airports) received 29.6% and 
sacral services, including housing, received 15.8%. 
83- Allocation to Land Purchase, only Kuwait and Qatar among the Emirates 
allocated considerable sums to this item. Kuwait rs the proneer rn this 
field. It started in 1952, and by 1970 more than one frfth of its oil 
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revenue was channelled through this item of expenditure. Qatar has 
followed suit, particularly s1nce the late 1960's, when an annual sum 
was allocated to land purchase schemes. During the per1od studied Qatar 
allocated 6.6% of its oi 1 revenue to this item of expenditure. 
B4- Ruling Families, allocation to the Rul1ng fam1lies accounted for a 
considerable proportion of the states' 011 revenue, Dur1ng the per1od 
studied Bahrain and Qatar each allocated about one third of their oil 
revenue to the Ruling family, Abu Dhabi allocated one quarter, while 
Kuwait allocated the lowest proportion to the Ruling family- only 2.7% 
of the total oil revenue. However, the functional allocation of this 
item of expenditure in the various Emirates Is not known. As our dis-
cussion has shown earlier, in Bahrain and Abu Dhabi it was allocated to 
the privy purse of the Ruler, while in Qatar 1t used to be d1vided 
between the privy purse of the Ruler and the other members of the Ruling 
family. As Table 6.12 has shown, about 48% of the sum allocated in Qatar 
went to the privy purse of the Ruler, while 52% was distributed among the 
other members of the Al-Thanl family. 
In Kuwait prior to 1963/64 the allocation was made to the Ruling 
family as a whole and, according to the closed account of the budgets, 
there was no fixed allocation to the Ruler. However, since 1963/64 an 
annual allocation to the Head of the State has been specified. 
B5- Allocation to the Reserve Fund, as Fig. 8.1 shows Qatar allocated 
·'-
the highest proportion to the reserve fund~ (20.6%). Kuwait allocated 
11.2%, Bahrain 2.2% and Abu Dhabi 1.5%. Almost all the Emirates except 
Abu Dhab1 allocated higher proportions to the reserve fund in the early 
years of their oil production, particularly during the early 1950's. 
However, in the late 1960's a very low proportion of the 011 revenue was 
·k. 
However, if we consider the total l1quid assets belonging to the Kuwait 
government at the end of 1970 as completely allocated from oil revenue, 
the reserve fund account will represent 2401% of the total oi 1 revenue 
received (Table 5.9 and App. 3.2). 
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allocated to the reserve funds in most of the Emirates and some of them 
even started to draw on what they had saved in the 1950's, almost all the 
public reserve funds in the Emirates were invested abroad, mainly in 
bank deposit accounts and other foreign financial investments. Since the 
beginn1ng of the 1960's Kuwait has been trying to invest some of its 
reserve funds locally, and by 1970 most of the Emirates were also trying 
to invest in the shares of local companies and other types of investment 
available in the local financial and industrial markets. 
C Changes in the Allocational Patterns 
As mentioned earlier the oi 1 revenues in each of the Emirates were 
divided into four or five principal allocations. The first three of 
them are in the nature of current and transfer expenditure. These are 
the governments' current expenditure, allocations to the Ruling family 
and to the land purchase schemes. The second category Included the 
allocations to capital expenditure and the reserve fund. Fig. 8.2 shows 
that the long-term trend in the allocational patterns of the Emirates 
was almost steadily against capital expenditure and the reserve funds. 
This trend occurs despite the ever-increasing ol I revenues of these 
Emirates. For some years, particularly the late 1960's, even these 
increasing oi 1 revenues were not enough to cover public expenditure in 
some of the Emirates and the need arose to use the state reserve fund to 
bal~nce the governments' budgets. The main features of this trend were 
the increasing proportion allocated to current expenditure and the de-
creasing proportion allocated to the reserve fund. These two features 
were noted in all the Emirates (see Fig, 8.2 and our detailed pre~entation 
of the change in the allocational pattern in each of the Emirates, Figs.4.5, 
5.5, 6.4 and Table 7.9). 
The allocation to capital expenditure decreased also, and in the 
late 1960's the proportional allocation to capital expenditure was below 
that of the early and mid 1950's. The allocations to the Ruling famil 1es 
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and to the land purchase schemes have shown an overall Increase 1n some 
of the Emirates compared to those of the early 1950 1s, However, there 
was a proportional decrease dur1ng the late 1960 1s towards the very end 
of our per1od of study, particularly 1n Kuwait and Qatar" 
Before end1ng this part at the chapter, 1t 1s worth mentioning 
some notable statistical ev1dence of correlation between annual 011 
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revenue and total annual allocation to each 1tem of the ma1n public ex-
penditure and reserve. These correlations express in terms of correlation 
coefficient 1r 1 for Bahrain (23 years) and Kuwait (18 years) are shown 
below. 
Kuwait 
Bahra1n 
Current Exp. 
0.95 
0.96 
Capital Exp-
0.80 
0.66 
Ruling Family Land Purchase 
0-72 0,45 
0.99 
Reserve 
-0.22 
0.06 
These findings again prove the very high correlation between the 
oil revenue and the current expenditure and the weak correlation between 
the oil revenue and the allocation to the reserve fund accounts. Also 
they indicate some differences between the two exemplified Emirates, 
which can be expla1ned by social and political developments in each of 
them, The significance of these correlations Is referred to again in 
Chapter X. 
These are the main findings of the detailed stud1ed presented in 
Chapters IV-VI I. We next look to the factors which have influenced 
allocation to the different items of expenditure and the reserve fund. 
Part Two: Factors which Influenced the Distribution of the Oil Revenues 
to Individual Allocations 
In th1s part of the chapter our discussion will be concerned with 
the factors wh1ch have affected the share allocated from the oil revenue 
to the principal items of public expend1ture and the reserve funds. These 
factors, in fact, are closely inter-related, and are consequent upon the 
main factors which have determined the broad-based financial policies of 
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the Emirates. 
Before proceeding with our discussion of these factors it is 
necessary to emphasise that what is discussed here is not the allocations 
from the total public revenue, but only the distribution of the state 
oil revenue among the individual allocations. Since the o1l revenues 
in most of the Emirates accounted for about 90% of the total public 
revenues, it is of minor accountancy significance to differentiate 
between allocations made from 011 revenue and from total revenues, 
because almost al 1 allocations are met mainly and many entirely from the 
oil revenue. However, it must be remembered here that it is normal for 
any single state to subsidise some sectors of the economy and provide 
many public goods and services at a price below their cost of production, 
below their variable cost, or even completely free. What then appears 
as significant are the differences between one state and another in the 
goods and serv1ces chosen for subsidy, the sectors subsidised, and the 
source of revenue used to finance these subsidies. These differences 
reflect the economic, social and political policies of states. 
A Factors Affecting the Allocation to Current Expenditure 
As has already been noted, the current expenditure of the Emirates 
has engrossed a considerable and increasing proportion of their public 
revenues. Therefore, with the decreasing or static proportion drawn 
from non-oil sources, the allocation from oil revenue has played an 
essential and increasing role in financing current publ 1c expenditure. 
This is indicated by Table 8.2 shown overleaf: 
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TABLE 8.2 
THE EMIRATES: ALLOCATION FROM THE OIL REVENUE TO CURRENT EXPENDITURE 
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL CURRENT EXPENDITURE, SELECTED YEARS 
Year Bahrain Kuwa 1 t 
1947 23.3% 0.0% 
1952 37, O% 85.7% 
1957 57.6% 83.3% 
1962 68.4% 86.7% 
1967 63.4% 89.8% 
~'· ..1-
1970 71.4% 88.7%"" 
Total 63.8% 86.0% 
,., Qatar 1953, 1955, 1967 and 1970. 
"''* 1969/70. 
Source: Calculated from Apps. 
j~ Qatar 
89.7% 
81. 1% 
N,A. 
74.5% 
74' 1% 
72 0 7% 
Abu Dhabi 
90"4% 
91 . 1% 
92.0% 
The importance of the oil revenue in financing current expenditure 
has tended to increase, particularly during the 1960 1 s. Therefore, not 
only has the proportional allocation from oil revenue to current expen-
diture increased, but the relative role wh1ch this allocation has played 
in financing current expenditure has become more important also. This 
in fact reflects both the increasing demand for this type of expenditure 
and the governments 1 lack of success in producing any significant rise 
in the proportion of the total revenue stemming from non-oil sources. 
We will now turn to the factors wh1ch have affected the growth of 
current expenditure and the Emirates 1 dependence on oil revenues to finance 
this growth. 
A1 - Overstaffing In the Public Sectors 
The Emirates 1 employment policies have been one of the principal 
reasons for the soaring current expenditure. Most of the Emirate govern-
ments have felt obliged to secure a job in the public sector for every 
citizen who wanted one. Consequently employment in the public sectors 
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was not geared to real needs, but was instead used to solve the problem 
of the lack of competitive employment opportunities in the private sector. 
7!'\ 
However, while this policy is found in all the Emirates during all or 
part of the periods studied, the situation IS by no means identical in 
al 1 of them. Kuwa1t suffered most and as early as 1965 1t had realised 
the existence of thrs problem and the need to solve it, (l) The problem 
of the overstaffing of the public sectors in Kuwait therefore became a 
matter of study for many committees. In one of these stud1es, as Mr. 
David Hirst reported in the Guardian, February 25, 1972: 11A productivity 
study has revealed the astonishing fact that, though a top few work hard, 
the 45,000 Kuwaiti employees have a per capita output of 15 minutes for 
"''''' every six hours' work. 11 This has become a major problem not only 
because of its effect 1n directing human efforts away from the most pro-
ductive work and increasing disguised unemployment in the public sector, 
but also because of its part in increasing the proportional demand made 
by current expenditure on available revenues. This problem is still 
worrying the financial and planning authorities in Kuwait and a recent 
committee, headed by Mr. Jassin Al-Qutamy, was formed by the plann1ng 
board to study it and to suggest a solution< 
The committee's report, after mentioning the previous committees 
formed for this purpose, suggested that the problem needed no more reports 
and theoretical solutions, but required certain actions capable of 
striking at its roots. (2) The committee found that the employment policy 
depended on social and local political considerations more than the actual 
needs of the administration. (3) It has resulted in increasing the al lo-
cation to wages and salaries from KD 48 million ln 1962/63 to KD 164 
* Except Bahrain, particularly before the late 1960's. 
** In an interview With Mr. Ali Musa, the Head of the Manpower Planning 
Department in the Planning Board, I enquired about this study. The 
answer was that, as far as he knew, no such study had been carried out. 
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mill ion in 1972/73, This increased the proportion of total publ lc 
expenditure allocated to this Item from 27.2% in 1962/63 to 39.9% 1n 
1972/73. (4) The main reason for this increase was the numPer of those 
employed in the government services. Thi5 increased, for example, from 
73 thousand in 1964/65 to 101 thousand 1n 1971/72. (5) 
The committee suggested some solutions to solve the problem of 
overstaffing, in the short and long term. As for the short term, the 
main suggested solutions are: the freezing of the allocation to wages 
and salaries at its present level; the gearing of future employment to 
the actual needs of the administration; an investigation into the man-
power surplus in the administration; and the transferring of some of the 
government departments to a public corporation run on a commercial 
enterprise basis. (6 ) Later the committee recommended the separation of 
the ports authorities from the customs department, and its transfer to 
a public corporation. (7) 
In Qatar and Abu Dhabi the existence of the problem does not seem 
to have been realised yet. This is due to the small populations and 
indigenous labour forces. However, this problem does ex1st and must be 
faced sooner or later, particularly w1th the 1ncrease in the number of 
graduates from secondary schools and universities and with the entrance 
of women to the government service. In Qatar, for example, the allocation 
to wages and salaries from the publ !c revenues Increased from 15.3% in 
1966 to 16.5% in 1970. (B) 
All this clearly illustrates the effect of the overstaffing of the 
public sectors in the Emirates on the soaring trend of the proportion 
allocated from the oi 1 revenue to finance current expenditure. 
A2 - Transfer Payments 
As noted in our discussion in the last four chapters, we have not 
distinguished between current and transfer expenditure, but we included 
both of them under the one heading •current expenditure•, The reason 
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for this treatment was the lack of distinction between current and 
transfer expenditure in the Emirates' budgets, w1th the exception of 
Kuwait during the 1960's. The increasing allocation to transfer paymentsi 
at home and abroad has clearly, however, been affecting the increasing 
trend of current expenditure. For example, these payments 1n Kuwait not 
only increased current expenditure but also played an essentjal role in 
raising the proportional allocation to current expenditure, for the 
allocation to transfer payments increased from only 1.3% of total public 
expenditure in 1963/64 to 10.5% in 1965/66 and to about 21% in the period 
from 1967/68 to 1970/71 (Table 5,6), In the other Emirates the major 
portion of the transfer payments was made to social allowances at home. 
They have also been used to aid some of the poorer Emirates and some of 
the other Arab countries, In Qatar the government Introduced a social 
allowance scheme in 1962, and the allocation to this item of expenditure 
has risen rapidly since then. (9 ) In Abu Dhabi also, allocation to the 
social affairs department has increased considerably and the department's 
current expenditure has risen from only BD 23,000 in 1967 to BD 275,000 
in 1970 (App, 7.2.1), Thus the allocation to transfer payments has 
played a considerable role in driving current expenditure upwards, and 
since there is no policy in any of the Emirates to finance these transfer 
payments from new sources of revenue the burden of providing funds for 
these allocations has lain completely on the oi 1 revenues. 
A3 - Increasing Demand for Social Services 
Together with the social allowances mentioned earlier, there has 
been an increasing demand for education and health services. As a result 
of the governments' policy of not taxing the local economies (excluding 
the oil industry), the oi 1 revenue has been the only source from which 
funds for these services could be provided. Therefore the allocation to 
the current expenditure of the social services has taken an increasing 
proportion from the oil revenues, as shown overleaf in Table 8.3. 
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TABLE 8.3 
THE EMIRATES: PROPORTION ALLOCATED FROM ANNUAL AVAILABLE OIL REVENUE TO 
THE CURRENT EXPENDITURE OF THE SOCIAL SERVICES (SELECTED YEARS) 
(PERCENTAGES) 
·'· 
Year Bahra•n Kuwa1t Qatar" Abu Dhabi 
% % % % 
1947 11.6 o.o 
1952 12.8 12.7 0.9 
1956 13.6 12' 1 2.7 
1960 22.3 11 -7 N,A. 
1965 36.3 14' 3 
•  .t .. t'~ 
11.5 009 
1970 30.9 18.2 16,0 4.2 
~~~ 1953, 1955, 1966, 1970. 
~1\)1\ 1967. 
Source: Apps. 4.3.4; 5.3.4; 6 3.4; 7 3.4, 
This expenditure shows an almost monotonous increase. We noted 
also that Bahrain, with the lowest per capita income from the state oil 
revenue (see Table 3.8), allocated the highest proportion among the 
Emirates. This perhaps indicates that there •s no limit below which 
these items of expenditure may be kept, for the current demand for such 
services is great and there 5eems to be no 1 1m1t to its potential growth. 
A4 - Law and Order Services 
Current expenditure on law and order serv1ces (including defence) 
has received an increasing proportional allocation from state oil revenue. 
TABLE 8.4 
THE EMIRATES: PROPORTION ALLOCATED FROM ANNUAL 
THE CURRENT EXPENDITURE OF THE LAW AND ORDER 
(PERCENTAGES) 
Year Bahrain Kuwait 
% % 
1947 7.6 0,0 
1952 4.8 2. 1 
1956 7.3 1.5 
1960 10. 3 10. 1 
1965 11. 1 10 4 
1970 14.5 15. 1 
?~ 1953, 1955, 1966, 1970. 
;h'< 1967. 
Source: Apps. 4.3.4; 5.3.4; 6.3.4, and 7.3.4. 
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AVAILABLE OIL REVENUE TO 
SERVICES, SELECTED YEARS 
-;':: Qatar Abu Dhabi 
% % 
1.5 
1.9 
N .A. 
;'>.)'\ 
3.9 3.7 
6.4 17.8 
Table 8.4 shows that the increase in the proportional allocation 
to the current expenditure of the serv1ces for maintaining law and order 
was one of the main reasons for the soaring current expenditure of the 
Emirates. The proportional located to this item of expenditure increased 
with the era of political independence. The allocation to th1s Item 
may rapidly increase in the future because of the withdrawal of British 
Military Forces from the Gulf and the arms race building up 1n the area. 
A5 - Policies Concerning the Pricing of Publ 1c Goods and Services 
The policies followed in pricing goods and services produced by the 
public sectors have affected the sum allocated from oil to subsidise the 
production of these goods and services. Almost all the goods and services 
produced by the public sectors in the Emirates are subsidised mainly 
from oil revenue. As an example of the Emirates' pol 1cies in this respect 
we may look into the subsidy allocated from oi 1 revenue to meet the 
deficit in the public utilities, VIZ. electricity and water (see Table 8.5 
overleaf.) 
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TABLE 8,5 
THE EMIRATES: PROPORTION ALLOCATED FROM ANNUAL AVAILABLE OIL REVENUE TO 
THE CURRENT EXPENDITURE OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES (SELECTED YEARS) 
(PERCENTAGES) 
Year Bahrain Kuwa1t Qatar Abu Dhabi 
1947 
1952 
1956 
1960 
1965 
1970 
% 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.5 
0.9 
1.0 
-/: 1953, 1955, 1966, 1970. 
~·n-: 1967. 
% 
0.0 
0.0 
2.9 
0.8 
1.2 
0.8 
Source: Apps. 4 3.4; 5 3,4; 6.3~4; and 7 3 4 
% 
1 . 2 
L8 
N A. 
3.1 
4.2 
% 
Electricity and water were pr1ced below the level needed to meet 
current expenditure and this necessitated the use of 011 revenue to cover 
the deficit, hence th1s pol 1cy affected the sum allocated from 011 
d , X revenues to current expen 1ture. 
A6 - The Increasing Expense of Maintenance 
With the building of considerable phys1cal capital, the expense of 
maintenance has increased annually. To g1ve an 1nd1cat1on of the 1ncrease 
of maintenance expenses we may refer to the costs of maintenance in some 
of the Emirates. In Bahra1n maintenance expenses for roads, drains, 
public buildings and br1dges, all of them items for wh1ch the public works 
department is responsible, increased from BD 43,900 1n 1950 to BD 65,600 
in 1960 and to BD 528,500 in 1970. Another example may be found in the 
maintenance cost of the electricity department in Qatar, which has risen 
x Table 8.5 1nd1cate trends, its worth ment1on1ng the 0.8% of AAOR 
allocated to the current expenditure of publ 1c util 1ties 1n Kuwait in 
1970/71 represented 22.6% of the1r total current expenditure. 
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from an annual average of about QDR 1.5 mi 11 1on 1n the early 1960 1 s 
to an annual average of about 3.5 m1 11 ion 1n the late 1960 1 s. ( 10) In 
the other Emirates these maintenance expenses are not separated from 
other items of current expenditure, but as these Em1rates have already 
built a considerable physical Infrastructure we would expect an 
Increasing allocation to maintenance expenses. 
A7- The Share of Non-Oil Revenue in the Public Revenue 
This factor affected the allocation from oil revenue to all items 
of expenditure and in our model it has an important impact on current 
expenditure. We deducted the internal revenue of any department from 
its current expenditure and later used the surplus of al 1 departments, 
together with the oil revenue, to cover the deficits in non-oil revenue. 
Therefore, as the proportional contribution of the non-ol 1 revenue 
decreased, the def1cit 1n the departments 1 non-ol 1 revenue Increased, 
and consequently the oil revenue was called upon to f1 11 the gap. 
This effect may be noted 1n the increasing or decreasing role 
played by the oil revenue in f1nancing current expenditure, when the 
proportional share of the non-oil revenue decreased or Increased, This 
may be exemplified by the part allocated to current expenditure from the 
oil revenue in Kuwa1t in 1970/71 In this year the sum allocated from 
oil revenue was only KD 178.4 mill ion out of a total allocation to current 
expenditure of KD 224.4 mill ion, This compares with KD 191.9 mil lion 
allocated from oil revenue to cover the total needs of the current ex-
penditure of KD 216.3 mil lion in 1969/70 (Apps. 5,2.7 and 5,3.6). The 
main reason for th1s change was the improvement 1n the non-oil revenue 
in 1970/71 compared with 1969/70. The percentage contributed by the non-
oi 1 revenue rose from 8.6% 1n 1969/70 to 13.5% in 1970/71 (App. 5.1), 
and therefore the sum allocated from the 011 revenue dropped from KD 192 
mil lion in 1969/70 to KD 178 m1 11 ion in 1970/71. The proportion dropped 
from 89% in 1969/70 to 79% in 1970/71. 
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Since the 1950 1s the Em1rates have been receiving an Increasing 
oil revenue in excess of their need for physical capital proJects. At 
the same time there is an increasing pressure to expand soc1al services, 
develop public util 1ties, 1mprove the standard of living and distribute 
the oil revenue more widely among the inhabitants. The governments have 
been quite content With the relative stab1l tty and reduced social tension 
realised only with the help of the 1ncreas1ng oil revenue, and they have 
sought no fundamental change 1n the status guo; oil has financed the 
essential public services, considerable transfer payments have been made 
at home and abroad, and most of the Emirates have managed to employ every 
citizen in_ the public services. Thus the governments have been able to 
increase current expenditure without needing to raise the proportional 
contribution of the non-oil revenue, or even to maintain Its level (see 
Table 8.2) .~ 
A8- The Socially Pervasive Nature of Current Expenditure 
Current expenditure, being mainly wages, salaries, maintenance 
expenses, and transfer payments, is difficult to decrease without 
causing great disturbances throughout society as a whole. The problem 
with this expenditure is that once it has reached a certain level or 
maintained a certain rate of growth, it wil 1 be counted on by large 
sectors of society and it becomes fundamental to the standard of 1 iving 
and other aspects of social wellbeing. Consequently there are dangers 
in reducing it or even curta1 1 1ng 1ts growth trend. However, there is 
room for more efficient use and some economy, but it should be noted that 
even to cut the waste may anger some sectors of a society and such a cut 
may need to be accompanied by fundamental changes in the whole public 
f1scal pol icy and perhaps in wider fields. Therefore the allocation to 
this item of expenditure has shown the most consistent growth of any item 
* This is not true of Bahrain financial administration policy up to the 
early 1950 1s, it was then that current expenditure ceased to be met mainly 
from the non-oil revenue. 
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of the allocations, as may be noted from Figs. 4 4 and 5.2_ This 1tem 
of expenditure IS the last allocation to be affected by change in the 
public revenues and thus it has continued to grow 1n sp1te of fluctuations 
in public revenue; these have had a far greater effect on the allocations 
to the reserve fund and to capital expenditure Thus the nature of 
current expenditure and the absence of any effective pol 1cy to raise the 
non-oi 1 revenue so as to meet the Increasing needs of current expenditure 
have jointly resulted in increasing 1ts dependence on the oil revenue. 
A9 - Other Factors 
Among other factors which have affected the increasing current 
expenditures in the Emirates are the establishment of new ministries and 
government agencies, such as min1str1es of fore1gn affairs, planning 
boards, and Similar services. In add1t1on, the take-over of existing 
services which were once operated by private concerns, usually but not 
always for valid technical reasons, has resulted in an increase in the 
deficit in the budgets of these services and has necessitated the use of 
oil revenue to cover-up these deficits. Examples of such services are 
electricity and ports handling services in Kuwait, and the postal, tele-
phone and telegraph services in almost al 1 the Emirates 
B Factors Affecting the Allocations to Capital Expenditure 
As we noted in our previous discussion in Chaps. IV- VII, all the 
Emirates, except Bahrain, have met almost all their cap1tal expenditure 
from their oil revenues. For example, 100% of the capital expenditure of 
Kuwait 1n the per1od studied (KD 588 mill ion) was allocated from oi 1 
revenues (see Tables 5,4 and 5.11), In Abu Dhab1 the proportion was also 
100% (Tables 7.4 and 7.8), and in Qatar 98,2% (Tables 6.6 and 6.12). 
Bahrain was the only Emirate in which the non-ol 1 revenue provided a 
significant proportion of capital expenditure, 17.3% over the whole period 
studied. However, the proportional share of the o1 1 revenue in financing 
the cap1tal expenditure of the Bahrain Government rose from about 35% in 
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1947/48 to 81.0% in 1960 and 100% in 1970 (Apps. 4.2.7 and 4,3,4), Thus 
the financing of capital expenditure in the Emirates is almost totally 
dependent on the oil revenues, whose allocation to capital expenditure 
was affected mainly by the following factors, 
Bl - The Need to Build up the Physical Infrastructure and Develop the 
Public Uti Hties 
The need to build up the basic Infrastructure by constructing such 
things as roads, ports, airports, public buildings, and the need to 
develop the public utilI ties have greatly affected the allocation to 
capital expenditure. Thus th1s expenditure received the h1ghest pro-
portional allocation at the early stage of economic development in each 
of the Emirates. The scope of th1s expenditure, i.e. whether it is to be 
confined to the basic infrastructural proJects or w,dened to Include 
housing, 1ndustr1al estates, etc., has also Influenced th1s item of 
expenditure, 
B2 - The Pressure from other Allocations 
The allocation to capital expenditure has been affected by the 
pressure from other allocations, particularly those to current expenditure 
and the Rul1ng families. Thus the fluctuation in capital expenditure 
allocations has been greater than that in allocations to current expen-
diture and the Ruling famll tes. Therefore, a decreasing proportional 
allocation to capital expenditure was noted when a low rate of growth or 
stagnation was experienced in the oi 1 revenue, When high growth in the 
oil revenue has been achieved, the allocation to capital expenditure has 
usually enjoyed a higher rate of growth than any other item of public 
expenditure, as was the case in Qatar in the late 1960's_ These fluctu-
ations in the proportional allocation may reflect the nature of this 
expenditure, which, although important, may be delayed for some years 
without causing great disturbances to society (as was the case 1n Qatar 
in delay1ng the building of Doha Port and the housing scheme, and even 
205 
1n postponing unt1 l the late 1960 1 s the construction of first class 
roads connecting the peninsula to the mainland.) There have also been 
major changes in the indiv1dual Emlrates 1 policies in allocating their 
oil revenue, and in the pr1ority given to any group of allocations 
83 - The Need for Planning 
Capital expenditure needs to be planned for some years in advance 
and the execution of certain capital projects may take several years. 
Thus while increases in the allocations to current expenditure, the 
Rul 1ng families, land purchase schemes, and especially the reserve fund 
may be implemented as soon as the relevant dec1s1ons have been made, the 
I 
allocation to capital projects may need to be planned and the projects 
studied for a year or more before it is possible to dec1de whether they 
should be carried out or not, Therefore, although the need for some 
capital projects may exist and the pressure from other allocations may 
be lightened by reason of a high rate of growth in the oil revenue or by 
changes in the policy of allocating the oil revenues, It IS st1 11 nee-
essary to carry out viab1 1 ity and feasibility stud1es and commit 
allocations to capital expenditure some time in advance, or incur con-
s1derable waste of investment. 
B4- The Absorptive Capac1ty of the Construction Sector 
The capacity of the construction sector to undertake and execute 
physical capital projects is 1 1mited. Any expansion of this capacity needs 
some time to be realised. This is so even 1f there is no cash problem, 
* and the need for certain projects ex1sts. Therefore, the allocation to 
capital expenditure depends on the absorptive capacity of the local 
* The Ruler of Qatar, when discussing the 1974 state budget urged the 
Minister of Public Works to execute the planned capital projects 1n 
six months 1 time, and he would then be w1lling to allocate another 
equivalent sum for the rema1n1ng SIX months. The sum allocated was 
about QR 600 mill ion, This is more than the state oil revenue 1n 
1970, but still represents only an estimated 12% of the oil revenue 
of 1974. 
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construction sector. This capacity in turn depends on the ava1 lability 
of a balanced combination of sufficient eFtrepreneurs, manual and tech-
nical manpower, capital equipment, material, and managerial and 
administrative skills. The development of such a combination takes a 
considerable time, and may not always keep pace with the sharp and 
sudden jumps of the oil revenue, as was the case 1n the early 1950 1 s 
and early 1970's; unfortunately such per1ods are the most favourable for 
increasing capital expenditure, since the pressure from other items of 
expenditure is lightened by the sharp increase in the 011 revenue. Thus 
in the short-term the absorptive capacity of the local economy may limit 
increases in the allocation to capital expenditure, This problem may 
be reduced by increasing dependence on foreign enterprise, imports and 
immigration. 
C Factors Affecting the AllocatiOn to the Ruling Famil 1es 
The allocation to the Ruling famil les ;n the Emirates has accounted 
for considerable proportions of their public expenditure, These pro-
portions, as mentioned earlier, reached 40,6% in Qatar, 28.9% In Bahrain, 
25.7% 1n Abu Dhabi and 2,7% ln Kuwa1t. The proportions of the Emirates• 
total oi 1 revenues allocated to the Ruling families during the period 
studied were 32.1% in Bahrain, 35.1% in Qatar, 25,0% 1n Abu Dhabi and 
2.7% in Kuwait (Fig. 8,1). The high proportional allocation to this item 
of expenditure, which illustrates one of the ma1n features of the financial 
policies in the Emirates, has been affected mainly by the following factors. 
Cl - The Influence of History 
The pattern has been affected by the allocation of the state public 
revenue in the pre-oil period. As already indicated 1n Chap. I, pp. 13-26, 
the public revenue in all the Emirates in the pre-oil period was either 
considered as the private income of the Ruler (Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai) 
or a considerable part of it was reserved for the Ruling families (Bahrain 
and Kuwait). This practice has affected later policies of allocation to 
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the Ruling families. The immediate effect was that, 1n the first place, 
those Emirates which used to produce a budget of which a part was 
allocated to the Ruling families continues to do so. Secondly, those 
Emirates which had not produced a publ 1c budget 1n the pre-oi 1 per1od 
continued to consider the oil revenue as the private income of the Ruler, 
as was the case in Abu Dhabi in the early 1960 1 s. The long-term effect 
has been that the pre-oil practice of allocating part of the public 
revenue to the Ruling families has continued for a long time despite the 
various pressures brought on the Rulers and the Ruling families to 
decrease their proportional allocation and if possible the sum allocated 
to them. This long-term effect may be considered as one of the main 
reasons why the Emirates stil 1 allocate such a high proportion of the1r 
revenues to their Rul 1ng families, compared W1th other countries, as 
indicated below: 
TABLE 8.6 
ALLOCATION TO THE RULING FAMILIES IN THE EMIRATES AND 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1970 (MILLION £) 
as % of 
Amount Total Ex~enditure 
Abu Dhabi 24 25.7% 
Bahrain 7 29.3% 
Qatar 16 32.8% 
Kuwait 9 2.6% 
U.K. (1971/72) 0 8 0.005% 
Saudi Arabia (1971/72) 16 12.0% 
L1bya (1967/68) 2 0.8% 
Brunei (1970) 0.3 0. 7% 
Sources: Apps. 4.2.7; 5.2.7; 602.7 and 7 2.6. 
Libya: Rawley, Farley, Planning for Develo~ment in L1bya, pp.210-211. 
Saudi Arabia: MEED, 1st Sept. 1972, p.1007. 
U.K.: Dally Telegraph, 3rd Dec. 1971; Chancellor of Exchequer, 
U.K., Financial Statement and Budget Report, 1971-72, HMSO, 
p. 18 < 
Brunei: State of Brunei, 1 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for 
the Year 1972 1 , pp.15-19. (The amount was B$ 1.6 mi 11 ion. 
In 1973 the£ sterling= 5.837- see The Financial Times, 
21/11/73, p.4. 
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Table ~.6 shows that the Emirates have allocated very high pro-
portions of their publ 1c expenditure to their Rul1ng fami 1 1es, and some 
of them still allocate higher proportions than any other country. This 
comparison may give us an indication of how strong the effect of the 
Emirates 1 pre-oil practices remains in their public revenue 
C2- Limits on the Rule~ 1 s Absolute Powe~ 
Although the Emirates 1 rulers may, in principal, be considered as 
having been absolute Rulers in the pre-constitutional per1ods (see 
Chap. I, pp.26-31), in actual fact there are certain I imitations on their 
power, particularly in the field of public financial administration" 
These restraints may be imposed directly, as in the case of the British 
government 1 s advise and Its policy of encouraging the Rulers to f1x their 
allocations as a proportion of the oil revenue, or indirectly by pressure 
from the Rulers 1 own subjects or even from the outside world. One of the 
effects of this pressure has been to cause some of the Emirates to allocate 
a proportion of the oil revenue to Ruling family before budgeting, as was 
the case in Bahrain from 1959 to 1973. 
Such direct and ind1rect pressure has affected the proportional 
allocation to the Ruling family by decreasing 1t, as was the case in 
Bahrain in 1935, and in Abu Dhabi 1n the late 1960 1 s, when the proportional 
allocation to the Ruler was fixed. Such was also the case of Qatar when 
the allocation to the pr1vy purse of the Ruler was fixed at one quarter of 
QPC payments, a proportion not to be extended to include one quarter of 
Shell Qatar payments. However, though these direct and ind1rect pressures 
have affected the allocation to the Rul 1ng families by decreasing it, on 
the other hand similar pressures have been exercised by the Rulers and 
the Ruling families to increase the1 r allocations. We may refer to a 
statement by Sir Rupert Hay, the Pol I tical Resident in the Gulf, about 
the Ruling families and their pressure to be allocated more and more of 
the state oil revenue. He wrote: 
Although a Ruler may have 1 ittle trouble with his 
people, his relations are often a thorn in his flesh. 
There may be a few who are of real assistance to him, 
but the rest may be divided into two classes, those 
who want both money and power and those who want only 
money. The former can be compared to the barons of the 
Middle Ages and their activities are encouraged by the 
present system of succession. The latter class Is far 
more numerous, There are a multitude of shaikhs who 
refused to do any work and some of them lead debauched 
lives. They clamor continuously for increased allowances 
and make a Ruler•s I ife a burden to him, He finds it 
difficult to res1st their appeals and when he gives way 
usually has to face a protest from the Political Resident 
on the squandering of State revenues in payments to 
useless drones. (11) 
To illustrate this statement we may refer to the pressure 
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exerted by the Ruling family in Qatar in 1960 to increase their allocation 
from the state oil revenue (see Chap. VI, pp, 151-156). As for some of 
the Rulers• attempts to increase their own allocation from the state oi 1 
revenue, we may refer to the recent event in Bahrain, when the Ruler 
added the whole revenue obtained from Bahrain 1 s share in the Abu Safah 
oilfield to his previous allocation, which was f1xed at one third of 
BAPCO payments. Thus, the Ruler increased his proportional allocation 
of the state oil revenue at a time when the state was facing a financial 
;'\ 
crisis and when funds to finance cap1tal schemes were badly needed. 
C3 - The Effect of the Constitutional Stage 
The transition of any of the Emirates to a modern type of govern-
ment with a democratic constitution and institutions naturally affects 
the allocation to the ruling families, and has wider consequences for the 
whole of public financial policy. As mentioned earlier (see Chap, I, 
See MEDD, ~n Economic Survey of Bahrai~, Vol. I, 1965. The MEDD 
Commission when discussing the sources needed to finance Bahrain State 
capital schemes said: 11 Under the present arrangements the government 
receives a fixed proportion of the oi 1 revenues paid to the statec 
Our projections have been based on the assumption that this arrangement 
will continue, but the possibility of change which would increase the 
share of revenue going to the budget should not be excluded. This 
raises wide issues which lie beyond the scope of this report. Our 
purpose in mentioning it here is to draw attention to the fact that this 
would be a relatively simple method of financing part of the investment 
programme. •• 
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pp.32-33), when such a development has taken place the whole oil revenue 
has been considered, in principal and actual fact to belong to the state, 
and not to be the joint property of the Ruler and the government, The 
direction of public revenue and expenditure is discussed freely, has to 
be approved by the national assembl 1es, and is no longer left to the sole 
decision of the Rulers. "lo d1rect allocation Is made to the members of 
Ruling families. The Ruler 1 s allocation has nothing to do with the o1l 
revenue, but is instead fixed at the beg1nning of a Ruler 1 s term of office. 
Kuwait was the only Emirate to reach the constitutional stage before 
1970. Since 1963/64, the allocated sum and proportion to the Ruler have 
been decreased. The amount allocated decreased from KD 10 mil lion in 
1963/64 to KD 8 million in 1970/71, The proportion of the total oil 
revenue decreased from 5.2% in 1963/64 to 2.6% in 1970/71 (App. 5.3.5). 
Bahrain was the next Emirate to adopt the path of Kuwait when a 
constitution was produced in 1973. The allocation to the Ruler aroused 
violent controversy between most of the elected members of the Constituent 
Assembly and the appointed ones. It took several secret sessions of 
discussion. Thus the article concerning the allocation to the pr1vy purse 
was not approved unt1 l the last working session of the Assembly. This 
article (Article 33i) determined an annual f1xed allocation to the Ruler 
from the public revenue. ( 12 ) The allocation has been fixed at BD 6 
million in the 1974 budget. This equals only 18% of the state 1 s estimated 
oi 1 revenue. (13 ) However, the actual o1l revenue, in the l1ght of the 
increase in the posted price of oil in December 1973( 14 ) is likely to be 
double the budget estimate. This will result in decreasing the proportional 
allocation to the Ruler to about 9% of the total 011 revenue. 
C4- The Peculiarity of the Source of Oil Revenue 
Oil is not a traditional source of revenue. The 01 l revenue has 
~een earned from the exploitation of natural re~ources, and has been 
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collected from one or a few international companies. Thts has on the 
one hand allowed the Rulers to keep secret the amounts they have received, 
on the other it has meant that the collection of these revenues has not 
been felt by their subjects in the same way as taxes on the local economy 
would be felt There has therefore, been 1 ittle pressure from the people, 
and consequently the Ruler and the Ruling fam1l 1es have felt that it is 
easy for them to increase the1r allocation from th1s source of revenue, 
D Factors Affecting the Allocation to the Land Purchase Schemes 
Kuwait is perhaps the only country in the world which has allocated 
22.3% of its total expenditure during the last two decades (1952-1970/71) 
to the purchase of land from the private sector (App, 5.2.7). This 
allocation amounted to KD 697 m1 11 10no Of this amount only KD 36 mill ion 
was recovered from the re-sale of land, the remaining KD 661 million belng 
allocated from the oil revenue. This amount equalled 20 1% of the total 
oil revenue received during the period studied. The only other Emirate 
to allocate a considerable part of its oil revenue to this item of 
expenditure was Qatar, which allocated 6.6% in the periods studied. 
The following factors have affected the allocatton to the land 
purchase schemes: 
Dl - The Availability of Large Surpluses 
The availabl llty of considerabfe sums as surpluses from public 
revenue, after financing all the fields of public expenditure, encour-
ages some of the Emirates to channel a part of these sums to their 
indigenous population, The importance of this factor becomes apparent 
if we consider the great surpluses which were accumulated •n Kuwait in 
the early 1950's, the state surplus revenues before allocation to the 
land purchase schemes were 21% of the total 011 revenue rece1ved in 
1952, 43% in 1953, 51% 1n 1954, 74% in 1955, 63% 1n 1956, and 50% in 
1957 (App. 5.3.6), Thus the accumulation of a great and continuous monetary 
surplus in a state almost controlled ?nly by the decisions of one man, and 
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the lack of a well defined strategy or long-term plans for economic and 
social development, have affected the decision to direct a part of the 
o1l revenue into this new channel. A Ruler may decide that it is 
desirable for social, political and economic reasons to share some of 
his enormous wealth with hls people. 
02 - The Pressure from Influential People 
The pressure from influential people, particularly the members of 
the Ruling families and of the merchant class, has affected the allocation 
to this item of expenditure in many ways. The means by which th1s 
pressure has been exerted include:(a) The acquisition of large areas of 
desert-land around the old cities; this land was claimed as private 
property to be sold later to the state. (15 ) (b) The inflating of the 
price of land. (16 ) In Kuwait for example, the price paid by the govern-
ment for land purchased has increased from KO 4 per sq.metre in 1952 to 
KO 129 in 1960. (c) The inducing of the government and even the National 
Assembly to vote for an increase in the allocation to land purchase 
schemes, as happened in 1966 when the National Assembly 1n Kuwait voted 
to add KO 85 million to the sum projected in the budget (see closed 
account of the budget, 1966/67). In this year the sum allocated to the 
* land purchase schemes reached its all time high, a value of KO 93 mill ion. 
(d) The using of this item of expenditure by the government to obtain the 
support of influential people, particularly in times of cris1s, e.g. 
during the dispute between Kuwait and Iraq on the border question in 
1959/60, when th1s allocation accounted for 45% of the total oil revenue 
spent, including KO 14 million drawn from the reserve fund to meet the 
budget deficit (App. 5.3.6; see also IBRO Report, p.4). 
03 - Re-development of the Old Cities and Increasing Urbanisation 
* 
One of the principal a1ms of the land aquisltlon scheme, especially 
This sum alone equals about 64% of the total oil revenue received by 
Bahrain State during a quarter of a century. 
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as envisaged 1n the early 1950's in Kuwait and later ln Qatar, was the 
modernisation of the old cities, particularly so as to make them suitable 
for modern means of transportation. Although important at first, this 
aim became less Important in time, and the scheme was directed to buying 
land to be used by the government or distributed to the public. 
With the rapidly increasing demand for land caused by an increasing 
population and the need for large areas of land to accommodate housing 
schemes, schools, hospitals, power stations, sea water distillation 
stations, and commercial and industrial estates, the government found It 
necessary to acquire increasing areas of land. The prevailing system 
of land-ownership in Kuwait and Qatar made the purchase of land for 
urbanisation unavoidable 
D4 - Government Land Registration Pol 1cy and Actual Practice 
In Bahrain and in Abu Dhab1 particularly In the t1me of Shaikh 
Shakhbut, ( 1l) all the land was considered government property and con-
sequently nobody could lay claim to land previously unowned. In Kuwait 
and Qatar, however, there have been official land registration regulations 
since the early 1950's, but these do not apply to the influential people 
who may obtain land merely by 'staking their cla1m 1 0 Therefore, the 
degree of restriction placed on ownership claims to free land has 
affected the purchase of land by the governments 
E Factors Affecting the Allocation to the Reserve Funds 
The portions of the oil revenue which remained unspent, i ,e. the 
net allocation to the reserve funds in each of the Emirates, stood as 
follows at the end of 1970. (a) In Bahrain there remained 2.1% of the 
total oil revenue received du(1ng the period studied, a sum equal to 
only 12.5% of the state 1 s total expenditure 1n 1970. (b) In Kuwa1t the 
proportion was 11-2%, approximately equal to about the sum spent by the 
* Excluding the reserve fund investment profit, 1961-70. 
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* state 1n 1970. (c) 1n Qatar the proportion was 20.6%, again approximately 
the sum spent by the state 1n 1970. In Abu Dhabi the proportion was 1.5% 
or only about 5% of the state's total expenditure in 1970. 
The factors which affect the allocation to the reserve fund are in 
brief the following: 
El - Government's Financial Administration Pol icy 
The government's financial policies in keeping a part of their oil 
revenue in their reserve fund accounts was one of the main factors which 
affected the accumulation of a relatively large proportion of the Emirates' 
oil revenue in the early years of oil production, Bahrain was the 
pioneer in this respect and about one third of its revenue was allocated 
to the reserve fund. The reason for this policy in Bahrain has been given 
by Sir Charles Belgrave, who wrote in his 'Personal Column' (p.166) that: 
"It was the Shaikh's and my policy to add a certain 
proportion of the revenue each year to the reserve fund, 
which was invested in England in government stock so as 
to build up a fund which would supplement the revenue 
when the income from oil decreased. This was not a 
popular idea, and since I left Bahrain I see that the 
plan for saving money has been given up." 
Sir Charles's observation was absolutely true, and this allocation, which 
was running at about one third of the oi 1 revenue to the early 1950's, has 
dropped since 1957 to only 13.4%. Moreover, the saving in this fund was 
heavily drawn on in the 1960's (App. 4.3.5). In the early 1950's, 
Qatar also followed a financial policy similar to Bahrain's. Kuwait too 
followed a similar line at that time, though it was not so clearly 
planned. Thus it was official financial policy to allocate a certain pro-
portion of the state oil revenue to a reserve fund. When th1s policy was 
given up, the annual allocation was left to be dec1ded by other factors. 
However, the allocation of a fixed proportion of the oi 1 revenue to the 
* Excluding the reserve fund investment profit and the prepaid income 
tax. 
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reserve fund is still thought of as a proper financial policy. In 1972 
the Kuwait National Assembly debated a law under which all oil royalties 
wi 11 be allocated to the state reserve. (lB) 
E2 - The Pressures from other Items of Expenditure 
The increas1ng need to finance other items of expenditure, partl-
cularly current expenditure, greatly affected the public revenue surplus. 
For some years public revenue was insufficient to cover current public 
expenditure, and it was therefore necessary to draw upon the unspent 
oil revenue to fill the gap. 
E3 - The World Monetary Crisis 
In recent years, particularly subsequent to the devaluation of the 
pound sterling in 1967, the Emirates have become worried about their 
savings, which were mainly invested abroad in financial assets. Wtth 
increasing world-wide inflation and the international trend towards 
currency devaluations (particularly of the US dollar and the pound 
sterling), they have become mo~e cautious about the long-term future of 
their reserve funds, particularly in view of the investment pattern of 
these funds. However, this factor has been realised by the Emirates only 
recently, and has therefore had 1 lttle effect on the allocation to the 
reserve fund in the past, although 1t may affect it in the future. More-
over, it might not only affect the allocation to the reserve fund, but 
1 h E , 1 o • • • h o f o 1 (19) a sot e m1 rates economtc tncentlve to Increase t e1r output o 01 , 
unless, of course, they can invest their surplus revenue more securely. 
E4 - The Poor Achievement of the Reserve Fund Investments in the Past 
Due to failures of administration and to the lack of internal invest-
ment opportunities, the achievement of the reserve funds has been very 
1 imited. Neither the amount of money saved in them (at best equal to one 
year 1 s expenditure), nor the1 r investment income (at best about 10% of 
1970 1 s revenue) represents a good achievement or encourages a greater 
allocation to them. 
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These are the main factors which have influenced the financial 
policies of the Emirates and the allocation to each item. The factors, 
as mentioned earlier, are inter-related and are products of the major 
factors which have determined the financial policies and consequently 
the allocational pattern of the Emirates' oil revenues. These deter-
mining factors will be the subject of the next part of this chapter. 
Part Three: Factors Determining the Broadly-Based Revenue Allocation 
Policies 
The factors that have played the essential role in determining the 
pattern in which the oil revenue has been allocated are common to all the 
Emirates, though they may have differed in importance in the various 
Emirates during each stage of their contemporary history. These factors 
reflect the social, political, economic and geographical facts of the 
Emirates societies. 
The following seven points will briefly discuss each of these 
factors: 
A The Social Impact 
Societies in their evolutionary processes are affected by their 
past experience and ideas. No society can be cut off completely from 
its roots and turned into a different society with a new attitude, 
social characteristics and cultural notions. Thus the present social, 
political and economic practices of any society are the result both of 
its heritage from the past, and of its capacity to adopt new notions 
and practices which have already emerged from human experience elsewhere. 
The dynamic characteristics of a society, its knowledge of contemporary 
science, and its broad contacts with the outside world are all important 
in moulding its present stage of development, but its cultural 
institutions and the attitudes of its citizens nevertheless remain a 
synthesis of its sociological evolution through the ent1re length of its 
. . (20) 
organ1c existence. 
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The societies of the Emirates, being parts of Islamic society, 
have been influenced by the teaching and traditions of Islam. Also, 
since most of the indigenous population are descendants of nomadic and 
semi-nomadic Arabian tribes, these societies have also been affected 
greatly by tribal mentality and culture. Although it is a considerable 
time since most of the tribes of the Emirates abandoned their wandering 
life and settled in their coastal towns and villages, they st1 11 retain 
much of their tribal organisation as well as many of their tribal attitudes, 
The other factor shaping the present day social mentality of the population 
of the Emirates is their experience of seafaring occupations. 
Thus, when the oil revenue began to be received, the people could 
not differentiate between it and any wealth they might obtain during a 
good pearling season, a successful voyage, a good herding season or even 
as tribal booty. Therefore, though part of the oil revenue was used for 
capital formation at a national level, a considerable part of it was shared 
almost directly by the indigenous people, as if it were income earned from 
the old sources, rather than from a new source which by its nature allows 
greater inequal it1es in the distribution of wealth. 
However, although the exploration of the sociological and psychological 
factors influencing the allocational patterns of the Emirates• oil revenue 
is important, these factors are too peripheral to this study to warrant 
an exhaustive consideration. Thus our treatment will briefly deal with 
only some aspects of the economic behaviour and past practices of these 
societies in so far as they may affect the attitude of the people towards 
the utilisation of the oil revenue. These factors are: 1) Belief in 
chance. 2) The concept of sharing wealth and income. and 3) The educational 
status of the people and their failure to understand the nature of the 
oi 1 revenues. 
A1 - Belief in Chance 
The people of the Emirates believe in chance to a great extent. 
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Their prosperity or otherwise in the pre-oil period has been greatly 
affected by forces beyond their control. The economic life of the mass 
of the people depended either on herding and other nomadic activities, 
or on the seafaring occupations, among which the pearling industry was 
the main (see Chap. I, pp.8-12), 
The earnings of the nomads from herd1ng and related activities 
depend on precipitation, which varies from one year to another for 
reasons beyond their control and in a way they cannot forecast. 
Precipitation affects grazing opportunities and other aspects of nomadic 
1 ife. Thus, for nomads, a rich or poor season depends in the f1rst 
place on chance and a good or bad rainy season. 
In the pearling industry, chance also played an essential role 
in the prosperity or otherwise of the people. The luck of a good catch 
inspires everybody in the industry. The chance of finding a large jewel 
(Danih) forms the core of expectation for every man employed when opening 
every oyster with his unsharpened knife. In the large boats the ex-
pectation of this possibility even necessitated engaging guards to watch 
the men during the course of opening the oysters. Besides this, other 
aspects of the industry also depended on chance, the chance of a high 
price for pearls, the chance of suitable weather and the avoidance of 
disastrous events, and so on and so forth. Thus it is not strange that 
grandmothers in the Emirates keep telling tales about poor people grown 
suddenly rich because God has granted them a very large jewel, or rich 
men who have lost their riches and joined the sea folk after some diaster. 
Belief in chance, indeed, forms the theme of Arab folk tales, quite 
apart from the experience of those Arabs in the peninsula who have seen 
and felt its effects on their daily 1 ife. As Professor Bowen-Jones 
wrote: 
11 0ne of the most profound remarks made by Professor Arberry 
was his comment that in Arab folk tales there is no question 
of reward following merit, but only of heaven-sent fortune or 
d i sas te r. 11 (21) 
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Thus, people with such a strong feeling for good luck and belief 
1n chance may be expected to give little care for the future, They tend 
to enjoy what they have at present, their happiness unspoiled by worrying, 
thriftness, and hard work. This is reinforced by the nomadic tradition 
of hospitality and lavish consumption when the nomads can affort it. A 
true nomad finds it difficult to economise. and a!though he may be forced 
by nature to live a very hard life at subsistence level, when he can 
afford to spend he will apparently forget the hard days, This behaviour 
may be explained partially by the fact that nomads have usually ex-
perienced great fluctuations in their standard of l1ving caused by forces 
beyond their control. Thus, 11when supplies are plentiful, the Bedawin 
eat copiously, because the time and scale of the next meal may be uncer-
t 0 11(22) a1n, 
A2- Concept of Sharing Incomes and Public Wealth 
The peoples of the Emirates are generally accustomed to having 
equal opportunities to benefit from their countries 1 natural resources. 
They have equal right to the pearl banks, fish resources, pasture, and 
other resources. This right of equal opportunity is based on traditional 
practices as well as the religious tradition that people are sharers of 
water, pasture and fire. (23 ) However, these rights have been restricted 
by custom to the people of a region or a sheikhdom, or even to members 
of a tribe, Nevertheless the concept of sharing natural resources remains 
strong and an exclusive monopoly of these resources by individuals has 
not been accepted. 
Therefore, the people 1 s claim for a share of the oil revenue is not 
unappropriate, nor 1s it unprofound. In the people 1 s mind the oil resources 
are national wealth- Consequently benefits derived from them should be 
shared. Moreover the people, influenced by their previous seafaring and 
other traditional activities (see Chap. I, pp.B-11) prefer a sort of 
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d1rect distribUtiOn of the return They conce1ve of the outpour1ng of 
ol 1 wealth as 1f 1t were the wealth of a lucky pearl 1ng season, booty 
or tribute pa>d to a tr1be 
The people's own bel .ef :n the; r right to share ln the o• I wealth, 
be1ng 1nfluenced by the nomadic conception of the role of government, 
makes them ask for a sort of direct d•str!bUtlon of the or I revenu~. 
The nomads do not think of a state as an 1nstrtut1on concerned w.th the 
long-term social and econom1c development of a country, or of government 
as an ,nstrument by wh1ch a society 1nsures the we!lbe.ng and welfare of 
present and future generations, something wh1ch not only g1\es to 
indlvjduals but also takes from them as wel 1 The nomad1c mental 1ty 
rather expects dl•ect sub~1dies, grants and preferent,al treatment from 
f h 1 1 d f 1 to be maintained (24) a state 1 t e oya l.'f an support o the peop e IS 
However, though the concepl. of shar,ng wealth and 1ncome 1s deep-
rooted In the Emirates, It perm1ts considerable differences 1n the s1ze 
of the shares. These differences could not be explained purely on the 
bas1s of effort and rewa•a. The differences rather reflect trJbal 
rrad1t;on and customs These differences have become greater s\nce the 
start of the o1l revenue. The reason fo~ this 1S the nature or l.he 01 I 
revenue. This revenue had l.ttle or noth1ng to do WITh 'Che efforts of 
the people and 1n lhe early years, 1n particular, they knew very l1ttle 
of 1ts scale, let alone •ts future. 
A3 - The Educat~onal Status 
As has already been sa1d, l.he economic behav\our of a society at 
any g1ven t1me depends on 1ts soc1al attitudes These, •n t •. nn, depend 
on 1ts pasl. e~per,ence and heritage on the one hand, and on 1ts capac1ty 
ro onvent and ddapt new methods to deal w1th 1ts econom.c affa1 rs on the 
other Thus, the educar,onal status of a society is an 1mportant factor 
in determining 1ts level of understanding and Its ab1 1 lty to solve Its 
economic problems When wealth from 01 l began to pour 1nto the state 
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purses of the Emirates, th1s was very different from the trad1t1onal 
~ources of income, It was thus 1ncomprehensible to the people, who had 
not the necessary contemporary knowledge to understand its nature. For 
example, when the oil revenue (commercial product1on stage) began to be 
recelved ln each of the Em1 rates, there were no modern schools above the 
elementary level, Thus we may certa1nly say that few, 1f any, of the 
Indigenous population could understand the nature of the 01 l resources, 
Nor d1d they have the advanced economic knowledge upon which to base an 
efficient pol 1cy of sustained and real economic development able to assure 
the econom1c future of the present generation as well as future ones 
Al 1 they could think about at that time was how they might secure for 
themselves and possibly for their relatives or tribes the highest proper-
t1on of this wealth, so that they could enjoy 1t, consume It and wa1t for 
God to prov1de new wealth, 
Th1s backward educational status was general when the 01 l revenue 
was rece1ved, and it was years before a considerable proportion of the 
people were able, as a result of increasing education and world-wide 
contact, to realise the nature of the oil revenue and possibly to think 
about better economic pol 1c1es to utl 1 1se the income obtained from the 
exploitation of their resources 
In summa?y, the social attitudes and mental1ty of the people of the 
Emirates has been one of the main factors in determ1n1ng the pattern by 
wh1ch their 01l revenues were allocated. Their bel1ef 1n chance, their 
tendency to lav1sh consumption, their concept of sharing natural wealth, 
their concept of the state 1s role in economic life, and the1 r educational 
status have all been act1ve factors push1ng governments 1n a certain 
direction 1n their channeling of the oll revenue, 
Except Duba1, which had a secondary school when the state started to 
receive 01 I royalties and taxes 1n 1969, 
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B Po 1 1 t 1 cal Impact 
The nature of the pol ttical system 1n any country, as wel 1 as the 
Internal and external pressures exerted on It, play an essential role in 
shap1ng the social and economic pol tcles of that country. In the Emirates 
these factors have natu~ally Influenced the allocation of the oll revenue. 
Bl - Nature of the Pol I tical System 
During the period stud:ed two d1fferent types of government have 
extsted in the Em1rate, a patriarchal and autocratic type, and a demo-
cratiC type. Both types have had the1r impact on the al locar1onal pattern 
of the oil revenue" 
As we have seen earl1er in Chap. I, pp.26-31, the sha1khdom system 
evolved from a tr;bal a1 i 1ance into a sort of autocra~y Th1s stage was 
undergone by all the Em1rates for all or a considerable part of the 
per l od s stud 1 ed Consequently the nature of th1s stage has determ1ned 
some of the channels through which the oil revenue is disbursed, The 
effects may be seen 1n the following practices: 
Frrst: The reserving of a considerable proportion of the state 
oi 1 revenues for Rul1ng fami! 1es" This proportion, as 1nd1cated ijn F1g. 
8, 1, ranged from about 3 to 35 percent of the tot a 1 o ~ 1 revenue 
Second: Bes1de the'r d1rect allocation from the 011 (evenue, the 
Rul 1ng fam1 1 1es have enjoyed a very spec1al posit1on 1n the adm1n1stration. 
'i\ 
Th1s is very clear 1n most of the Em1rates 1n the pre-constitutional 
stage. Taking the admtn1strat1on of Kuwait 1n the pre-constitutional 
stage as an example, we may see the spec1al position the Rul lng family 
occupied and its consequences on the utilisation of the state oil revenue. 
s~r Rupert Hay, the Political resident In the Gulf, descr:bed the system 
of government in Kuwait at that ttme 1n these words: 
The spectal position of the Rul 1ng fam; I 1es 1n Bahra1n and Qatar was 
less marked when the Brttlsh Advisers were at the head of the 
administrations than 1t became later. 
The system of government Is patriarchal and the h1gh 
offices of state are held by members of the Rul 1ng fam1 ly, 
each of whom conducts the affa1rs of the department 
entrusted to h1m With the min1mum of f1nanc1al or any 
other control by any central authority. In fact, each of 
these sha1khs 1s a law unto h1mself, and there Is much ln 
the adm1n1strat•on wh1ch depends on thei~ relations With 
each other, their presence or absence from the state or the 
willingness of rhe Ruier to control their actlvltles,(25) 
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Another Br1t1sh diplomat in the Gulf, S1 r John Richmond, conf1rmed this 
special position when he wrote. 
"previously the heads of the departments who were then 
almost all members of Al-Sabah, though responsible to the 
Ruler, enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy, Their 
position could be compared to that of the medieval pr1vy (26 ) 
counc 1 1 and the 1 r departments to the f 1 efs of 1 ts members, 11 
This spec1al posit1on has not been conf1ned to the sen1or members 
of the famll ies, but has In most of the Em1 rates extended to the other 
members, though It has differed in degree. Most of the members have 
the1r pr,vate teachers, secretaries, body-guards (Akhw1a), and household 
·k. 
servants pa1d for by the state. Most of the1 r hal •days abroad are paid 
for by the M1n1str1es of Health under their schemes for treatment abroad. 
All this IS •n add,tion to the1r pr1v1leged pos1tlon regarding the owner-
sh1p of land, and their r1ght to duty-free 1mports, 
The need to reduce such p~1vlleges and ''the need to prov1de a 
strong central control over the semi-autonomous policies of the 
departments 11 ( 27) 1n Kuwait, 1s cons1dered by S1r John Richmond, to be one 
of the ma1n reasons for She1kh Abdul 1a Al-Sal 1m's dec1slon to grant the 
constitution in the early 1960's 
Third: The nature of the system necessitated the channelling of a 
considerable proportion of the ol 1 revenue 1n such a way as to obtain and 
retatn the poJ;tlcal acceptance of the Indigenous populat1on Therefore 
current expenditure, and expenditure on such th1ngs as land purchase have 
Considered government employees, these men 1n fact occup1ed pos1tlons 
ent1rely in the private serv1ce of the Rul .ng fam. 1 1es. The members 
of the Ruling family of Bahrain enjoyed a much less priv1 leged position, 
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been Widened so as to absorb most of the oppos1t1on to the gove~nments 
Thus expenditure on the acquisition of property for development 
purposes becomes mainly a means of channel! 1ng oi I revenue to certain 
sectors of the people. As p,-ofessor Bowen-Jones noted: ''Revenue is 
released 1nto the pr!vate sector selectiVely because the channels are 
controlled by the nature of prev1ous land ownership II ( 28) Moreove~"', 
the price pa1d for land IS usually an inflated one. This ;s all because 
the government feels the need for support from certain sectors (see 
Next comes the •ncreaslng proportlonal allocation to current 
expenditure, caused by over-staffing the publ lc sector, reducing the 
price of publ lc goods and serv1ces, or by transfer payment A I I rhese 
channels have been affected in part by government pol ICijeS to obtain and 
retain the political acceptance of the indigenous population Therefore 
the government of Bahrain, which was prevented by the smallness of ItS 
oil revenue from solving the unemployment problem by over-staffing the 
publ ~c sector, from lowering the price of public goods and services, and 
from making conslderable transfer payments, has galned less political 
acceptance than the governments of the other Emirates and has faced more 
.. \ ';~ 
opposition, 
Greater democracy and 1ncreaslng publIC participation in governments 
have changed the allocation of the o\1 revenues. At this stage d1 rect 
allocation to the members of the Ruling fam1lies no longer exists (Chapo I, 
pp.32-33), and the proportional allocation to the Rulers is considerably 
reduced, Also the privlleged pos1t1on of members of the Ruling fam1l 1es 1s 
greatly decreased, as ls the semi-autonomy of government depa~tments. 
Howeve~, although the pol •tical effects are reduced, they have by no means 
Th1s was the case before the production of the 1973 constitution, 
~- The h1gh standard of education and political awareness in Bahrain is 
an important factor in this opposition, 
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disappeared, and in fact stil 1 play a cons1derable role. Moreover, 
the soc1al impact and the people 1 s conception of the 011 revenue and 
how it should be spent acquire greater we1ght through the National 
Assembl 1es, and the allocation to current expenditure In Kuwait for 
example, has 1n consequence inc~eased considerably 
B2 - External Pressure 
The external pressures wh1ch have affected the channels through 
wh1ch the oi 1 revenue has been allocated may bel llustrated by the 
pressure from the British Government and to a lesser extent pressure 
from the Arab world, 
The Briti~h Government concluded special treaties with the Rulers 
concerning their defence and international relations, it did not restrict 
its influence to these matters, but extended 1t to Internal matters when 
the Ruler asked for advice, or when the British Government felt it 
des1rable to adv1se the Rulers on 1nternal pollc1es. We may refer ro the 
Brit1sh pol lcies 1n Bahrain and Kuwait during the 1920 1 s and 1930 1 s (see 
Chap. I, pp.13-26), and 1n Qatar and Kuwa1t 1n the late 1940's and early 
1950 1 S In Kuwait, for example, Mr. Borrows of the Fore1gn Otf1ce advised 
She;kh Ahmed Al-Jaber on the use of the state oil revenue, recommending 
him to step up adminlstrat1ve and social reform and to put part of the 
state oi I revenue into a reserve fund to be kept for the future. (29 ) 
The influence of the Br1t1sh Government on the allocational pattern 
of the state oil revenue may be seen in the following ways. a) Its policy 
of encouraging the Rulers to distinguish between the pr1vy purse of the 
Ruler and the public purse and the attempts to 1 1mit their allocation to 
a flxed sum or proportion (Bahra;n, Qatar, Abu Dhabi). b) !ts adv1ce 
that a part of the ol l revenue be kept as a reserve fund. c) its encourage-
ment of the development of the :nfrastructure schemes 
As for the pressure from the Arab world, one may cons1der the 
criticism which rlses sometimes 1n the press and in political circles, 
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particularly dur1ng times of internal upr1s1ng. This type of pressure 
has affected the allocation of the otl revenue ma1nly 1n the following 
ways, a) By putting the governments under a certain pressure to 1mprove 
social services, dim1n1sh unemployment and make cons1derable transfer 
payments at home b) By 1nduc1ng a sort of Pan-Arab attitude and hence 
necessitating considerable transfer payments to the Arab worldo This is 
bes1de expend•ture on publ 1c relations des1gned to reduce cr·t1~1sm 1n 
some quarters. 
B3 - Internal Pressure 
Internal pressu~es have greatly affected all the channels through 
which ol 1 revenue is allocated. These pressures come from different 
sectors of society and are exerted in quite different d;re~tions 
Members of the Rul 1ng fam1 1 ies are press1ng to keep or even Increase their 
allocations and privileges, the landlords to increase the allocation to 
the land purchase schemes, and the general public for easy wei 1-pa•d 
governmental jobs, cheap public goods and services, and increasing soc1al 
transfer payments, However, with increasing education, democracy and 
wor1d-w~de contact 1nternal pressure seems to favour social and economic 
pol 1cies designed to util 1se the oi 1 revenue 1n more productive ways (see 
th1s part, G), 
C Economic Impact 
Economic factors have played an essential role 1n determ\n1ng the 
channels through which the oll revenue of the Emirates has been allocated. 
These factors, as well as the social and pol ttl cal factors menttoned 
earlier, have provided the 1nput resulting ;n the social and esonomic 
policies implemented dur•ng the per1ods studied. The econom1c impact 
results from the limited resources of the Em1rates, the econom1c conse-
quences of the.r small s1ze, and the excess 011 revenues, 
Cl - Natural Resources and Investment Opportunities 
The Em1 rates, be1ng arid zones with a great scarc1ty of water 
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resources, have 1 lttle potential for agricultural development In 
addition to this the Emirates also lack commercial deposits of m1neral 
resources other than petroleum (see Chap, I, pp.2-4), In fact, apart 
from petroleum, the Em1rates have very few natural resources. This lack 
of varied natural resources has l1mlted opportunities to ut1lise the oil 
revenue or the petroleum resources locally, for there Is too narrow a 
scope either to Integrate petroleum resources Into local production or 
to invest the proceeds of oil exports In the development of other natural 
resources. 
In addition to this, national investment in the petroleum Industry 
is very 1 1mited. This is because the production and associated activities 
of the o1l Industry are mainly f1nanced by fore1gn capital and the o1l is 
exported as crude rather than :n the form of products, consequently 
nor rows 1 oca 1 i nves tmen t opportunities. 
C2- Small Population 
The Emirates are m1n1 or micro-states not only because of the1r 
small area, but essent:ally because of their small population (see 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2) In 1970 only Kuwait had a population of about three 
quarters of a milllon, while Qatar 1s population was only one hundred and 
th1 rteen thousand, 
A small population may be cons1dered a hand1cap to the economic 
development of a country. It restricts the production capacity of that 
country, limiting the supply of skills and the avai lab1 1 1ty of entre-
preneurs, administrators, technicians, and even unskilled labour, 
The problem in the Emirates exceeds the normal handicap Impeding 
countries with a small population. First, che Emirates not only have 
small populations, but virtually the smallest 1n the world. Second, 
during the major part of the periods studied the indegenous population 
above twenty years of age was mostly uneducated. Third, the prevail1ng 
economic incentives discourage people from engaging in the most productive 
228 
actiVIties (see Chap, IX, Part Three), Fourth, the narural1sat1on laws 
have greatly restricted the opportunity of immigrants to settle and 
obtain local nationality, (3D) thus ruling out one Important way of over-
coming a deficiency in population 
Apart from l1miting manpower, a small population has Important 
effects on the local marketo A small population means a small market, 
though 1n the Emirates, the purchasing power 1s very high 1ndeed. 
However, this high purchasing power is offset by the small number of 
buyers and their custom of choosing from goods of a very h1gh standard 
from all over the world, Th1s small market narcows the opportunity tor 
economies of scale, which are very 1mportant for any country WIShing to 
Industrial 1se. In view of the 1 :mited natural and human resources 
available as a bas1c for competition ;n the international expo·t market, 
it 1s easy to see how this small local market affects productive 
activities in the Emirates. 
C3 - The Excess 011 Revenue 
The Em1rates are well known for this relatively considerable surplus 
of foreign exchange and f1nanc1ai resources. Th1s ls due to the lack of 
opportunity for internal productive Investment on the one hand, and to the 
excess of 011 revenue avai !able to the governments on the other Thus 
the local econom1es were not able or ready, socially, pol It teal ly, or 
economically to absorb the revenue obtained from exploit1ng 01 I resources 
ln a more productive and economic way than they have done. 
The behaviour of countr1es 1n economic matters 1S not very different 
from that of Individuals. Differences between countries are analagous to 
differences between Individuals 1n their personal it1es, experiences, fore-
sight and ab i I 1 ty to ut 1 1 1 se their resou"ces Thus we mtght expect that 
a socially backward, uneducated and Inexperienced person who 1nherited 
wealth would squander a considerable part of 1t on lavish consumption and 
luxury with 1 1ttle thought of the future and possibly little respect for 
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the effort needed to accumulate it In simi Jar circumstances a state 
may be expected to behave similarly, A continu1ng surplus achieved w1th 
1 ittle effort on the part of a state may open the door wide for sorts of 
expenditure wh1ch not only do not promote long-term economic growth, but 
may even place obstacles 1n the way of the sound econom1c behaviour of 
the people and affect their productivity. An example Is t~e link between 
effort and reward wh1ch may be constdered the fundamental mechanism in 
every human society, and to wh1ch little consideration was paid in the 
Emirates. 
C4- The Small S1ze of a Country and Foreign Influence 
Smal 1 countries are usually easily influenced by great powerso 
This problem, though it 1s pol 1tical rather than economic, has 1mpl i-
cations fo( the internal econom1c policies and the freedom of economic 
action in small countries. Mr. Keesing from Stanford University, noted 
that one obvious difficulty impeding national development ln small 
countries, 
11 is the political-military weakness of any small country 
and Its vulnerability to interference and manipulation by 
the larger powers, with 1 1ttle opportunitY to rec1procate 
~n kind. This may be, in 1ts own right, a cruc1al obstacle 
to development, if the great powers stand actively opposed 
to the type of internal pol1cies and leadership that are 
essential for successful development. 11 (31) 
A small country may even be dominated by one of the big mult1-nat1onal 
firms, not only in its economic 1 1fe, but even tn 1ts political adminis-
tration for the b1g companies may extend their Influence in order to 
prevent measures threatening their profitability or position, even 1f 
such measures are in the interests of the country concerned and of its 
econom1c future. The small s1ze of the Emirates thus may render them 
vulnerable to pressure from abroad when they attempt to ut1l ise their 
oil resources in ways unpalatable to the 011 companies or the oil-
consuming countries. 
These are the main economic factors affecting the al locational 
230 
patterns of the Em1rates 1 011 revenues, The iack of natural resources, 
the small size of the populations, and the small markets limit the 
opportunities to attract the income der1ved from the explo1tat1on of the 
petroleum resources, Rece•pt of o•l revenues above the level wh1ch the 
local econom1es can productively absorb makes :t easy for the government 
to use these revenues to satisfy all demands from var1ous sectors of the 
society, even when such demands are economically unp~oduct1ve, 
D Geographical Impact 
The characteristics of the location and surrounding reg1on of the 
Emirates have had two maJOr effects on the allocationai pattern of the 
o i 1 revenue, 
The f1rst effect springs from the Emirates' resource base and the 
degree of regional differentiation The Em1rates 1 main resource base is 
petroleum, as •t IS In almost all the su~round;ng countries, a fact which 
may be seen very clearly from the Gulf petroleum industry maps (see 
Figs, 2,1 - 2,5), This regional srmilar1ty rn resource base has reduced 
to a m1n1mum or even precluded opportunities for comparative advantage 
which might be grasped ,f the other countrres In the reg1on were lack1ng 
1n petroleum resources. Thus none of the Em1rates has been in what m1ght 
be called a prtv,leged or preferable pos:r10n as far as its petroleum 
resources are concerned, They all have 011, surplus natural gas, and 
considerable financial resources; conversely, as mentloned earlier, they 
all lack any considerable variety of natural resources, a fact which has 
minimised the poss1b1l 1ty of Integrating the productron of petroleum 
resources w1th other sectors of the econom1es 
The second effect may be related to locatlonal factors Among 
these factors the ma1n are the relat•ve cu1t~ral 1Solar1or ana the macro-
regional absence of perceived or obv1ous opportunit:es for Investment 
Despite considerable contact with other people, particularly dur1ng 
the last two or three centur1es, the culture of the people of the Em1rates 
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has undergone little change, and th1s 15 particularly true of the period 
up to 1950" Their contact with fore1gners has been purely formal and 
has not deepened 1nto social interaction, They have scarcely appreciated 
and adopted the instltut1ons of other cultures, or critiCISed and 
abandoned any of their own They have 1 1ved in relative cultural 
.solation, avoldtng cultural interactions and ho1dlng to their own 
1nstitut1ons. It may be noted that no 1nstltut1on could be easily changed 
by the action of the people to whose social system it belongs; It is 
only by Interaction, pressure and perhaps some sort of clash, necessarily 
involving foreign cultural Influence, that cultural stagnation can be 
avoided, 
The people of the Emirates have, during the:r recent and contem-
porary history, 1 ~ved in relative cultural Isolation not only from non-
Islamic cultures, but also from othe- Islamic cultures, such as those of 
the northern Arab countries. To exemplify this we may refer to trlba1 
caste systems, the lack of respect for certain types of work, and to 
inter-marrying. Tribal caste iS still an important factor In the 
Emirates, although It differs in strength from one Emirate to another, 
It nevertheless plays a considerable role tn social, political and 
economic 1 ife, People are d1vided lnto low caste men and high caste men, 
instead of being dlv1ded on the1r own me;its. The social respect for 
certain types of wo~k is 1ndeed very low, though it is not the same 1n 
all the Em1rates. Craftsmen such as carpenters, sm1ths, and even farmers 
and fishermen may be regarded by a considerable portion of people at the 
top of society as following low caste occupations. inter-marriage be-
tween sectors of the societies of the Em1rates is one of the most difficult 
of undertakings. People 1 ive, work, and worship together, but when it 
comes to inter-marrying they seem as conservative as their fathers and 
grandfathers. 
This relative cultural isolation asserts itself in all socio-
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economic pol ic1es and has up to now exe;ted considerable pressure to 
make development an extension of traditional practices and prevent it 
from accommodating new concepts which would render it more effective and 
relevant to present-day world-w1de development. 
The other locat1onal factor wh1ch has affected the allocat1onal 
pattern of the Em1rates' oil revenue rs the macro-regional absence of 
perce1ved or obvious investment opportunities, The Emirates and to a 
lesser extent other surrounding countries lack any obv1ous opportunity 
for Investment. All the potential investment opportunities are of a 
type which requires highly sophisticated experience and know-how which 
the Emirates mostly lack. Opportunities such as those offered by world-
wide financial institutions, service sectors, and export-oriented 
manufacturing, are among the ones that the Em1rates' financial resources 
permit, but their entrepreneural, administrative, managerial, and 
technical capacity deny. 
E Absence of Long-Term Economic Strategy 
The Emirates have passed most of the period studied Without adopting 
long-term plans through which they could def1ne the most Important economic 
and social goals they aim to achieve by us1ng their 011 revenues In fact 
they have been faced, almost eve~y year, wlth a revenue thar has probably 
exceeded their expectations. Thus the governments have been more concerned 
with ways of channel 1 ing the revenues from their national resources than 
w1th maximising the potential of the whole economy in the long-term by 
using the money for productive Investment designed to ensure the rapid 
and sustained growth of their economies, 
The Emirates' oil revenues offered go1den opportunities for the 
governments to avoid one of the ma1n problems 1n rhe process of economic 
development, i oeo the problem of the mobil isatlon of financial resources 
for purposes of productive investment, But due partly to the lack of 
long-term strategies for economic and social development, the governments 
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failed to produce the necessary plans to allow the productive channelling 
of these resources, and the absence of such guide 1 tnes also led to con-
siderable waste" 
In countries such as in the Emirates, where the government may be 
cons1dered as the central dynamo of the economy, the absence of a clear 
and well-defined long-term strategy for social and econom1c development 
is a ser1ous hindrance, not only because of the waste it causes to a 
. 
considerable part of the society's scarce resources, but also because of 
the long-term effect of encouraging wrong practices and creating wrong 
economic incentives, 
F The Multiplier Effects (Increasing Dependence) 
While the social, political, economic geographical and administrative 
factors are the basic determinants of the pattern by which the Emirates 
have allocated their oil revenue, there have also been certain multtpl ler 
effects. The above-mentioned factors have allowed the Indigenous pop-
ulation to depend on the state not only to provide soc.al serv•ces, for 
which no tax is collected from the local economy (except tax from the 
International 01 l compan1es), but also to supply them With electricity, 
water and other public services at pr1ces below the curcent cost, and to 
prov1de employment in the public sector for every 1nd1genous person who 
requ1red it even if there were no need for hls work Th1s dependence has 
made 1t poss1ble for almost every Indigenous person to rely on the 
government to provide many services free of charge, and has bred into him 
the custom of expecting the government to increase its free g1fts. At the 
same time, he has himself been g•ven an excuse fo~ not supporting the 
publ 1c purse even to the extent of cover1ng its Gurrent expenditure (see 
Tables 8,1 and 8,2). 
This dependence IS now spreading. To take Qatar as an example, it 
includes a free housing scheme; electricity and water free of charge (the 
peope have refused to pay for these amenities); a gift of about £2,500 
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for every university graduate together with a free p1ece of land, and 
an additional interest-free loan of about £13,000; and extens1on of the 
national health service to Include treatment abroad on a larger scale 
than before, a facll ity usually used more by holiJdaymakers than by those 
actually in need of treatment abroad, Many other aspects of the In-
creasing dependence of rhe lndlgenou5 population on the stare may be 
noted in all the Emirates, while there is no effective policy to decrease 
this tendency, 
G The Realisation of the Poor Achievement of Past Pol 1c1es 
A realisation of the poor achievement of past policies has been 
developing, particularly since the 1960 1 s, not only among the more 
educated sector of society but also in the government organisations and 
political institutions, such as the Kuwait Nat1onal Assembly and The 
Planning Board, In 1965 the Kuwait Min1ster of F1nance and Industry, 
introducing the public budget to the National Assembly, sa1d in h1s 
statement (translated from Arabic): 
The state budget in the past e~pressed the government 1 s 
pol 1cy wh1ch aimed to provide the maximum possible 
number of free services for all citizens and to secure 
an acceptable level of education, health, and liv1ng 
standards for all Kuwaitis It is t1me now for the 
state budget to express the government 1 s long-rerm 
policy to achieve the aims of econom1c and social 
growth, for it to lay the foundation of thiS growth 
on a sound scientific bas1s, and for it to transfer 
us gradually from the path of giv1ng alds and 
allowances to the path of offering opportunities of 
productive work to every able-bodied citizen, (32) 
When speaking at the third session of the Kuwa1t1 National Assembly 
in October, 1972 Shaikh Jaber Al-Ahmed, the Kuwaiti He1r Apparent and 
premier sa1d (translated f~om Arable): 
God has granted us wealth, Th~s wealth has made ~t 
easier for us to live free and d1gnified lives. We 
have taken from It for ourselves and others, an ald 
and support (Sanad); but we must not forget the right 
of future generations to share 1n th1s wealth; we must 
not let selfishness control our attitude lest we devour 
(Naab) It by different means and leave future generations 
to-Tfve in an all-enveloping darkness, (33) 
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The real 1sation of any problem may be considered the f;~5t step 
towards its solution, but an effect1ve and balanced pol 1cy IS st1ll 
requ1red to p~oduce the alteration necessary to mln1m1se the long-
term effects of such a problem, However, those who are the decision-
makers in the Em·irates have only recently begun to recognise the 
problem. The first effect of their realisation has been a restraint on 
the growth of certain allocations such as the Kuwait! land purchase 
scheme. Moreover it has ra1sed some questions such as the overstaffing 
of public sector and 1ts effect on economic development. 
These are 1n br1ef the pr1nclpal factors wh1ch have dererm1ned 
the broadly based policies of allocating oil revenue 1n the Em1•ates, 
The summary exploration of these factors has shed l 1ght on their 
underly1ng causes, causes which must be understood and dealt w1th 1n a 
proper way if any alteration of the prevai I 1ng pattern of ol I revenue 
allocation is to be effected. 
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CHAPTER IX 
IMPACT OF THE OIL REVENUE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter we WIll assess the impact of oil revenue on the 
Emirates' econom1c development. The attempt WI 11 necessarily be brief, 
avoiding statistical ~etails and concentrating only on the most Important 
features. The chapter falls into three parts: 1) Oil revenue and 
economic d~velopment. 2) Some aspects of the Emirates' economic devel-
opment. 3) Some problems and obstacles to economic development. 
Part One: Oil Revenue and Economic Development 
This part will attempt to answer the two following questions: 
f1rst, what is the nature of the oil revenue, and what 1s the role that 
It should play in economic development, second, the meaning of economic 
development for the purpose of this study. 
A The Nature of the Oil Revenue 
The 01 l revenue has three clearly identifiable characteristics. 
First, the greater part of it is in the nature of an economic rent, 
Second, it is collected in return for depleting and irreplaceable natural 
resources. Third, it is the principal national benefit derived from an 
export-oriented industry. 
Al - Economic Rent Element 
The difference between the production cost of crude oil and 1ts 
price (posted and realised) is very high (see Chap. Ill, pp.83-85). 'This 
difference is accounted for mainly by the h1gh cost of producing oil in 
other areas, as well as by the cost of producing other competitive sources 
of energy. This difference in the cost of production has resulted 1n the 
Emirates' oil industry earning over and above the necessary supply price 
of the factors of production, or in economic terms, 'economic rent'. 
Since the 1950's the governments of the Emirates have joined other 
exporting countries in obtaining an increasing part of this surplus. Thus 
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their off-take per barrel has increased about eight fold 1n the last 
~ 
two decades (Table 3.6): The character of the Emtrates 1 oil price 
structure was the prtncipal reason for the Emirates 1 high off-take per 
barrel and consequently for the1r continually Increasing oil revenue, 
Having in mind this important element of 1 economlc rent 1 and its 
role in these revenues, we cannot but remember the potential possibility 
of discovering all or other competitive resources in other parts of the 
world, or of maktng a new scientific breakthrough which would significantly 
reduce the cost of producing competitive sources of energy. Such a dts-
covery, or technological breakthrough would consequently reduce the 
dependence on the Emirates 1 oil and decrease its price and the obtainable 
economic rent. Though such a possibility is not in sight in the near 
future (and desp1te the fact that the present energy shortage has its 
effect on increasing the economic rent), the possib1 1 ity of a constder-
able decrease or even elimination of this element should be always borne 
in mind. This danger, therefore, threatens the level of the revenue 
obtained by the Emirates and consequently their national income, Thus, 
in addition to the dangers of a single resource economy, the presence 
.. 
of the economic rent element in the oil revenues renders vulnerable the 
present-day prosperity of the Emirates. Consequently this calls into 
question the Emirates 1 present-day practice of utilizing a considerable 
proportion of their oil revenue to maintain a very high standard of 
consumption. Moreover, it supports the case for investing the oil 
revenue in productive fields which should widen the productive capacity 
of the economies and diversify the sources of the national income. 
Such an emphasis on cultivating the oil revenue rather than 
spending it on current consumption is further necessitated by the fact 
This is before allowing for the increasing price of crude oil s1nce 
1971 onward. The per barrel governmental receipt in 1974 may reach 
as high as eight fold that of 1970. 
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that the economic rent IS an element of a highly sensitive nature, 1 1kely 
to deteriorate long before the supply price of the factors of production 
are affected. A deterioration of this sort might follow not only from 
technological development in the field of energy, though this will rema1n 
the pr1ncipal potential cause, but also from economic and pol it1cal 
pressure exerted by the consuming countries, 
Hence any undue rel lance on the oil revenue to support the present 
high standard of 1 iving could have very dangerous consequences, Investing 
it in productive activities so as to increase the absorptive capacity of 
the economies and diversify the source of national 1ncome would on the 
contrary in the long-term serve not only to enlarge and diversify pro-
ductive capacity, but also indirectly to support and even raise the 
standard of 1 iving. Such an investment-oriented policy, when the pros-
perity of a country depends on so variable a revenue, has in its own 
right a strong case, even when the resource in question is not a 
depleting one. 
A2- A Society's Return for Depleting Irreplaceable Natural Resources 
The second characteristic of the oi 1 revenue is its funct1on as 
society's return for the extraction of irreplaceable resources, i.e. 
petroleum resources. This fact indicates the temporary nature of these 
revenues. Even if the petroleum resources cont1nued to be in demand, or 
even if they became more scarce as a source of energy or a raw material 
commanding a highly priced seller's market and producing a considerable 
economic rent, there still are two facts which must be realised. First, 
their production cannot go on for ever. Second, though their cost of 
production is not high, they have a soc1al cost represented in their 
potential future utilisation, 
These facts necessitate the cultivation of these revenues in 
widening the productive capacity of the economy and compensating for the 
cost incurred by the society in the depleting of its natural resources. 
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Such compensation should be 1n the form of bu1lding nat1onal assets 
equal to if not exceeding the predictable future benefits of these 
resources, The danger of utilising a considerable proportion for current 
consumption IS the short-sighted waste of valuable natural resources, 
and the consequent removal of the Emirates' most important resource-base 
for future development This danger was stressed 1n the Un•ted Nations 
Conference on the applICation of sc1ence and technology for the benefit 
of less developed areas: 
"As one conference paper pointed out, funds derived from 
the sale of high grade resources should be converted to 
other forms of cap1tal, which are of equal or greater 
value, particularly Into basic industrial 1nstallat.ons -
and into power, transportation and communication systems 
,,.The conversion of high-grade resources asset into 
current living expenses by means of export can lead to 
tragedy""(1) 
A3 - Proceeds of Export-Oriented Production 
If the exploitation of irreplaceable natural resources supports 
local production in other fields of a soc1ety's economy, then the 
revenue der1ved from the exploitation IS not the main-spring of this 
economy, since these resources are ~ti I 1sed to support overall economic 
expansion by injecting energy or raw materials. Thus the producing 
country's ma•n benefit 1 ies ln the impact produced by these resources on 
the productive capacity of the local economy; but, when these resources 
are exported as prima~y products, such as crude oil, then the1r main 
benefit to the economy 1 1es 1n the1r proceeds, and their long-term impact 
1 ies in the purposes that these proceeds have been d1rected to, If these 
proceeds are used for d1rect consumption, then the1r effects w1l 1 be 
limited to that purpose (particularly in an under-developed and open 
economy), wh1 le 1f they are invested to widen the productive capacity of 
the economy, then their .mpact wi l 1 be more last1ng and the economy will 
be able to develop other resources and build new nat1onal assets from the 
proceeds of the national asset wh1ch has been exported, 
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The Emirates 1 oil revenue represents the ma1n advantage accru1ng 
to the national economies from the proceeds of crude 011 exports. Thus 
these revenues represent the greatest part of the benefits derived from 
explo1t1ng the1r natural resources, i,e, petroleum resources; the other 
benefits der1ved from the oll lndustry are m1nor 1f compared with its 
export proceeds. This fact directs our attention to the role that we 
expect the oil revenue to play; which 1s not only to raise the standard 
of 1 1v1ng of the people of the Emirates for a short time, but also to 
assist in building national assets to replace the natural resources lost. 
B Meaning of Economic Development 
In this study economic development is taken to mean an 1ncrease 
in real per capita income associated with structural changes as to 
produce self-sustaining growth forces 1n the economy In this study we 
agree With Professor Gerald M, Meier, who defined economic development, 
11 as the process whereby the real per cap 1 ta 1ncome of a country increases 
over a period of time, 11 ( 2) However, one point should be made clear, 
that while Professor Meier considers that two or three decades IS long 
enough to Indicate development, this study - examining growth caused by 
exporting a single irreplaceable natural resource- must stress the 
importance of identifying economic development W1th structural change of 
the economy, and the generating of forces wh1ch can sustain growth_ 
While the increase in the real per capita 1ncome as an ind1cation 
of economic development has been stressed by almost every student of 
economic development and need not be discussed here, (3) structural change 
and the prospect of sustained development need br1ef clarification, 
81 - Structural Change and Sustained Growth 
An increase in real per capita 1ncome may occu- trom exporting a 
single or a few pr1mary commodities which enjoy a high demand abroad with-
out caus1ng significant change in other sectors of the home economy. A 
recent study of the Liberian Economy notes: 
11 Except 1n already developed countries, rapid growth 
may occur for a short time in response to ISolated 
incidents such as the establishment of one or two new 
factories or the development of a few oil wells or 
iron mines. Spurts of this kind do not indicate the 
capac1ty of an economy to sustain h1gh rates of growth, 
Neither do they necessarily ind1cate structural change 
inducing development 1n complementa~y activitles, 11 (4) 
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Thus structural change ,n a one-~esource economy may be considered the 
only ~eans by which such an economy can lay the basis for continuous 
progress. 
11 For development of a national economy really means that 
all the sectors -whether goods- producing or serv•ce-
producing- and all regions become technologically pro-
gressive, although not necessarily at the same rate For 
development means change and the incidence of change ;n 
the economic field is always uneven, But at the same 
time it remains true that development, if it means any-
thing, means that production-functions are constantly 
changed and that capital is being constantly accumulated 
in all sectors and all regions, This ls why an enclave 
economy - even one which yields a high level of per 
capita income and consumption to its inhabitants cannot 
be considered truly developed- 11 (5) 
A sustained and rapid economic development can be achieved only 
through structural change in an economy, permitting the utll 1satlon of 
all the existing and potent1al resources of the society in any sector, 
and not encouraging dependence on any one sector at the expense of 
neglecting or hinder~ng an exploitation of the potentiality of others, 
The structural change that is required cannot be conf1ned to economic 
areas alone, but must also extent to social, pol ttical and cultural areas, 
for such a wide-ranging change is necessary to enable a society to utilise 
all its resources efficiently and productively, and thus raise 1ts per 
capita income in the short term wh1 le at the same t1me sustaining long 
term growth, 
One of the crucial steps 1n susta1n1ng economic development, apart 
from increas:ng capital fo~mat1on and modernising social institutions, 
consists in preparing and moballzlng human resources, and selecting eco-
nomic Incentives to d1rect human efforts to the f1elds where they are most 
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needed in order to promote economic development, This enables man to 
fulfil his function as a positive factor in the production process 
So far we speak of sustaining economic development in a pol itfcal 
unit, However as Mr, Demas has pointed out in his study The Economics 
of Development in Small Countr;es: 
11To some extent even 1n transformed small economies the 
national economy may not 1n many Important respects be 
the really important unit of econom1c activity, and 
economic regional 1sm may be an important means of such 
economies achiev1ng a more self-sustaining pattern of 
growth . 11 (6) 
This directs our attention to the possibl I lty of a w1der framework 
through which small countr les, such as the Emirates, may overcome one of 
their essential obstacles, i.e the smallness wh1ch has restra1ned their 
prospects for structural change and sustained growth. 
Part Two: Some Aspects of the Emirates' Econom,c Deve;opment 
In the past three decades 01 so, the Emirates' economies have 
undergone a cons:de~able change, The main cause of this change has been 
the development of the petroleum resources, wh1ch has affected the 
Emirates' econom1c progr'ess ;n two ways. F1rsr, the oil 1ndustry has had 
a direct impact on the local econom1es, p~o,•d,ng employment, lnc~easing 
capital-formation and supply1ng the domestic market w1th cheap fuel and 
raw materials (see Chap. 1 I, pp,52-68) Secondly, the Industry has 
provided revenue for the governments. S1nce the early 1950's this 
revenue has been by far the most important factor 1n the economic devel-
opment of the Emirates, From it has come all the existing social overhead 
capital. Almost all publ 1c and private assets have been accumulated from 
it. Also all the improvements In education, health, and the general 
standard of 1 iv1ng have been d1rectly supported by the 011 revenue, 
In this part we wil 1 assess the impact of the oil revenue on the 
development of the Emirates' eco~omres, Th1s assessment w1ll entail a 
brief examination of certain aspects of the econom1c development of the 
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Eml rates, 
A Social Overhead Cap1tal 
One of the most important effects of the oil revenue on the Emirates 
has been their Investment In the bas1c ;nfrastructure and the public 
util 1t1es projects. The government of Bah1ain, the first Emirate to 
receive oil revenue, declded to cha~nel one third of its oil revenue Into 
building up social overhead capital, a pol icy followed successfully In 
practice for two decades, 1935-1955. Since the early 1950's Kuwait and 
Qatar have also shown keen interest 1n building social overhead cap1tal. 
Finally Abu Dhabi has joined the other Emirates stnce the late 1960ss, 
By 1970 each of the Emirates was spend1ng between one f1fth and 
two fifths of its total oil revenue on constructing ports, atrports, 
roads, power stations, water d•stlllation plants, hosp1tals, houses, publ1c 
buildings and other construction works connected with the basic infra-
structure and public ut1lit1es and services (see Fig. 8,1 and Table 8,1,), 
The impact of this expenditure on the local economies is indicated by the 
growth of facilities and encouragement of production. 
A 1 - Development of the Bas1c Infrastructure 
Basic infrastructure projects, including the building of roads, sea 
ports, airports and admin;strative buildings are constantly in progress in 
each of the Emirates, Thus by 1970 al 1 the Emirates had built a reasonable 
network of roads, linking all the ma1n reg1ons and towns as wei l as con-
necting the Emirates with other Arab countries (see Fig 1"1), The Emirates 1 
dependence on imports has made It necessary for them to develop modern sea 
ports, provided with dredged approach channels for large vessels and with 
large berths and good handl lng equipment, The airports have also been 
developed, and each of the Emirates possesses a modern airport able to 
accommodate all the largest jets in commercial operation F;nally, they 
have constructed a number of modern administrative and official bu1ld1ngs. 
The table overleaf gives some indication of the facll ities for the local 
economies provided by the basic Infrastructure proJects: 
TABLE 9,1 
BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE: SOME INDICATORS, 1970~ 
Service and Indicator 
Roads 
Paved Road Networks 
No, Vehicles in use 
Sea Ports 
Large Vessels (called)x 
Import Value 
DWT (Import) 
Export and Re-Export 
Airports 
Aircraft Movement 
Cargo Imports 
Cargo Exports 
Passenger Arrivals 
Passenger Departures 
Passenger Transit 
e· estimation, 
;';. <;'\ 
Un1t 
KM 
000 
No. 
M1ll ion 
QDR 
000 Ton 
Mi 11 ton 
QDR 
No. 
M, Tons 
M, Tons 
000 
000 
000 
Bahrain 
100e 
13 
551 
801 
323 
252 
14,088 
2,707 
1 '764 
N .A. 
N.A, 
98 
Kuwait 
1 '518 
149 
2,417 
2,960 
351 
16,098 
7,233 
2,831 
231 
207 
94 
Qatar 
Boo 
N.A, 
276 
305 
N,A, 
N .A, 
N.A. 
N,A, 
N A. 
N.A. 
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Abu Dhabi 
200 
1 0 
204 
352 
221 
9,966 
2,247 
574 
50 
50 
47 
*: Dubai has not been 1ncluded because almost all the .nfrastructure 
facilities existing 1n 1970 had been developed before receiving the 
oil money, 
·l'-;';:: Excluding foreign oi 1 compan•es exports. 
x: All large vessels exc 1 ud i ng o i 1 tankers. 
xx: Figures for six months of 1971 only. 
Source: SAK, 1971; SAB, 1971; SBA, 1969-1971; Customs Departmentp 
Yearly Bulletin of Imports, 1970 and 1971; Government of 
'Background Features'. 
A2 - Social Infrastructure 
Qatar, 
Qatar, 
After the basic infrastructure it is the soc1al Infrastructure that 
has benefited most from construction schemes Schools and hospitals were 
among the f1 rst development projects 1n the Emtrates, which have provided 
free education and health services for every inhabitant, The housing 
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schemes were introduced later. Every Emirate has developed 1ts own 
project in this field. Kuwait was the first to start large scale housing 
schemes in the mid 1950 1 s, followed by the other Emirates in the late 
1960 1 S. 
The following table shows the impact of the oil revenue on the 
construction of the social infrastructure projects. 
TABLE 9.2 
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS AND LOW INCOME HOUSES BUILT BY THE 
GOVERNMENTS, END 1970 
Sector and Indicator 
Schools and Educational 
Institutions 
No. of Schools (Govt. property) 
No. of Classes 
Hospital and Health Centres 
Hospitals 
Others 
Beds 
Housing 
Low Income Houses 
as %of Total Houses 
Unit Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Abu Dhabi 
No. 
No. 
No. 
No. 
No. 
50 
711 
3 
17 
907 
No. 1,385 
% 4.5% 
230 
4,644 
11 
321 
3,557 
85 
640 
3 
1 0 
581 
11,845 1,000 
11.4% 7.7% 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
1 '346 
13.6% 
Source: SAK, 1971; SAB, 1971; Ashir, A. E., Bahrain Trade Directory, 1971, 
p.139; MEDD-,--1 Economic Survey of Qatar 1 , Education Department, 
Qatar, Annual Report, 1970/71 and 1971/72. 
A3- Public Utilities 
The investment of oi 1 revenue in the public ut1 lities, and parti-
cularly the supply of water and electricity, has been a major concern of 
the governments of the Emirates. Thus the construction of power stations, 
sea-distillation plants, gas p1pel 1nes, and the development of means of 
distributing water and power were often given top priority. The postal, 
telephone and telegraphic services were also developed by government ex-
penditure in some of the Emirates, but the only government to spent 
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considerable sums on these has been the government of Kuwait, wh1ch took 
these services over from a private firm in the late 1950 1 s (see Table 8.1). 
The impact of capital expenditure on developing the capacity to 
produce electricity and water is shown in Table 9.3. 
TABLE 9,3 
THE EMIRATES: ELECTRICITY AND WATER PRODUCTION, 1970x 
Sector and Indicator Unit Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Abu Dhabi 
Electricitz: 
Installed capacity Mega-watt 80 1 ,096 75 28 
Units produced Mi 11 ion KWH 243 2,213 279 N .A. 
No. of consumers 000 46 N.A. 19 N,A. 
Water 
Total production Mi Ilion Gallon N,A. 12,438 2,300 ( 1 ) 
Distil lated Water II II 5p935 1 ~ 168 ( 1 ) 
x Public sector only. 
(1) Figures for water production have not been obtained. However, by 1970 
the government was able to construct a water pipeline to pump water 
from the interior to Abu Dhabi town. Also a distillation plant was 
constructed with a capacity of six mi 11 ion gallons per day. 
I 
Source: SAK, 1971, The Planning Board, Kuwait, The Kuwait Economz:, 
1969/70, p.43; SAB, 1971; Ministry of Electricity and Water, Qatar, 
Direct contact.---
A4 - Industrial Estates 
In addition to government capital expenditure on the infrastructure 
and public utilities, Kuwait has also established an Industrial estate to 
accommodate heavy industry in one area and prov1de It with all the necessary 
facilities. An Emiri Decree issued in 1964, establ 1shed the Directorate 
General of Shuaiba Industrial Corporation (later changed to 1 Shuaiba Area 
Authority 1 ). The Area Authority provided industry with a suitable site, 
constructed roads and sewers, provided natural gas, constructed specialised 
sea ports (mainly for export) and provided fire-fighting and other s1milar 
services. In addition to this the area provided industry with electricity 
and water. The Authority prepared specialised studies to promote and 
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attract industry to the estate. The following table shows some of the 
Shuaiba Area activities: 
TABLE 9.4 
SHUAIBA AREA ACTIVITIES, 1970 
Area (total) (1972) 
Used Area (1972) 
Roads ( 1972) 
Cooling water pumped 
Natural gas consumed 
Sea ports 
Export 
Import 
Electricity (consumption) 
Drinking water 
Employment 
No. of industry accommodated (1972) 
Unit 
Mi 11 ion Square Meter 
II II II 
KM 
Mi 11 ion Square Meter 
Mi 11 ion Cubic Meter 
No. 
000 Mi 11 ion Tons 
000 Mi 11 ion Tons 
Mi 11 ion KWH 
Mi 11 ion Cubic Meter 
Person 
No. 
6 
2 
18 
772 
1, 039 
3 
4,221 
100 
438 
2.6 
2,602 
10 
Source: Shuaiba Area Authority, Mantagat Al-Shuaiba Al-SJnayih, 1973. 
Bahrain and Qatar considered establ 1shing similar estates, but none 
was constructed before the early 1970 1 s, when Qatar decided to develop 
Umm-Said Area as an industrial estate and Bahrain chose the Sitra Area as 
a site for heavy industry. 
B Direct Productive Activites 
The impact of oil revenue on the capital formation of the Emirates 
in the direct productive activities is considerable. The only sector not 
supported by the oil revenue is the petroleum sector (production and to a 
..... 
lesser extent refining).~ The capital invested in this sector is either 
foreign capital or a re-investment of oil companies profits. Apart from 
this instance the oil revenue has played an essential role in providing 
the capital accumulated and invested in all the direct productive 
The only exception up to 1970 was the 10% of AOC capital owned by the 1 
Government of Kuwait, and the capital invested in the national oil 
companies. 
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activities. The effect has been both d1rect and indirect, The allocation 
of part of this revenue to investment (the reserve fund) has had a direct 
impact, while the impact of government public expenditure (the channelling 
of the oil revenue) and the re-investment of public and private sector 
profits, have had an indirect influence. 
To assess the role played by the oil revenue in the capital-
formation and production of the direct productive activities, we will try 
to establish the total assets invested in this sector and we wil 1 examine 
some indicators of its productive capacity. 
Bl - Estimated Total Assets Invested in the Direct Productive Activities 
The estimated total assets held by the public sectors are given in 
the reserve fund accounts and its investment outlets. The assets 1nvested 
1n the private sectors are diff1cult to assess However, the following 
table attempts to establish these assets in so far as the published 
sources of information make this possible. 
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TABLE 9.5 
ESTIMATED ASSETS INVESTED IN DIRECT PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES, 1970 
(MILLION QDR) 
Sector and Investment Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Abu Dhabi 
Publ 1c Reserve Fund 
Publ 1c Establishments 
Local Company Shares 
Local Loans and Deposits 
Loans to Governments 
Investment Abroad 
Others 
Total Public Sector Assets 
Private Sectorsx 
Joint Stock Companies 
Limited Liability Cos. 
Joint Liability Cos. 
Deposit of the Residents 
with Commercial Banks 
Total Public & Private Assets 
(1) The independent account. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N .A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
53 
N.A. 
N.A. 
33(5) 
375 
461 
--
1 '596 N.A N A" 
598 107(3) N.A. 
1 '330 111 N.A. 
1 ,529 N.A 
2,820 510 N.A. 
3,748(1) N.A. 
11 '052 728 154 
910(2) N .A. 
2]1 (2) 329(4) N.A. 
373(2) N .A. 
4,356 278 192 
16,962 1 , 335 346 
--
(2) The authorised capital of the companies registered with the Ministry 
of Finance, Kuwait. 20% was added to the authorised capital of 1968 
to make up the estimated capital at the end of 1970. 
(3) Including shares in Arab companies. 
(4) Total capital invested in Trade and Industry exclud1ng capital 
owned by foreign oi I companies, but including government shares 
in the authorised capital of joint stock companies. 
(5) 31/12/1969. The capital pa1d up in 55 industrial companies (out 
of 145 registered in 1969). 
x The private assets does not include the private sectors' direct 
investment abroad. Assets invested in farms, local crafts and 
small businesses are also excluded. 
Source: App. 5.4; The Planning Board, Kuwait, Kuwait Economy, 1968/69, 
pp.98 and 100; Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry, op.cit., 
p.58; Table 6.9; Ministry of Economy and Commerce, Qatar, op.cit., 
pp.96 and 122; (Chap. IV, p.119); SAB, 1971, p.42; Mulla, A.A.K. Al-, 
op.cit., p.13; SBA, 1969 and 1970.---
The table shows the public assets, and g1ves a rough idea of the 
proportion of private assets invested in commercial and industrial 
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enterprises or deposited With the local commercial banks. The estimated 
Kuwaiti total assets invested in productive activities was KD 1,276 
mil lion or about 37% of the total oil revenue received by the state, 
1947//1970/71. 
B2 - Agriculture and Manufacturing Industries 
The impact of the oil revenue on lndustr1al and agricultural 
development, compared w1th its 1mpact on other f1elds of the Emirates 1 
economies, is not very significant. This is mainly for two reasons, the 
low absorptive capacity of the local econom1es and the lack of sufficient 
economic strategies from the governmental side. 
The establishment of smal 1 factories in the construction and food 
industries started in the 1950 1s, or perhaps earlier, However, the 
establishment of large modern Industries did not begin before the mid-
1960 1s. By this time Kuwaiti public and private capital had begun to be 
invested 1n heavy industry; later Qatar and Bahra1n followed suit. By 
1970 a number of heavy industries were in production and others were 
under construction, 
In agriculture and fisher1es, development was also moderate, and 
the most distinguished event was the growth of cultivated land in Qatar, 
where the area under cultivation increased from 1,570 Donum in 1960 to 
* 13,488 in 1970. 
The economic impact of the development of manufacture and agri-
culture is shown in the following table: 
* Recently I have been told that the area of cultivated land 1n 1972 had 
dropped below that of 1970 and 1971. 
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TABLE 9.6 
SELECTED EMIRATES 1 AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY: SOME INDICATORS, 1970 
Employment as % of economically Act. pop. 
Manufacture 
Agriculture and Fisheries 
Contribution to the GDP as % 
Manufacture 
Agriculture and Fisheries 
Other Indicators 
No. of public share-holding compan1es 
within Manufacturing lnd 
Cultivated Land (Donum) 
Import of Machinery and Transport 
Equipment as % of total ~mporr 
Import of Crude Materials& Inedible:> 
asJ.ofT Import 
~·, Including public uti 1 ities. 
Kuwait 
13.7% 
1 7% 
3.5% 
0.4% 
1 0 
5,297 
35.9% 
1, 5% 
,•d, Qatar Cement Company and Qatar Ferti 1 izer Company. 
x Excluding oil refining. 
xx ALBA and Bahrain Flour M1lls Company. 
Bahrain 
6.9x 
6 6 
N.A. 
N.A. 
2xx 
N.A, 
7.2% 
1 .4% 
Qatar 
11 '0% 
4.0% 
N.A. 
N.A. 
;a,"}, 
2 
-;'' 
13,488 
47 0 1%¢ 
0.2%¢ 
¢ Representing 1972, the first year when the customs statistics have 
classified on International comparative bases. 
Source. Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry, op.cit., pp.34 and 70; 
The Planning Board, The Kuwait Economy, 1969/70, p.128 and 
1970/71-1971/72 (in Arabic) p.120; Statistical Bureau, Bahra1n, 
Statistics of the Population Census 1971, p.23; Statistical 
Bureau, Bahra1n, Foreign Trade, 1970, pp 6-9; Ministry of Commerce 
and Economy~ Qatar, op.ciL, p.9; Al-Kuwari, Sultan R., 
Al-Tharwah Al-Ziraayih, p. 19; Customs Department, Qatar, op.cit., 
1972. 
B3 - Financial and Commercial Sector 
The commercial and financial sector has developed rapidly 1n the 
last two decades. Commercial activity was ma1nly centered on the import 
trade, except in Bahrain where re-exporting 1s qu1te important (see Table 
9.1). In the financial sector the Commercial Banks and Insurance Companies 
are the main interest, Very 1 ittle attention has been given to specialised 
banks, e.g. for industry, agriculture or fisheries. Only Kuwait established 
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sav1ng and credit banks in the 1960 1 s to provide low Interest loans for 
~·~ 
real estate, industry and agriculture. The effect of this sector on 
the Emirates 1 economies is indicated below: 
TABLE 9.7 
SELECTED EMIRATES 1 COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL SECTOR: SOME INDICATORS, 1970 
Indicator 
Employment as% of Economically Act1ve Pop. 
Participation in the GOP (% of 1969/70 GOP) 
No, of National Commercial Banks 
No. of Specialised Banks or Currency Board 
No. of National Insurance Companies 
No. of Investment Companies (Joint Stock) 
(1) 31/12/1969. 
Kuwa1t 
14.0% 
8.6% 
4 ( 1) 
2 
3 ( 1) 
2 ( 1) 
Bahrain Qatar 
12.4% 18.3% 
N.A. N .A. 
Source: Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Kuwa1t, op.cit., p.34; 
The Planning Board, Kuwait, Kuwait Economy, 1969/70, p.128; 
Statistical Bureau, Bahrain, Statistics of the Population Census, 
1971, p.23; Ministry of Commerce and Economy, Qatar, op.cit., 
p.9. 
C Impact on Health and Education Serv1ces 
The oil revenue has been util 1sed not only to provide cap1tal for 
this sector but also to support current expenditure, Together with wages 
and salaries, and the associated goods and services, th1s expenditure 
also covers the cost of free medicine, the cost of treatment abroad, and 
the cost of books and other materials needed by the students. 
The Emirates utilise a major or part of their current expenditure 
for the support of education and the health serv1ces. Table 9.8 shows 
the current expenditure on the social services (mainly education and 
health) as a proportion of the total current expenditure and the total 
oil revenue during the period stud1ed in each Emirate. 
* The Saving and Credit Bank in Kuwait had laoned KD 25.9 ml 1 lion on 
31/3/1971. 89% to real estate, 5% to industry, 3.8% in social loans, 
0.2% to agriculture, and 2%- other loans. 
TABLE 9 8 
TOTAL CURRENT EXPENDITURE ON THE SOCIAL SERVICES (PERIOD STUDIED) 
(MILLION QDR) AND PERCENTAGES 
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% of Total Current % of Total 01l 
Emirate Total Exeend;ture Revenues 
Kuwait (1952-70/71) 6,365 31.8% 14.5% 
Bahrain ( 1947-1970) 489 65.n 26. 1% 
Qatar ( 1953/55&66/70) 328 53.7% 11.0% 
Abu Dhabi (1967-1970) 119 11 . 0% 3.4% 
Source: Apps. 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7-1,4 2.1, 5.2.1, 6.2.1, and 7.2.1. 
C1 - Education 
Al 1 the Emirate governments have shown a keen Interest in education. 
Bahrain and Kuwait had subsidised the schools established by the merchant 
communities even before they rece1ved the oil revenue, However, the 
massive development of education started in the early 1950's. Since then 
all the governments, especially those of Kuwait and Qatar, have encour-
aged education, not only by running sufficient schools to accommodate 
every child of school age, but also by running schools in every village, 
providing free meals, free transport and all school materials, and in 
Qatar a salary was also given to every student start1ng from h1s first 
school year. This policy encouraged the people to send their children to 
school and in Qatar even made the parents ins1st on send1ng the1 r daughters 
to boys' schools when no school for girls was established. The following 
table shows some indicators of educational achievement in the Emirates. 
TABLE 9.9 
EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS, 1970/71 
Indicator 
No. of Students 
No. of Students as % of Total 
Pupil/Teacher Ratio 
Passing Exam. -General P r i rna ry 
II II II Secondary 
II II II Technical 
II II II Commercial 
University Graduates 
Government Scholarships Abroad 
*;" Cost per Student (QDR) 
Bahrain Kuwait 
4 7' 106 138,747 
,-
Pop. 21 '8% 19.9% 
1:24 1 : 15 3 
Level 4,869 N.A. 
Level 982 N.A. 
Level 39 N,A 
Level 55 N.A. 
38x 446 
N.A. 533 
777 2,867 
Qatar 
18,531 
15.4% 
1 : 17' 3 
1 , 11 0 
276 
21 
25 
15xx 
290 
2,063 
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Abu Dhabi 
(69/70) 
6,972 
1 3% 
1 :20 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N ,A, 
N.A. 
N.A 
380 
3,647 
x The total of university graduates up to 1970 was 303 students 
** Current expenditure only (1970). 
N.A. Not available. 
* The low percentages in Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi may be explained 
by the distortion of the age structure of the population by the 
high proportion of male Immigrants (see Table 1.3). 
xx The total of Qatari graduates was 59 students. 
Source: SAB, 1971, Ministry of Education, Bahrain, Annual Report, 1970; 
SAK, 1971; Ministry of Education, Qatar, Annual Report, 1970/71; 
SBA, 1969 and 1970; Apps. 4.2. 1, 5.2. 1, 6.2.1 and 7.2, L 
C2 - Health Services 
The Emirates have expended a considerable proportion of their oi 1 
revenue on the health services. 
In addition to financing the building of reasonably well equipped 
hospitals, the money allocated has permitted a heavy current expenditure, 
covering wages and salaries, free medicine and the major expenses in-
valved in sending some patients abroad for med1cal treatment. To show 
the situation of the health services 1n the Emirates, we refer to the 
follow1ng indicators: 
TABLE 9.10 
HEALTH SERVICES: SOME INDICATORS, 1970x 
Emirates 
Bahra1n 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
Abu Dhabi 
People/Bed 
Ratio + 
227 
207 
193 
620 
x Government only. 
XX 1969, 
People/Doctors Per capita cost' 
Ratio of Health Services 
2,333 118 
1 ,087 290 
1,876xx 436 
N.A. 283 
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(QDR) 
Source: SAB, 1971; SAK, 1971; SBA, 1969 and 1970; Guani, F., Nahdat Qatar 
Ai'"="Sih1yeh. 
In addition to the expenditure on education and the health services, 
the Emirates, particularly Kuwait and more recently Qatar, have intro-
duced schemes for social security. 
D Effect on the Standard of Living 
The effect of oil revenue in raising the standard of 1 iv1ng is very 
significant indeed. This revenue has been the main factor 1n increasing 
the national incomes and the per capita Income, which is not only the 
highest in the third world but in many cases is even higher than in many 
advanced countries, if indeed It is not the highest of them alI. To 
demonstrate the high standard of 1 1v1ng in the Emirates, we refer to the 
following table. 
It is certain now that 1n 1974 the per capita income in most, if not 
all of the Emirates will be very considerably higher than in any of 
the advanced industrial states. This is only because of the high 
increase in the price of crude oil. 
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TABLE 9,11 
STANDARD OF LIVING INDICATORS, 1970 
Indicator Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Abu Dhabi 
$X 844 ( 1) 3,016(2) ·\ i'\ Per capita 1 ncome, N.A. N.A. 
Per cap 1 ta income from oil 
revenues, $ 196 1 , 1 34 1, 082 888 
Per cap1ta imports, $ 767 847 573 810 
Net per capita imports 
(food and live animals), $ 87 123 11 0 93 
Net per capita import of 
Electrical Machinery, Apparatus 
and Appliances, $ 46 83 N ,A. (3) 83 
Private car/people ratio 1:16(4) 1 :5" 6 N.A. N.A. 
* Estimates suggest a level approximately the same as 1n Kuwait. 
x In 1969 the GNP per capita income in the USA was $3,603; U.K. $1,610, 
Turkey $290, U.A.R. $137, India $90 and Haiti $65. 
(1) 1968 per cap1ta gross national products at market pr1ce. 
(2) 1969/70 per cap1ta national Income at factor cost 
(3) 1970 was the first year in which Qatar state published a foreign 
trade statistics. The Bulletin was not classified on a comparative 
basis 
(4) Total of registered vehicles 
Source: Table 1.3 and 3.8; SAK, 1971; Statistical Bureau, Bahrain, Foreign 
Trade, 1970; Matter:-s.A,, 1A Prel1minary Estimate of Gross 
Products of Bahrain for 1968 1, p.4; SAB, 1970; Customs Department, 
Qatar, op.cit., 1970; SBA, 1969 and 1970. 
As the table shows the Emirates 1 standa~d of l 1v1ng may be compared 
with many advanced countr1es and is much better than that of the third 
world. The net import of food alone is wel 1 above the per capita income 
of many countries. 
However, the problem with the 1 on the average 1 1 nd 1 cators is 1 t 
generality. Nevertheless, though indicators such as per captta of 
national income, oil revenue and total import may say very little about 
the distribution of income and welfare, the net per capita 1mport of 
' food stuff and electrical equipment and the car/people ratio may provide 
more reliable indications of the level of consumption and welfare. 
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E The Growth 
So far we have surveyed the impact of the oil revenue on some 
aspects of the society and economies of the Emirates. Here we will 
show very briefly how rapid the development has been and 1ts effect 
on the structural balance of the Em1rates. 
To speak of any sort of progress achieved in the Emirates, apart 
from the production of oil Itself, IS clearly to speak of the effects of 
the 011 revenue. This revenue changed the Emirates from poor, com-
pletely underdeveloped countries, lack1ng in almost every aspect of 
modern 1 ife to countries graded among the most advanced nations of the 
world by many social and economic indicators, such as the per cap1ta 
income, health and education facll ities and welfare services, Whereas 
before they received oil revenue the Em1rates had few students who 
completed even the elementary level of education, each of them now has 
hundreds of students every year who complete their secondary education 
or graduate from un1vers1t1es. The benefits of the production of 
electricity and distillation of sea water are enjoyed by every inhabitant, 
solely as a result of th1s revenue, and all the Innovations of modern 
technology, from luxury cars to transistor radios and diesel engines, as 
wei I as all sorts of food, clothes and other products have been imported 
* to the Emirates only because of this revenue, The following table 
cites only a few indications of the continuation of this development even 
after the early years of receiving the oil revenue 
* However, though every inhabitant in the Emirates has so far enjoyed 
the fruits of this change, inequality is considerable and the dis-
tribution of these fruits has not been proportionate to the productivity 
of the people or their role in economic development. 
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TABLE 9.12 
SOME FEATURES OF THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT (INDEX) 
Base Year Bahrain Kuwait Qatar 
Indicator = 100 1970 1970 1970 
Students in the 
Government School 1 ,956 626 683 1 '300 
Electricity Production 
KWH 1 ,956 1 '140 2,573 3,883 
Import Value 1 ,959 307 239 N.A. 
'~ Export Value 1 .959 232 377 N.A. 
* Excluding crude oil and products exported by International oil companies. 
Source: SAK, 1971; SAB, 1971; Ministry of Education, Bahrain, Educational 
statistics 1961-1971; Statistical Bureau, Bahrain, Foreign Trade, 
1970; Hamer, A.M. Al-, Development of Education in Bahra1n 1940-
1965, pp.44-45; Ministry of Education, Qatar, Annual Report, 1970/71, 
Ministry of Water and Electricity, Qatar, Direct contact. 
However, although these indicators are true in absolute and relative 
terms, as far as the whole period studied IS concerned, relative to the 
1960 1 s alone they are not necessarily accurate. In Kuwait, for which the 
GOP and GNP have been calculated, since the early 1960 1 s, the per capita 
GOP between 1965 and 1970 fel 1 by about 4.5% annually. This fall has 
been noted in a recent study by Dr. Riad El-Sheikh where he writes: 
Between 1965 and 1970, population growth averaged 11"6% 
annually. This is slightly ahead of the annual growth 
rates of consumption (10%), GNP (11%) and national income 
(10.7%), thus indicating a slight fall in per cap1ta income 
and consumption .... GOP grew by only 6.7% which implies 
that per capita GOP fell by 24.6% over a period of f1ve 
years or by about 4.5% annual ly.(7) 
Nevertheless one would even welcome such a trend if it were the 
result of a planned pol icy to put more emphasis on the non-oil sectors 
so as to achieve a structural change in the economy. This was not so, 
and the reason was only the marketing difficulties which had been facing 
Kuwaiti crude oil during the late 1960 1 s. These difficulties slowed the 
rate of growth in crude oil production (App. 2.1.2). This 1nd1cates 
the extent of variability in the growth trends of the Emirates and 
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demonstrates the diff1cult1es 1 ikely to face the Emirates' econom1es 
when there is a drop in the market price for oil, or a change in the 
pattern of demand, or when the oil resources are depleted. This 1s so 
inspite of the fact that the recent increase in the price of oil will 
easily double the per capita income in most of the Em1 rates th1s year 
(1974). 
Without discussing in depth the effect of the ol 1 revenue dur1ng 
the last two decades (1950-1970) in inducing structural change in the 
Emirates' economies, (S) one can see from the many aspects of its 
influenced discussed throughout this thesis, that it has had only a 
1 imited impact on productive capacity, and on the mobilisation of internal 
forces and the creation of internal factors necessary for sustaining 
economic development. Tak1ng Kuwait as an example, we see that in 1970/71 
the contribution to the GOP by the primary and secondary sectors ex-
cluding oil was only 3.9%, and their share of total employment was 15.4% 
(Table 9.6). In addition to th1s the allocational policies for the oil 
revenue pursued by the Emirates during the period studied have not aimed 
primarily at sustained development and structural change. In actual fact, 
as noted earlier, these policies have in some cases even produced negative 
results and created new problems. These problems, added to the unsolved 
problems of the past, are actively hindering the Emirates' achievement 
of structural change and sustained growth. These problems are the subject 
of the next part of this chapter. 
Part Three: Some problems and obstacles to Economic Development 
While oil revenue has played a very significant role in developing 
many aspects of the Emirates' economies,lts impact differs greatly from 
one field to another. The main stress has been on channel] ing the oil 
revenue to the household sector, rather than investing it in productive 
activities. It has been directed to consumption rather than production, 
This pol icy has failed to solve some of the problems and overcome some 
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of the obstacles fac1ng the Emirates. It has even ra1sed new problems 
which, if unsolved, will hinder structural change and sustained develop-
ment. In this part we will discuss briefly some of these problems and 
obstacles. 
A Overwhelming Dependence on Oil Revenue 
The Em1rates• high per capita income, their prosperity, Indeed 
every aspect of the1r social, economic and admin1strat1ve life, is 
mainly supported by this revenue. Thus, if anything happens to decrease 
this revenue considerably, a not unl 1kely prospect, the whole economic 
structure will inevitably collapse completely unless new alternative 
sources of national income can be rapidly developed. 
That the Emirates• growth and prosperity IS overwhelmingly 
dependent on the oil revenue is beyond disputeo However, to show the 
degree of this dependence we refer to the following table: 
TABLE 9.13 
POSITION OF THE OIL SECTOR AND REVENUES IN GDP, PUBLIC REVENUE, 
Ol 1 Sector share in the GDP 
Oi 1 Revenue share in the 
Public Revenue 
Oil and Oil Products share 1n 
the Total Export and Re-Export 
X 1969/70. 
XX 1968. 
1< 1970/71. 
AND EXPORT, 
Kuwait % 
"-6o" 
91x 
95x 
1970 
Bahrain % Qatar % Abu Dhabi % 
50xx N.A. 
80.5 90 97 
74xx N .A. 
Source: Apps. 4.1; 5.1; 6.1 and 7.1; Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, Kuwait, op.cit., 1971, p.82; Central Bank of Kuwa1t, 
Second Annual Report, 1971, p.27 (in Arabic); Matter, S.A., 
op.cit., p.34. 
This overwhelming dependence constitutes a great danger, particularly, 
when we realise the temporary nature of this source of income. The 
governments of the Emirates have done 1 ittle to solve this problem; their 
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dependence on this source of revenue for consumption purposes has even 
;ncreased; and an lncreas1ng proportion of the 011 revenue has been 
diverted from capital expenditure and the reserve fund to current and 
transfer ex~nditure (Table 8 2 and F1g. 8.2) ft Wd., nor unt11 the 
late 1960's that the Kuwait government realised the full impl1cat1ons 
of this problem and starred th:nklng about: re-channel 1 1ng some of Irs 
oil revenue (Chap. VI I I, pp.234-235). The government succeeded 1n 
increasing the contribution of the non-oil secror 1n the GDP from 36 9% 
1 n 1965/66 to 39,7% In 1970/71, (9) Howeve•, there wa3 anorher reason 
for this change. This was the low rate of growth 1n Kuwait crude oil 
production. Nevertheless the share in the GDP of the primary and 
secondary sector (excluding crude oi 1 and gas product1on) only •ncreased 
from 3 6% in 1965/66 to 3.9% 1n 1970/71. (10) 
Though all the Emirates have experienced the problem at different 
stages of their development and have tried to adopt pol 1c1es to reduce 
the danger involved, to judge by the state of the Emirates' economies in 
1970 the problem remains as Important as ever, A search for a solut1on 
and for effective means of divers1fy\ng the econom1es and ensur•ng sus-
tained growth should be the matn concern of both governments and people. 
They should take advantage of the golden opportunities they now possess 
before lt IS too late. 
B Underutil ising rhe Human Resources 
The Emirates, with the1r capital-surplus economies and lack of 
varied natural resources, should concentrate on the development and ful 1 
utilisation of their human resources. These resourc~s are the most 
prectous of all resources 1n any society. They are the only positive 
factor in production and hence rheir development and effect1ve uti 1 isation 
in productive activities WI 11 be rhe pre-condition for structural change 
and sustained development, The development of these resources is so 
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outstandingly Important that F.H, Harbison concluded in his book Human 
Resources as the Wealth of Nations, 11 that a nation wh1ch is unable to 
develop and utilise its labour force effectively w1 11 be unable to 
develop anything else,''(1l) 
The role of human resources 1n economic development Is considered 
by increasing numbers of economists to De one of the most 1mportant 
factors. H,W, Singer, taking the view that the capacity to create 
wealth resides essentially in the people of a country, wrote: 
11The fundamental problem is no longer considered to be 
the creation of wealth, but rather the creation of the 
capacity to create wealth. Once a society has acquired 
this capacity to create wealth, the creation of wealth 
itself becomes almost incidental; it follows quasi-
automat 1 ca 11 y" 11 ( 1 2) 
The Emirates' policies for develop1ng and utilising their human re-
sources have failed to create the skills and develop the talents most 
needed for economic development and have failed to utilise existing 
skills in efficient productive activity. Indeed their poiic1es have 
even resulted in a great waste of these resources, for they have 
resulted 1n a diversion of nat1onals from the most product1ve activlt1es 
to well paid disgu1sed unemployment in the publ 1c sectors and they have 
caused some groups to be offered sources of income that make them 
reluctant to Join the labour force. 
81 - Disguised Unemployment 
Disguised unemployment 1n the public sectors is a very clear 
phenomenon in Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi (see Chap. VIII, pp,193-203), 
where every citizen is entitled to a JOb 1n th1s sector whether h1s work 
is needed or not, Th1s problem was not serious to beg1n with, but later, 
1n add1tion to imposing a financial burden on the government budget, it 
diverted considerable numbers of Citizens from. the private sector to the 
public sector, where production is lowest, Thus it is not strange that 
the Kuwaiti and Qatari employment percentages were very low 1n some 
sectors, while they were highest in the government services, as the 
following table shows: 
TABLE 9 14 
KUWAITI AND QATAR! EMPLOYEES AS PERCENTAGES 0~ TOTAL ECONOMICALLY 
ACTIVE POPULATIONS IN SOME SECTORS, 1970 
·l:;;; 
Total Economically Active Population 
Nationals as Percentage of Total 
Agriculture and Fisheries 
Construction 
Banking and Commerce 
XX Government 
* Nationals and expatriate 
x Exclud1ng public ut1l ities. 
Kuwalt 
234,356 
25.4% 
19.9% 
6.5% 
25.1% 
47.8% 
Qatar 
48,390 
17% 
4.3% 
2,6% 
11. 3% 
22.5%x 
xx Total employment 1n the government services, 1970 was 93.531 o~ 
39.9% of total economically act1ve population 
Source: Qatar: MEDD, Economic Survey of Qatar, p.5. 
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Kuwait: Kuwa1t Chamber of Commerce and Industry, op.cit,, 1971, 
p.34; Lljnat tanztm Al-Jihaz Al-Wazify Al-Hikumy, 'Mudakarah An 
Tasawar Al-Lijnh Liabaad Mushkilat tanzim Al-Jihaz Al-Wadify Al-
Hikumy~ p 12 
This table gives some Indication of the strong preference of the 
nationals of the Emirates for government employment; In Kuwait about 58.5% 
of the total economically active Kuwaiti population were employed in the 
';': 
government services; in Qatar the proportion was about 30% (see the same 
source as Table 9, 14) In Bahra1n under-employment ex1sts in agriculture 
and the local fishing Industry both of which are stl 11 operated almost 
in traditional ways. 
B2- Economically Active Population 
The economically active population among the Emirates' nationals 
are the lowest in the world, as may be seen from the comparative table overleaf. 
The 58.5% of Kuwaiti clt1zen labour force or the 39.9% of total econo-
mically active population engaged in the government services, is very 
high indeed by any standard. The correspondent figure 1n 1969 for U.K. 
was 11.9%, Venezuela 12,4% and Boliv1a 4.4% (1970) (See Finance and 
Development, March 1974, p.31), 
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TABLE 9. 15 
ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATIONS AMONG EMIRATE NATIONALS: 
COMPARATIVE DATA, 1970 (PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION) 
Kuwa i tx 17.2% 
Bahra1n X 21,8% 
Qatar X 18. 1% 
L1bya 25.6% 
Iraq 39.6% 
USA 40.9% 
UK 46.7% 
Japan 49.8% 
X Excluding expatriate populations. 
Source: Kuwait: Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry, op.cit., 1971, 
pp.27-34; Statistical Bureau, Statistics of the 
Population Census 1971, pp 6 and 25; MEDD, 1 Econom1c 
Survey of Qatar', p. 5. 
The table indicates that the proportion of Emirate nationals 
engaged in economic activities was lowest even when compared with other 
Arab countries where social conditions are not very different. The 
ma1n reasons for this low proportion are: 
(a) The social conditions which prevent women from seeking 
economically active employment outside their homes. 
(b) The high birth rate prevailing since the 1950 1s, consequently 
increasing the section of the populat1on aged under twenty. 
Free education also encouraged young people to continue their 
formal educat1on and raised the school population. 
(c) Though unemployment in the strict sense is low* another sort 
of unemployment exists. This includes many people who have 
left their trad1t1onal occupations and 1 ive on social security 
However, during the 1960's Bahrain seemed to be faced with increasing 
unemployment. This was caused by the increasing number of school 
leavers and the lack of employment opportunities. This problem was 
eased during the late 1960 1s when considerable numbers of educated 
persons emigrated to Abu Dhabi. 
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(c)/ allowances, and the members of the Rul 1ng fam1l:es and 
considerable numbers of their relatives and dependents, 
These three reasons account for the Emirates 1 low percentages in 
the table, and the d;fferences among the Em!rates themselves as well as 
the differences between the Emirates as a group and other :oG~tr~e~ in 
the world 
B3 - Education: Orientation and Motlvat!on 
The Emirates have done little to orient education and encourage 
training in the skil Is most needed to promote economic development The 
choice of subject and the type of 5tudy were left to the students who 
were assured, no matter what they studied, of a JOb, by r1ght of birth, 
In the public sector (Bahrain excluded), This has directed most students 
from science and technology to 11 ~otter 11 subjects, which are not only 
easier to study but may also secure white-col Jar jobs With h;gh prestige 
later on. Thus most students choose to go into the general section of 
secondary education instead of going into the speclal1sed sections-
Teacher Training, Commerce and Technical Schools- even if they plan to 
·' leave school after th1s level, Such a preference !s clear 1n all the 
Em1rates, as 1s demonstrated by the following table which shows the 
pattern of education at the secondary level, 
In Qatar some graduate students from technical secondary schools found 
it much better to have a clerical job than the JObs they were trained 
to do. 
TABLE9-16 
SELECTED EMIRATES: DISTRIBUTION PATTERN OF STUDENTS AT THE 
;', 
SECONDARY LEVEL, 1970/71 
Number 
Level Bahra1n Kuwa 1 t Qatar 
General Sect1on 5,242 15 ,99 7 911 
Commercial Section 490 489 66 
Teacher Section 289 2 '1 03 237 
Technical Section 439 1 '565 59 
Total 6,460 19' 154 1 '2 73 
General Section as % of 
Total 81 0 1% 83,5% 74.6% 
·'· Excluding religious studies, 
Source: Bahrain: 
Kuwait: 
Qatar: 
Mln1stry of Education, Educational Statistics, 
1961-1971, 
SAK, 19 71. 
Ministry of Education, Qatar, 'Annual Report,' 
1970/71 
As the table shows about 80% of the students enter the general 
section of secondary education, Qatar has the highest percentage 1n 
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special 1sed education at the secondary level The rea5on for this high 
ratio lay in the high salar1es paid to the students in the Commerc1al, 
Teachers' and Technical schools during their period of study, However, 
the numbers dropped after the f1 rst qualif1ed students completed their 
courses and left the commerc1al and technical schools (F1g 9 1 The 
Teachers' Secondary School shows no drop in 1ts total number of students 
because about one half of them are g1rls who have 1 1ttle choice but to 
work as teachers, This trend in Qatar may expla1n why students in the 
Emirates prefer the General Section of Education; quite simply 1t g1ves 
them better career prospects than other type~ of education 
C Disconnected Links between Effort and Reward 
Economic development 1s the result of human effort, It occurs when 
people engaged 1n economic activities direct their attention towards 
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1ncreas1ng the y1eld of given effort or resources, or towards reducing 
the cost of a given yield. ''The greatest growth occurs in societies 
where men have an eye to the economic chance, and are willing to stir 
themselves to se1ze lt."(l 3) Thus societies develop only when their 
members seek out and exploit economic opportunities, Therefore, one of 
the main types of difference among soc1et1es 1n their course of develop-
ment is "differences 1n the extent to which Institutions encourage effort, 
either by removing obstacles in its way, or by ensurrng to the indrvidual 
the fruit of his efforL"(l 4) 
One of the most important means of encouraging people to partie•-
pate in economic activities is the connection between effort and reward, 
People will be most wlll ing to give their effort, where effort iS the 
only means of reward, On the other hand most people wl I 1 be reluctant 
to exert themselves If they are assured that they will be rewarded no 
matter what their efforts are, In this case people will g1ve very little 
consideration to economic activities and wil 1 continue to be the spoiled 
children of society, do1ng very 1 1ttle to support progress and demanding 
a great deal to enjoy and consume. 
This dangerous situation of a disconnection between effort and 
reward prevails for most or some citizen groups in all the Emirates, The 
Emirates, w1th their fantastic oil wealth, not only find it easy to 
exempt their citizens from taxes and levies, but also f1nd themselves in 
a position to channel some of th1s revenue to their citizens by one way 
or another no matter what their efforts are, and no matter whether this 
channelling helps or hinders structural change and sustained development. 
Thus the Ruling families and influential people were rewarded through 
direct allocations from the state revenue, land purchase schemes and many 
other modes of preferential treatment, while other groups prof1t ma1nly 
through employment in the public sector, free or cheap publ 1c goods and 
services, and social security allowances, which are by no means confined 
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to the d1sabled, the old, the orphans and widows. 
This aspect of the situation in Kuwait was summarised by Dr, Yousef 
Fadel Al-Sabah as follows: 
"The Kuwait society suffers from a disconnected l 1nk 
between effort and reward. This is mainly because of 
the distribution of a large part of oil revenue to the 
population which was uneven and unable to stimulate 
productive domestic investmenL''(15) 
The disconnection between effort and reward was also enforced by the 
nationality bar, whereby the expatriates, who are the most active group 
of the population, are not only denied the opportunity to integrate into 
the society and make the Emirates the1 rhome, but are also taxed by the 
individual nationals. This occurs when the laws govern1ng commerce 
demand that expatriates shall enter 1nto partnership WIth a national, 
who is usually a sleeping partner, reaping a share of the profits, but 
contributing nothing other than the right to register the business in 
his name. 
The expatriates are also discriminated against by other means than 
the commercial laws, for the easy and wel 1 paid jobs are reserved for the 
Citizens. This is the case ;n most of the Emirates, and in Kuwait, for 
example, as Dr. Al-Sabah noted: "The Kuwaitis are usually paid more than 
the market price. This is one of the political dev,ces to make people 
loyal to the government, a kind of d,scriminat1on demarcated by a 
nationalty bar."(lG) 
Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi are s1milar in this respect, though 
there is a difference in the degree of preferential treatment granted to 
the citizens. Bahrain is different in that less preference is given to 
nationals except in the case of the Ruling fam1ly. 
This disconnection of effort and reward in the Emirates has a 
serious effect on their economic development It IS unreasonable to 
expect a man to g1ve his best effort to economic activities if he is best 
rewarded for adding to the number of his sons, or can gain by hanging onto 
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desert land and selling it later at a fantastic price, or by allowing 
companies to be reglstered tn h1s name 1n return for part of the 
profits. It IS also strange to ask a man to work very hard if he will 
be "'ewarded anyway. Thus the Emirates' policies 1n channelling the1r 
011 revenues, beside be•ng far f.-om equq.able, are actually destroy1ng 
one of the most important mechanisms necessary for any society that 
wishes to develop and susta1n its growth, i.e. the relation between 
effort and reward, 11 For unless we match differential effort w1th 
d;fferential reward, men are unl 1kely to take the ttouble to develop 
( 1 7) 
thetr talents and resources to the utmost of the1r capab1l 1t1es, 11 
D lnvestment Opportunity and Land Speculation 
lncreas1ng urbanisation and the governments' expenditure on land 
purchase schemes have increased the price of iand very rapidly" Th1s 
Increase, coupled with the lack of sufficient lnvestment opportunltijes, 
makes the purchasing and selling of land the most profitable activity 
in the Emirates. 
This act1vity has attracted most of the private money invested in 
the Emirates and diverted 1t f~om other f,elds of the1r economies. Many 
people have left the1r previous jobs and confine their activities to this 
field, and many merchants and government employees, particularly in Kuwait 
and Qatar, have borrowed money from banks and Invested it in land, 
This problem is a serious one F1rst, it Is d1vert1ng effort and 
capital from productive activities to these transfer actiVIties. 
Secondly, most of the proceeds of these act1vltles go to the r1ch land-
lords, who spend a considerable part of the1 r profit on consumption, while 
reinvesting most of the rest 1n the same actiVIties; thus the price of 
land is pushed htgher and higher and everybody else is attracted to the 
bus1ness of buying and selling 1t, Therefore, while try1ng to increase 
opportunities for investment in productive activities, the Em1rates should 
at the same time restrict land speculation 
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Th1s may be achieved by restricting the land purGhase schemes, 
taxing land speculation punitively, and preventing people from cla1m1ng 
public land, 
E Social and Pol1t1cal InstitUtions 
Though they have undergone considerable change 1n some of the 
Emirates (see Chap I, ppc32-33), the social and pollt•cal instltut•ons 
still in many respects lag beh:nd what Is needed for development (see 
Chap. VIII, pp.216-235). In fact, 1n some of the Emirates they form one 
of the main constraints on economic development, 
Economic development, being a complicated process and not a simple 
one, 11 depends not merely on economic circumstances but on social structure 
and the attitudes to life as a whole. 11 (lS) Thus the soc1al and po11tical 
structures are important factors which need to change progressively and 
continuously if they are not to form an obstacle in the way of progress. 
Societies may be compared to lndlvidual human beings; their economic 
power may be compared to ene~gy and the muscles of men, their social 
attitudes to human behaviour and habits, and their pol;tical Institutions 
and leadersh1p to a man•s brain power and experiences, Thus unless these 
three Important aspects are developed together, the soc1ety w· 11 face a 
bottleneck p'"oblem Wh1ch w1ll 1nev1tably cause cons•derable waste 
Social and pol1t1cal institutions may promote econom1c progress ln 
many ways, the principal being these: by assoc1at1ng effort With reward; 
by ma1ntain1ng respect for productive work, manual or Intellectual, by 
encourag1ng contempt for Idleness; by linking status With 1nd1vldual 
achievement rather than family connections; by encourag;ng belief 1n 
cause-and-effect relations; by d1scouraging ways of l1fe which put a great 
prem 1 urn on cur rent consumption rat he"' than p'rovl s I on for the future; by 
foster•ng an abhorrence of corruption 1n general, and In the public ad-
ministration in particular; by allowing scope and freedom for publ 1c 
participation 1n publ lc affairs; and by free1ng economic policies from 
273 
undue pol lt1cal considerations 
Some of the Emirates, such as Kuwa1t and later Bahrain, have 
ach1eved considerable change 1n their political InstitUtions. Neverthe-
less, w1th their t'lbal trad,t,ons, and the1r h1story of paternal 
government, the Em1rates are st1ll fac1ng many social and pol 1tlcal 
problems which are hlnder1ng structural change and t~e prospect of 
sustatned growth The Emirates lack most of the characteristics 
enumerated in the last paragraph. (l 9 ) As has been shown throughout 
th1s study, they are faced w1th the problems of a disconnection of 
effort and reward, a tendency towards 1 avi sh consumption, a re ~ uctance 
to engage in productive work, and the overwhelming Importance g1ven to 
pol 1tical considerat1ons instead of economic conslderat1ons 1n the\r 
f1nanc1al and economtc pol 1cles 
Soc1a] and political restraints on development are not easy to 
overcome and probably const1tute the most difficult of all developmental 
problems, Therefore it is true to say that development, 11 depends on 
able and 1ntell1gent pol it1cal leadership, above all, on an appropriate 
and vigorous use of public fiscal resources and other 1nstruments of 
public social and econom1c po11cy. 11 (ZO) Such leadership imp! 1es ex-
ceptlonal courage and foreslghL 11 lt ,s Important to observe that 
promoting development requires some extremely dlff1cult dec1s1ons, 1n-
volv1ng personal sacr1flces, hard work, unpopularity, and even (in almost 
general case) 'class traitor' behavlour. 11 (Zl) However, although such 
h1stor1c leadership may be considered the core hope of every country in 
the world, 1t is not always obta1nable, particularly 1n the underdeveloped 
countr 1 es Nevertheless 1t rema1ns true that the role of pol1tlcal leader-
sh1p is a very Important factor 1n the development process. Thus a more 
rapid and steady social and econom1c development, together w1th the 
prospect of real stab1l1ty, may be achieved, lf only a country's political 
and social 1nstitut1ons can be evolved gradually but continuously, so as 
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to discourage favouritism, corruption, and the dom1nat1on of prtvate 
Interest on the one hand, and on the other hand to encourage productive 
activities, and a scientific approach to society's problems, and to 
allow wider pub! ic participation 1n publ 1c affa1rs 
F Small Size of Emirates 
The Emirates are small states by any standard (see Chap I, pp.l-
8). This smallness has Its economic consequences on every aspect of the 
economies, whether it be a quest1on of natural resources, human resources, 
large scale economies or m1l 1tary and pol it1cal weakness (see Chap VI I I, 
pp 228-229). Ali these deflc1enc1es have restricted structural change 
1n the Emirates and reduced the1r prospect of sustained growth. In 
addition to all th1s, their small SiZe, coupled with the1r huge oil 
wealth, makes It possible for almost every citizen to have a personal 
stake 1n the preval ling sltuatton, no matter how small or large his 
interest 1s. Thus everybody becomes more Interested in maintaining the 
newly drawn political boundaries, and opposed to any real economic or 
pol 1tical integration w1th other neighbours. This oppos1t1on 1s common 
to virtually every c1t1zen in the Emirates, from the members of the 
Rul 1ng families down to the merchants and most of the ord1na(y citizens, 
though of course, It differs in strength according to the 1nterest of 
each particular group. 
The problems arrsing from the smal 1 size of the Emrrates together 
with other problems, obstruct attempts to transform and develop the1r 
economies, e.g. the problem of the lack of var1ed natural resources has 
prevented any real diversificatiOn of the economy. The problem of a small 
population affects the supply of entrepreneurs and other manpower re-
quirements, and has restricted specialisation of manpower and production, 
1 lmit1ng the local market, and decreasing the opportun1t1es for large 
scale economies in the prrvate and publ 1c sectors. 
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Thus, the impact of the Emtrates' small size ts most sertous 
In this world of large economic and political blocks, large and powerful 
states ftnd 1t necessary to integrate into larger communities 1n order 
to sustain their economic development and assure their national 
security, Such integration, e,g, of the UK, tn the Common Market, was 
not seen by the majority of people tn Europe as against rhetr Interest, 
but rather they saw it as a transformation necessitated by changes in 
politics and technology, Therefore, if the changtng conditions of our 
contemporary world have made it necessary for these great states to 
Integrate with other states In order to obta1n better opportun,tles for 
growth, then small states, such as the Emirates, should think deeply and 
qutckly of Integration for the sake of the• r very survival, 
Th1s problem seems to be very difficult to solve unless the 
governments and the people are wtlltng to give the! r long-term future 
the consideration it needs, They should real tse the vulnerability of 
their present prosperity and recogntse the urgent need to utilise the1r 
oil wealth 1n the best way possible and they should be ready to sacrifice 
some of the•r 1ndiv,dual short-term interest for the sake of com1ng 
generations and for the long-term tnterest of their country and people, 
However, it should be realised that the economic and pol1t1cal inte-
gration of the Emirates alone w1 11 provide only 1 im1ted new Investment 
opportunities, since all of them are in a sim,lar posttlon as far as their 
resources-base is concerned, they do not complement each other, Neverthe-
less such integration should provide reasonable opportunities for 
rational ising and Widening the scope of planning pol nc1es Th 1 s shou 1 d 
result from wider home markets, from reduc1ng the wasteful practtce of 
dupi ;cattng development proJects, from achlev,ng more economies of large 
scale in the public administ~ation, stmllar opportunlt,es elsewhere con-
sequent upon a larger economy 
The other opportunity, which should be regarded as completing the 
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Emirates 1 economic and political Integration, lies in their Integration 
as one region, w1th countries which possess different resources, such as 
other Arab countrieso An integration of this type wlll provide the 
Emirates wlth larger and var1ed opportunities to ut1l1se their 01i 
revenue, However, policies of 1ntegrat1on require a very strong political 
w1ll( 22 ) not only from each of the Emtrates or all rhe Emirates, but also 
from all parties concerned. Also, if It ls going to be effective 1n the 
long-term, integration needs to be built up gradually, consistently, and 
continuously on the clear and common 1nterests of all che peoples and 
countries concerned, 
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CHAPTER X 
COiKLUS I Oli: THE r~EED FOR ALTERI~AT I VE APPROACHES 
A - Traditional Approaches 
Throughout the study an attempt has been made to analyse the 'oi 1 
revenue of the Arabian Gulf Em1 rates: pattern of allocation and impact on 
economic development•. As shown earl 1er the pattern of allocating oil 
revenue and the impact on economic development has been fairly uniform in 
all the Emirates. The few differences may be explained by 'time lag• as 
each Emirate in turn reached a particular stage of development in its 
social, economic and political institutions. 
The pattern of allocations, as indicated in Fig. 10.1, shows that 
the part of the oil revenue received dur1ng the period studied (about 88% 
of the total 011 revenue received) has been allocated essentially to 
current and transfer types of expenditure. Th1s expenditure accounted for 
more than 69% of the total, leaving less than 31% to be directed to 
capital expenditure or accumulated 1n the reserve funds. The correlation 
coefficient between oi 1 revenue and different types of allocation was very 
high in the case of current expenditure, reaching 0.96 1n Bahrain and 
0.95 in Kuwait, and in the case of the allocation to the Rul 1ng family It 
reached 0.72 in Kuwait and 0.99 in Bahrain. In Qatar and Abu Dhabi the 
situation must have been similar, since the allocation to this item is a 
proportion of the oil revenue. On the other hand the coefficient in the 
case of capital expenditure was 0.66 in Bahrain and 0.8 in Kuwait, and in 
the case of the allocation to the reserve fund was 0.22 1n Bahrain and 
-0.06 in Kuwait. The long-term trend as shown in Fig. 8.2 seems to favour 
current and transfer types of expenditure as against allocations to 
capital expenditure and reserve funds. The two latter dropped to about 8% 
in Bahrain in 1970 compared With about 64% in 1947/48 (Fig. 4.5); 1n Kuwait 
they dropped to about 29% from about 66% in 1952 (Fig. 5.5); and 1n Qatar 
they dropped to about 34% compared to 59% in 1953 (Fig. 6.4). 
The Allocat1on Patterns of the Em1rates 011 Rewnue (Mil II on QOR l 
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The factors determining the allocation pattern of the 011 revenue 
are traditional and political forces, rather than economic considerations. 
The allocational pattern of the oil revenue followed the pattern of 
allocating publ 1c revenue in Bahrain and Kuwait in the years just before 
the commencement of o1l royalties, as may be seen by comparing tables 
1"9 and 1,13 to Apps. 4.304 and 5.3.4. 
Except for the few differences explained earlier and mainly 
necessitated by political development and excessive oil revenue, the 
traditional channels of expenditure were simply widened rather than 
altered. The oil revenue has been substituted for ordinary publ 1c 
revenue and been allocated with 1 ittle consideration for its special 
nature and the need to use it d1fferently from other revenue and even 
the one channel thought of as a basis for supplementing future public 
revenue, i.e. the reserve fund, proved unsuccessful, not only through 
lack of adequate investment opportunity but also because the allocation 
to and savings in this fund have been openly pressured by the unlimited 
demands of current and transfer expenditure. 
The impact on econom1c development has been mixed. First, a part 
equal ling about one fifth of the total oi 1 revenue received during the 
period studied was util 1sed to construct social overhead capital, which 
provided the Emirates with an advanced system of transport and communi-
cation, and to develop very considerable public ut1 lit1es, to build and 
equip the social infrastructure, and 1n the 1960's to construct estates 
for heavy industry. Also a considerable part has been utilised to 
provide and greatly imporve education and health standards, to raise the 
standard of 1 iving and consumption very considerably, and to help to 
f1nance direct productiVe act1vit1es. Secondly, wh1 lethe Improvements 
achieved by ut1l ising oil revenue are obvious, the impact on prospects for 
long-term sustained growth is questionable. The impact on structural 
change has been very 1 imited. Tak1ng Kuwait as an example, after a quarter 
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of a century s1nce first receiv1ng oil royalties, its pr1mary and 
secondary sectors, excluding crude petroleum production have contributed 
only about 4% of the GOP and provide employment for about 15% of the 
total act1ve population. The commercial and financial sectors contributed 
about 9% to the GOP and 14% to employment (Table 9.6). The rate of 
growth 1n the Emirates is overwhelmingly dependent on a high growth of 
oil revenue; thus when Kuwait's oil revenue did not grow very fast in the 
late 1960's the per capita income accordingly dropped by 4.5% per annum in 
the period 1965/66-1970/71 (Chap. IX, pp.259-261). The same pattern may 
be expected 1n the other Emirates which have not yet produced an official 
estimate of GOP, or national income. In spite of the huge sums channelled 
to each society, the estimated public and private assets invested in pro-
ductive activities or deposited at the end of 1970 were relatively small, 
amounting to only 37% of the total oil revenue received by Kuwait State, 
while in Bahrain the proportion was 27%, in Qatar 23% and in Abu Dhabi 9% 
(Table 9.5 and Apps. 3.1-3.4). All th1s indicates the limited impact the 
01 I revenue has had on productive activities compared w1th its Impact on 
consumption. At the same time the trad1t1onal approaches followed in 
allocating the oil revenue of the Em1 rates have failed to solve the 
essential problems hindering their prospects for sustained development, 
and have produced new types of problems which w1l l add a heavy burden 
and could impede future development. Thus the Emirates at the end of 
1970 were overwhelmingly dependent on oil revenue, underutilising their 
human resources, following practices which disconnect effort from reward, 
and encouraging unproductive speculative activities. They have al~o fallen 
short of achieving the necessary development of social and political 
institutions and have not adequately faced the problem of smallness wh1ch 
has impeded structural change and sustained development. 
In this thesis we have shown the mechanism by which the traditional 
approaches of the fiscal system of the immediate pre-oil period in Bahrain 
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and Kuwait were extended to the utilisation of the oil revenue, and we 
have seen how this led to the creation of a very high level consumer 
soc1ety depend1ng almost entirely on export of an irreplaceable asset and 
distributing the proceeds in a quasi-direct manner. This fact pinpoints 
the likely danger facing the Emirates• economies and highlights the 
vulnerability of their present-day prosperity, should their receipts from 
this source be decreased or eliminated before the alternative capacity to 
produce wealth and sustain development has been created. 
B The Need for New Approaches 
In the early 1970 1 s, the Emi rates• oil revenue has been increasing 
enormously; the per-barrel receipt for 1974 will reach an average of eight 
US dol Jars compared with less than one dollar in 1970. As production has 
risen above the 1970 level, the revenue in 1974 WI 11 easily have increased 
more than tenfold. However, unless the Emirates alter their traditional 
approaches, the huge increase wi 11 be expended through widening the 
ex1sting channels. Moreover, it may encourage the opening of new transfer 
or consumption-oriented channels, perhaps not very different from the 
channels invented in Kuwait in the 1950 1 s (land purchase), when oi 1 receipts 
gave a similar jump and great surpluses remained unspent after al 1 the 
existing demands of public expenditure had been satisfied. The likely 
prospect, if the Emirates do not change the1 r traditional approaches for 
a development-oriented approach, wi 11 be the accumulation of a very high 
monetary surplus in the reserve fund, reaching a proportion near or above 
that of the early 1950 1 s (see Figs. 4.5 and 5.5), but within a few years, 
if the oil revenue grows at a moderate rate, the unlimited demands of 
transfer and current expenditure wil 1 quickly absorb the surplus. Moreover, 
the1r demands may exceed the revenue available and necessitate drawing on 
the surpluses accumulated, as was the case in some of the Emirates 1n the 
1960 1 s. This type of expenditure, boosted by excessive oil revenue, will 
thus in turn necessitate an increase in production and the further growth 
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of the 011 revenueo 
Therefore, the fantastic increase in the oil revenue and the danger 
of continuing the traditional mode of spending it provide the second 
important reason for chang1ng pr1or1t1es and approaches 1n ut1l is1ng oil 
wealth, the f1rst reason of course be1ng the failure of the traditional 
approaches to induce structural change and generate forces capable of 
sustaining the Em1rates' development Thus, the need and the opportunities 
for alternative approaches exist, The Em1rates can now easily avoid 
pouring the new increase into the endlessly grow1ng channels of transfer 
and current expenditure, and can alter their traditional approach to a 
development-oriented one. They are asked to grasp this opportunity and 
reform their f1nanc1al policies to promote production Instead of sub-
Sidising consumptiono They need to integrate their allocational policies 
in the pattern of production 1nstead of current consumption. 
Although the need for an alternative approach IS apparent, the 
Emirates need to pass through a transitional period before being able to 
adopt approaches which will affect their present economic way of life 
Th1s transitional period could be started by preventing the recent Increase 
in 01! revenue from be1ng committed to current and transfer expenditure, 
then freezing the sums allocated to this expenditure and later decreasing 
them. The aim would be to direct the greater part of the oil revenue to 
the types of allocation which could most promote and sustain economic 
development. 
This transitional period should also aim to improve popular under-
standing 1n the Emirates of the concept of economic development, to decrease 
the effectiveness of the wrong economic Incentive created in the economy, 
and to prepare the Emirates' economic, social and political institutions to 
be more relevant to the task of econom1c development, This transitional 
per1od may take a decade or so, Bearing 1n m1nd the present economic, social 
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and political structure of the Emirates and the relatively short period 
dur1ng which they have rece1ved oil revenue (hardly more than the ex-
pected l1fe span of a person in the area), one does not expect radical 
change, but asks for a reasonably rapid evolution which could allow the 
Emirates to take advantage of their present economic potent1al and to 
set themselves on the right way to development. 
C A Development-oriented Approach 
A need for a development-oriented approach to utilise oil wealth is 
apparent, if the Emirates are going to sustain economic development. The 
aim of such an approach will go beyond providing a temporarily prosperous 
1 ife, to creating the capacity which can sustain the prosperity in the 
long-term. This can be achieved only by real ising the vulnerability of the 
present prosperity and recognising the need to uti lise the 011 wealth 1n 
a way which can best develop other sources of national 1ncome as rapidly 
as possible. However, the projection of such strategy needs more than this 
thesis can provide. It is the function of the planning authorities in 
each Emirate to draft its plan and define its strategy for achieving 
structural change and sustained growth. Nevertheless some relevant con-
siderations noted in the course of this study can be brought in here. 
Petroleum Resources as Base for Economic Development 
In the past, the governments' main concern was with oil revenue 
rather than petroleum resources. In fact, up to 1970 the Em1rates urged 
the companies to increase the1 r production whenever possible and were 
willing to receive as much o1l revenue as possible no matter what their 
productivity happened to be at the t1me. Such a policy should be altered 
to serve the long-term prospects of economic development. The emphasis 
should be put on all the benefits that can be derived from petroleum 
resources, including their export proceeds, rather than merely upon the 
oil revenue. Therefore, the planning programme for the production of oi 1 
should take into consideration the productive use of the anticipated export 
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proceeds at the t1me cogether with other local benefits which can be 
derived from the produced petroleum resources, compared to the anticipated 
future benefits of the petroleum resources. The production of petroleum 
resources can serve economic development best if it 1s viewed 1n the light 
of an overall economic strategy a1ming to realise the full potential 
possessed by the resources, and not merely to provide a source of revenue. 
However, while 1t is a nation's undisputed right to conserve 1ts 
natural resources for the benefit of its people, at the same t1me it has 
an obligation towards the international community. Therefore, the devel-
opment approach should take into consideration the international community's 
need for oil and do the utmost to avoid interrupting the development efforts 
of other nations. Instead the Emirates should co-operate with the con-
suming countries so as to find the course which wi 11 secure their interest 
without hinder1ng the consuming countries' development. Nevertheless, 
harmony of interest is a hard thing to achieve and thus the Emirates 
should be well aware of th1s and prepare for the task. 
2 Distinguishing Oil Revenue from Ordinary Public Revenue 
Oil revenue is extraordinary public revenue derived from the export 
of irreplaceable natural resources which happen to be in great demand in 
the international market'. It is not an indication of the productive 
capacity and econom1c activities of the local economy as a whole, but only 
a return for an exhaustible national asset, a material source which must 
come to an end at a certain time. Adding to this the present oil price 
structure, which is very sensitive to technological change (Chap. IX, pp. 
238-242) we can realise the nature of the oi 1 revenue. Therefore not only 
should policies govern1ng the mobil 1sation of oil revenue be different 
from those for mobilising ordinary public revenue, but moreover, the 
policies concerned with its allocation should differ as well. Since the 
oil revenue is non-recurrent public revenue it would be dangerous to depend 
on it to support current consumption and the ordinary financing of the 
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administration. Such a danger supports the argument for utilising the 
revenue rece1ved from export1ng national assets to build instead new 
national assets, equal to if not exceeding the value of those lost. Thus, 
a pol icy of channel] 1ng the oi 1 revenue 1nto activities according to their 
potential productivity should replace the present-day policies of 
allocating 011 revenue according to the demands of each different allo-
cation, no matter what its productivity happens to be. 
To make the application of such criteria more visible, It would 
perhaps be of help to establish a new public economic agency to receive 
and allocate oil revenue, instead of relying on the fiscal authorities. It 
need hardly be mentioned that such an agency is nothing other than a 
part of public administration created to indicate the necessary emphases 
and separate f1scal problems from economic ones. The agency's activity 
should be integrated into and co-ordinated with the whole governmental 
machinery. 
3 An Investment Fund Instead of Reserve Fund 
A reserve fund, to which a part of the oil revenue is allocated, has 
existed in each of the Emirates since the early years of the oil royalties. 
The fund's aim is to supplement public revenue in the future. However, as 
noted earlier, the reserve fund has in the past been regarded as a pool of 
liquid capital which could be drawn on at anytime. Hence, whenever the rate 
of growth of the annual oil revenue slowed and the pressure of other items 
of expenditure increased, the reserve fund, which is invested mostly in 
short call 'monetary• Investment, was brought in to bridge the gap. ln 
keeping with the importance of oil wealth in the economies of the Emirates, 
what they need is not a reserve fund to supplement public revenue in the 
future, but an investment fund which can invest the major part of oil 
revenue in long-term national and international investment. The a1m of 
these investments should be the creation of direct productive activities 
which can best diversify the source of national income and sustain develop-
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ment. This can be done 1n both directions, local and international. Thus, 
first the reserve fund, whose main objective is to settle the fluctuation 
of the public budget, should be attached to the fiscal authorities and 
should be different from the fund which is assigned to investment; second, 
the Investment author1t1es should be separated, and should create the 
necessary specialist organisations and have the efficiency and expertise 
to carry out the1 r diff1cult task; third, the activities of the fund 
should be integrated into the economic strategy of the county concerned 
and should play an essential role in developing its productive capacity; 
fourth, the sum and proportion allocated should not be fixed on ad hoc 
bases but decided on the productivity of the fund 1 s activities compared 
to other recipients. 
4 Public Expenditure 
After a transitional period, preferably lasting no longer than the 
medium term, current and transfer expenditure, and perhaps most public 
expenditure, will have to be financed from other ordinary public revenue, 
which could be mobilised according to the economic capacity of the 
country concerned and its social and economic policies. Thus the 
governments need gradually to run down their pol icy of subsidies, to 
recover a reasonable price for the services rendered by government 
departments, and to cut the waste element and lavish public spending. 
Meanwhile the fiscal policies should make people contribute to the public 
burden, as is done in every other country in the world, 1nstead of 
depending on the extraordinary return to society for the export of 
irreplaceable natural resources to do the job. Therefore a plan for 
maintaining an equilibrium between ordinary public expenditure and 
ordinary publ 1c revenue should be adopted, not only because it is sound 
fiscal policy, but also becuase it can serve to eliminate the wrong 
economic Incentive created in the Emirates by past policies. 
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5 Enlarging the Productive Absorptive Capac1ty 
Enlarging the productive absorptive capacity should be the core of 
the Emirates development strategy. The Emirates 1 economies, supported 
by the fantastic financial resources derived from oil export, have 
solved one of the essential development problems facing the third world. 
However, money alone could not initiate development unless matched by 
other factors of production, all together leading to an increase in the 
production capacity. Thus the widen1ng of the Emirate capacity to absorb 
the 01 l revenue productively requires the assessing of all the resources 
available, most important of all human resources, and the adopting of the 
measures necessary to allocate resources efficiently. The problem of 
smallness, which is a serious one, should be given the consideration it 
deserves. Consequently the question of unifying the Emirates should be 
gone into more deeply than it has been up till now, and the Emirates 
together can seek regional economic integration with other Arab countries. 
Moreover the Emirates can establish mutual relations with developed and 
under developed countries, where they can provide oil and money and in 
return have technology, know-how, capital goods, raw materials and 
reasonably secure opportunities for 1nvestment and thus forward their 
long-term objectives of diversifying the economy and sustaining develop-
ment. 
The essential effort for all this must come from the Emirates 
themselves. They should think, decide and act in the way that seems most 
to suit their interests, and they should see to what extent their interest~ 
can be integrated with the interests of other parties. 
6 Comprehensive Strategy for Economic Development 
Achieving and sustaining growth needs more than scattered adminis-
trative decisions, it needs rather a comprehensive strategy that can 
indicate the goals and provide the means for achieving them. Such a 
strategy should be consistent 1n 1ts emphases and clear in the policies 
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it advocates, It must be prepared w1th a full awareness of the problems 
and importance of creating and sustaining economic development and must 
be based on an open-minded approach as 1 ittle fettered by traditional and 
political restraints as poss1ble, However, such a strategy, together with 
its pre-requisites, IS not an easy thing to ach1eve; it needs a number of 
years before the Emirates could assess the opportunities open to them 
reasonably, prepare to grasp them, and start facing what all the other 
countries in the world are facing, the normal problems of a productive 
societyo 
A comprehensive strategy for economic development is the only way 
the Emirates can harmonise their policies and direct their society's 
scarce resources, of which human resources and oi 1 wealth are the most 
important, so as to improve development prospects and call into action 
forces capable of sustaining growth, 
The Emirates have in the past lacked a comprehensive strategy for 
economic development, therefore their efforts and policies for utilising 
oil wealth have fallen short of preparing their economies for the hard 
path of development Their pol 1c1es have even induced wrong economic 
incentives which, If not firmly dealt within reasonable time, wil 1 hinder 
future development, Thus unless the Emirates produce a comprehensive 
strategy able to alter the pattern of utilising oil wealth from being 
principally consumption-oriented to becom1ng development-oriented, then 
their efforts will be dissipated and their different policies will hinder 
each other, los1ng their effectiveness; 1n that case the Emirates will 
have lost their golden opportunity for real and sustained development. 
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BAHRAIN CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, BY COMPANIES, 19]2-70 
(000 BARRUS) 
. 
.!!!!. DAPCO A!IAKO Toul 
1932 I I 
1933 31 31 
193A 285 285 
1935 1265 1265 
1936 ~5 ~5 
1937 7762 7762 
1938 8298 829a 
1939 7589 7589 
1940 7074 7074 
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KWAIT CRUDE OIL PROOUCTION 1 BY COMPANIES 1 1246-1210 
(~) 
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~TAR CRUDt: OIL PRODUCTI0. 1 BY COMPAIIIES. 19lf9-1970 
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CRUD£ OIL PRODUCTICII, E"IAATES, "IDDLE EAST AND WORlD, 1,)1t-197U 
(OliO IIETRit TOIS) 
Part I- .. 
K'*'alt tlone~ Bet<! rain Abu Qator Abu Oubol TaU I K hst World Yoar Safah Ohobl Eml rates Zone 
- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- --- -----
193~ J9 J9 8992 210)22 
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1945 999 999 26976 351400 
19116 800 1095 1895 35558 375)'1)0 
1947 2200 1287 3487 ~2308 ltlltOOO 
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1966 114354 11221 3079 816 13845 1731) 160628 472100 16ll1200 
1967 115175 11077 3469 1016 15479 18125 164)41 506100 1758700 
1968 121975 11461 3773 1527 16363 24006 179105 571500 1990,00 
1969 129548 119)4 3798 1657 17341 28761 500 19)044 633)'1)0 21115000 
1970 137500 13000 3800 19)4 1730ll JJ288 4300 206822 712100 2330300 
. K~.Ao~al t share 
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THE BURATES' CRUDE OIL EXPORT 1 1266-1210 
(hiLLION METRIC TONS) 
Count,.y .!.ill_ 
-'.ill .ill!! ~ .!ill. 
KI.Aoola It 113 ,,. 120 123 130 
Qat a,. II 15 16 17 18 
Abu Dhabi 17 18 24 29 33 
Duba• 0 5 
Total ~ 1'47 l6o 170 184 
" East Toni 372 408 171 509 587 
WOrld Total 625 691 806 905 IOJJ 
Source BAY AN 1968/69 p 28, 1970/71 p 30 1971172 p 26, Al-Batrol 
;a--AT- S • nah 1971 IP, OIL Wo,.ld Statist• cs 1967-1971 
Prtvate conmun1cat •on (Qatar) 
APPENDIX 2 3 
PARENT COKPAH IES' ESTIAATED GROSS SHARE OF CRUDE OIL IN THE EMIRATES 1970 
(000 80) 
GOVT 
BP CFP ESSO GULF MOBIL SHEll s~:~- TEXACO or NAT JAPAN A~:~- PARTAX HI~~~N SUNCO CONCO TOTAL 
OIL Cos 
----------------------------
1168 1566 2731 0 
PartItIoned Zone 35 138 2 81 254 2 
Abu Phab • 280 190 51 51 101 21 694 0 
Qatar 45 45 22 22 217 10 361 0 
Bahrain 38 J 38 3 76 6 
Abu Safah 111 J 7 Ill 111 37 0 
Oubal 21 I 10 21 4 5 J 27 9 86 7 
"i"49i 256"4 a;;] 1""566 76 7 JIB 19 4 60 1 138 2 81 21 4 ---35 Jl 5 J 27 9 4213 5 Total 
~ Apps 2 I I - 2 I 5 OPEC Annual Statlsttcal Bulletin 1970 pp 38-JJ 
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THE EKIRATEs' PROVED OIL RESERVE BY EHIRATES 1 1227-1210 
(HI LLION BARRELS) 
'tear Bahrain Kuwa• t Qatar Abu Ohab 1 Dub a• Total BAPCO Abu Safah KOC P Zone Em• rates \Jorld 
1957 200 50000 181 1500 51884 237481 
1958 2}0 58000 6250 1425 65905 264393 
1959 220 58000 3560 2500 64280 291614 
1960 220 58000 3300 2500 64020 272700 
1961 220 59000 3000 2500 64720 294439 
1962 "0 61000 3500 2700 5000 72410 315976 
1963 245 62500 1250 2700 7300 76995 331121 
1964 250 65000 7500 3500 10000 86250 "'7761 
1965 250 1200 65000 7500 4000 12000 89950 146481 
1966 250 1200 70000 7500 4000 14000 96950 182589 
1967 375 1200 70000 6000 3600 8000 1004) 90175 399190 
1968 "5 1167 71210 6250 J88o 12000 1000 95932 196230 
1969 427 1131 70500 6250 3900 15000 1000 98208 526791 
1970 6JI 1117 67100 12850 IJOO 11800 983 98781 617342 
Source 'il(lRLO PETROLEUM REPORT 1958-1967 WORLD OIL 1968-1969 E 1 U OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST {Annua 1 
Supplerr.!nt 1971), p 2 Pr1vate COtml~n (Abu Safah) 
APPENDIX 2 S 
BAHRAIN REFINERY'S CRUDE THROUGHPUT BY SOURCE, 191o6-1970 
(000 u s BARRELS) 
Year l~rted Bahra• n Total S Arab•a Others Crude 
- --
19lo6 26757 7309 34066 
1947 37865 8010 45875 
1948 45463 9412 54646 
19•9 45145 10915 56060 
1950 45915 10985 56900 
1951 54762 11016 65778 
1952 58978 10994 69972 
1953 61585 227 110'+4 72856 
1954 67141 227 10779 78148 
1955 63269 I 102ft 74293 
1956 58459 2317 10941 71717 
1957 4.291 10796 11785 66872 
1958 .8668 6733 14828 70229 
1959 50549 2018 16390 68957 
1960 59lo63 974 16493 75931 
1961 63239 1"94 79733 
1962 71982 16488 88470 
1963 66450 16598 83048 
1964 56975 17'911 74886 
1965 49"8 229 20793 70670 
1966 49397 22516 71913 
1967 624.5 25311 87756 
1968 55877 27543 83420 
1969 58159 14 27813 85987 
1970 63518 27941 91451 
~ BAPCO Annual Report ls) WORLD PETROlEUM, Sept 1954 
~ 
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KUWAIT DO~STIC CONSUMPTION OF REFINED PRODUCTS 
AND REFINERIES lOSSES. 1970 
(000 80) 
Local refined products consumption 14 7 
Imported refined products consumption 0 2 
Total Inland consumption of refined products TT;""9 
Bunkers 80 8 
Total consull1)tion of refined product5 '§'5'"7 
Reflnenes Lones 9 S 
Total consumption T05""2 
OPEC, Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1971, SAK, 1970 
~. 1971/72 p 27 KOC, Annual Report """"f970 AAINOIL 
Annual Report 1970 
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BAHRAIN BAPCO SALE OF REFINED PRODUCTS ANO REFINERY LOSS. 19]0 
(THOUSAND 80) 
Inland refined products consumption 
Bunker fuel 
Total refined products consumption 
Refinery lou 
Total 
~ BAPCD. Annual Report 1969 and 1970 
2 3 
19 2 
215 
11 6 
Jj'"1 
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EI'IPLOYMENT IN ABU DHABI Oil INDUSTRY BV NATIOMALITY, 1910 
U A E 
Nationality/ 0-1 Other Jap- 1n- Pakls· 
Company S Gulf Arab British anet.e dian tan I u s Others Toul 
------------------
AD11A 4o4 11 115 272 100 4 906 
ADPC 92 13 90 99 9 3 13 319 
Philips Petroleum 
Co 1 1 6 3 9 21 
l'llddle East 011 
Co 75 9 5 4 1 6 100 
Abu Dhabi Oil Co 
(Japan) 1 2 24 6 33 
Pan Ocean 0 II Co 1 1 
Total m R" m r, m m Ti rr i'TSO 
~ AI-S.trol wa AI·Sinah. 1971, p 115 
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UtPLOYMUIT IM QATAR OIL IMDUSTAY, 19]0 
~ NOII-QATAA1 .!2.!!.! 
Q.lltar Petroleum Co 876 328 120'-
She II QJitar (Qq)any 332 367 699 
Qatar 011 Coq)eny l 17 20 
National Oil Distribution Co 90 10 100 
Total nor m ;m 
Source QPC Departeaent of PetroleUfl Affal rt '0•1 lnd~.~~otry •n Qaur , p 23 
-- QOC Private COIIIIIUftiutlon 
Shell Qatar and IIDOC Estimation 
Al'PI:001X 2 7 3 
El'tPLOHEIT ,. KUWAIT OIL IIIDUSTRY I 1970 
!!!!!!.!.!. IIOif·KUWAIT I !2!!.!.. 
KOC 1283 2567 3850 
AOC' 101 658 759 
Alt1NQIL 180 613 793 
KIIPC 2}11 1515 17~5 
Total n;o ffi1 1m 
. One hal f of the unpawe r 
~ KDC Annu.l Rel!!:!rt 
Annual l~rt. 19'70 
1970 oPC .,nual Report. 1970 
AOC. """~l _ __§i'irt 19j0 
MINOIL 
N 
I..D 
"' 
APPENDIX l I 
BAHRAIN STATE OIL REVENUE BY SOURCE 1 1226tllt-12lg 
(~I 
BAPCO 
!.!!.!:. ~ Refining !£!!.!. Others* l2!!l 
19261)4 9 a 9 a 
19)5 568 568 56 8 
19)6 69 2 69 2 69 2 
19)7 )16 5 )16 5 )16 5 
19)8 )54 5 )54 5 354 5 
1939 3235 323 5 323 5 
191t0 355 2 355 2 355 2 
19111 296 6 296 6 2966 
1902 262 I 262 1 262 I 
19o3 271 1 271 I 271 1 
''"" 
278 8 278 8 278 8 
1945 302 6 302 6 302 6 
1946 liD 9 liD 9 liD 9 
1947 J!la I l!la I l!la I 
1948 o59 2 059 2 059 2 
1949 092 2 092 2 ¥.12 2 
195a 938 l 938 l 938 l 
1951 1)83 9 150 0 1533 9 1533 9 
1952 !1110 I 600 0 2010 I 2010 1 
1952153 1558 • 8058 2004 l >Oa4 l 
1953 .. 1555 a 188 5 17oJ • 1743 4 
1954 "aa 8 801 5 525a l 5250 l 
1955 3060 6 ;o,o 9 4255 5 o255 s 
1956 4092 8 759 7 5252 5 5252 5 
1957 o567 5 688 6 5256 I 5256 I 
1 958 5240 5 692 5 5933 a 5Hl a 
1959 6888 I 657 I 7505 2 7505 2 
1960 6912 9 755 5 7668 4 7668 • 
1961 7a26 l ;o,o 5 7816 8 7816 8 
1962 6947 2 1199 8 7947 a 7947 0 
1963 2737 5 830 6 8068 2 8068 2 
196o 80)1 8 712 2 8780 0 8780 a 
1965 8231 8 623 5 8855 2 8855 2 
1966 11159 2 617 5 11776 6 131" 0 ll090 6 
1967 10861 4 780 6 11602 0 18n a 13510 0 
1968 11460 1 698 5 12158 6 2173 a Iolli 6 
1969 1)765 I n12 10.92 l 2981 a 17473 a 
1970 13697 8 ;o,4 o 14491 8 2919 0 17 .. 10 0 
1935/7a 'i06o'iTI Tm"01 ~ 11259 a ~ 
!!2!.!! . From llrJ/53- 31/12/53 
. 90\ of wtuch represents the Abu Safah 011 f1eld revenue 
However checking these g•~o"en figures with the Bahrain share of 
product I on we found that the average was very much below the ~auctl 9Qver-
nment roce•pt per barrel even If the total sum Indicated ded come from 
ARA"'O These dl fferences ar11 shown overl11ef 
Estimated 
Bahrain 
Saud1 Arabia Government 
Recel pt Product ion Cents per recel pt cents Revenue 
Year 000 8a ooas 000 Barrel Barrel per b01rrel* ooa 80 
---
1966 1)10 2737 5885 o6 8] 2337 
1967 1872 39aa 7326 53 85 2959 
1968 2173 0527 11014 01 88 o6a5 
1969 2981 6210 11956 52 87 0959 
l"a 2919 6a81 I )661 .. 88 5705 
Total Tim m 
* See PPS Septentler 1971 pp 326-327 
General Notes 
For the period 1961-1970 there was a slq;Jht difference between the 
estimated Bahrain 5tate revenue figures end those of BAPCO's cash 
payments to the Government These de fference<> are shown below 
~ 
Year State 0 II Rev .. BAPCO Pal!!!;nt ~ 
1961 7817 7818 I 
1962* 8115 7947 
1963 8068 8051 + 17 
1964 8780 8706 + 38 
1965 8855 8509 +)06 
1966 11777 1ZOft8 ·271 
1967 1161t2 12153 -511 
1968 12159 11894 'f'265 
1969 14¥.12 ~~~05 • 87 
1970 10!192 1~)68 +1211 
9J 
* Budget esti1110tlon 
Government actual budget oil rewmue"' the estimated •I location to the 
Privy purse 
Bahrain s budget and fln.,clal statement used to ~~~entlon all the oil 
re¥enues received by the state until 1959 when the practice changed 
and the Privy purse's third was excllolded 
After ~ring BAPCO's actual peyllletlt w1th the oil revenue In a.hraln's 
bud911t we found the latter rapresented only a SUIII epproachlng tliiiO thl rds 
of the for~~~er, end nottllng IIHIS ~~Cntloned In the budget about the Abu 
Safah field oil revenue This practice continued untl1 the 197,. budget 
which shaft all the state oil revenue (BAPCO and Abu Safah) and at the 
s- shOwt an allocation of BD 6 mlll•on to the Ruler 
~ BAPCO, 'Bapco and Bahrain Governrrent of Bahrain Annual Report, 
1955 p 5, 1956-61 and 196]-66 (Statement of Revenue and 
Expenditure) Ministry of Flnant.e and National Economy 'Statement 
of Revenue and Expenditure , 19b6-70 Private Corm1Uf11catloo (Abu 
Safah) 
N 
1..0 
-......J 
!!!!. 
1935/45 
~ 
1947 
1948 
1949 
19SO 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959/60-
1960/61 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
196't65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
APPENDIX 3 2 
KUWAIT STATE 011. REVENUE BY SQURtE 1915flt§-19ZQIZ1* 
!!!!f. 
172 
~ 
530 
1250 
2600 )BoO 
6120 
19350 
59938 
69079 
100098 
103626 
109175 
125554 
154736 
147408 
161810 
164820 
181135 
195295 
212381 
217905 
257369 
227580 
265119 
281265 
(000 KD) ond Ml LLI 011 QDR 
~L 
1969 
156 
223 
223 
223 
223 
223 
400 
695 
986 
18 .. 1 
3651 
nos 
JJ48 
4245 
4940 
5217 
6010 
5186 
3839 
2870 
1926 
1801 
~ 
1072 
1430 
~L~ 
893 7000 
893 1000 
2935 1000 
2499 2000 
5695 
6935 
8584 
11734 
12537 
1JJ94 
14635 
!2.ill. 
172 
-n 
530 
3219 
2756 
4103 
6)113 
19573 
60161 
69302 
100498 
10lt321 
110161 
128467 
159817 
158606 
167051 
173000 
190574 
206207 
225326 
231675 
272942 
242988 
280440 
297702 
Total 
qoo OPR 
2288 
""WI" 
7049 
42813 
36655 
54570 
84362 
260321 
800100 
921717 
133662{ 
1387469 
1465141 
1708611 
2125566 
2109460 
2221778 
2)00900 
2534634 
2742553 
2996836 
3081277 
3630129 
3231740 
3729852 
3959437 
Total "3'0'b'B'27o 
1970171"' 230589 
535"0'0 
2857 
"ffi'"j6 "i""i"OOO 
8137 
J 3~16009 
241583 
42772920 
3213054 
Toul 3298859 5m7 9Tffi "i""i"OOO J 3457592 1i5ffi97li 
~ 
~ 
* Excludtng educattonal securtty and representattves' retnburse" 
ll'll!nts All payment appeared as taken tnto fiscal accounts 
15 months 
Income tax due for the ftscal years 1970/71 whtch was kept In 
a special account to be used In flnanctng the 1971/72 budget 
after the transfer of Its tnvestment proft t to the Reserve Fund 
Htntstry of ftnance and Petroleum, Kuwa• t dt rect contact, 
Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, Kuwatt 'AI-Kudhakarah AI-
Tafstryh Ltl Klzanyth 1972/73' ~ 1971/72 pp li-S 
~ 
~ 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Total 
1950/70 
~ 
APPENDIX 3 3 
QATAR STATE OIL REVENUE BY SOURCE. 1935"19]0 
(~) 
~ 
4075 
4762 
19048 
~ 
47619 3465 
85714 1000 
I 38095 1000 
161905 1000 
171429 1000 
214286 1000 
285714 1000 
252381 1000 
259200 1000 
257400 1000 
268900 1000 
326 752 1000 
294294 
311422 
312172 
323200 
323429 
32liOOD 
325000 
4706722 
11 .. 00 
18578 
121400 
16)200 
202500 
228000 
256200 
1015743 
goc (Japan) 
I 3347 
480 
11827 
~ 
1000 
3214 
3214 
3214 
3214 
13856 
lou\ QDR 
4075 
4762 
19048 
51084 
87714 
139095 
162905 
I 72429 
215286 
286714 
25JJ81 
260200 
258400 
269900 
327752 
308908 
333214 
436786 
489614 
525929 
563347 
581680 
5748148 
Shuqtr M and Ohab S ~ Vol 11, p 31 ~ 
PETROLEUM, Septentler 1962 Longrtgg S H , .2£...£..!.1 p 231 
Government of Qatar, Budget Estimate 1 7 ·1 75, Department 
of Petroleum Affat rs Qatar Dl rect contact 1960-70) 
Petroleum Information Foundation,~, PPS, Septentler 1972 
p 322 Government of Qatar, Qatar Into .. he Seventtes pp 87 4 88, 
Q.PC and QOC, 01 rect Contact 
APPEND I X 3 .. 
ABU OKABI STATE OIL REvttWI. BY SOURCE. 19J9!61·1979"' 
(~) 
~ 
1939/61 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967x. 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1962/70 
~ 
280 
20 
20 
1921 
9952 
37429 
36287 
47747 
55565 
69265 
258206 
~ 
100 
= 
938 
3048 
3919 
5831 
!1')62 
12Jl0 
25053 
35310 
41312 
I 37703 
!2!.!.! 
380 
958 
3068 
5840 
15783 
47391 
48617 
72800 
90875 
110577 
395909 
,.. These revenues exclude the non·produclng oil companies operating In 
Abu DhabI The est 1 mated payment of these co""an I es I nd 1 cated by 
the 1 r con cess 1 on terms are shown below (000 BO) 
!!!! 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Total 
!!:!..!..!:..!! 
1476 
48 
48 
52 
ffili 
AOOC 
24 
500 
952 
tm 
KIDDLE 
EAST CO 
821 
36 
1155 
2oT2 
~ 
1238 
T2j8" 
~ 
1500 
1369 
1036 
2445 
mo 
These payments were transferred to the ruler directly However since 
these payments are relattvely small and some of the operating Cofl'lpanles 
I'IIIY be exempted from pay • ng them as ...,s the case In Qatar In the same 
per 1 od we haw- exc I uded them from the state's tot a 1 o 1 I revenue 
x AOPC £20 513 ,S2 patd on llt October 1967 and £.7898o19 due on 13 January 
1968 AD/'ll. s pllymtmt equelled U S $2S892172 
Source Otablh, tl AJ~ Eattsadyat Abu Dhabi, pp 1)9 and 1,.4 Otablh K AI-
-- OPEC PP 55 and J1l; Al-Batrol wa Al-Sinah 1971 PPS Septentler 
T9'i"1 PP 326-327 
N 
\.!) 
co 
299 
SOURCE: APPENDICES ATTACHED TO CHAPTER IV (4. 1 - 4.3.6) 
Government of Bahrain, Annual Report(s), (Budgets and Statements of 
Revenue and Expenditure); 
Direct communication, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, 
(Statement of Revenue and Expenditure); 
Appendices 3.1 and 4.4. 
Estimation: The allocation to the Privy purse of the Ruler, 1960-
1970. This was estimated as The State Oil Revenue minus The 
Government Oil Revenues. 
Notes: 1. In the years before 1955 the government fiscal accounts were 
produced according to the Hijry years. The 1367 Hijry corres-
ponded to 1947/48. 
2. The years 1947-1953 should be read as 1947/48 ... to 1953/54. 
3. 1953 represents 16 months. 
4. Where the word •other• appears in the appendices it means 
'Administration and Others•. 
0: Nil or not available. 
. , . 
. ., 
. " I~ t• 
111 
11t •• 
,., 1140 ~ 
-.}.,, 
._HI 
.. ,,t> 
,,u 
?'\ ..... 
71'JhO 
hll 
'""'1 "·~ .. 
lth<t 
,,. ... 
I J '"l 
tHl• 
.... J~ 
1hH 
lhll 
411ft,. I 
4t '• Ju 
\\,lu 
• I elf I 
•z.c:., 
6flo, ,,, 
1Q1 l11 
u, .. fl 
12,41111 
.,.,,,, 
''··' n,z,
1\,uv 
'q· \(1 
'"·•(I fl, .llt 
u,,, 
?1,'1u 
11, 5u 
., ..... ~.~ 
Pll,tto 
e),tu 
U,lJ 
U!!sS1l2n 
" 1 I) 
Ill 
1•• 
'I' I•• 
.. I 
"" .. '
'" fll
'" .. 
111 
., .. J 
lfr·l• 
ll'lal:l 
l\.!1 
I II 
IT 
. "' 
,._,,. 
.... ,, 
l• ... 
I 
II 
I' ,, 
.. 
I ,, 
" 
" ,, 
,. 
•• 
I' 
II 
,. 
. ,
" 
" 
'" ,. 
... 
,, 
.. 
Ill 
1 .. 
11• 
'" ... 
... 
._, 
•I' , .. 
'" tl•ll 
11'« 
I 'I 
' .. "'. 
I ~ .. ' 
Ill 
, . 
" 
,• 
,, 
" tt• ,., 
po 
Po 
It' 
I" 
Ito 
'" , ..
'" 
APP!IDII It, I 
!!I nan P\lll~t aaw.•uu BY souact '"'Z!"·''za 
(!!LJ!!!) 
'• , 
'• )! 
'' 
S~IY TABU 
I' ,, 
I' 
' ,. 
I• 
I 
" I\ ,, 
., . 
,,. 
41• 
". ..
H!H 
I I' 
1 • r 11. Iii lvE' Ul 
~ rJAt 'iH'V!rr~ 
I ho A ~o,.,,-, 
"V·I If t TIt lllr-s 
TWI\ 1~1" I<T \ (tj 
6(11 !fUL Tpg £ 
1 • IIUl I -..c f &.,It Y 
~ 6 n P1.,.11(t-ASF 
rAPITAt ITF"'S 
1 "l .. FR"\ 
11 t"Q•,,n Tr "',u 
J,I;Cl 
··" 
'·"' ),411 
' " '· ~,., 
l,ll 
'• (I 
•.1• 
1,!:111 
'•' 1,7• 
'•B•• 
t,}l 
1,}1 
•.1• 
.... 
t,l, 
l.t• 
z. ]11 
'·' ,,,., 
'·'' 
APPDIDil It 2.1 
1 or 
l,J' 
" 
'I' 
•' 
) " 
·" 
( 0 
' J) 
... 
..-,I( 
., 
'I' 
'•'-' 
IOCIM. H!ttCI!z CUf!!IIIT liPPDIT\JM 19411"·1970 
liDU!I 
f 
II 
I' 
I' 
" l' 
I' 
I 
'. 
l' ,, 
,. 
" 
" 
11 
l. 
Aural Affal" 
., 
,, 
" ..
'" 
) ' 
l Ill 
'•' 
•• 11 
"• 
I I 
I 
'' 
. " 
'·J' 
) ' 
i1 lJ 
"' 
llt<; 
12 .. t: 
,,._, 
'' 
) '• 
' .. 
11'11 
,,, 
l,LJ .. c; 
"' 
<l I 
.,,_ >!" 
42 l 1 
}7 II 
1'i 2 I 
n.t 
21 ll 
l5 "'" 21 • ..,) 
'4 
.'1 ~ 
? I 0:: I 
?l 11 
'" 7 H 11 
l<i er 
),., 11 
' J• 
11 ' 
" ' 11 4! 
16 ':1 
I' 
.lGl. 7 
1 ""' ~ l ... 4q 
I <• 
l\,-"l 
l'':l) 
l ~" 1 
1 ... "'" 
}QO::<;, 
.tq&'} 
•••lG!ifl 
.!<,&<; 
}C.I-! 
) ,, 
ol '-6, 
}-,(1 
1<..>4 
ol'H:C. 
1 <, ~ ,. 
1 ...... 1 
I""'" 
l 
' ' 
'I 
'" ld 
" 
., ' 
'-
l,.>r 
'-ltl 
l I • 
1 )117 
l 1}7 
lllH 
114( 
•"'"<;. 
lli1"'2 
>lll1. 
71741 
t J 7~4 
It 
,,, 
~1 l 
1 J (I 
'" I '' ll ) 1 
l) 
I'> 
lf' II 
'" I'' 
I'' 
1 ' 
I I 
,,, 
l J 
l) 
ll• 
1.,, I 
I ' 
l ' 
1,1 0 I 
111 I 
300 
301 
APPENDIX Ill 2 2 
LAW & ORDER SERVICES CURRENT EXPENOITUR(. 1•~71~8-"ZD 
(.Q.Q2.....'l£) 
Pl.bllc Protection ~ PaB~ Land Registration 
11 1• 
120 1' 
117 
" IB I c 
148 ;• 
lt ~ 
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1' 
254 .. ,, 
284 
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PUBLIC UTILITIES SERVICES CURRENT EXPENDITURE 1911]Jl!8-1970 
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AllOCATIONS TO TH£ R!A.ING FAMILY '2~Z£'B·I2ZO 
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APPENDIX 4 4 
BAHRAIN GOVERNMENT BUDGETS' PUBLIC REVENUE BY SOURCE 1935-1970a 
(000 BD) 
Year* Customs Interest Other Rev Total 01 1 Rev Grand Total 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
19 1·0 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1935/47 
1947/48 
1948/49 
1949/50 
1950/51 
1951/52 
1952/53¢ 
1954 
1955 
1935/55m 
1956 
1957 
1958 
19 35/58 
1959e 
1960 de 
1961e 
1962e 
1963e 
1964e 
1965e 
1966e 
1967e 
1968e 
1969e 
1970e 
1935/70 
Notes 
69 
87 
106 
100 
103 
87 
78 
88 
140 
204 
245 
273 
352 
1932 
459 
590 
604 
816 
973 
1389 
1065 
1222 
9050 
1289 
1380 
1274 
12993 
1442 
1584 
1684 
1500f 
1900 
2085 
2115 
2269 
2431 
2593 
2818 
3184 
38598 
3 
10 
16 
22 
40 
30 
27 
28 
53 
30 
50 
3i6 
45 
62 
57 
66 
90 
148 
192 
234 
1210 
293 
335 
351 
2189 
406 
433 
8 
8 
8 
10 
15 
26 
28 
18 
33 
39 
39 
53 
75 
360 
69 
75 
100 
105 
133 
204 
163 
648c 
T8s7 
4016 
267 
280 
2805 
367 
365 
327 
590f 
350 
342 
450 
1232 
2207 
3307h 
2550J 
5491k 
20383 
a- Excludtng revenues of publiC bodtes 
77 
95 
117 
120 
134 
135 
145 
136 
200 
271 
339 
356 
477 
26o8 
573 
727 
761 
987 
1196 
1741 
1420 
2104 
12117 
1983 
1982 
1905 
T7§B7 
2215 
2382 
2011 
2090 
2250 
2427 
2565 
3501 
4638 
5900 
5368 
8675 
62009 
57 
69 
316 
354 
323 
355 
297 
262 
2]1 
279 
300 
311 
___m_ 
3590 
459 
492 
938 
1534 
2010 
4148 
5250 
4255 
2ID6 
5252 
5256 
5933 
39117 
5030 
5287 
5211 
5410 
5379 
5856 
5903 
7851 
7761 
80]1 
9661 
9612 
120149 
134 
164 
434 
474 
457 
490 
443 
399 
471 
550 
639 
667 /M 
1032 
1219 
1699 
2521 
3206 
5889 
6670 
6359 
34793 
7235 
7238 
7838 
57iOll 
7245 
7669 
7222 
7500 
7629 
8283 
8468 
11352 
12399 
13971 
15029 
18287 
182158 
b - lncludtng Hts H1ghness the Ruler's grant of BD 200 thousand 
c - Includes H1s Htghness's grant to publ 1c protect ton (BD 50 thousand) 
and a drawtng from the reserve fund (Annual Report, 1955, p 90) 
d - Thts ts the last year tn whtch the Bahratn Budget tncluded the 
reserve fund tnterest 
e- 011 revenue exclud1ng the allocatton to the prtvy purse 
f - Budget esttmatton 
h- Includes BD 2 mtll ton transferred from the reserve fund to meet the 
budget deftctt 
J - Includes BD 1 1 mtll ton transferred from the reserve fund to meet the 
budget def 1 c 1 t 
k- Includes BD 3 8 m1llton transferred from the reserve fund to meet the 
budget def 1 c 1 t. 
m- Annual Report, 1955, p 5 
*- Unttl 1952 the Bahratn Government Budget was assessed accordtng to 
H 1 J ry ca 1 end a r 
¢ - 16 month 
Source Government of Bahratn, Annual Report, 1955, p 5, 1956-61 and 1963-65, 
Htntstry of Ftnance and National Economy, Bahratn, Dtrect Communtcat 1on 
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SOURCE: APPENDICES ATTACHED TO CHAPTER V (5. 1-5.3.6) 
1957-1970/71: Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, Kuwait, 1Al-H1sab 
Al-Khltamy Lil Mizanih Al-Aamah 1 ; 
1952-1956: Royal lnst•tute of International Affairs, op.cit., 
p.125 (2nd ed. 1954); 
U.N., Economic Development in the Middle East, 1958-
Other Sources, concerned individual departments. 
Land Purchase:~' 1967, p. 139, 
Social Affairs:Soc1al Affa1rs Dept., Annual Report, 1955, p.69 and 
Education 
Department: 
Estimation : 
Notes: 
Education Department, Annual Report, 1956/57, p.1. 
For the years 1952-1956, a few departmental items of 
expenditure were estimated at a fixed rate of growth. 
0: Ni 1 or Not Available. 
1959: 15 months. 
-All the years 1959-1970: should be read as 1959/60-
1970/71; 
- For some departments items of expenditure in the years 
1957-1959 Include both capital and current expenditure. 
- Others: where the word 'others• appears it means 
'Administration and Others•. 
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POST TEL • TELEGRAPH SERVICES/CU~~ENT EXPENDITURE 1952-1970/71 
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APPENDIX 5.4 
KUWAIT GOVERNMENT ASSETS: AMOUNT & COMPOSITION (RESERVE ACCOUNT) 1965-1971 
(000 KD) 
Investment 31/3/65 31/3/66 31/3/67 31/3/68 31/3/69 31/3/70 
Govt. Establ 1shments 70,551 90' 134 105,237 105,237 108,912 113,912 
International II 6,961 7,950 8,268 8, 734 8,872 9,372 
K.I.B. Reserve 138,208 116,989 76,090 62,986 37,872 41 '789 
First National City Bank, 
New York 45 '777 44,611 37' 135 42,333 38,409 52,444 
Foreign Stock 6,933 8,063 5,394 7,718 18,527 20,322 
Foreign Shares 7,854 80 '180 8' 199 8' 100 11 '491 14,230 
Local Companies Shares 15,963 26,684 33' 177 33' 177 40,395 41,045 
Depos1t & Loans (Local) 27,068 40,235 56,796 58,024 65,574 78,095 
Loans (to Govts.) 100,874 124,314 129,816 125 '770 122,620 119 '369 
Loans (Externa 1) 3,454 1 '0 1 3 512 512 512 512 
Deposit (External) 35,883 61 '329 65,067 47,526 45,057 43,127 
Real Estate - 1 '786 1 '839 2,525 6' 191 6,750 
Other Outstanding Aces. 777 774 774 774 1 '715 774 
Total Reserve Fund 460,302 531 ,900 528,305 503,416 506,249 541 '742 
Independent Current Ace. N.A. N.A. N.A. 171 '509 209,354 221,017 
·k Gross Profit - - 25' 172 28,072 24 '146 39 '792 
-Administration Exp. - - - 74 84 8,660 
-Others - - - 28,958x 
Net Profit 25' 172 - 960 24,063 31 ' 1 32 
-;,', Includes interest from 1 The Independent Account 1 , London. 
X Loss resulted from the sterling devaluation in 1967. 
K. I .B. Kuwait Investment Board. 
31/3/71 
120,162 
12,769 
36,045 
62,897 
29,364 
23,880 
45,048 
91 '066 
114,868 
39,578 
6,991 
774 
583,441 
245,996 
34' 179 
2,358 
31 '821 
Source: M1nistry of Finance and Petroleum, Kuwait, 1 Al-Hisab Al-Khitamy Li 1 Mizanih Al-Aamah 1 , 1964/65-1970/71. 
w 
.l:" 
315 
SOURCE: APPENDICES ATTACHED TO CHAPTER VI (6.1 - 6.3.5) 
1373: Cummins, J.W., 'Report on the Accounting Establishment 
and Organisation of the Government of Qatar', p.3. 
1374-75: Government of Qatar, 'Budget Estimates, 1375, State 
Budget' . 
1386-1390: Ministry of Finance, Qatar, 'Closed Accounts of the 
Budget', Direct communication. 
Notes: 1. 
2. 
3. 
The Hijry years 1373 correspond to 1953 and 1390 to 1970. 
0: Ni 1 or Not Available. 
Others: where the word 'others' appeares it means 
'Administration and Others'. 
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Year 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Education 
2 '185 
6,436 
13,420 
16 '390 
25,881 
27,790 
26,354 
26 '059 
27,798 
32,536 
APPENDIX 6.4 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE OF SOME DEPARTMENTS OF QATAR GOVERNMENT 1956-1965 
(000 QDR) 
·'· Electricity Social Affairs Health Ports Water Dept. ' 
10,760 
3,405 
8,892 
8 '511 
19,554 
27,259 
29,941 
23,540 
11 '142 
13,061 
116 
147 
1 '0 16 
1 '870 
3,489 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
16,712 
15,785 
15,850 
13,385 
16,451 
N .A. 
N.A, 
N.A. 
N ,A. 
N .A. 
N .A. 
N.A. 
N .A. 
4,340 
13,550 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N .A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
5,400 
3,400 
3,800 
1 ,600 
* Capital Expenditure. ~*Operating Expenditure. 
-~-'-
Water Dept. ' 
N .A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
N.A. 
13,300 
8,800 
10,500 
13,100 
12,600 
Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Report(s), Electricity Dept., Qatar, Direct Contact; Social Affairs, 
Qatar, Annual Report, 1964, p.19; Guani, F., op.cit., p.99; MEDD, 'Economic Survey of Qatar', pp.114, 
120 and 121. 
w 
\.!) 
SOURCE: APPENDICES ATTACHED TO CHAPTER VII (7.1- 7.3.5) 
U.A.E.: ABU DHABI 
Ministry of F1nance, Abu Dhabi, Direct communication (closed 
accounts of the Budget, SBA, 1969, p.59. 
Notes: 0: N1l or Not Available. 
Others: Administration and others. 
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